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Foreword
HE subject of perpetuities is peculiarly appropriate
for monographic treatment. Replete with intricate knots, which only history and precise logic can
untangle, it presents to the general practitioner a quagmire of uncertainty, and causes him to seek the aid of
the specialist. Yet from the standpoint of a writer, this
subject requires the examination of a sufficiently limited
body of source material to make the preparation of a
treatise definitely less than a lifetime undertaking. Thus
legal writers early chose this theme. Lewis on Perpetuities, the first English treatise, appeared in 1843, when the
rule itself had hardly crystallized in all its aspects. Marsden's book on the same subject came out forty years later.
The classic treatises on this side of the Atlantic, both
on restraints on alienation and the rule against perpetuities, are those of John Chipman Gray. His Restraints on
Alienation, the first edition of which appeared in 1884,
was primarily an argument against the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Nichols v. Eaton which approved the spendthrift trust.
But the high quality of its scholarship fixed its character
in the legal profession as a treatise rather than a brief.
Gray's treatise on the rule against perpetuities, the first
edition of which appeared in 1886, is known to every
lawyer worthy of the name. Written in part to eliminate
the confusion between rules as to restraints on alienation
and the rule against perpetuities, the book so thoroughly
taught its lesson that it has ceased to be regarded as a
demonstration of the remoteness-of-vesting theory, and
has become almost the embodiment of the rule itself.
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The fourth and last edition of Gray's treatise was
edited by his son, Mr. Roland Gray, and appeared in
1942. But monographic treatment of the American rule
did not stop here. Thus, 588 pages of volume VI of the
American Law of Property, published in 1952, are devoted to three excellent monographs: one by Professor
W. Barton Leach and Mr. Owen Tudor on the commonlaw rule against perpetuities, one by Professor Horace
Whiteside on statutory rules against perpetuities, and
one by Professor Merrill Schnebly on restraints on alienation.
The question may then be asked: Why another monograph on Perpetuities and Other Restraints? The answer
is not far to seek. Even a superficial examination of the
treatises on the American law of these subjects is sufficient
to demonstrate that no one treatise can deal exhaustively
with the law of each state. Thus the treatises of Leach
and Tudor and of' Schnebly make no attempt to deal
separately with the law of Michigan. And Whiteside's
treatise disposes of the Michigan statutory law of perpetuities in about twenty-three pages. Yet Professor
Fratcher finds it necessary to devote four chapters and
135 pages of his monograph to the Michigan statutory
rules.
Indeed, in view of our constantly growing body of cases
and statute law, it is believed that an increasingly fruitful
type of legal research is that which concentrates on the
law of a single jurisdiction. Not only does it provide a
more precise statement of legal doctrines of one state than
can be derived from more general treatises, but it also
furnishes a unique basis for generalizations as to rules
which are applicable in all jurisdictions. After all, general statements about the American common law, when
in one sense there are in fact some forty-eight or more
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American common-law systems, are not uniformly
helpful.
Professor Fratcher has brought to bear on the preparation of his monograph the qualities needed to make it
something more than a treatise on one facet of Michigan
law. That he has made a thorough and exhaustive examination of all pertinent cases and statutes is evident.
But he is also the legal historian. Major aspects of his
subject are introduced with a delineation of the background of English and American legal history. If the
English law of restraints on alienation prior to Magna
Carta is necessary to an understanding of modern Michigan law, it is discussed. If the New York legislation of
1828 on perpetuities furnishes a background for the
Michigan statutes of 1846, then a brief treatment of the
New York legislation is included. Moreover, before entering upon a specialized discussion of a major area of
Michigan common law, Professor Fratcher follows the
general plan of summarizing the pertinent English common law.
That the Michigan lawyer, vexed with a problem in
the law of perpetuities and restraints, will find the last
word on it in this treatise, goes without saying. But the
book also has significance outside Michigan. Just as a
careful scholarly study by a psychologist of the conduct
of twenty-five white mice in a maze may be significant
as to the reactions of all white mice and even as to human
beings, so a study of perpetuities and other restraints
based upon Michigan source material will have significance wherever Anglo-American law is known and practiced.
LEWIS

Ann Arbor, Michigan

M.

SIMES

Preface
al fetter thee with brazen bonds that none can loose."

-Aeschylus) Prometheus Bound
HE central theme of this study comprises the judicial and legislative rules developed to restrict
attempts by men of property to endow their families in perpetuity, usually with land, in such manner
that each successive living generation can neither part
with the property nor prevent unborn generations from
succeeding to it. Part One deals with attempts to accomplish this object by bestowing the whole title on each
living generation but denying each such generation the
power to dispose of the property or to prevent its· descent
to the next generation. In this part the principal restrictive rules are judicial, the common-law rules against
restraints on alienation. Part Two deals with attempts
to accomplish the same object by splitting the title into
present and future estates; bestowing only an estate for
life on the currently living generation and conveying
future estates directly to unborn generations, so that the
currently living generation cannot cut them off. In this
part the principal restrictive rules are likewise judicial,
the common law Rule Against Perpetuities and the
common-law Rule Against Accumulations. Part Two
also deals with a partial statutory substitute for the common-law Rule Against Accumulations which was in
force in Michigan from 1847 to 1952. Part Three deals
with a group of Michigan statutes, applicable to dispositions of land made between 1847 and 1949, which partially superseded the common-law Rule Against Per-
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petuities and supplemented, but did not supersede, the
common-law rules against restraints on alienation.
In earlier centuries the motivation for attempts to
create perpetual family endowments of land arose primarily from the concept, made vivid by the philosophic
realism of mediaeval schoolmen, of the agnatic family as
a perpetual series of generations, an entity vastly more
important than any single generation and deserving of
the loyalty and devotion of each succeeding generation.
When such ideas were generally accepted, the perpetual
endowment of one's family with land, the chief source
of prestige and social position, must have seemed as
morally worthy and compellingly attractive as patriotic
loyalty and the perpetual endowment of public, religious, and charitable organizations now seem to us. This
concept has not been prominent in America, but other
motives for the creation of indestructible family endowments exist. The desire to protect the immediate succeeding generation and its progeny against want and
suffering caused by mismanagement or business reverses
is one. Perpetuities created by means of future interests
are commonly designed to avoid or minimize inheritance
taxes by having unborn generations take by purchase
instead of by descent.
Although the study centers upon the rules developed
to restrict attempts to create perpetual family endowments of land, its scope is by no means limited to such
attempts. The rules developed for this purpose are not
limited in their operation to family settlements of land.
Some of them apply to dispositions of personalty and to
transactions which are primarily commercial in nature.
Indeed, the application of rules designed to govern
family settlements to very different sorts of transactions
occasions much of the difficulty found in the cases, and
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the fact that some of these rules invalidate seemingly
inoffensive commercial transactions may make this study
as valuable to practitioners who do not handle family
settlement problems as to those who do.
The law of Michigan in the fields covered by this study
was enormously complicated by the adoption in 1846 of
some, but not all, of a New York statutory code which
was designed to replace the entire common law of perpetuities, accumulations, trusts, and powers. The fact
that some of this code was not adopted left questionable
gaps in the law. The situation has been further complicated by the gradual piecemeal repeal, beginning in
1907, of sections of the partial code adopted in 1846.
Because portions of that code are still in force, the law
of Michigan is unique, different from both that of New
York and that of states which follow the common law.
Hence the general treatises which cover these fields are
not fully satisfactory guides to the law of Michigan. If
this book helps Michigan judges and lawyers to thread
the complex maze of statutes and decisions in the fields
covered, it will have served its purpose.
In an effort to prevent, so far as human fallibility permits, overlooking pertinent local precedents, I have, in
addition to consulting the usual digests and secondary
authorities, read the head notes of all published decisions
of the Supreme Court and Court of Chancery of the
Territory and State of Michigan to July 6, 1954, and read
the opinions in all those cases which, from the head
notes, appeared to have any possible bearing on the
problems under study.
This study was begun (1940-41) when I was practicing
with the Detroit firm of Lewis and Watkins. Messrs.
Lewis and Watkins, especially Mr. James K. Watkins,
were helpful in making available the time necessary for
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the initial stages of the work. It was completed (195054) while I was a member of the University of Missouri
Faculty of Law. Dean Glenn A. McCleary of that Faculty has given much friendly encouragement to the
progress of the undertaking. Mr. Percy A. Hogan, Law
Librarian of the University of Missouri, procured needed
books. The initial and part of the final stages of the
work were financed by the University of Michigan Law
School. The original outline was prepared with the
guidance of Professors Lewis M. Simes and Ralph W.
Aigler of the University of Michigan Law Faculty and
Professor (later Dean) Oliver S. Rundell of the University of Wisconsin Law School. The manuscript of
Part One, which was accepted by the University of Michigan as a thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law, was read
by Professors Simes and Aigler and by their colleague,
Professor Allan F. Smith. Portions of Part One were
published originally in the University of Detroit Law
.Journal and the Michigan Law Review and are reprinted by permission. My wife typed the original outline and a large part of the manuscript and supplied
much of the inspiration for the project.
To Professor Lewis M. Simes, Floyd Russell Mechem
University Professor of Law and Director of Legal Research in the University of Michigan, I am deeply indebted for helpful guidance and advice throughout the
progress of the study. He read every chapter as it was
completed, often while still in longhand, and made suggestions of great value at all stages of the work.
WILLIAM F. FRATCHER

New York University
October 4, 1954

Table of Contents
PAGE
FOREWORD BY LEWIS M. SIMES

PREFACE

PART ONE.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Vll

Xl

RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION

Chapter 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

A. Alienability in the Absence of Restraints . .

1

B. Scope of Part One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

C. Michigan's Reception of English Law . . . . .

9

Chapter 2. Entails . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

A. The English Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

B. The Michigan Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

Chapter 3. Present Legal Estates in Fee Simple.

37

A. The English Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

B. Restraints on Alienation by Deed . . . . . . . .

46

C. Restraints on Testation and Descent . . . . . .

65

D. Restraints on Partition and Division . . . . .

75

E. Illusory Restraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

Chapter 4. Present Legal Estates For Life . . . . .

91

Chapter 3. Present Legal Estates For Years . . . . Ill
Chapter 6. Expectant Legal Interests in Land .. 138
XV

xvi

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

Chapter 7. Legal Interests in Chattels Personal. 155
A. The Differences Between Land and Chattels 155
B. Donative and Testamentary Transactions. . 163
C. Commercial Transactions ............... 169
Chapter 8. Equitable Interests and Interests Subject Thereto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
A. The Origin of Equitable Estates . . . . . . . . . . 198
B. Trusts in the Absence of Statute . . . . . . . . . . 202
C. Michigan Statutory Changes in the Law of
Trusts ............................. 210
D. Permissible Duration of Trusts of Land ... 216
E. Statutory Inalienability of Interests Under
Trusts of Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
F. Spendthrift Trusts of Personalty ......... 229
G. Charitable Trusts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
H. Mortgages and Executory Land Contracts 240
PART TWO. THE COMMON-LAW RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

Chapter 9. Source, Nature and Local Reception. 259
A. The English Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

B. Michigan's Reception of the Rule ........ 270
Chapter 10. The Period of the Rule .......... 280
A. Commencement of the Period; DestructIbility ............................. 280
B. Computation of the Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xvii
PAGE

Chapter 11. The Requirement of Certainty of
Vesting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
A. Certainty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
B. The Concept of Vesting in English Law. . . 311

C. Vesting Under Michigan Law ........... 323
( 1) Contingency as to Person or Event. . 333
(2) What Language Creates Contingency 343
Chapter 12. Glass Gifts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 358
Chapter 13. Powers of Appointment ......... 370
A. Interests Limited in Default of Appointment .............................. 370
B. Powers of Appointment Themselves ...... 372
C. Interests Appointed Under Powers ....... 376
Chapter 14. Interests to Which the Rule Applies 387
A. Interests of a Transferor ................ 388
B. Contracts, Options and Mortgages . . . . . . . . 397
Chapter 15. Trusts and Charities ............ 409
A. Remoteness of Vesting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
B. Duration; Restraints on Termination .... 421

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Charitable Trusts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Honorary Trusts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Trusts for Unincorporated Societies.
Indestructible Trusts for Private
Persons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

422
423
425
426

xviii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

Chapter 16. Accumulations

432

A. The Common-Law Rule Against Accumulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
B. The Michigan Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
Chapter 17. Consequences of Violation of the
Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448
A. Excision of the Limitation Which Violates
the Rule ........................... 448
B. Effect on Prior Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 454
C. Effect on Alternative and Concurrent Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 461
D. Effect on Subsequent Limitations ........ 468

PART THREE. THE TWO LIVES STATUTES

Chapter 18. The Statutory Scheme

477

A. The Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 77
B. Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation ............................... 485
C. Scope and Arrangement of Part Three . .
Chapter 19. The Restrictions on Life Estates

490
493

Chapter 20. What Suspends the Absolute Power
Alienation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504
A. Indestructible Future Interests . . . . . . . . . . 504

TABLE OF CONTENTS

XIX

PAGE

B. Powers

516

(1) Powers Which Cause Suspension
516
(2) Interests Created by Execution of
Powers ...................... 528
(3) Powers Which Prevent Suspension;
Destructibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 532
C. Indestructible Trusts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 549
(1) Trusts for Receipt of the Rents and
Profits of Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550
(2) Trusts for Payment of a Sum in
Gross; Annuities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555
Chapter 21. The Statutory Period ............ 570
A. Commencement of the Period ...........
B. The Requirement of Certainty ..........
C. Two Lives in Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(1) What is a Life in Being? ..........
(2) Ascertainment of the Measuring
Lives ........................
(3) Life of the Survivor of a Group . . . .
(4) Separability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

571
572
576
576
581
582
602

D. The Restricted Minority Provision ...... 604
E. Periods in Gross . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 608
TABLE OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CITATIONS

613

TABLE OF RESTATEMENT CITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

626

TABLE OF PERIODICAL CITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

630

TABLE OF CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

633

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

683

PART ONE
RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION

CHAPTER

1

Introduction
A. ALIENABILITY IN THE ABSENCE OF RESTRAINTS

URING the century and a half which followed
the Norman Conquest, the owner of land who
attempted to transfer it might meet with opposition from three interested parties: his feudal overlord,
his heir apparent, and his tenant. His feudal overlord
might object to a transfer by way of substitution, that is,
one under the tenris of which the transferor did not
retain a reversion, because the proposed transferee was
not a suitable person to perform the feudal services due
for the land. As these services were frequently of a personal or military nature, such an objection was not necessarily captious. His overlord might object with equal
reason to a transfer by way of subinfeudation, that is,
one under the terms of which the transferor did retain
a reversion. Although in this case the transferor would
remain personally responsible for the feudal services due
to the overlord, the value of some of the feudal incidents
of lordship might be seriously reduced. For example,
if the owner died such, the overlord, by virtue of the
feudal incident of wardship, would be entitled to possession of the land during the minority of the heir;
whereas if the owner had transferred the land by way
of subinfeudation, reserving only nominal services, such
as a rose a year at midsummer, the overlord would be
entitled only to those nominal services from the trans-
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feree during the minority of the transferor's heir. The
reason why an heir apparent might object to the alienation of his anticipated inheritance requires no elucidation. The tenant might have cogent reasons for opposing a transfer which would require him to render
homage, fealty, and personal or military service to a
stranger.
The extent to which the objections of the overlord,
the heir, and the tenant constituted legal impediments
to inter vivos alienation prior to the year 1200 is not
now known and probably was far from clear at the
time.1 Early in the thirteenth century it was settled by
judicial decision that neither the heir apparent nor the
tenant could effectively prevent a transfer by the owner.
If an owner in fee simple absolute transferred the land
in his lifetime without the consent of his heir apparent,
the heir could not get it back after his ancestor's death. 2
Although the acquiescence (attornment) of the tenant
was necessary to the complete effectiveness of a transfer
of land, that acquiescence could be compelled. 3 The
objection of the overlord was not so quickly overruled.
The 1217 edition of Magna Carta expressly recognized
the right of an overlord to object to alienation in some
1 1 Pollock and Maitland, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw BEFORE THE TIME
OF EDWARD l, 310-330 (1895); 2 id. 93, 127-128, 250-253, 306-311; 3
Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 73-87 (1923). This
doubtful state of the law is not surprising in view of the then relatively
recent imposition of a system of feudal tenures upon the earlier AngloSaxon land law, which had included a variety of tenures and of local
customs not fully understood by the Normans. Scrutton, LAND IN
FETTERS 1-36 (1886).
2 FitzRoger v. Arundel, Bract. N.B. pl. 1054 (1225).
3 Pesehale v. Fitz Aucher, Bract. N.B. pl. 533 (1231 ); Cambridge v.
Risle, R.S.Y.B. 34-35 Edw. I, 314 (1306). The requirement of attornment was abolished by Stat. 4 Ann. c. 16, §9 (1705). It never existed
in Michigan. Perrin v. Lepper, 34 Mich. 292 (1876).
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cases. 4 Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that by
1284 the courts recognized the power of an owner of
land to transfer it without the consent of his overlord. 5
However that may be, the question was settled by the
enactment in 1290 of the Statute of Westminster III,
commonly known as Quia Emptores Terrarum. 6 This
statute forbade further transfers by way of subinfeudation and provided,
"That from henceforth it shall be lawful to every
freeman to sell at his own pleasure his lands and tenements, or part of them, . . . This statute extendeth but
only to lands holden in fee simple." 7
Although it may have been possible to transmit land
4 "No freeman from henceforth shall give or sell any more of his
land, but so that of the residue of his lands the lord of the fee may
have the service due to him, which belongeth to the fee." C. 39, Barrington, MAGNA CHARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF ENGLAND, 2d
ed., 279 (1900). This provision was repeated in 9 Hen. III, stat. 1, c.
32 (1225), 2 Coke, INSTITUTES 65. The "Grand Chartre des Franchises"
of Henry III was confirmed by 25 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1297), 28 Edw.
I, stat. 3, c. 1 (1300), and 42 Edw. III, c. 1 (1368) but without specific
mention of chapter 32. It would seem that these confirmations of
Magna Carta did not revive chapters which had been repealed or modified by later statutes. Jenk. 2, 145 Eng. Rep. 2 (1771).
5 Plucknett, LEGISLATION oF EDWARD I, 104 (1949). The Statute of
Wales, 12 Edw. I, c. 10 (1284), 1 Stat. of the Realm 55, 66 (1810) prohibited specific enforcement of covenants against alienation. This statute was a codification of the existing English common law made for
the purpose of extending it to \Vales and, although not applicable to
England, is evidence of the current state of the common law.
s 18 Edw. I, stat. 1 (1290).
7 Id., caps. 1, 3; 2 Coke, INSTITUTES 500, 504. Sir Edward Coke states
that the word "sell" (vendere) includes "give." Id., 501. The statute
was not construed to permit alienation by tenants in chief of the
Crown without royal license [3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw,
3d ed., 81, 83-84 (1923)] but this exception was narrowed by statutes
providing that lands once held under a subordinate overlord should
not be treated as being held in chief of the Crown by reason of the
king's acquiring the overlord's estate by escheat, attainder, dissolution,
or surrender. 9 Hen. III, stat. 1, c. 31 (1225); 1 Edw. III, stat. 2, c. 13
(1327); 1 Edw. VI, c. 4 (1547). Moreover, a transfer by a tenant in
chief without royal license was not void but merely entitled the king
to a reasonable fine. 17 Edw. II, stat. 1, c. 7 (1324); 1 Edw. III, stat.
2, c. 12 (1327). Such fines for alienation of land held of the Crown in
chief were abolished by stat. 12 Car. II, c. 24, §1 (1660).
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by will in the Anglo-Saxon and early Norman periods,
it became settled in the twelfth century that a devise of
a legal freehold estate in land was ineffective as against
the heir of the testator. 8 Early in the thirteenth century
the device of conveying legal title to others to hold to
the use of the transferor or those whom he might name
was developed. 9 The rights of the beneficiary of a conveyance to uses, who was known as a cestui que use,
were not initially enforcible in any tribunal, and the
common-law courts never did enforce them, but from
the end of the fourteenth century they were enforcible
in equity. 10 Such rights were conceived of as being more
in the nature of a chose in action than a property interest, and choses in action were not assignable.u Nevertheless, the interest of the cestui que use was always alienable inter vivos, and a statute of 1483 empowered him
to convey the legal title without the consent of the legal
owner. 12 The interest of the cestui que use was transmissible by will, and one of the chief purposes of the
use device was to avoid the rule that legal freehold
estates in land could not be devised. 13 This possibility
8 2 Pollock and Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE
TIME OF EDWARD I, 312-328 (1895). There were exceptions to this
rule as to land in towns. I d., 330.
9 Quency v. Prior of Barnwell, Bract. N.B. pl. 999 (1224).
10 Godwyn v. Profyt, Sel. Cases in Chancery (S.S.) 48 (1396-1399);
Ames, "Origin of Uses and Trusts," 21 HARV. L. REv. 261 at 262, 274
(1908); Brown, "Ecclesiastical Origin of the Use," 10 NoTRE DAME
LAWYER 353 at 361-366 (1935).
nAmes, "The Inalienability of Choses in Action," LECTURES ON
LEGAL HISTORY 210-218 (1913).
12 Stat. I Ric. III, c. 1 (1483); Bacon, READING UPoN THE STATUTE
of UsES 16 (1642); Cruise, EssAY ON UsEs §36 (1795); Gilbert, LAW
oF UsEs AND TRUSTS, 2d ed., 26 (1741); Holmes, CoMMON LAw 408
(1881); Sanders, EssAY ON UsEs AND TRUSTS, 4th ed., 65 (1823).
13 Rothanhale v. Wychingham, 2 Cal. Proc. Ch. iii
(1413-1422);
Williamson v. Cook, Sel. Cas. in Chan. (S.S) pl. 118 (1417-1424), note
539, infra; Stat. 4 Hen. VII, c. 4 (1487); 7 Hen. VII, c. 3 (1490); 3
Hen. VIII, c. 4 (1511); Sullivan, HisTORICAL TREATISE oN THE FEUDAL
LAW 166-167 (1772); Jenks, SHoRT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, new ed.,
104 (1934); Maitland, EQUITY, 2d ed., 25-26 (1936).
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was cut off in 1535 by the Statute of Uses, which converted the interest of the beneficiary into a legal estate. 14
Five years later the power to transmit legal freehold
estates by will was conferred by statute. 15
The Statute of Uses had no application to property
interests other than freehold estates in land, and within
a century after its enactment the High Court of Chancery
created two important exceptions to its applicability to
freehold interests in land. The uses excepted from the
operation of the statute were the use created by a conveyance which imposed active duties upon the conveyeet 6
and the use on a use. 17 In these cases and in the case of
a conveyance to uses of something other than a freehold
interest in land, the transaction was enforced in equity
as a trust. The early decisions treated the interest of
the beneficiary of a trust as a chose in action which could
be transmitted by will but was not transferable inter
14 Stat. 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535). This statute is entitled, "An Act
concerning Uses and Wills," and its preamble recites as its primary
purpose the abolition of wills of land. It may be that this effect of the
Statute of Uses could be avoided by making a feoffment to such uses
as the feoffor might by will appoint. See Sir Edward Clere's Case,
6 Co. Rep. 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (1599).
15 Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1540). The explanatory statute of 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5 (1542) limited the operation of the
Statute of Wills to estates in fee simple, thus excluding estates in fee
tail and estates pur autre vie. The latter were made devisable by Stat.
29 Car. II, c. 3, §12 (1676). The Statute of Wills restricted the devisability of land held by knight-service. This form of tenure was
abolished and land formerly so held made freely devisable by Stat. 12
Car. II, c.. 24, §1 (1660). See 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 111b (Hargrave's note
No. 138 to 13th ed., 1787). The restriction on devisability of land held
by knight-service could be avoided by making a feoffment to such uses
as the feoffor might by will appoint. Sir Edward Clere's Case, note
14 supra.
1s Anonymous, Brook's New Cases 94, 73 Eng. Rep. 888 (1544);
Nevil v. Saunders, 1 Vern. 415, 23 Eng. Rep. 555 (1686).
11 Tyrrel's Case, 2 Dyer 155a, 73 Eng. Rep. 336 (1557) (common-law
decision that use on a use is not executed); Sambach v. Dalston, Tot·
hill 188, 21 Eng. Rep. 164 (1634) (Chancery decision that use on a
use is enforceable in equity); Ames, "Origin of Uses and Trusts," 21
HARv. L. REv. 261 at 270-274 (1908).
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vivos. Before long, however, the property analogy prevailed and a cestui que trust could transfer his interest
inter vivos as freely as he could an equivalent legal
estate. 19
The transferability of estates for life seems to have
been conceded without serious opposition in the mediaeval period. 20 Such a transfer did not affect the overlord's feudal incident of wardship or injure the transferor's heir. Estates for years were treated as chattel
interests and regarded as freely alienable, both by assignment inter vivos 21 and by wil1. 22 The law of England has
always recognized the alienability of chattels personal,
both inter vivos 23 and by wil1. 24
18

B. SCOPE OF PART ONE

It thus appears that by the time English law was carried to this country in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries it recognized that, in the absence of special
restrictions on alienability imposed by the creator of the
interest or by its owner, property interests, real and personal, were transferable by their owner, either inter vivos
or by will. As to estates in fee simple, the incident of
alienability was expressly conferred by the statute Quia
ts Anonymous, 3 Dyer 369a, 73 Eng. Rep. 827, Jenk. 245, 145 Eng.
Rep. 172 (1580); Earl of Worcester v. Finch, 4 Coke, INSTITUTES 85, 2
Anderson 162, 123 Eng. Rep. 600 (1600); Holmes, CoMMON LAw 409
(1881 ).
19 Warmstrey v. Lady Tanfield, 1 Ch. R. 29, 21 Eng. Rep. 498 (1628).
w Littleton, TENURES §301 (1481); 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 123 (1923).
21 FitzHenry v. Utdeners, Bract. N.B. 804 (1233); Littleton, TENURES
§319 (1481).
22 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME
OF EDWARD I, 115-117 (1895); 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw,
3d ed., 215 (1923).
2a Cochrane v. Moore, 25 Q.B.D. 57 (Ct. App. 1890).
24 Anonymous, S.S.Y.B. 1 & 2 Edw. II, 39, 42 (1308); 2 Pollock &
Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I.
353 (1895); 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 552-553
(1923).
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25

Emptores Terrarum. From an early period, English
law had permitted access by judgment creditors to property which the debtor had power to transfer voluntarily. 26
There then were and still are a number of restrictions
imposed by law upon the free alienability of property.
Nevertheless, by the law of England, property interests
are, in general, alienable. In Part One the question for
inquiry is, to what extent will the law recognize and
enforce special restrictions on alienability, imposed by
the creator of the interest or its owner, on property
interests which, in the absence of such special restrictions, would be alienable? Such a restriction may assume
the form of a prohibition on alienation, the effect of
which would be, if enforced, to leave the owner still
owner despite an attempt on his part to transfer his interest. It may assume the form of a provision that the
interest shall revert to its creator or pass to a third party
if the owner attempts to transfer it. Or it may provide
for some other penalty to be suffered by the owner or
his transferee in the event of a transfer.
Part One does not cover the validity of indirect restraints on alienation, that is, provisions which do not
directly nullify or penalize a transfer of property but
which have the indirect effect of making alienation impossible, difficult, or improbable. The creation of property interests in unborn or unascertained persons has
the effect of making them inalienable, because there is
no owner to alienate. 27 The creation of a type of interest
as to which the law imposes restrictions on alienation
18 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1290); note 7 supra.
13 Edw. I, stat. l, c. 18 (1285); Amby v. Gower, 1 Ch. Rep. 168,
21 Eng. Rep. 540 (1655); 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 19la (Butler's note No.
77, VI 9, to 13th ed. 1787).
21 As to the possibility of creating such interests, see Fratcher, "Trustor as Sole Trustee and Only Ascertainable Beneficiary," 47 MICH. L.
REV. 907-934 (1949).
25
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has the effect of restraining its alienation although the
creator of the interest may not wish this result. For
example, a conveyance of land to a husband and wife
creates a tenancy by the entirety which neither tenant,
acting alone, can alienate, wholly or in part. 28 Even
though a property interest is legally transferable, its sale
may be commercially impracticable if it does not entitle
the owner to exclusive enjoyment of the land or goods
concerned, if enjoyment is burdened with onerous servitudes, or if enjoyment is uncertain as to coming into
existence or duration. Property subject to cotenancy,
easements, profits, or use restrictions may be very hard
to sell because of such burdens. A present interest which
is subject to being defeated by the happening of an event
which is not certain to occur or uncertain as to time of
occurrence is likely to be unsalable. A future interest
which may never become possessory unless an uncertain
event occurs is almost certain to be unmarketable. There
is little commercial demand for future interests, even
those which are certain to become possessory, particularly if the date when enjoyment is to commence is uncertain. The law recognizes the social undesirability of
too great extension of these indirect restraints upon
alienation and upon free commerce in property and sets
limits to them in various ways, some of which are treated
in Parts Two and Three of this book. The common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities, which is the subject of Part
Two, restricts the creation of contingent future interests.
The former statute prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation for unduly long periods, which
is treated in Part Three, restricted the creation of interests in unborn and unascertained persons and of interests
28

Naylor v. Minock, 96 Mich. 182, 55 N.W. 664 (1893).

INTRODUCTION

9

which the law makes inalienable. Part One does not
extend to such indirect restraints upon alienation except
where an interest is made conditional upon or subject
to defeasance by alienation, or the creator or owner of
an interest which is by its nature affected by an indirect
restraint attempts to impose an additional restriction
designed to nullify or penalize such alienation as would
otherwise be legally possible.
29

C.

MICHIGAN's RECEPTION OF ENGLISH LAW

The direction and scope of the present inquiry have
been defined, but discussion of the Michigan decisions
relative to direct restraints on alienation must be defer-·
red to a preliminary inquiry into the extent to which
the law of England has been adopted as the rule of
decision in Michigan. Until its cession to Great Britain
by the Treaty of Paris of 1763, the area which now
composes the State of Michigan was subject to the laws
of France and of the French colonial government. By
the law of England, the settlement of uninhabited territory by English colonists extends to that territory the
common law and statutes of England then in force, but
English law does not extend to conquered territory unless and until so extended by the king. 80 As Michigan
2 9 The common-law rules restricting restraints on alienation, which
are the subject of Part One, are sometimes confused with the statutes
restricting suspension of the absolute power of alienation, which are
the principal subject of Part Three. These statutes supplemented but
did not supersede the common-law rules against restramts on alienation. For the distinction between a restraint on alienation and suspension of the absolute power of alienation, see Chapter 18, Section B,
infra.
8
°Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 1a, 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398, and
Fraser's note k (1608); Blankard v. Galdy, 4 Mod. 215, 87 Eng. Rep.
356, 2 Salk. 411, 91 Eng. Rep. 356 (1693); Sioussat, "The Theory of the
Extension of English Statutes to the Plantations," 1 SELECT EssAYS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HisTORY 416-430 (1907). The present writer has
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became British by conquest rather than by settlement,
the problem of whether English law is in force here is,
therefore, different from that in the seaboard states.
The British government was very slow in extending
its administration to the area, no definite provision being
made until it was incorporated into the Province of Quebec by the Quebec Act of 1774, which provided that the
law of Canada, that is, the French law, should be the rule
of decision in matters of property and civil rights. 31 In
1791 the old Province of Quebec was divided into Upper
Canada and Lower Canada, the former embracing the
territory which now composes Michigan and Ontario. 32
In the following year the legislature of Upper Canada
repealed the Quebec Act insofar as it made the law of
Canada the rule of decision and provided:
"That from and after the passing of this Act, in all
matters of controversy relative to property and civil
rights, resort shall be had to the Laws of England, as the
rule for the decision of the same." 33
On July 14, 1795, the Governor and Judges of the
Territory of the United States Northwest of the River
Ohio adopted a law reading as follows:
"The common law of England, all statutes or Acts of
the British parliament in aid of the common law, prior
to the fourth year of the reign of King James the first
discussed the vexed question of the application to colonial possessions of
British statutes enacted after the settlement or conquest of the colony
in an unpublished magisterial thesis entitled, A CoMMENTARY FOR
CANADA ON THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER, 1931, PP· 118-123 (1938),
copies of which are deposited in the library of Wayne University.
at Stat. 14 Geo. III, c. 83, §§I, 18. Great Britain was in actual control of Michigan from November 29, 1760 to July 11, 1796, despite the
provisions of the treaties of 1783 and 1794. 1 Burton, CITY OF DETROIT
114, 154 (1922); Riddell, MicHIGAN UNDER BRITISH RuLE: LAw AND
LAw CouRTS 1760-1796, 21-26 (1926); Russell, THE BRITISH REGIME IN
MICHIGAN AND THE OLD NoRTHWEST 1760-1796, 16, 270n (1939).
32 Canada Act, 31 Geo. III, c. 31 (1791).
33 Stat. 32 Geo. III (Upper Canada), c. 1, §3 (1792).
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(and which are of a general nature, not local to that
kingdom) and also the several laws in force in this Territory, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered
as of full force, until repealed by legislative authority,
or disapproved of by Congress." 34
It has been suggested that this law of the Northwest
Territory is the basis upon which the law of England,
as altered by local statutes, is applied in Michigan, 35 but
this is probably inaccurate, for Michigan was not annexed to the Northwest Territory until July 15, 1796,
and a mere cession of territory from one sovereign to
another does not of itself alter the law of the land. 311 The
statute of Upper Canada would seem to be in force in
Michigan, however, except insofar as repealed or modified by local statutes. 31
On September 16, 1810, the Governor and Judges of
Michigan Territory adopted an act providing that no
act of the parliament of England, no act of the parliament of Great Britain, no law of France or the French
provinces of Canada or Louisiana, no law of Canada
generally or of the province of Upper Canada under
the British Crown, and no law of the Northwest Territory or Indiana Territory should have any force in
3 4 Laws of the Territory of the United States North-West of the Ohio,
175, 176 (I796). As to the validity of this law see 1 Trans. Sup. Ct.
Terr. Mich., 1805-1814, xiv, xv. The similar law of Indiana Territory
(Act Sept. 17, I807, Laws of Indiana Territory, p. 323) was never
effective in Michigan because Michigan was part of Indiana Territory
only from July 4, H~OO, to June 30, 1805.
as May v. Rumney, 1 Mich. I, 4 (1847). See: Abbott v. Godfroy's
Heirs, I Mich. I78 (1849).
36 Laws of the Territory of Michigan, x (1871).
31 In Denison v. Tucker, I Trans. Sup. Ct. Terr. Mich. I805-I8I4,
385 (I807), Chief Judge Woodward of the Territorial Supreme Court
held that a statute of Upper Canada authorizing slavery ceased to operate in July, 1796, but on the ground it was superseded by the antislavery provisions of the Ordinance of 1787.
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Michigan. 38 The legislative authority of the Governor
and Judges was limited to the adoption of "laws of the
original states." 39 In token of conformity to this limitation, the act of September 16, 1810, recites that the part
of it relative to British statutes and laws of the Northwest and Indiana territories is taken from the law of
Virginia, and that relative to French and Canadian law
from the law of Vermont. The writer has been unable
to find any Virginia statute repealing the laws of the
Northwest Territory or Indiana Territory, or any Vermont statute repealing the laws of Upper Canada. In
consequence, the validity of the act of September 16,
1810, would seem to be dubious. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court of Michigan has held that it was effective to repeal English statutes of Henry VIII, Elizabeth I, and Charles 11.40
38 1 Laws Terr. Mich. 210, 900 (1871). This act was expressly excepted from the act of the Legislative Council of AJ.>ri1 13, 1827 which
repealed most of the early territorial legislation. 3 td., 602, 603. Since
Michigan has become a state there have been only two attempts to
revise and reenact completely all the statutory law, Rev. Stat. 1838 and
1846. Neither revision appears to repeal the 1810 act.
3 9 Ordinance of 1787, §5, 1 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) 53; act Jan. 11,
1805, 2 Stat. 309, 1 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) 58.
40 Grant v. Earl of Selkirk, 1 Trans. Sup. Ct. Terr. Mich. 1814-1824,
431 (1818) (Lord's Day Act, 29 Car. II, c. 7, 1676. The court held, however, that the statute was merely declaratory of the common law, which
is in force in Michigan); Bruckner's Lessee v. Lawrence, 1 Doug. 19
(Mich. 1843) (Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, 1540); Trask v. Green, 9 Mich.
358 (1861) (Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10, 1535); Ready v.
Kearsley, 14 Mich. 215 (1866) (id.); Methodist Episcopal Church of
Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207 (1879) (Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz., c. 4, 1601.) In this case the court did not recognize
that the Statute of Charitable Uses was declaratory of the common law
despite the convincing evidence to that effect presented by Horace
Binney in Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. (43 U.S.) 127 (1844).
In his dissenting opinion in Laraviere v. Campau, 1 Trans. Sup. Ct.
Terr. Mich. 1825-1836, 305 at 312, Judge Sibley suggested that all English statutes passed before the colonization of America were part of
the common law in force in Michigan. There are dicta by Justice
Christiancy in Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 358 at 365 (1861) and Chief
Justice Campbell in In the Matter of Lamphere, 61 Mich. 105 at 108,
27 N.W. 882 (1886), suggesting that the English statutes were never
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In a case decided in 1845, counsel contended that
the common law was repealed by the Schedule to the
Constitution of 1835 or by the Revised Statutes of 1838.
This contention was rejected by the Supreme Court,
which held that the common law is in force in Michigan.41 Assuming the soundness of this decision and of
those holding that the act of September 16, 1810, repealed the Tudor and Stuart statutes, are the statutes of
the Plantagenet kings in force in Michigan? In his
astonishing opinion in Grant v. Earl of Selkirk/ 2 Judge
Woodward stated that the common law "became complete, and insusceptible of any additions" upon the
coronation of Richard the Lion-Hearted, September 3,
1189.43 Such a view would restore trial by ordeal and
wager of battle; it would deny that even Magna Carta
and the English case law of the thirteenth through sixteenth centuries are part of the common law and would
effective in Michigan, but they are clearly erroneous. In his dissenting
opinion in Dalby v. State Highway Commissioner, 283 Mich. 609, 278
N.W. 694 (1938), at pp. 625-627, Justice Potter expressed the view that
the Act of 1810 was void and that the English statutes have been since
1796 and still are a part of the law of Michigan.
41 Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184 (Mich. 1845). Accord: Lorman v.
Benson, 8 Mich. 18 (1860); Reynolds v. McMullen, 55 Mich. 568, 22
N.W. 41 (1885). A better argument would have been that, as it was
the Upper Canada Act of 1792 (note 33 supra) which extended the
common law to this area, the repeal of that act in 1810 repealed the
common law. The schedules to the Constitutions of 1850 and 1908
provide that the common law shall remain in force until altered or
repealed. l Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) pp. 105 and 151. In Stanton v.
Loranger, 1 Trans. Sup. Ct. Terr. Mich. 1825-1836, 282 (1825) it was
held that· a common-law rule does not apJ?lY here unless the facts and
principles upon which it was founded exiSt here.
4 2 1 Trans. SUp. Ct. Terr. Mich. 1814-1824, 431 (1818).
43 !d. at 436. In fairness to Judge Woodward, it should be noted
that he did use English cases decided after 1189 as precedents, probably
upon the theory that, although the common law remains complete,
static, and unchangeable, judges find or declare it from time to time
as occasion requires. No doubt the modern concept, necessitated by
the research of legal historians, of the common law as a constantly
growing and developing system, moulded by the judges to fit new
conditions, would have been anathema to Judge Woodward.
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confine that term to a primitive system which is virtually unknown and certainly unsuited to a modern community. Sir Matthew Hale thought that the statutes
enacted prior to 1327 or 1336 should be treated as part
of the common law/ 4 and even a most conservative view
would include later non-statutory judicial developments,
at least through the period of the Year Books. Although
there is reason to believe that parts of the two Plantagenet statutes which are most significant in the law of
restraints on alienation. De Donis Conditionalibus45 and
Quia Emptores Terrarum/ 6 declared pre-existing common law, 47 the view that thirteenth and fourteenth century statutes were mere custumals, solely declaratory of
the common law and effecting no change in it whatever, has been effectively refuted. 48
The English polity of the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries knew no clear differentiation among executive,
legislative, and judicial functions. The king in his council, of which the royal judges were important members,
was chief executive, supreme legislator, and chief judge.
His formal enactments, orders in council, written and
oral instructions to judges about to go on circuit, and
decisions of litigated cases were alike sources of law. The
judges had administrative as well as judicial functions
and their pronouncements were sometimes legislative,
sometimes administrative, sometimes judicial, and some4 4 Hale, HISTORY OF THE CoMMON LAw oF ENGLAND, 3d ed., 7-9
(1739). Sir Edward Coke thought that the statutes enacted prior to
1351 were part of the common law. 8 REPORTS, Preface, xxiii. (1611).
Cf. dissenting opinion of Sibley, J. in Laraviere v. Campau, note 40
supra.
45 13 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1285).
46 18 Edw. I, stat. 1 (1290).
47 Plucknett, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I,
104 (1949); Plucknett,
STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE FoUR·
TEENTH CENTURY 10, 130-131 (1922).
4 8 !d., 26-31; Venour v. Blund, S.S.Y.B. 3 & 4 Edw. II, 159, 162 (1310).
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times all three. In later centuries, when Parliament, the
Council, and the courts had become sharply distinct,
compilers chose to print some of the early royal charters,
proclamations, and orders with the acts of Parliament.
Many, perhaps most, of the rules which were not so
printed had origins which were equally as legislative
as those which were printed. 49 The law of the thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries cannot be divided into statute
law and common law as can that of later eras. Any
attempt to adopt the common law of those centuries and
reject the statutes produces disconnected fragments of
what was a unified legal system, selected according to
arbitrary modern standards which would be unintelligible to contemporary lawyers. We must adopt Plantagenet law as a whole or reject it entirely.
To Americans generally, the English common law
is the general system of jurisprudence, including statutes
and their judicial interpretation, expounded in the Institutes of Sir Edward Coke. The usual view, exemplified by the law of the Northwest Territory of 1795,S0
that the law of England, statutory and otherwise, as it
was at the time of the settlement of Virginia in 1607,
i.s in force in this country 51 is consistent with this concept. It provides a complete and integrated system of
law upon which American courts and legislatures may
engraft such changes and additions as our social conditions and development require. The unfortunate territorial law of September 16, 1810, and the decisions
49 Plucknett, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF
OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 1-2, 7-11, 20-25 (1922); 1 Pollock 8c Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, 159160 (1895).
5o Note 34 supra.
61 1 Kent, CoMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw, 11th ed., 515-516, notes
(a), (b) (1867); 1 Blackstone, COMMENTARIES, (Cooley's 2d ed.) 67,
Cooley's note (3) (1872).
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that the statutes of the Tudors and Stuarts were repealed
by it 52 prevent .Michigan from being fully in accord
with the general American view. They do not prevent
a decision that the Plantagenet statutes are part of that
common law which is declared to be in force by the
Schedule to the Constitution of Michigan. 53
Note 40 supra.
Note 41 supra. In his great opinion in Mandlebaum v. McDonell,
29 Mich. 78 at 95 (1874), Justice Christiancy suggested that, whether
or not the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum is in force as such here, its
principles have always been basic in the law of the western states.
52
53

CHAPTER

2

Entails
A. THE ENGLISH BACKGROUND

NCIDENT to his daughter's marriage, the mediaeval
man of property commonly gave land to his new sonin-law to facilitate support of the daughter and the
children of the marriage. The donor in such cases, understandably, desired to restrict the gift so that the land
would be certain to go to the children of the marriage
rather than to the son-in-law's children by some other
wife, that it would not be lost by the improvidence of
the son-in-law, and that it would return to the donor
if there were no children of the marriage or if the issue
of the marriage failed. The device used for this purpose from very early times, probably before the Norman
Conquest, was the maritagium, a gift under the terms
of which the land could descend only to issue of the
marriage; the immediate donee, the children of the
marriage, and the grandchildren of the marriage were
forbidden to alienate in fee; and the land returned to
the donor if there was no issue of the marriage or if
the issue of the marriage failed before a great~grandchild
inherited. If a great-grandchild of the marriage did
succeed to the title, he and his heirs owned the land in
fee simple absolute. 54

I

54 Plucknett, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I, 125-127 (1949). Strictly
speaking, the entailment lasted until there had been three descents. If
a son died before his father, the descent to the grandson would be only
one. In such cases the restraint on alienation might extend beyond
grandchildren. There were other forms of maritagium. The gift might
be to the daughter or to the daughter and son-in-law jointly. When
the terms exempted the estate conveyed from feudal services during
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There were other situations, notably gifts to younger
sons, in which restrictions upon inheritance and alienation and provisions for reversion to the donor seemed
desirable, particularly after the courts decided, early in
the thirteenth century, that an owner in fee simple
could transfer his estate without the consent of his heir
apparent. 55 These restrictions were commonly imposed
by making the gift to the donee and the heirs of his
body, to him and the heirs male of his body, or to him
and the heirs of his body by a particular wife. Initially
such gifts seem to have been construed and enforced
similarly to the maritagium, but about the middle of
the thirteenth century the courts, probably due to the
influence of Roman law, held that all such gifts, including the maritagium, were in fee simple conditional.
That is, they construed a gift to "B and the heirs of his
body" to mean "to B in fee simple on condition that
he have heirs of his body." Under this tortured construction, the donee of a conditional fee could transfer
a fee simple absolute, cutting off both the reversion of
the donor and the expectancy of his heirs, as soon as
issue of the specified class was born. 56 This judicial legislation enabled a donee to thwart the reasonable desire
of a parent who made a gift incident to the marriage
of a son or daughter that the land should revert to him
if there were no children of the marriage and that it
should pass to the children of the marriage if any there
were. In modern law this desire can be effectuated by
the period of inalienability, the transaction was known as a gift in frank
marriage.
55 I d. at 127-128; 3 Holdsworth, HrsToRY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed.,
111-113 (1923); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, Introductory Note to Div. IV,
Pt. I (1944).
56 Brian v. London, R.S.Y.B. 32-3 Edw. I, 279 (1304). An alienation
by the donee before birth of issue barred the issue but not the donor's
reversion. 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 19a.
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a conveyance to the donee for life, with remainder in
fee to his children, which makes the children take by
purchase instead of by descent. Although future interests by way of remainder were not unknown in the
thirteenth century, 57 the law governing them was in a
very imperfect state of development. It is probable that
conveyancers of that century anticipated the rules which
became established in the next century that remainders
limited to unborn persons were contingent and that
contingent remainders were invalid. 58 Accordingly, the
enactment of a statute seemed to be the only effective
way of making it possible for a donor to make sure that
he would get the land back if there were no children of
the marriage to which the gift was incident, and that
they would get it if there were.
Chapter I of the Statute of Westminster Il, 59 known
as De Donis Conditionalibus recited the recent judicial
construction which defeated the intent of the donor of
a maritagium or other fee simple conditional, and provided:
1

3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 104 (1923).
!d. at 134-136. Even after the validity of contingent remainders
was established in the fifteenth century, they would not have served
the purpose at hand because, under the Rule in Shelley's Case, I Co.
Rep. 93b, 104a, 76 Eng. Rep. 206, 234 (1581), and the doctrine of
worthier title [Fenwick v. Mitforth, Moore K. B. 284, 72 Eng. Rep.
583 (1589); Read v. Erington, Cro. Eliz. 321, 78 Eng. Rep. 571 (1594);
Bingham's Case, 2 Co. Rep. 82b, 91a, 76 Eng. Rep. 599, 611 (1600);
Wills v. Palmer, 5 Burr. 2615, 98 Eng. Rep. 376 (1770); Doe ex dem.
Earl and Countess of Cholmondeley v. Maxey, 12 East 589, 104 Eng.
Rep. 230 (1810)], attempts to limit remainders to the heirs of the
life tenant or the heirs of the donor gave interests by descent, not by
purchase, and even a valid contingent remainder was destroyed by
the life tenant's conveyance in fee. Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 102, 79
Eng. Rep. 691 (1628). It is scarcely necessary to point out that the
trust to preserve contingent remainders was not invented until the
seventeenth century. See Fratcher, "Trustor as Sole Trustee and Only
Ascertainable Beneficiary," 47 MicH. L. REv. 907-918 (1949); Part Two,
notes 14-21, infra.
5 9 13 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1285).
57
58
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"Wherefore our lord the king, perceiving how necessary and expedient it should be to provide remedy in
the aforsaid cases, hath ordained, that the will of the
giver, according to the form in the deed of gift manifestly expressed, shall be from henceforth observed; so
that they to whom the land was given under such condition, shall have no power to aliene the land so given,
but that it shall remain unto the issue of them to whom
it was given after their death, or shall revert unto the
giver, or his heirs, if issue fail (whereas there is no issue
at all) or if any issue be, and fail by death, or heir of the
body of ruch issue failing."
The statute provided remedies to enforce the donor's
reversion when issue of the donee failed and to protect
the issue's right to the land when the donee had alienated and died. The courts soon devised a similar remedy
to enforce a remainder limited after the gift to the donee
and the heirs of his body. 60 The effect of the statute, as
applied by the courts, was to give the donee a new type
of estate of inheritance, the fee tail, which, unlike the
pre-statutory conditional fee, was not a fee simple but
a lesser estate carved out of the fee simple. After the
creation of an estate tail, what was left of the fee simple
remained in the donor by way of reversion or passed
to another by way of remainder. 61 In consequence, the
statute Quia Emptores Terrarum, 62 enacted five years
after De Donis Conditionalibus, being limited to estates
in fee simple, had no application to estates tail as such,
although it did apply to the reversion or remainder: in
fee simple following an estate tail. In inter vivos conveyances the words "heirs" and "body" were both required for the creation of an estate tail; such words as
6 0 Fitzwilliam v. Anonymous, R.S.Y.B. 33-35 Edw. I, 20
(1305);
Anonymous, S.S.Y.B. 1 & 2 Edw. II, 166 (1308-09).
61 1 Coke, INsTITUTES 18b-19b, 327a.
62 Or Westminster III, 18 Edw. I, stat. 1, notes 6 and 7 supra.
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seed, issue, and the like being insufficient as substitutes
for "heirs," although some substitutes for "body" were
allowed. In the construction of devises, however, much
latitude was allowed, the only requirement being a
sufficient expression of an intention to entail.63
De Donis Conditionalibus clearly restrained alienation by the immediate donee in tail, but it was not clear
as to whether it restrained alienation by his issue. The
word "issue" in the statute may have referred only to
the children or immediate heirs of the donee in tail or
it may have meant lineal descendants forever. There is
respectable authority for the view that the statute was
not designed to revive the restrictions of the ancient
maritagium or to permit perpetual entails, but was only
intended to make it possible to give a life estate to the
immediate donee with an unbarrable remainder in fee
simple to his heir. 64 However that may be, it was decided in 1312 that the son of the donee in tail could not
alienate, with a suggestion that the restraint extended,
as in the ancient maritagium} to the grandson of the
donee, 65 and in 1330 it was settled that the restraint on
alienation was perpetual, binding the heirs of the donee
sa 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 9b, 20a-20b, 27a-27b. For the varieties and incidents of estates tail see id., 18b-28b, and 2 Blackstone, CoMMENTARIES
*113-*119.
6 4 Bolland, Introduction to S.S.Y.B. 5 Edw. II, xxv-xxix (1915); 3
Holdsworth, HisTORY oF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 114 (1923); Plucknett,
STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOUR·
TEENTH CENTURY, 51-52 (1922); Plucknett, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I,
131-135 (1949). But see Updegraff, "The Interpretation of 'Issue' in
the Statute De Donis," 39 HARv. L. REv. 200-220 (1925).
ss Belyng v. Anonymous, S.S.Y.B. 5 Edw. II, 176, 177 (XI Y.B. Ser.),
5 Edw. II, 225, 226 (XII Y.B. Ser.) (1312). This was the utmost limit
to which such a restraint could extend under Justinian's Novel 159
[17 Scott, THE CIVIL LAW 187 (1932)], Buckland, TEXTBOOK ON RoMAN
LAw, 360 (1921); 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 191a, Butler's Note 77 V. (7) to
-13th ed. (1787); Strickland v. Strickland, [1908] A.C. 551. Cf. Note
54, supra.
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in tail forever. 66 So by 1330 the courts, by construction
or extension of the statute De Donis Conditionalibus)
had made possible the creation of perpetual, unbarrable
entails. If they had been permitted to continue, all of
the land in England might have become inalienable,
and the withdrawal of land from commerce would probably have hampered seriously English commercial and
industrial pre-eminence in later centuries.
Unbarrable entails lasted for a little less than two centuries after the enactment of the statute De Donis Conditionalibus. By 1472 the courts had decided that a
tenant in tail in possession could bar both his heirs and
the reversioner or remainderman by suffering a common recovery, a default judgment in a collusive suit
brought by one who was feigned to have a title superior
to that of the tenant in tail. 67 Within a few years, statutes of Henry VII and his son empowered the tenant
in tail to levy a fine which would bar the heirs in tail
but not the reversioner or remainderman.68 A statute
6 6 Bastard v. Somer, Y.B. 4 Edw. III, Trin., pl. 4 (1330); 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 115-116 (1923).
6 7 Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, Mich. pl., 25 (1472). This case
was decided the year after the short-lived restoration of Henry VI.
At that time English law, unlike the Scots, did not permit forfeiture
of entailed estates for treason. There is a tradition that the decision
in Taltarum's Case was really a piece of royal legislation, dictated by
Edward IV with a view to minimizing the amount of land which was
exempt from forfeiture. Pigott, CoMMON REcoVERIEs 8-9 (1739). See
note 72 infra. It was not wholly certain that a common recovery
barred the reversion or remainder until the decision in Capel's Cas~, 1
Co. Rep. 61b, 76 Eng. Rep. 134 (1593). Stat. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c.
20, §2 (1542) nullified common recoveries where the king was reversioner or remainderman. Stat. 14 Eliz., c. 8, §2 (1572) made recoveries
by a tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct ineffective against
the reversioner or remainderman.
68 Stat. 4 Hen. VII, c. 24 (1487), as explained by Stat. 32 Hen. VIII,
c. 36 (1540). The statute excepts estates tail created by the king while
the reversion remains in the king. Statutory permission was necessary
because De Donis Conditionalibus had provided that a fine levied to
bar an estate tail should be void both as to the heirs and as to the
reversioner. Stat. 13 Edw. I, c. 1, §4 (1285), restated, Stat. 1 Ric. Ill,
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of 1540 empowered the tenant in tail in possession to
bind the heirs in tail and the reversioner or remainderman by leases for terms not in excess of three lives or
twenty-one years reserving substantial rent.69
When the law of trusts was developed in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, it was assumed that a trust
or equitable estate could be entailed as well as a legal
estate. In such case it was settled that a cestui que trust
in tail who was in possession could bar the equitable
entail and the equitable reversion or remainder by suffering a common recovery 70 and that a cestui que trust
in tail could bar his issue by levying a fine as fully as
if he had the legal estate. 71 Thus by the end of the sixteenth century a tenant in tail, although restricted to
special forms of conveyance, was able to transfer inter
vivos a fee simple or any lesser estate. The inheritance
could not, however, be reached by his creditors, 72 and
c. 7, §5 (1483). The fine, which was a compromise of record of a
collusive action brought against the tenant in tail, was used when the
tenant in tail was himself the reversioner or remainderman or was
conveying to the reversioner or remainderman, and when the tenant
in tail was such in reversion or remainder as, prior to Stat. 14 Geo. II,
c. 20, §1 (1741), only a tenant in tail in possession could suffer a
common recovery. 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 121a (Hargrave's Note No. 172 to
13th ed., 1787). It should be noted that the issue in tail could also be
barred in some situations, without common recovery or statutory fine,
by the operation of the highly technical rules of warranty. As this
operation was frequently dependent upon the occurrence of events
which could not be foreseen at the time of the conveyance, these rules
cannot have contributed a great deal to the alienability of entailed
land. Id., 37la-377a, 391b-393b. Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 24 IowA L. REv. 1 at 44-50 (1938).
69 32 Hen. VIII, c. 28, §§1, 2 (1540), continued in force by Stat. 34
8c 35 Hen. VIII, c. 20, §4 (1542).
10 North v. Way, 1 Vern. 13, 23 Eng. Rep. 270, sub nom. North v.
Williams, 2 Ch. Ca. 63, 78, 22 Eng. Rep. 848, 855 (1681).
n Basket v. Pierce, 1 Vern. 226, 23 Eng. Rep. 431 (1683).
12 Except the king, claiming under judgment or specialty. Stat. 33
Hen. VIII, c. 39, §75 (1541). Stat. 21 Jac. I, c. 19, §12 (1623) enabled
creditors to reach estates tail through bankruptcy proceedings. Estates
tail, but not the reversion or remainder following them, were subjected
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its descent according to the limitations of the entail
could not be affected by will. 73
As has been seen, restraints on alienation assume two
general forms, the prohibition, which, if effective, would
compel the owner of a property interest to keep it despite his attempts to transfer, and the imposition of a
penalty, usually forfeiture of the interest, upon alienation. Insofar as it is a restraint upon alienation, entailment is essentially of the prohibitory type. The
case law of the fifteenth century and the statutes of
the fifteenth and sixteenth made the prohibition on
alienation implicit in entailment completely ineffective
as to transfers by way of common recovery, fine levied
under the statutes of Henry VII and his successor, and
leases for periods not exceeding three lives or twenty-one
years. The peculiar mediaeval rules of seisin also made
the prohibition partially ineffective as against the more
ordinary modes of conveyance. If a tenant in tail conveyed an estate of inheritance or pur autre vie by feoffment, release, confirmation, or common-law fine, not
levied under the statutes, his act, although tortious and
not a complete bar to the issue in tail or the reversioner
or remainderman, was fully effective for the term of his
life and worked a discontinuance of the estates of the
issue and the reversioner or remainderman. That is, the
right of entry which the issue or the reversioner or remainderman would otherwise have had upon the death
of the tenant in tail was destroyed and he left with only
a mere chose in action, the right to bring an action of
formedon. 74
to forfeiture for treason of the tenant in tail by Stat. 26 Hen. VIII,
c. 13, §5 (1534) and 33 Hen. VIII, c. 20 §3 (1541). See Dalrymple,
GENERAL HISTORY OF FEUDAL PROPERTY, 2d ed., CC. 3, 4 (1758).
7 3 Stat. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5, §3 (1542).
74 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 325b-327b; 1 Cruise, DIGEST 89; Maitland, "The
Beatitude of Seisin,'' 4 L.Q. R.Ev. 24, 286, 297-298 (1888).
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It having been settled that entailment was largely ineffective as a prohibition on alienation, questions soon
arose as to the extent to which a donor in tail could impose penalties on alienation.
As might be expected, the decisions rendered before
1472 had held valid conditions providing for forfeiture
of an estate tail upon alienation by the tenant in tail.
This continued to be the rule, even as to alienations
by way of common recovery or statutory fine, until the
end of the sixteenth century, although there is evidence
of growing recognition of the fact that to hold such
conditions valid as against common recoveries and statutory fines would operate to defeat these methods of barring the entail and recreate perpetual unbarrable entails.75 The old decisions were overruled early in the
seventeenth century, and it was settled that no restraint
by way of penalty, by forfeiture or otherwise, could be
imposed upon the right of a tenant in tail to bar the
7 5 Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil. pl. 21 (1443); Anonymous, Y.B.
8 Hen. VII, Hil. pl. 3 (1493); Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich. pl.
28 (1494); Anonymous, Y.B. 13 Hen. VII, Pasch. pl. 9 (1498); Newis
v. Lark, 2 Plow. 403, 75 Eng. Rep. 609 (1571) (condition good against
common recovery); Earl of Arundel's Case, 3 Dyer 342b, 73 Eng. Rep.
771, Jenk. 242, 145 Eng. Rep. 170 (1575) (dictum in the report m
Jenkins, p. 243, that condition bad against common recovery); Croker
v. Trevithin, Cro. Eliz. 35, 78 Eng. Rep. 301 (1584); Rudhall v. Milward, Moore K.B. 212, 72 Eng. Rep. 537, sub nom. Ruddall v. Miller,
1 Leon. 298, 74 Eng. Rep. 271 (1586) (condition good against fine);
Spittle v. Davie, 2 Leon. 38, 74 Eng. Rep. 339 (1588) (condition good
against lease); Arton v. Hare, Poph. 97, 79 Eng. Rep. 1207 (1595)
(condition against "going about to alien, sell, grant or give or to suffer
any recovery or levy any fine" assumed to be good); Sharington v.
Minors, Moore K.B. 543, 72 Eng. Rep. 746 (1599) (condition against
mortgage, sale or pledge good. Popham, C. J ., dissented on the ground
the condition was "encounter ley" and void). A proviso that the estate
should cease only as to the offending tenant in tail and pass to his
heir was ineffective, not because of the restraint on alienation but because of technical common-law rules preventing an estate from being
forfeited in part. Germin v. Ascot, Moore K.B. 364, 72 Eng. Rep. 631
(1594); Cholmeley v. Humble, Moore K.B. 592, 72 Eng. Rep. 778
(1595); Corbet's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 83b, 76 Eng. Rep. 187 (1599); Mildmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 40a, 77 Eng. Rep. 31l (1605).
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entail by statutory fine or to bar both the entail and the
reversion or remainder by common recovery. 76 Whether
exercise by a tenant in tail of his statutory power to
make leases for three lives or twenty-one years could be
penalized was not definitely settled. 77 A covenant by the
donee in tail not to bar the entail was not specifically
enforcible 78 but might give rise to an action for damages. 79 The seventeenth century decisions did not overrule those of the preceding centuries insofar as the latter
held valid restraints by way of penalty upon tortious
feoffments and other conveyances which worked a discontinuance but did not bar the entail. 80
As a common recovery could not be suffered by a tenant for years, attempts were soon made to create an unbarrable entail in estates for long terms of years. These
attempts were frustrated by decisions that estates for
years could not be entailed and that the first donee in
tail owned the entire term with full power of aliena76 Sonday's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 127b, 77 Eng. Rep. 915 (1611) (common recovery); Partington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 77 Eng. Rep. 976
(1613) (common recovery); Foy v. Hynde, Cro. Jac. 697, 79 Eng. Rep.
605 (1624) (fine); King v. Burchall, Amb. 379, 27 Eng. Rep. 252
(1759) (common recovery). The first three cases involved penalties of
forfeiture, the last a penalty by way of an equitable charge on the
entailed land. Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 24 IowA L.
REv. 59-66 (1938). Accord: PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §408 (1944). Justice Christiancy's classic opinion in Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29
Mich. 78 at 93-94 (1874), quotes the reasoning in Partington's Case and
cites that in Mildmay's Case with approval.
77 Cf. Spittle v. Davie, 2 Leon. 38, 74 Eng. Rep. 339 (1588); 1 Coke,
INsTITUTEs 223b, with contrary dicta in Mildmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep.
40a, 43a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311, 317 (1605); Partington's Case, 10 Co. Rep.
35b, 39a, 77 Eng. Rep. 976, 982 (1613).
78 Collins v. Plummer, 2 Vern. 635, 23 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1 P. Wms.
104, 24 Eng. Rep. 313 (1708).
79 Ibid.; Freeman v. Freeman, 2 Vern. 233, 23 Eng. Rep. 751 (1691).
But see Poole's Case, cited in Tatton v. Mollineux, Moore K.B. 809,
810, 72 Eng. Rep. 920 (1610).
8o 1 Coke, IN1!TITUTES 223b-224a, and Butler's note No. 132 to 13th
ed. (1787). See Anonymous, 1 Brown!. & Golds. 45, 123 Eng. Rep. 655
(1616); Pierce v. Win, 1 Ventr. 321, 86 Eng. Rep. 208 (1677).
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tion. 81 As the statute De Donis Conditionalibus applied
only to land, chattels personal could not be entailed.
B. THE MICHIGAN STATUTES

On March 2, 1821, the Governor and Judges of the
Territory of Michigan adopted a law providing that
all estates tail were abolished and that all persons holding or to hold land under any devise, gift, grant, or
conveyance which did, or which, but for the law would,
create a fee tail, should "be seized thereof as an allodium." 82 This law was in force until superseded by a
provision of the Revised Statutes of 1838 that:
8 1 Tatton v. Mollineux, Moore K.B. 809, 72 Eng. Rep. 920 (1610);
Lovies's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 78a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1043 (1613); Sanders v.
Cornish, Cro Car. 230, 79 Eng. Rep. 801 (1631); Grig v. Hopkins, 1
Sid. 37, 82 Eng. Rep. 955 (1661).
8 2 Code of 1820, p. 393; Laws of 1827, p. 261; Laws of 1833, p. 278;
1 Terr. Laws, P· 815. Sections 1 and 2 of the law provide:
"Sec. 1. Be tt enacted by the Governor and judges of the Territory
of Michigan, That all estates tail shall be, and are hereby abolished;
and that in all cases, where any person or persons now is, or are seized
in fee tail of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, such person or
persons shall be deemed to be seized of an allodial estate; And further,
in all cases where any person or persons would, if this act had not
been passed, at any time hereafter become seized in fee tail of any
lands, tenements or hereditaments, by virtue of any devise, gift, grant
or other conveyance, heretofore made or hereafter to be made or by
any other means whatsoever, such person or persons, instead of becoming seized thereof in fee tail, shall be deemed and ad justed to be seized
thereof as an allodium.
"Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That where lands, tenements or
hereditaments, heretofore have been devised, granted or otherwise conveyed by a tenant in tail, and the person or persons, to whom such
devise, grant or other conveyance, hath been made, his, her, or their
heirs or assigns, hath or have, from the time such devise took effect, or
from the time such grant or other conveyance was made, to the day
of the passing of this act, been in the uninterrupted possession of such
lands, tenements or hereditaments, and claiming and holding the same
under or by virtue of such devise, grant or other conveyance, then such
devise, grant or other conveyance shall be deemed as good, legal and
effectual, to all intents and purposes, as if such tenant in tail had at
the time of the making of such devise, grant or other conveyance, been
seized of such lands, tenements or hereditaments allodially, any law
to the contrary hereof notwithstanding.''
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"All estates tail are abolished, and every estate which
would be adjudged a fee tail, according to the law of the
territory of Michigan, as it existed before the second day
of March, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-one,
shall, for all purposes, on and after the said second day
of March, be adjudged a fee simple." 83
There are two difficulties with the Act of 1838: (1)
If the statute De Donis Conditionalibus was not in force
immediately before March 2, 1821, it is possible that
no estate would, at that time, have been adjudged
a fee tail; 84 and (2) It is not clear whether a conveyance (if any could be) affected by the Act of 1838
created a fee simple conditional or a fee simple absolute.
The second difficulty has been eliminated by the present
statute, but the first remains. It may be argued that
both the provisions of the Revised Statutes of 1838 and
those of the statute now in force should be considered
practical nullities, since no conveyance could fall within
their terms and that, therefore, a conveyance which
would have created an estate tail under the statute De
Donis Conditionalibus, would now create an estate in
fee simple conditional. Since March 1, 1847, the following provisions have been on the Michigan statute books:
"Sec. 3. All estates tail are abolished, and every
estate which would be adjudged a fee tail, according to
the law of the territory of Michigan, as it existed before
the second (2nd) day of March, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-one (1821), shall for all purposes be
83

P. 258.
It would seem that the term "fee tail" was sometimes used before
the statute De Donis Conditionalibus in reference to conditional fees
other than the maritagium. 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, 19, n. 6 (1895); Plucknett,
CoNCISE HISTORY OF THE CoMMON LAw 353-357 (1929). An application
of the Michigan statutes to such fees tail only, leaving the maritagium
in existence as a fee simple conditional, would be awkward to say
the least.
84
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adjudged a fee simple; and if no valid remainder be
limited thereon, shall be a fee simple absolute.
"Sec. 4. When a remainder in fee shall be limited
upon any estate which would be adjudged a fee tail
according to the law of the territory of Michigan as it
existed previous to the time mentioned in the preceding
section, such remainder shall be valid as a contingent
limitation upon a fee, and shall vest in possession, on the
death of the first taker, without issue living at the time
of such death." 85
As has been shown, estates in fee tail as that term is
understood in the developed common-law system are a
creation of the statute De Donis Conditionalibus. These
statutory provisions only purport to affect estates "which
would be adjudged a fee tail, according to the law of the
territory of Michigan, as it existed before the second
(2nd) day of March ... 1821". Yet despite dicta suggesting that no English statutes ever were in force in
Michigan and positive decisions that if any were in force
they were repealed by the Act of September 16, 1810,86
the Supreme Court of Michigan has consistently applied
these statutory provisions to conveyances which would
85 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§3, 4; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2587, 2588;
Comp. Laws (1871) §§4070, 4071; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8785, 8786;
How. Stat., §§5519, 5520; Comp. Laws (1915) §§II521, II522; Comp.
Laws (1929) §§ 12923, 12924; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.3, 26.4; Comp.
Laws (1948) §§554.3, 554.4.
Six other states have similar statutes: Cal. Civ. Code (Deering,
1949) §§763, 764; Mont. Rev. Code (1935) §§6725, 6726; N. Y. Real
Property Law (1909) §32; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §§47-0405, 47-0406;
Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 60 §§24, 25; S.D. Code (1939) §§51.0405, 51.0406.
The New York statute was construed in the following cases: Wilkes v.
Lion, 2 Cow. 333 (1823); Grout v. Townsend, 2 Denio 336 (1845);
Van Rensselaer v. Poucher, 5 Denio 35 (1847); Wendell v. Crandall, I
N.Y. 491 (1848); Emmons v. Cairns, 3 Barb. 243 (1848); Lott v.
Wykoff, 2 N.Y. 355 (1849); Barlow v. Barlow, 2 N.Y. 386 (1849);
Brown v. Lyon, 6 N.Y. 419 (1852); Barnes v. Hathaway, 66 Barb. 452
(1873); Buel v. Southwick, 70 N.Y. 581 (1877); Jenkins v. Fahey, 73
N.Y. 355 (1878); Coe v. De Witt, 22 Hun. 428 (1880); Alger v. Alger,
31 Hun. 471 (1884).
s6 Note 40 supra.
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have created fees tail under the statute De Donis Conditionalibus.87
The effect of the Act of 1821 abolishing estates tail
came before the Supreme Court only once, in Fraser v.
Chene .88 This was a suit in chancery to quiet title to
land involving the construction of a will, which was executed and became effective in 1829, reading:
"I give and bequeath unto my beloved son, Gabriel
Chene, my eldest, the farm I now reside on, for and
during his life-time, with all the appurtenances thereon; and after he, my said son, the said Gabriel Chene, is
deceased, then the right, title and appurtenances of the
aforesaid farm, is to become the property of the said
Gabriel Chene's male heirs, .... "
The plaintiff claimed under a deed from Gabriel
Chene which purported to convey a fee simple. The
defendants, who were the sons and heirs of Gabriel
Chene, contended that this devise created a life estate
in Gabriel, with remainder in fee simple absolute to his
male heirs. On this point the court decided that the
Rule in Shelley's Case was in force in Michigan in
1829; 89 in consequence of which the devisee, Gabriel
87 Fraser v. Chene, 2 Mich. 81 (1851); Goodell v. Hibbard, 32 Mich.
47 (1875); Eldred v. Shaw, 112 Mich. 237, 70 N.W. 545 (1897); Downing v. Birney, 112 Mich. 474, 70 N.W. 1006 (1897); Rhodes v. Bouldry,
138 Mich. 144, 101 N.W. 206 (1904); Millard v. Millard, 212 Mich.
662, 180 N.W. 429 (1927); Thompson v. Thompson, 330 Mich. l, 46
N. W. (2d) 437 (1951).
88 2 Mich. 81 (1851).
8 9 The Rule in Shelley's Case was abolished by Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 258,
which was replaced by a clearer provision, still in force, Rev. Stat.
1846, c. 62, §28, Comp. Laws (1857) §2612; Comp. Laws (1871) §4095;
Comp. Laws (1897) §8810; How. Stat. §5544; Comp. Laws (1915)
§11546; Comp. Laws (1929) §12948; Mich. Stat. Ann §26.28; Comp.
Laws (1948) §554.28. Accordingly, it was held in Wilson v. Terry,
130 Mich. 73, 89 N.W. 566 (1902), and Thompson v. Thompson, 330
Mich. 1, 46 N.W. (2d) 437 (1951), that a conveyance to A for life,
remainder to the heirs of his body, created only a life estate in A,
with remainder in fee simple in the heirs of his body.
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Chene, took a fee. The court held further that the wording was such as would have created an estate in fee tail
male prior to March 2, 1821. The Act of that date was
construed to convert this into an "allodial" estate, which
the court ·assumed to mean an estate in fee simple absolute.
The section of the Revised Statutes of 1838 abolishing entails was never considered in a reported decision,
but the provisions of the Revised Statutes of 1846, which
are now in force, have been construed in several cases.
Downing v. Birney 90 involved a deed between James G.
Birney
"And Lorainie Spicer, wife of Ezekiel Spicer, of the
same place, of the second part, witnesseth, that, in consideration of one hundred dollars paid by the said
Ezekiel Spicer to the parties of the first part, they have
bargained and sold and do hereby convey to the said
Lorainie Spicer ... lots .... To have and to hold the
said lots to the said Lorainie, to the children of her body
begotten by the said Ezekiel, to her heirs, executors, and
to the assigns of the said Lorainie and Ezekiel, forever;
and the said James G. Birney, for himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, hereby covenant and agree
that he will at all times defend the lawful title hereby
conveyed, to the said lots, of the said Lorainie, to the
children of her body begotten by the said Ezekiel, to her
heirs, executors, and to the assigns of the said Lorainie
and Ezekiel, against the claim or claims of all persons
whomsoever.''
The court held that this instrument was not designed
to create a fee tail and that, therefore, the statutory provisions in question had no bearing. The deed was construed to vest: (1) A life estate in Lorainie; (2) A life
estate in the children of Lorainie by Ezekiel in being
9 o 112 Mich. 474, 70 N.W. 1006 (1897), 117 Mich. 675, 76 N.W. 125
(1898), Part Three, note 49, infra.
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at the date of the deed, to take effect on the death of
Lorainie; and (3) A remainder in fee simple absolute in
Lorainie, to take effect on the death of the last of her
children by Ezekiel.
Section 3 of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of
1846, which converts a fee tail upon which no remainder
is limited into a fee simple absolute, has been applied
for this purpose only twice. In Rhodes v. Bouldry 91 a
devise reading:
"I bequeath the above described lands, not only to
the said Silas W. Bouldry, but to the heirs of his body."
was construed to be one which would have created a fee
tail under the statute De Donis Conditionalibus and
which, therefore created a fee simple absolute. The
other case, Millard v. Millard, 92 involved the construction of a warranty deed containing the following language:
"This indenture made the 27th day of July in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred forty-six, between Moses Dean, of the county of Ionia and State of
Michigan, of the first part, and Charity Millard and her
children, heirs of her body, of the second part .... To
have and to hold, the above-mentioned and described
premises, with the appurtenances, and every part and
parcel thereof, to the said parties of the second part,
their heirs and assigns forever."
The court failed to consider the fact that the language
of the habendum indicated an intent that there should
really be several grantees. Regarding the words "and
her children" as mere surplusage, it determined that,
since the magical words "heirs of her body" were present, the conveyance was one which would have created
n 138. Mich. 144, 101 N.W. 206 (1904). See Thompson v. Thompson, note 89 supra.
92 212 Mich. 662, 180 N.W. 429 (1920).
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a fee tail under the statute De Donis Conditionalibus
and which was transformed into a fee simple absolute by
"3 Comp. Laws 1915, S. 11521". It is to be noted that
the statutory provision applied by the court to a deed
executed in 1846 was that of the Revised Statutes of
1846, which did not become effective until March 1,
184 7. The provision of the Revised Statutes of 1838
should have been applied but the effect, no doubt, would
have been the same. 93
At the ancient common law, no remainder could be
limited on an estate in fee simple conditional.D 4 The
right retained by the donor was a mere possibility and
inalienable. It was not clear at first that the statute De
Donis Conditionalibus permitted the limitation of a remainder upon the newly created estate in fee tail, but
it was soon settled that it did. 95 It will be remembered
that since 1847 the Michigan statute has provided that
a remainder in fee limited on what would have been
a fee tail takes effect as a contingent limitation on a fee
and vests in possession on the death of the first taker,
without issue living at the time of such death. 96 It is to
be noted that the mere birth of issue has no effect under
this provision. If the donee in tail dies with issue, his
heirs, devisees, or assigns take in fee simple absolute; if he
dies without issue, the remainderman takes in fee simple
absolute. One peculiar effect of this provision would
seem to be that the issue of the donee in tail may never
»s There is some possibility, however, that the 1846 Act might be
construed to be retroactive and valid as such, at least in some situations.
See "Estates Tail in the United States," 24 HARv. L. REV. 144 (1910).
The 1821 Act clearly purported to be retroactive.
94 2 BLACKSTONE's CoMMENTARIES •164, 165. But see 3 Holdsworth,
HisTORY oF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 18 (1923). The modern American
cases are collected in 114 A.L.R. 616. See Part Two, note 7, infra.
95 Note 60 supra; 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed.,
18 (1823).
96 Note 84 supra.
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inherit, even though they survive the donee: their
rights are liable to be cut off by inter vivos conveyance
of the donee in tail, by his will, or, in part, by provisions
of the statutes of descent and distribution.
The provision first received the attention of the
Supreme Court in Goodell v. Hibbard/ 1 which. was an
action of ejectment founded on a will containing this
devise:
"Second, I give and devise all the rest, residue and
remainder of my real and personal estate, of every name
and nature whatsoever, to my sister, Betsey Goodell, ... ;
to have and to hold the said premises, which is described
in several deeds, to the said Betsey Goodell and her
heirs, forever; and in failure of heirs, all to fall and be
bequeathed to the minor children of Alexander Goodell,
now deceased, . . . . "
Alexander Goodell was a brother of the testator who
had pre-deceased him, leaving four minor children. The
plaintiffs claimed under a bargain and sale deed, the
only covenant of which was one of seizin, executed by
one of these children before the death of Betsey Goodell.
The court, taking into consideration the fact that Betsey
Goodell was an aging spinster with a large number of
collateral heirs presumptive at the time the will was
executed, determined that the word "heirs", as used in
the will, meant "heirs of her body". In consequence,
the estate created was held to be what would have been
a fee tail in Betsey with remainder in fee simple absolute
in the children of Alexander. Applying the statute, the
land passed to the children of Alexander in fee simple
absolute upon the death of Betsey without issue.
97 32 Mich. 47 (1875). It should be noted that, in this case, the contingent estate created by §4 of the statute was held to be alienable before taking effect in possession. See also Mullreed v. Clark, liO Mich.
229, 68 N.W. 138, 989 (1896).
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Eldred v. Shaw 98 was a suit to construe a will devising land to a trustee for "my grandson, Rata Eldred",
with directions to manage and control until the grandson should reach the age of twenty-one,

"and, in the case of the death of my said grandson
without heirs by his body begotten, the lands and property above described, with all its increases or accretions, I give, devise and bequeath to my said sons, Lysander, Henry, and William, and my said daughters,
Matilda and Sally, share and share alike, and to their
heirs and assigns forever."
The grandson contended that the gift over to his
uncles and aunts would be effective only if he died during minority and that, upon reaching majority, he became vested with title in fee simple absolute. The circuit judge agreed with this contention but, on appeal,
it was held that the devise created an estate tail general
with remainder over which, by force of the statute, became a fee simple subject to a contingent limitation over
if the tenant should die at any time, before or after
reaching majority, without issue him surviving.
It would seem then that the statutory provision affecting remainders limited upon estates tail will be enforced in accordance with its terms. Its application to
estates in fee tail general not restricted to issue of a particular sex is not difficult. As to the more complicated
forms of estates tail the effect of the statute is far from
clear. Suppose a conveyance to A and the heirs male of
his body, remainder to Band his heirs, forever. If A dies
9 8 112 Mich. 237, 70 N.W. 545 (1897). In Coe v. De Witt, 22 Hun.
428 (1880), testator devised land to "Edward B. Coe, and the heirs of
his body forever, and in case of his death without issue then living"
to certain charities. Edward B. Coe conveyed the land in his lifetime
and then died, leaving a surviving daughter. It was held that the
grantee of Edward took a fee simple absolute upon the death of Edward, leaving issue.
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leaving a daughter as his only descendant, does B take?
A similar problem would be created by a gift to A and
the heirs of his body begotten of a particular wife, remainder to Band his heirs, forever, if A should die leaving only issue by another wife. Presumably, in these
cases, the remainder would take effect in possession if,
at the time of the first taker's death, he had not issue of
the particular class named in the conveyance.
Under Michigan law, then, the entail is completely
ineffective as a prohibition on alienation, except that,
when a remainder is limited after an estate tail, the
donee in tail cannot, as he could in England after 1472,
bar the remainder. The remainderman can, however,
transfer his interest. 99 As the statutes convert the estate
of the donee in tail into a fee simple, the rules which
govern the validity of restraints on alienation of fees
simple apply to that estate. If the remainder is in tail,
the same conversion occurs. The validity of restraints
on alienation of the remainder is governed, therefore,
by the rules applicable to expectant estates of types other
than the fee taiP 00
99

Note 97 supra.

wo For periodical material on the treatment of fee tail in other juris-

dictions, see: Morris, "Primogeniture and Entailed Estates in America,"
27 CoL. L. REv. 24-51 (1927); Lundberg, "Barring of Entails, Its Marks
on Our Land Laws," 3 DAKOTA L. REv. 160-164 (1930); Redfearn,
"Estates Tail in Florida," 6 FLA. L.J. 69-78 (1932); Costigan, "Equitable Fee Tail Estates-Illinois Fee Tail Statute-Shall Equity Follow
the Law?" 5 ILL. L. REv. 514 (1911); Beals, "Estates Tail in Kansas,"
1 J. BAR A. KAN. 203-209 (1933); Turner, "Estates Tail in Kansas,"
2 J. BAR A. KAN. 241-256 (1934); Hudson, "Estates Tail in Missouri,"
7 ILL. L. REv. 355 (1913); Steiner, "Estates Tail in Missouri," 7 KANsAs
CITY L. REv. 93-108 (1939); Ho1mested, "Estates Tail," 22 CAN. L.T.
426 (1902); Sanger, "Estates Tail Under the New Law," 2 CAMB. L.J.
212 (1925); "Estates Tail in the United States," 15 CoL. L. REv. 618
(1915).

CHAPTER

3

Present Legal Estates in Fee Simple
A. THE ENGLISH LAW

T THE beginning of the thirteenth century, when
the royal courts of justice were acquiring effective
control of the development of private law, the
possible forms of action and their limits were uncertain.
It seemed then that a new form of action could be devised to fit any need which might arise. In the course
of that century the courts set themselves to limiting the
possible forms of action to a definite list, defining with
certainty the scope of permitted actions, and so refusing
relief upon states of fact which did not fall within the
fixed limits of permitted forms of action. This process,
of course, operated to fix and limit the classes of private
rights protected by law. 101
A parallel process went on with respect to interests
in land. At the beginning of the thirteenth century,
when alienation of land was becoming possible, it
seemed that any sort of interest which ingenuity could
devise might be created by apt terms in the transfer
creating the interest. Perhaps the form of the gift could
create interests of any specified duration, with peculiar
rules for descent, with special rights not ordinarily incident to ownership, or deprived of some of the ordinary
incidents of ownership. As in the case of the forms of
action, the courts set themselves to limiting the possible
interests in land to a definite list, defining with certainty

A

1o1 Maitland,
1941).
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the incidents of permitted interests, and refusing to enforce provisions of a gift which would add to or subtract
from the fixed incidents of the type of interest conveyed.
The law would recognize only a certain definite list of
estates in land, each with fixed incidents, and every gift
must be forced to fit the Procrustean bed of one or another of these estates.102 The effect of this process in reducing widely varying types of maritagium and entail to
one estate in fee simple conditional with a fixed incident of alienability after birth of issue has been shown
in the preceding chapter. The statute De Donis Conditionalibus checked the process of systematization insofar
as that process tended to impose one canon of descent and
a uniform rule of alienability upon all estates of inheritance. Beyond this it did not stop the rigid fixation of
estates and their incidents. With respect to duration,
the recognized types of estates came to be limited to
those in fee simple, in fee tail, for life, for years, at will,
and at sufferance. As to these, the courts would permit
slight variations in non-essential incidents, but none
whatever in those considered essential. And an incident
formally conferred by statute was almost necessarily
deemed essential. A provision purporting to deprive the
estate granted of an essential incident was repugnant to
the grant and void. For example, it was settled.by the
102 2 Holdsworth, HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 4th ed., 349-352 (1936);
3 id., 3d ed., 101-105 (1923); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities,"
22 IowA L. REv. 437 at 444-445 (1937). "For the sake of certainty and
stability, the law has classified and defined all the various interests
and estates in lands which it recognizes the right of any individual
to hold or create, and the definition of each is made from, and the
estate known and recognized by the combination of certain legal incidents, many of which are so essential to the particular species of estate
that they cannot, by the parties creating it, be severed from it, as this
would be to create a new and mongrel estate unknown to the law,
and productive of confusion and uncertainty." Christiancy, J., in
Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 at 92 (1874).
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first decade of the seventeenth century that every estate
in fee tail was endowed by law with certain inseparable
incidents, that among these incidents were dower,
curtesy, and the right to bar the entail by common recovery, and that any provision purporting to deprive an
estate tail of any of these incidents or penalize its enjoyment was void. 108
As has been seen, the Statute of Westminster III, Quia
Emptores T errarum, made two important provisions as
to estates in fee simple; first, that the donor of such an
estate could not retain a reversion, and second, that the
owner might "sell at his own pleasure his lands and tenements, or part of them." 104 A remainder being analogous to a reversion, 105 the first provision operated to prevent the limitation of a remainder after a fee simple.106
That the statute made free alienability an inseparable
incident of every estate in fee simple seems always to
have been assumed by the judges and lawyers of England.
Knowing this, and realizing that such an attempt would
be nugatory, English conveyancers have not attempted
to restrain alienation of legal estates in fee simple by
1oa Sir Anthony Mildmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 40a, 4la, 77 Eng. Rep.
311, 314 (1605); Mary Portington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 38b-39a, 77
Eng. Rep. 976, 982 (1613).
10 4 Stat. 18 Edw. I, stat 1, c. 1 (1290); 2 Coke, INsTITUTES 66, 67.
The language of the statute, as printed in the Statutes at Large, is,
"quod de cetero liceat unicuique libero homini terram suam sen tenementum pen partem inde pro voluntate sua vendere." In Mayn v.
Cros, Y.B. 14 Hen. IV, Mich., pl. 6 (1412), Justice Hankford said, at
£. 3b, "le statute voit, 'Quod quilibet liber homo possit dare et vendere
terram suam.' " Sir Edward Coke (whose version of the statute varies
slightly from that of the Statutes at Large) says, "'Vendere' is here
not onely taken for a sale, but for any alienation by gift, feoffment,
fine, or otherwise: But sale was the most common assurance." 2 INSTITUTES 501.
1os 1 Coke, INsTITUTEs 373b (Butler's Note No. 328 to 13th ed. 1787);
Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 24 IowA L. REv. 635 at
655-656 (1939).
1o6 1 Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, 5th ed., 7 (1794); Part Two,
note 7, infra.
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prohibition, and there is a consequent dearth of English
decisions as to such restraints. American lawyers have
not always understood so well the system of estates, and
conveyancing by laymen has been more common here.
By the overwhelming weight of authority in this country, a prohibition on alienation of a legal fee simple,
that is, a provision that a transfer by the owner shall
be wholly inoperative and leave him still owner, is a
nullity, whether extending to all alienation or limited
to alienation in a particular manner, alienation during
a limited period, or alienation to specified persons or
classes of persons. 107
As to restraints by way of penalty, it has been settled
in England since the fourteenth century that a proviso in
a conveyance in fee simple that the estate shall be forfeited upon any alienation is void. 108 The same rule
101 The cases are collected in Gray, REsTRAINTS oN ALIENATION, 2d
ed., 91-133 (1895); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of
Property,'' 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §§26.15, 26.16 (1952); Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation since Gray," 48
HARv. L. REv. 373-406 (1935); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961-995, ll86-1215 (1935). Accord:
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §405 (1944). The Restatement and Professor
Schnebly refer to prohibitions on alienation as "disabling restraints."
Id. §404. The statement in the text does not apply to provisions of a
trust instrument restraining alienation by the trustee. As to these see
Schnebly, 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PRoPERTY, §26.13 and Chapter 8, infra.
1os Anonymous, Liber Assissarum 33 Edw. III, pl. 11 (1359); Mayn
v. Cros, Y.B. 14 Hen. IV, Mich., pl. 6 (1412); Anonymous Y.B. 21 Hen.
VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443); Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 3
(1493); Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28 (1494); Anonymous, Y.B. 13 Hen. VII, Pasch., pl. 9 (1498); Vernon's Case, 4 Co. Rep.
1a, 3b, 76 Eng. Rep. 845, 854 (1572); Shailard v. Baker, Cro. Eliz. 744,
78 Eng. Rep. 977 (1600); Statham, ABRIDGEMENT, "Conditions," pl. 12
(1495); Brooke, GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT, "Conditions," pl. 57, 135, 239
(1573); 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 222b-223a. Shailard v. ·Baker involved a
condition in a will, the other cases conditions in inter vivos conveyances.
As in the case of estates tail, restraint by way of penalty on types of
conveyance which had purely tortious operation, working a discontinuance, were upheld. Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28
(1494); Brooke, td., pl. 239.
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obtains in this country.
Sir Thomas Littleton, writing in the fifteenth century, expressed the rule in this
wise,
109

"Sect. 360. Also, if a feoffment be made upon this
condition, that the feofee shall not alien the land to
any, this condition is void, because when a man is infeoffed of lands or tenements, he hath power to alien
them to any person by the law. For if such a condition
should be good, then the condition should oust him of
all the power which the law gives him, which should be
against reason, and therefore such a condition is void." 110
So much is clear. Unfortunately for the clarity of the
law, Sir Thomas added,
"Sect. 361. But if the condition be such, that the
feofee shall not alien to such a one, naming his name, or
to any of his heirs, or of the issues of such a one, etc.,
or the like, which conditions do not take away all power
of alienation from the feoffee, etc. then such condition
is good." 111
Littleton's exception to the general rule was repeated
by way of dictum in a case decided twelve years after
the publication of his treatise, 112 but it seems inconsistent with the reasoning of the opinions which declare
the general rule. 113 Those cases hold that conditions in
restraint of alienation of an estate in fee simple are void
109 The cases are collected in Gray, REsTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d
ed., 8-25 (1895); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.15 (1952) and the articles
cited in note 107 supra. Accord: PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT §406, comment d, §407 (1944).
110 TENURES §360 (1481).
111 I d., §361; 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 223a-223b. See Sheppard, ToucHSTONE ON COMMON AssURANCES 129-130 (1648); Sweet, "Restraints on
Alienation," 33 L.Q. REv. 236 at 242-243 (1917).
112 Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 3, f. lOb
(1493), per
Hussey, C.J.
113 Pearson, J., in In re Rosher, [1884] 26 Ch. Div. 801 at 813-814.
Chancellor Kent says of this section, "But this case falls within the
general principle, and it may be very questionable whether such a
condition would be good at this day.'' 4 CoMMENTARIES •131.
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because, (1) they are repugnant to the grant, that is,
their operation would tend to deprive the estate of the
inseparable incident of alienability conferred upon it by
the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum/ 14 and (2) restraints on alienation may be imposed only in favor of
a reversion or remainder following the estate restrained,
and, by force of the same statute, no reversion or remainder may follow a fee simple. 115 In a case decided
in 1443 Mr. Justice Paston argued that the existence of
a reversion or remainder had no bearing, that restraints
on alienation were void only because of "inconvenience." l:Hl This view was decisively rejected, not only in
that case but in the sixteenth and seventeenth century
decisions which developed the law of restraints on alienation on estates in fee tail, for life and for years. Nevertheless, some modern writers, notably Professor John
Chipman Gray, have tried to explain and support the
law of restraints on alienation solely on the ground of
public policy, rather than the technical common-law
rules as to estates.111 No doubt there are objections of
114 Anonymous, Liber Assissarum, 33 Edw. III, pl. 11 (1359); Mayn
v. Cros, Y.B. 14 Hen. IV, Mich., pl. 6 (1412); Anonymous, Y.B. 10
Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28 (1494); Anonymous, Y.B. 13 Hen. VII, Pasch.,
pl. 9 (1498); Shailard v. Baker, Cro. Eliz. 744, 78 Eng. Rep. 977 (1600).
m Yelverton, J., in Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443);
Hussey, C. J., in Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 3 (1493); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 23 IowA L. REv. 1 at 11-13
(1938).
116 Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443). He was contending that restraints on alienation in a lease for years are void, a
contention long since overruled.
11 7 Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., ll (1895); Sweet, "Restraints on Alienation," !13 L.Q. REv. 2!16, 243 (1917); Schnebly, "Reatraints upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961-966
(19!15); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, Introductory Note to Div. IV, Part
II, "Rationale." Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation since Gray," 48 HARV. L. REv. 373-374 (1935), appears to recognize the inadequacy of public policy as an explanation of the law as
it is, and Professor Schnebly's most recent study of the subject does
likewise. "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.25 (1952).
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public policy to a complete restraint on alienation of
property for an extended period, but public policy alone
does not explain the technical rules which govern restraints on alienation of estates in fee simple. For example, where, as in Michigan, 118 the Rule in Shelley's
Case has been abolished, it is possible to convey a life
estate to John Stiles, remainder in fee simple to his
heirs, with a proviso that if John transfers his life estate
it shall be forfeited. Professor Gray would concede the
validity of this penalty restraint upon the alienation of
the life estate. 119 On the other hand, if land is conveyed
to John Stiles in fee simple with a proviso that if John
transfers an estate for his own life his estate in fee simple
shall be forfeited and the land pass to Andrew Baker
for the life of John and then to John's heirs, the restraint
upon alienation is in Professor Gray's opinion, void.uo
So far as removing land from commerce is concerned,
one restraint has an effect which is virtually identical
with that of the other. Public policy is no explanation
of why one is good and the other bad. The true explanation was given us five hundred years ago by Mr. Justice
Hankford, who pointed out that the statute Quia Emptores T errarum conferred an inseparable incident of
alienability upon every estate in fee simple, 121 and by
Mr. Justice Yelverton, who pointed out that the statute
prohibited the retention of a reversion after a fee simple
to which the restraint on alienation could be annexed. 122
Professor Maitland remarked, "The forms of action
we have buried, but they still rule us from their
118

Note 89 supra.

119 RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION,

2d ed., 72 (1895).

1 20

I d. at 33-42.

121

Mayn v. Cros, Y.B. 14 Hen. IV, Mich., pl. 6 (1412).
Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443).
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graves." 123 So it is with the doctrine of estates. The
nineteenth century saw numerous efforts to abolish common-law rules of property, such as the Rule in Shelley's
Case, which operate to defeat intention. The theory behind such efforts seems to have been that the real, subjective intention of every testator and grantor should be
carried out fully unless the effect of its execution is contrary to public policy. The success of these efforts, like
the contemporary efforts to abolish the forms of action,
has been much qualified. We may be thankful that it
is so. The judges of the thirteenth century remembered
a period when great stress had been laid upon carrying
out the intention of the donor, no matter how whimsical or capricious, unless it contravened some ill-defined
standard of public policy. They knew the effect of such
a stress, namely, that there can be innumerable types of
interests in land with widely varying and doubtful incidents; that the effect of a conveyance is uncertain until
there has been litigation to determine the true intent of
the donor and its compatibility with public policy. They
sought to achieve simplicity and certainty as to titles by
limiting the possible interests in land to a very few, with
fixed and inseparable incidents. They must have known
that, in doing so, they were defeating the intention of
donors. But the land belongs to the living, not to the
dead. The generation now alive should have certain
titles and known rights of enjoyment, even at the expense of thwarting the expressed wish of some long-dead
and half-forgotten testator or donor. The rules which
Justices Hankford and Yelverton laid down were not unreasonable. The law of their day permitted perpetually
inalienable estates in fee tail; why should it permit any
other inalienable estate of inheritance? The owner of
12s FoRMS OF
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a reversion or vested remainder which is certain to become possessory within a relatively few years has a real
interest in the personal characteristics of the tenant in
possession; no one else has sufficient interest to warrant
allowing him to interfere with alienation by the tenant
in possession.
If the true basis of the rules governing restraints on
alienation of estates in fee simple lies in the two provisions of the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum, no such
restraint should be valid, and Mr. Justice Littleton's ex.ception in Section 361 as to restraints limited to alienation to a named man, his heirs or issue, is wrong in principle. Even if it is sound, it should not be extended to
restraints which are more comprehensive than the examples he gives. Littleton's statement in Section 360 of
the general invalidity of restraints on alienation of fees
simple describes a restraint which is limited in time to
the lifetime of the feoffee/ 24 Hence his statement that
conditions which "do not take away all power of alienation" 125 are good cannot extend to restraints which are
general in scope and limited only in duration. 126 Certainly it should not be extended to the converse of the
example given, i.e., to a restraint upon all alienation
except to a certain person. 127
Probably because it is inconsistent with the commonlaw doctrine of estates and so an unsure foundation for
further development, Section 361 of Littleton's Tenures,
asserting the validity of limited penalty restraints on
alienation of estates in fee simple, has caused confusion
Note llO supra.
Note ll1 supra.
126 In re Rosher, [1884] 26 Ch. Div. 801.
127 Mr. Serjeant Bridgman in Muschamp v. Bluet,
137, 123 Eng. Rep. 1253 at 1256 (1617).
124
125

J.

Bridg. 132 at
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in the law, both in England and in this country. 128 The
Restatement of Property takes the position that a penalty restraint upon alienation of a legal possessory estate
in fee simple is valid if (1) qualified so as to permit alienation to some though not all possible alienees, and (2)
reasonable under the circumstances.129 This rule denies
the validity of restraints which are general in scope so
far as alienees are concerned but qualified as to duration 130 or as to manner of alienation,131 but in other
respects it does not provide a certain and definite standard against which to test the validity of limited restraints.
B.

RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION BY DEED

The Michigan statutes adopt the common-law classification of estates in land into estates of inheritance,
estates for life, estates for years, and estates at will and
by sufferance, and establish the estate in fee simple as the
only permissible type of estate of inheritance. 132 As these
1zs The English cases are collected in Sweet, "Restraints on Alienation," 33 L.Q. REv. 236-253, 342-362 (1917); the American cases in
Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 25-69 (1895); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROP·
ERTY, §§26.19 to 26.34 (1952) and the articles cited in note 107 supra.
Much of the English confusion was eliminated by Justice Pearson's
wise reliance in In re Rosher, [1884] 26 Ch. Div. 801 on the reasoning
in Justice Christiancy's brilliant opinion in Mandlebaum v. McDonell,
29 Mich. 78 (1874).
129 Sections 406, 407 (1944). This, in effect, means that a penalty
restraint which permits alienation only to members of a very small
group is void but one which permits alienation to anyone except members of a relatively small group is valid. This view is supported by
considerable American authority. Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§26.31 to 26.34
(1952).
1so I d., §406, comment e. This view is supported by the great weight
of American authority. Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of
Property," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.19 (1952).
131 I d., §406, comment f. See: Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.34 (1952).
132 Rev.
Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§l to 5; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2585 to
2589; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4068 to 4072; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8783
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statutory provisions were adopted verbatim from the
New York Revised Statutes of 1830, Chancellor Kent's
remark, "The technical language of the common law
was too deeply rooted in our usages and institutions, to
be materially affected by legislative enactments," 133 is
apt. In adopting the common-law classification of
estates, our legislature must have intended to give the
terms the meaning they had at common law, that is, to
adopt the common-law definitions and incidents of
estates, except as they are modified by our statutes. So
far as legal estates are concerned, our statutory modifications tend to increase alienability. They certainly do
not favor restrictions upon it. The incidents of an
estate in fee simple were fixed in part by the statute Quia
Emptores Terrarum. The term "fee simple" has no
meaning in the developed common law without assuming that fixation. Our courts have assumed, as indeed
they must, that by adopting the term, the statutes adopt
the incidents of the estate as known to the developed
common law. 134
Walton v. Torrey 135 was a suit brought by the widow
and children of Jesse Hicks, who died in 1825 leaving
a will directing that his land remain undivided in the
use and occupation of his children until the youngest
should reach twenty-one, then to be divided among them
and the heirs of any who might die, subject to a life
estate of the widow in the homestead and a third of the
to 8787; How. Stat. §§5517 to 5521; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11519 to
11523; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12921 to 12925; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.1
to 26.5; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.1 to 554.5.
133 4 CoMMENTARIES, * 3.
134 See Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 at 92 (1874). The
will involved in this case became operative before the effective date of
the Revised Statutes of 1846, but the Revised Statutes of 1838 had
adopted, at least by implication, the common-law classification of estates, including fees simple. Pp. 257-269.
135 Harr. Ch. 259 (Mich. circa 1836).
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profits of the farm. The widow and a son who was of
age conveyed their interests to the defendant, and the
interest of the minor children was conveyed to the defendant under license of the probate court. Chancellor
Farnsworth denied an injunction against the defendant's
asserting title under these conveyances, saying that the
direction against division should not be construed as an
attempt to inhibit any of the devisees from conveying
whatever interest he possessed, and that provisions in
restraint of alienation are not to be favored. The will,
as so construed, did not purport to restrain the type of
transfer involved, so there was no occasion for a decision as to the validity of such a restraint.
Campau v. Chene ~ was a suit to quiet title brought
by the heirs of Jean Baptiste Campau against the devisees of Gabriel Chene. In 1800 Campau conveyed the
land in que.stion to Chene in fee simple, the deed providing that the grantee promised and obligated himself to
pay £1000 and to support the grantor for life,
13

"And for the security of the said payment of one
thousand pounds, in the manner above mentioned, and
for the fulfilling of the clauses and conditions here above
expressed, the said Gabriel cannot give, alienate, exchange or sell the said farm or land, ... without the permission or assent of the said Jean Baptiste Campau, ...
till the payment in full of said one thousand pounds."
The plaintiffs contended that these provisions constituted a condition subsequent and that they were entitled to enter for breach. The court held that the provisions were not a condition but a covenant secured by a
lien on the land, supporting its construction by the remark,
"If the covenant against alienation could be con1s6

1 Mich. 400 (1850).
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sidered a condition, it would be void. For a condition
annexed to a conveyance, in fee or devise, that the purchaser should not alien, is unlawful and void. 4 Kents'
Com. 126." 137

Mandlebaum v. McDonell 138 was a suit to quiet title
to land which now forms part of the site of the Federal
Building in Detroit. John McDonell died in 1846 leaving a will, executed the year before, which, as construed
by the court, devised a legal life estate to his widow with
legal remainder in fee simple to his four sons, an adopted
daughter, and a grandson,
" ... upon the express condition ... that it shall not
be competent for any of my devisees hereinbefore named
to either dispose of, alienate, mortgage, barter, pledge or
transfer any portion of the real estate,"
until the grandson reached twenty-five years of age, or
until twenty-one years from the date of the will in case
of his death, and not then while the widow was living and
had not remarried. During the lifetime of the widow,
who had not remarried, and while the grandson was less
than twenty-five years of age, the four sons, the adopted
daughter, and the grandson executed conveyances of
their remainder interests, under which the plaintiff
claimed. The suit was brought after the death of the
widow against the devisees in remainder and the administrator cum testamento annexo of the testator, who
denied the effectiveness of the conveyances previously
made.
137 ld. at 414. Relief by way of foreclosure of the lien was denied
on the ground of laches. The citation should be to 4 Kent, CoMMENTARIES, *131. This is the passage in which Chancellor Kent questions
the soundness of Justice Littleton's approval of limited restraints on
alienation of a fee simple. Note 113 supra.
13 8 29 Mich. 78, 18 Am. Rep. 61 (1874). This case involves the effect
of a restraint on alienation on a vested remainder in fee rather than
on a possessory estate in fee. It is mentioned here because the ground
of decision necessarily includes possessory estates as well as vested remainders.
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The court, in an excellently reasoned opinion by Mr.
Justice Christiancy which has become a classic exposition of the law of restraints on alienation, determined
that the language of the will purported to restrain
alienation by prohibition, that is, to make conveyances
by the devisees completely ineffective, not merely to penalize them. In words broad enough to extend to all
legal interests, the court denied the validity of such a
prohibition, pointing out that it could have no beneficiary except the devisees themselves, and that an obligation owed only to themselves could be released by
them. "But lest this may be thought too narrow a
ground" the opinion proceeds to a review of the development of the English law of restraints on alienation of
fees simple by way of penalty.139 In language reminiscent of Justices Hankford and Yelverton, Mr. Justice
Christiancy rested the invalidity of such provisions upon
the twin grounds of repugnancy to the grant, i.e., that
they tend to deprive the estate of an inseparable incident conferred upon it by the statute Quia Emptores
Terrarum, and lack of a reversion or remainder to which
the benefit of the restraint can be annexed. He questioned the soundness, in principle, of Littleton's Section
361, pointed out that it related to a restraint limited at
all times as to alienees, and concluded,
"But however competent it may be, under the authorities, to impose upon an estate in fee, a condition against
alienation to certain specified persons, it does not follow,
and the authorities upon the point have no tendency to
show, that a condition against selling such an estate at
tall Id. at 91-107. A condition subsequent, even if valid, could not
have penalized alienation under the peculiar facts of the case. The
devisees were the sole heirs of the testator and so owners o£ any right
of entry on breach of condition subsequent which he might reserve by
his will.
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all to any party or parties, for a long, or for any period
of time, would be valid ....
"We are entirely satisfied there has never been a time
since the statute quia emptores when a restriction in a
conveyance of a vested estate in fee simple, in possession
or remainder, against selling for a particular period of
time, was valid by the common law. And we think it
would be unwise and injurious to admit into the law
the principle contended for by the defendant's counsel,
that such restrictions should be held valid, if imposed
only for a reasonable time. It is safe to say that every
estate depending upon such a question would, by the
very fact of such a question existing, lose a large share
of its market value. Who can say whether the time is
reasonable, until the question has been settled in the
court of last resort; and upon what standard of certainty
can the court decide it? . . . The only safe rule of decision is to hold, as I understand the common law for
ages to have been, that a condition or restriction which
would suspend all power of alienation for a single day,
is inconsistent with the estate granted, unreasonable and
void.
"Certainty in the law of real estate, as to the incidents
and nature of the several species of estates and the effect
of the recognized instruments and modes of transfer, is of
too much importance to be sacrificed to the unskillfulness, the whims or caprices of a few peculiar individuals
in isolated cases." 140
An earlier passage in the opinion had pointed out
that a restraint on alienation, of the same scope and
duration, could, perhaps, have been imposed validly by
means of the trust device. 141 The quoted language makes
14o I d. at 97, 107. Fuller v. McKim, 187 Mich. 667, 154 N.W. 55
(1915). involved a restraint on alienation of a fee simple general in
scope but limited in duration. A testatrix domiciled in Michigan devised in fee New York land which was subject to a twenty-year lease
with a direction that the land should not be sold during the term of
the existing lease. The court refused to determine the validity of this
restraint, saying it was a question for the New York courts. See also
Bennett v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889).
141 29 Mich. 78 at 88. See notes 548. 549. infra.
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it clear, therefore, that the decision in Mandelbaum v.
McDonell is not based upon any public policy favoring
free alienability of land; it is grounded squarely upon
the technical common-law rules of estates, rules which
were made and which still operate to make interests in
land certain and definite.
Barrie v. Smith 142 did not involve a direct restraint on
alienation, but it did raise a problem which has an important bearing upon the validity of penalty restraints
on alienation under our statutes. The plaintiffs had conveyed land in fee simple by a deed providing that if the
grantees, their heirs or assigns, should sell or keep for
sale intoxicating liquor thereon or permit anyone under
them to do so, title should revert to the grantors, their
heirs and assigns, and they might re-enter. Defendant,
a mesne purchaser from the original grantees, commenced operating a saloon on the land and plaintiffs
brought ejectment to enforce their right of entry. The
Michigan statutes provide,
"When any conditions annexed to a grant or conveyance of lands are merely nominal, and evince no intention of actual and substantial benefit to the party to
whom or in whose favor they are to be performed, they
may be wholly disregarded, and a failure to perform the
same shall in no case operate as a forfeiture of the lands
conveyed subject thereto." 143
The court held that the plaintiffs could not recover
without proof that performance of the condition would
be of substantial benefit to them; that the benefit of
being able to assert a right of entry upon breach was
47 Mich. 130, 10 N.W. 168 (1881).
Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §46; Comp. Laws (1857) §2630; Comp.
Laws (1871) §4113; Comp. Laws (1897) §8828; How. Stat. §5562;
Comp. Laws (1915) §11564; Comp. Laws (1929) §12966; Mich. Stat.
Ann. §26.46; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.46.
142

143
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not in itself sufficient to validate the condition. This
statutory provision, so interpreted, evinces a policy analogous to the common-law rule that conditions in restraint of alienation are valid only if imposed for the
benefit of a reversion or remainder in the lands involved.
That the statutory rule is narrower than that of the
common law, however, is shown by the decision of the
court, after the plaintiffs had proved on a new trial that
they owned a mill near the land in question and were
interested in keeping their employees sober, that such
a benefit, arising from ownership of land other than
that burdened with it, was sufficient to support the condition.144 The operation of the statute was narrowed
further by a later decision that it is applicable only to
conditions in inter vivos conveyances and does not invalidate conditions in wills. 145 Even as so limited, however, the statute may operate to invalidate some conditions which, because imposed upon estates less than a
fee simple for the benefit of a reversion or remainder in
the same land, would be valid at common law.
Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Pettys 146 was a suit to foreclose a mortgage given by Daniel Pettys, who died before
the suit was started. Before executing the mortgage,
Pettys had entered into an ante-nuptial contract with
144 Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314, 22 N.W. 816 (1885). The opinion,
by Cooley, C. J., contains dictum that a condition in general restraint
of alienation is always void. 56 Mich. 317, 22 N.W. 818. The decision is
criticized in Fratcher, "Defeasance as a Restrictive Device in Michigan,"
52 MICH. L. REv. 505 at 519-520 (1954).
145 Johnson v. Warren, 74 Mich. 491, 42 N.W. 74 (1889). Another
later decision broadens the operation of the statute beyond its express
words by holding that the substantial benefit must continue to the
time of breach. Abraham v. Stewart, 83 Mich. 7, 46 N.W. 1030 (1890).
146 59 Mich. 482, 26 N.W. 680 (1886). In Mertens v. Mertens, 314
Mich. 651, 23 N.W. (2d) 114 (1946), the court approved a provision in
a divorce decree, inserted by consent, which forbade either party to
dispose of the property assigned to him without the consent of the
court. Such approval seems unsound and a dangerous precedent when
it is recalled that for centuries most English conveyancing was done
by means of collusive or consent judgments.
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the defendant in which he covenanted that, if the defendant survived him, his executors, administrators or assigns would convey the land to the defendant in fee,
and both parties covenanted,
"that neither party hereto, during the lifetime of the
other party, shall bargain, sell, alien, or convey, or shall
incumber by mortgage, lease or otherwise, the said
premises, without being joined by the other party in
such bargain, sale, alienation, conveyance or incumbrance.''
The court affirmed a decree dismissing the bill in
language which implies the validity of the quoted restraint on alienation. On its face this decision would
appear to constitute specific enforcement of a covenant
in general restraint of alienation of an estate in fee
simple. Specific enforcement of such a covenant seems
to have been denied even before the enactment of the
statute Quia Emptores Terrarum. 147 If granted, it converts the restraint on alienation into a prohibition which
forces the owner to retain the land in spite of his efforts
to transfer it, thus imposif).g much more than a penalty
for alienation. In actuality however, the ante-nuptial
contract was a covenant to stand seised which operated
as a conveyance of a contingent springing use to the defendant. The only thing decided was that Petty's mortgage could not bind his wife's contingent future interest. That result would follow even if there had been
no attempt to impose a restraint on alienation by covenant. The validity of the covenant against alienation was
not involved in the decision, and the case is not properly a precedent as to the validity or specific enforcibility
of such a covenant. Nevertheless, it stands in the books.
a trap for the unwary.
147

Note 5 supra.
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Smith v. Smith 148 was an action of ejectment brought
by the executor of Joseph Smith, deceased. Joseph had
executed a quit-claim deed conveying land to his son
Thomas "and to his heirs for the use, benefit, and support of himself and his family, and the proper education of his children," habendum, "to have and to hold
for the period of his natural life, and after his death to
his children in fee-simple," Thomas covenanting,

"That he will, during the period of his
keep and preserve the same free and clear
liens, and incumbrances ....
"That he will make no conveyance of
therein during the life-time of any of his
of any of his brothers and sisters."

natural life,
from levies,
any interest
children, or

Thomas conveyed the land to the defendant, his wife,
and died, leaving a will by which he devised all his land
to the defendant. Thomas had no children. It is inferable from the opinion that he had brothers and sisters
living at the time of his death. The plaintiff proceeded
on the theory that the deed to Thomas conveyed only
a life estate, with contingent remainder to his children.
The court rejected this contention, holding that the
habendum was repugnant to the grant and so void;
that the deed conveyed to Thomas a fee simple, which
was owned by the defendant at the time of trial. The
opinion does not decide whether the defendant's title
rested on her husband's deed or on his will. Neither
court nor counsel raised the question of the validity of
the covenants against alienation, but it may be inferred that, if the habendum was void as repugnant to
the grant, the covenants were also. The action being in
ejectment, however, the decision is not a precedent as
to the enforcibility of such covenants.
148

71 Mich. 633, 40 N.W. 21 (1888).
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Bassett v. Budlong 149 was an action of ejectment
brought by the heirs of Annette Budlong. In 1873
William H. Budlong had executed a quit-claim deed
of the land to Annette, his wife, in the form usual to
conveyance of a fee simple. Following the habendum
the following language was inserted:

"Provided, always, and this indenture is made (in all
respects) upon these express conditions and reservations, that is to say: First, it is reserved that said party
of the second part shall not, at any time during the lifetime of the said party of the first part, convey to any
person or persons, by deed, mortgage, or otherwise, the
whole or any part of the said premises, as above described, without the written assent of the said party of
the first part, or his joining in such conveyance. Second,
it is further reserved that, in case of the decease or death
of the said Annette Budlong, party of the second part,
at any time before the decease or death of the said
William H. Budlong, party of the first part, then, in
such case, and upon such decease, the said premises, ...
shall forthwith, upon said decease, revert back unto the
said William H. Budlong, of the first part, and to his
assigns forever."
Annette predeceased her husband and he died, devising the land to the defendant. The court reversed a
judgment for the plaintiffs on the ground that, so far
as the fee was concerned, the conveyance was intended
to be contingent upon the wife's surviving, saying,
''The condition in the deed that his wife should not
convey or mortgage the land without his written assent,
or joining in the deed, is a clear indication that the title
should not pass, because if it was the intention that it
should pass, and the estate vest in his wife, the condition
would be nugatory; and no force or effect be given to
this part of the instrument." 150
149

15o

77 Mich. 338, 43 N.W. 984 (1889).
at 347.

I d.
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The restraint on alienation here involved was merely
a restatement of the common-law disability of a married
woman to convey her land without her husband's consent or joinder.m That disability was removed by the
Married Women's Act of 1855,152 and the language of the
court just quoted is clearly a statement that a condition
purporting to restrain the exercise of the power of
alienation conferred by that act is void. The opinion in
Bassett v. Budlong has sometimes been misunderstood
to assert the validity of conditions in restraint of alienation and so qualify the opinion in Mandlebaum v. McDonell.158 It does not do so; indeed, it reasserts and extends the doctrine of that opinion.
In re Estate of Schilling 154 was an appeal from a probate order of distribution under a will which devised
land to four children of the testatrix and the children of
a fifth and provided,
"None of my said real estate shall be sold or divided
between my said heirs before my youngest child is at
the age of 21 years."
Restated in Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 85, §25.
"The real and personal estate of every female . . . may be contracted, sold, transferred, mortgaged, conveyed, devised or bequeathed
by her in the same manner and with like effect as if she were unmarried." Act 168, P. A. 1855; Comp. Laws (1857) §3292; Comp. Laws
(1871) §4803; Comp. Laws (1897) §8690; How. Stat. §6295; Comp.
Laws (1915) §11485; Comp. Laws (1929) §13057; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§26.161; Comp. Laws (1948) §557.1. The power to devise and bequeath was conferred by the Constitutions of 1850 and 1908. CoNsT.
1850, art. 16, §5; CoNST. 1908, art. 16, §8.
15S Note 138 supra. It was held in Watkins v. Minor, 214 Mich. 380,
183 N.W. 186 (1921), that Bassett v. Budlong does not overrule or
modify Mandlebaum v. McDonell.
154102 Mich. 612 sub nom. Moore v. Schindehette, 61 N.W. 62
(1894). The opinion contains language (102 Mich. 617, 61 N.W. 63)
which may mean that a restraint on alienation of a defeasibly vested
interest is valid, even though the interest is possessory, at least so long
as the defeasibility exists. The soundness of such a view is very questionable. See PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §§407, 411 (1944); note 370
infra.
151
15'2
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The court held that this prohibition on alienation was
void as attempting to deprive an estate in fee of one of
its essential features, the right to convey, and so repugnant to the nature of the estate.
Howard v. McCarthy 155 was an action of ejectment
brought by the heirs of Shepard L. Howard. In 1872
Francis A. Howard and Abbie L. Patrick conveyed lands
to Shepard L. Howard by separate quit-claim deeds,
each, as to grant and habendum, in the form usual to
conveyance of a fee simple. The following provision
was inserted between the grant and habendum of one
deed,
"And it is provided that the said party of the second
part shall not sell the above described lands and premises, but that after his decease the above described
lands and premises shall descend to the heirs of the
aforesaid Shepard L. Howard."
The other deed contained a provision, inserted in the
same position, as follows:
"And it is hereby provided and the intention of this
conveyance is declared to be that the said party of the
second part shall have the use and possession only of the
premises above conveyed, but not the power or right to
sell the same, and after his decease the said bargained
land and premises shall descend to the heirs of the aforesaid Shepard L. Howard."
In 1889 Shepard L. Howard, Francis A. Howard, and
Abbie L. Patrick joined in a conveyance of the land
under which the defendants claimed. A judgment for
the defen_dants was affirmed by an equally divided court.
The justices who favored reversal thought that the deeds
conveyed a life estate to Shepard L. Howard with contingent remainder in fee to his heirs, and that the pro155

232 Mich. 175, 205 N.W. 169 (1925).

PRESENT LEGAL ESTATES IN FEE SIMPLE

59

hibitions on alienation were intended only to prevent
his destroying the contingent remainder, which he could
not do in any event under the Michigan statutes. 156 The
justices who favored affirmance seem to have agreed with
the defendants' contentions that the 1872 deeds conveyed a fee simple to Shepard L. Howard and that the
prohibitions on alienation of that estate were void.
Their opinion suggests that if the 1872 deeds conveyed
only a life estate, the reversion in fee was left in Francis
A. Howard and Abbie L. Patrick and passed by their
joinder in the 1889 deed. The latter construction seems
definitely unsound. The proper construction would appear to be that contended for by the defendants, that
the 1872 deeds conveyed a fee simple and that the prohibitions on alienation, although limited in duration
to the life of the grantee, were void under the rule laid
down in Mandlebaum v. McDonell. 157 Although the
result reached is in harmony with this view, it would
seem unfortunate that the court did not take this opportunity to reaffirm the doctrine of the Mandlebaum
case in clear and unmistakable terms.
Porter v. Barrett 1.s 8 ranks with Mandlebaum v. McDonell as a leading case on the law of restraints on alienation. The plaintiffs sold land by executory contract
to Louis Parent, who assigned his interest to Wilbratt
Barrett with the consent of the vendors.. The contract
provided, "This land is sold upon express condition
that the . . . same shall never be sold or rented to a
colored person." Barrett, by separate executory con1.ss Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §34, c. 65, §4; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2618,
2723; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4101, 4206; How. Stat. §§5550, 5654;
Comp. Laws (1897) §§8816, 8958; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11552, 11690;
Comp. Laws (1929) §§12954, 13280; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.34, 26.523;
Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.34, 565.4.
1.57 Note 138 supra.
15 8 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532, 42 A.L.R. 1267 (1925).
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tract, sold the land to Wilson Robinson, a colored person. The plaintiffs sought to assert a right of entry for
breach of condition by summary proceedings for possession against Barrett and Robinson. A judgment for the
defendants on procedural grounds was affirmed on the
ground the condition was void as an illegal restraint on
alienation of an estate in fee simple.
The opinion of the court, written by Mr. Justice Fellows, points out that the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum made free alienability an inseparable incident of
estates in fee simple and reaffirms the view of Chancellor
Kent and Mr. Justice Christiancy that Littleton's Section 361 and the English and American cases based upon
it, holding valid limited restraints on alienation of a
fee simple, are inconsistent in principle with the statute
of Edward I. It having been ruled in Mandlebaum v.
McDonell that a restraint general in scope but limited
as to duration is void for this reason, it follows, by parity
of reasoning, that a restraint limited as to alienees but
unlimited in duration is equally inconsistent with the
principle laid down by the statute and likewise void.
After quoting Mr. Justice Christiancy's statement, "that
a condition or restriction which would suspend all power
of alienation for a single day, is inconsistent with the
estate granted, unreasonable and void," 159 the opinion
presses this argument to its sound and ultimate conclusion in the following language:
"Now if a restraint on alienation for a single day is
bad, how can it be said that a restraint on alienation to
a large class of citizens or a small one, or to even one is
good? If it is not for the courts to determine what would
be a reasonable time to restrain alienation, how can it
be left to the courts to say whether a restraint on aliena159

Note 140 supra.
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tion to a class is reasonable or not? We must bear in
mind that we are not dealing with a restraint on the
use of the premises. Such restraints unless unreasonable
have quite uniformly been upheld. Before the sale of
intoxicating liquor was prohibited, this court and practically every court of last resort in the Union upheld
restraints of the use of premises for its manufacture or
sale. Such a restraint upon the use was uniformly upheld; but would a restraint on sale of premises to one
who was engaged in the sale of intoxicating liquors elsewhere be valid? I think not. Restraints upon the erection of manufacturing plants in residential districts have
uniformly been upheld, but would a restraint of sale to
one engaged in the manufacturing business be valid? I
think not. Restraint on the occupancy of premises in
residential districts by colored people has been upheld
by this court. Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625.uQ Does
it follow that a restraint upon the right to sell property
to a colored man is valid? I think not. I think the holding and the reasons for the holding in Mandlebaum v.
McDonell, supra, precludes us from sustaining as valid
the restrictions before us.161
1oo 188 N.W. 330 (1922). Michigan adhered to the rule that a restriction against occupancy by members of a particular race is valid
and specifically enforceable until overruled on constitutional grounds
by the United States Supreme Court. In Schulte v. Starks, 238 Mich.
102, 213 N.W. 102 (1927) a provision, "that the granted premises
shall not be sold, rented or leased to any person or class of persons
whose ownership or occupancy would be mjurious to the locality,"
was enforced by an injunction against occupancy by colored persons.
The opinion reiterates the rule in Porter v. Barrett that restraint on
alienation to members of a racial group is void as such. Northwest
Civic Association v. Sheldon, 317 Mich. 416, 27 N.W. (2d) 36 (1947);
Mrsa v. Reynolds, 317 Mich. 632, 27 N.W. (2d) 40 (1947); Sipes v.
McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W. (2d) 638 (1947), reversed, McGhee
v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948); Malicke v. Milan, 320 Mich.
65, 30 N.W. (2d) 440 (1948), reversed in conformity to the decision
in McGhee v. Sipes, 320 Mich. 77, 32 N.W. (2d) 353 (1948). Cf.
Kathan v. Stevenson, 307 Mich. 485, 12 N.W. (2d) 332 (1943); Kathan
v. Williams, 309 Mich. 219, 15 N.W. (2d) 137 (1944); Gableman v.
Dept. of Conservation, 309 Mich. 416, 15 N.W. (2d) 689 (1944); Saari
v. Silvers, 319 Mich. 591, 30 N.W. (2d) 286 (1948).
161 233 Mich. 373 at 382-383, 206 N.W. 532. The opinion in Porter
v. Barrett treats the condition against alienation as if it were annexed
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In Braun v. Klug 162 the defendants conveyed land to
the plaintiffs in fee simple by a deed which provided,
"grantees herein specifically covenant and agree that
the above property will not be sold to anyone except
grantors herein or their heirs, representatives or assigns. It is agreed that this covenant shall run with the
land." The Court held "the condition in the deed - - is repugnant to the grant and a restraint on the inherent
right of alienation and therefore void." This decision
completed the development of the Michigan law of
restraints on alienation by holding that a covenant in
restraint of alienation is void where a condition subsequent would be invalid.
At common law a conveyance in fee simple to two or
to a conveyance of a legal possessory estate in fee simple, whereas it
actually was a provision of an executory land contract. It was later
decided in Sloman v. Cutler, 258 Mich. 372, 242 N.W. 735 (1932), notes
716, 719, infra, that a provision in an executory land contract against
assignment without the consent of the vendor is valid, at least for some
purposes. Such a provision against assignment is, however, inserted
for the protection of the vendor's quasi-reversionary interest. The restraint in Porter v. Barrett was intended to be inserted in the deed
given pursuant to the contract, for the benefit not of the vendor's
interest but of other lands in the vicinity. Moreover, there was no
assignment in Porter v. Barrett.
Act 230, P.A. 1897, Comp. Laws (1897) §§7618 to 7638; Comp. Laws
(1915) §§10034 to 10056; Comp. Laws (1929) §§10304 to 10326; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §§21.661 to 21.683; Comp. Laws (1948) §§455.1 to 455.24,
authorizes the organization of corporations to hold property for summer resort or park purposes, permits their by-laws to prohibit transfer
of stock without the consent of the board of directors, and provides
that lands "assigned, allotted, or confirmed" to stockholders shall be
deemed appurtenant to the stock and not transferable separately. In
In re Berry, (D.C. Mich. 1917) 247 F. 700, Judge Tuttle expressed the
view that this statute permitted such a corporation to convey land to
stockholders in fee simple subject to a condition subsequent providing
for forfeiture upon alienation separately from the stock or contrary to
the rules of the corporation governing transfer of stock. It seems improbable that the legislature intended to authorize such a fettered fee
simple. The language of the statute seems to contemplate that the
corporation shall retain the fee and give stockholders only leases or
licenses.
162 335 Mich. 692, 57 N.W. (2d) 299 (1953).
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more persons created a joint tenancy unless it specified
that they were to hold as tenants in common.m If one
joint tenant died, the survivor or survivors took the
whole, and this right of survivorship could not be cut
off by the will of the tenant so dying. 164 If, however, one
joint tenant made an inter vivos conveyance, the joint
tenancy was severed, and the transferee took an undivided interest as tenant in common which was not
subject to the right of survivorship and could, therefore, be transmitted by will. 165 The Michigan statutes
change the common-law presumption, so that a conveyance to two or more persons creates a tenancy in common "unless expressly declared to be in joint tenancy,"
but provide that the nature and properties of estates in
joint tenancy and in common, "shall continue to be
such as are now established by law, except so far as the
same may be modified by the provisions" of the statutes.166
Smith v. Smith 167 involved a transaction in which J.
N. Smith conveyed land to a straw party who at once
conveyed in fee simple to J. N. Smith and D. R. Smith
as joint tenants by a deed which provided,
1ss Littleton, TENURES §277 (1481).
164 I d., §287. See Butler and Baker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 25a, 76 Eng.

Rep. 684 (1591).
165 Littleton, TENURES §§292, 294.
166 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§43, 44; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2627, 2628;
Comp. Laws (1871) §§4110, 4111; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8825, 8826;
How. Stat. §§5559, 5560; Comp. Laws (1915) §§II561, ll562; Comp.
Laws (1929) §§12963, 12964; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.43, 26.44; Comp.
Laws (1948) §§554.43, 554.44.
167 290 Mich. 143, 287 N.W. 411, 124 A.L.R. 215 (1939). The joint
tenancy in fee simple involved in this case must be distinguished from
a joint tenancy for life with contingent remainder in fee to the
survivor. In the latter case one tenant cannot cut off the remainder.
Schultz v. Brohl, 116 Mich. 603, 74 N.W. 1012 (1898); Finch v. Haynes,
144 Mich. 352, 107 N.W. 910 (1906); Ames v. Cheyne, 290 Mich. 215,
287 N.W. 439 (1939); Rowerdink v. Carothers, 334 Mich. 454, 54 N.W.
(2d) 715 (1952); Danahey, "The Confusing Right of Survivorship," 32
MICH. ST. BAR J. L. 14-17 (Feb. 1953).
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"It is a part of the consideration for which this deed
is given that neither of the parties of the second part
hereto shall or can sell, deed, mortgage, or in any way
incumber or dispose of his interest in said premises or
any part thereof without the consent of the other party
in writing."

J.

N. Smith, without the consent of his cotenant, conveyed his interest to the defendant, and later died. D. R.
Smith claimed title to the whole by survivorship, arguing that the prohibition on alienation was valid because annexed to and for the benefit of another interest
in the same land. This argument assumed, of course,
that the only basis for the common-law rule against restraints on alienation on estates in fee simple was the
provision of the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum prohibiting reversions or remainders on such an estate. As
has been seen, the rule has two bases, the other being
that the statute makes alienability an inseparable incident of every estate in fee simple. The court, recognizing the latter basis of the rule, held that the prohibition
on alienation "was repugnant to the grant and a restraint on the inherent right of alienation and therefore
void." 168 Accordingly, J. N. Smith's conveyance to the
defendant gave her an undivided half of the land as
tenant in common in fee simple, and her estate was not
cut off by the failure of J. N. Smith to survive his for290 Mich. 157, 287 N.W. 416. Accord as to result: PROPERTY RE§406, comment c (1944). In Portage Grange No. 16 v.
Portage Lodge No. 340, 141 Mich. 402, 104 N.W. 667 (1905), the grange
leased a lodge room to the lodge for use in common by them, the
lease providing that the room should not be rented to any other lodge
without the consent of both lessor and lessee. The grange rented the
room to another society without the lodge's consent and sued the
lodge in equity for an injunction against interference with the new
tenant's use of the room. A decree for the defendant was affirmed, the
court assuming without discussion that the restraint on alienation was
valid. The opinion does not state whether the grange owned a fee
simple or some lesser estate. See note 388 infra.
1 68
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mer cotenant. The court was careful to point out that,
inasmuch as one tenant by the entirety is disabled by
law from alienating his interest without the concurrence of his cotenant,169 the decision does not extend
to estates held by the entirety.
As to restraints on alienation of possessory estates in
fee simple by way of prohibition or penalty of forfeiture,
Michigan has achieved that clarity and certainty which
was the dream of the judges of the thirteenth century.
All such restraints, whether general in scope and unlimited in duration or limited as to duration or alienees,
are void. The law as to the validity and specific enforcibility of covenants or contracts imposing like restraints
has not been so fully worked out, but the decisions made
point to the same result: all restraints on alienation of
estates in fee simple are void. The fettered inheritances
permitted by the statute De Donis Conditionalibus have
been eliminated and the confusion in the law introduced
by Section 361 of Littleton's treatise has been dispelled.
To paraphrase Sir Edward Coke's nostalgic reference to
the good old days before De Donis Conditionalibus, we
have attained a state of the law in which purchasers are
sure of their purchases, tenants of their leases, and creditors of their debts.m

C.

RESTRAINTS ON TESTATION AND DESCENT

In the process by which the mediaeval judges limited
the number and fixed the incidents of the possible
estates in land, they developed rules of descent for estates
of inheritance.171 In the place of widely varying modes
169
Naylor v. Minock, 96 Mich. 182, 55 N.W. 664 (1893); Dickey v.
Converse, 117 Mich. 449, 76 N.W. 80 (1898). Accord: PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §406, comment C (1944).
170 1 INSTITUTES 19b.
171 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 171-185 (1923).
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of inheritance prescribed by custom or the form of
gifts, they strove to establish a uniform canon of descent,
applicable to all estates of inheritance. The statute De
Donis Conditionalibus partially thwarted this process of
unification and simplification so far as entails were concerned, but it did not prevent the creation of a single
rule of inheritance applicable to every estate in fee
simple.172 This rule of inheritance became, like alienability inter vivos, an inseparable incident of the estate.
Any attempt to deprive an estate in fee simple of heritability or to endow it with a peculiar mode of descent
not following the course fixed by the general law, is repugnant to the grant and void. 173 The Michigan statutes
governing descent are so worded as to suggest that they
make heritability according to the statute an inseparable
incident of every estate in fee simple. 174 Consequently, it
may be predicted that the Michigan courts will hold void
any provision of a conveyance or devise in fee simple
17 2 This statement must be qualified by an admission that a few peculiar local customs of descent, such as gavelkind and borough English, did survive. Id. at 256-275. Scrutton, LAND IN FETIERS 53-64
(1886).
1 73 "The law of England has from the earliest times prohibited the
introduction of new modes of devolution of property by operation of
law. Of course a man can direct his property to go according to any
series of limitations that he pleases, but he cannot create a new mode
of devolution by operation of law. If there be a gift in fee, for instance, the donor cannot say that in the event of the donee dying
intestate, the estate shall descend not to his eldest, but to his youngest
son . . . That is, a man cannot give property absolutely, and at the
same time say it shall not devolve according to law." Jessel, M. R.,
in In re Wilcocks' Settlement [1875] 1 Ch. Div. 229 at 231. Accord:
In re Irwin's Estate, Irwin v. Jacobs, 335 Mich. 143, 55 N. W. (2d) 769
(1952). And see Johnson v. Whiton, 159 Mass. 424, 34 N.E. 542 (1893).
1 74 "When any person shall die seized of any lands, tenements or
hereditaments, or of any right thereto, or entitled to any interest
therein in fee simple ... , not having lawfully devised the same, they
shall descend," etc. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 67, §1; Comp. Laws (1857) §2812;
Comp. Laws (1871) §4309; How. Stat. §5772a; Comp. Laws (1897)
§9064; Comp. Laws (1915) §11795; Comp. Laws (1929) §13440; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §27.3178 (150); Comp. Laws (1948) §702.80.
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which would operate to deprive the estate of its incident
of heritability or change the course of inheritance fixed
by law.
The statute Quia Emptores Terrarum did not make
transmissibility by will an incident of the estate in fee
simple and, as has been seen, legal freehold estates in
land were not devisable under the Plantagenets. It is
probable that one of the reasons why the courts did
not enforce wills of land is that they would interfere
with the uniform scheme of inheritance which the courts
had annexed as an inseparable incident to every estate
in fee simple.
The Statute of Wills provided that any person having solely, as co-parcener or in common, an estate in
fee simple,
"from the twentieth day of July in the year of our
Lord God M.D.XL. shall have full and free liberty,
power and authority to give, dispose, will and devise, as
well by his last will and testament in writing, or otherwise by act or acts lawfully executed in his life, all his
said manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any
of them, at his free will and pleasure; any law, statute
or other thing heretofore had, made or used to the contrary notwithstanding." 175
The wording of the Statute of Wills indicates that it
was intended to make devisability an inseparable in175 Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1, §1 (1540), as explained by Stat. 34 & 35
Hen. VIII, c. 5 §§3, 4 (1542); see note 15 supra. Section 14 of the
explanatory act provided that wills of land made by married women
should not be good or effectual. The Michigan statute of wills is
similar. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 68, §1; Comp Laws (1857) §2825; Comp.
Laws (1871) §4322; amended Act 15, P.A. 1873; How. Stat. §5785; Comp.
Laws (1897) §9262; Comp. Laws (1915) §11817; Comp. Laws (1929)
§13478; Mich. Stat. Ann., §27.3178 (71); Comp. Laws (1948) §702.1. As
originally enacted in 1846 the statute permitted married women to
make wills only with the consent of their husbands. This disability
was removed by the Constitution of 1850, and the Married Women's
Act of 1855, note 152 supra. The earlier Michigan statutes of wills
were Act Jan. 31, 1809, 2 L. TERR. MicH. 13; Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 270.
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cident of every estate in fee simple, just as the statute
Quia Emptores Terrarum made alienability inter vivos
an inseparable incident of every such estate, and it has
been so interpreted. A restraint on transmission of an
estate in fee simple by will is void if a like restraint on
inter vivos alienation would be.
If land is conveyed or devised in fee simple, a gift
over upon the death of the first taker if he fails to dispose of the land by will is clearly void.m It restrains
alienation by deed during the life of the first taker and
deprives the estate of the essential incident of heritability. If Andrew Baker devises land to John Stiles, his
heirs and assigns, "but any part undisposed of by the
will of John shall pass, at John's death to Lucy Baker,
her heirs and assigns," the executory limitation to Lucy
is void. If valid, it would prevent John from conveying
in fee by deed and would prevent his heirs from taking
if he died intestate. Conversely, if land is conveyed or
devised in fee simple, a gift over upon the death of the
first taker if he fails to dispose of the land by deed is
void at common law. 177 It deprives the estate of the essential incidents of heritability and of devisability. If
John Stiles devises land to his wife Lucy, her heirs and
assigns, "but what remains undisposed of at her death
shall pass to our children," the executory limitation to
the children is void. Moreover, if land is conveyed or
devised in fee simple, a gift over upon the death of the
first taker if he fails to dispose of the land by deed or
176 Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.37 (1952).
17 7 Gray, REsTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 43-48 (1895); Schnebly,
"Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY, §§26.41 to 26.44 (1952); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the
Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1198-1199
(1935). Accord: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §406, comment f.

PRESENT LEGAL ESTATES IN FEE SIMPLE

69

will is also void at common law.178 It attempts to deprive the estate of the essential incident of heritability.
Although, as has been seen, the true reason why an
executory interest cutting off a fee simple on failure of
its holder to alienate is invalid is that it is a restraint on
alienation by descent, devise or both, the courts have
commonly relied upon the very different reason that,
as such an executory interest would be destructible by
the first taker, it would violate the rule that executory
interests are indestructible. New York and Michigan
have statutes authorizing the creation of destructible
executory interests.179 There is some authority in New
York for the proposition that these statutory provisions
validate a gift over on failure of the first taker of an
estate in fee simple to alienate by deed. 180 There is no
Michigan authority for this proposition and the Michigan cases about to be discussed make it clear that these
statutes have not changed the common law on this point
here.
] ones v. Jones 181 was a suit to construe a will which
devised the testator's estate to his widow,
"to have, hold, use, and enjoy the same, as she may
178 The cases are collected in Gray, REsTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d
ed., 48-69 (1895), Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.42 (1952) and Schnebly,
"Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961,
1186 at 1198-1207 (1935). Professors Gray and Schnebly question the
soundness of the rule because it is not explicable by their theory that
the law of restraints on alienation is based wholly upon a public
policy favoring free alienability of land. Accord with the rule: PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §27, Comment f (1936), §406, comment g (1944).
Annotation 17 A.L.R. (2d) 7-227 (1951).
1.7 9 N.Y. Real Property Law, §57; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §33; Comp.
Laws (1857) §2617; Comp. Laws (1871) §4100; Comp. Laws (1897)
§8815; How. Stat., §5549; Comp. Laws (1915) §11551; Comp. Laws
(1929) §12953; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.33; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.33.
180 Vincent v. Rix, 248 N.Y. 76, 161 N.E. 425 (1928). Contra: Tillman v. Ogren, 227 N.Y. 495, 125 N.E. 821 (1920).
18125 Mich. 401 (1872).
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see fit, and in all respects the same as though it was hers
absolutely and without any limitation or reversion, for
and during her natural life.
"And after the death of my said wife, it is my will,
that my estate . . . that shall remain, should be distributed in manner following, to wit: (three quarters to
named persons and a society); and the remaining onefourth of said estate I desire that my said wife shall dispose of as she sees fit; the division, however, not to take
place until after her death.
"If my said wife shall desire to make sale of any of
my said real estate, in her use and enjoyment of it during her life, it is my will and desire that she have, and
I hereby give her, full power and authority to make such
sale, and to give all necessary deeds of conveyance thereof, and to receive the consideration therefor, to be used
as aforesaid by her during her life."
The court held that the intention expressed in the
will was to give the widow the entire estate in fee simple
absolute and that the second paragraph quoted above
was merely a precatory expression of what the testator
hoped she would do with three quarters of the property
when she was through with it. The court said, however,
that if the second quoted paragraph "should be considered as covering a gift of what should remain, it
would be void, as inconsistent with the absolute estate,
or jus disponendi, previously given." If, as the court
thought, the testator intended to give his widow a fee
simple, this dictum is correct, for the second quoted paragraph of the will would operate to deprive the estate
of its inseparable incidents of heritability and devisability and so be a void restraint on alienation. That is,
a gift over on failure of the first taker to alienate inter
vivos is repugnant to a grant or devise in fee simple.
The dictum in ]ones v. jones has been misunderstood
and has served as the foundation for a line of cases hold-
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ing or assuming that there cannot be a remainder following a life estate if the life tenant is given unlimited
power of inter vivos disposition of the fee. 182 The theory
of these cases, based on authority in other jurisdictions,
is that a gift of a life estate plus an unlimited power of
disposition inter vivos, as a matter of law, and without
regard to the intention expressed, operates to convey a
common-law estate in fee simple. If this premise were
sound in Michigan, the conclusion drawn by the cases
would be correct, i.e., that a gift over on failure of a
tenant in fee simple to alienate inter vivos is a void restraint on heritability and devisability. In Michigan,
1s2 Glover v. Reid, 80 Mich. 228, 45 N.W. 91 (1890) (personalty;
power held limited and so assumed rule of Jones v. Jones inapplicable);
Jones v. Deming, 91 Mich. 481, 51 N.W. 1119 (1892) (realty; same as
preceding); Gadd v. Stoner, 113 Mich. 689, 71 N.W. 1111 (1897)
(realty; same as preceding); In re Mallory's Estate, 127 Mich. 119, 86
N.W. 541, 89 N.W. 348 (1901) (same as preceding); Dills v. La Tour,
136 Mich. 243, 98 N.W. 1004 (1904) (realty; gift over held void on
the basis of the assumed rule of Jones v. Jones); Moran v. Moran, 143
Mich. 322, 106 N.W. 206 (1906) (same as preceding); Killefer v. Bassett,
146 Mich. 1, 109 N.W. 21 (1906) (same as preceding); Turnbull v.
Leavitt, 158 Mich. 545, 123 N.W. 43 (1909); Farlin v. Sanborn, 161 Mich.
615, 126 N.W. 634 (1910) (same as Jones v. Deming); Bateman v.
Case, 170 Mich. 617, 136 N.W. 590 (1912) (same as preceding); White
v. Grand Rapids &: Indiana Ry. Co., 190 Mich. 1, 155 N.W. 719 (1915)
(same as Dills v. La Tour); Laberteaux v. Gale, 196 Mich. 150, 162
N.W. 968 (1917) (same as Jones v. Deming); Gibson v. Gibson, 213
Mich. 31, 181 N.W. 41 (1921) (same as Dills v. La Tour). In Quarton
v. Barton, 249 Mich. 474, 229 N.W. 465 (1930) the court refused to
apply the assumed rule in Jones v. Jones to facts similar to those in
Dills v. La Tour and Gibson v. Gibson. Although it was suggested in
274 Mich. xxxv (1936) that Quartan v. Barton overruled the doctrine,
the opinion in that case does not do so in terms. Cf. In re Moor's
Estate, 163 Mich. 353, 12~ N.W. 198 (1910); Chamberlain v. Husel,
178 Mich 1, 144 N.W. 549 (1913); In re East's Estate, 325 Mich. 352,
38 N.W. (2d) 889 (1949); Thompson v. Thompson, 330 Mich. 1, 46
N.W. (2d) 437 (1951); Hollway v. Atherton, 205 Mich. 129, 171 N.W.
413 (1919); Grover v. Wood, 337 Mich. 467, 60 N.W. (2d) 316 (1953).
In New York [Leggett v. Firth, 132 N.Y. 7, 29 N.E. 950 (1892)]
and, by the great weight of authority, at common law, a remainder
of an estate for life is valid even if the life tenant has unlimited power
to dispose of the fee. Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of
Property," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.47b (1952).
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however, the premise is not sound because our statutes
provide that when an unlimited power of disposition
of the fee inter vivos is given to a life tenant,
"such estate shall be changed into a fee, absolute in
respect to the rights of creditors and purchasers, but
subject to any future estates limited thereon, in case
the power should not be executed, .... " 183
This statutory fee is not a common-law fee simple, and
the gift over on failure of the life tenant to alienate
inter vivos is not repugnant to the statutory fee because
the statute says that it is not. This line of cases is, then,
a correct exposition of the law of restraints on alienation of common-law estates in fee simple, but it reaches
a result contrary to the language of our statutes.
Robinson v. Finch 184 was a suit to construe a will. One
clause devised the residue to Thomas Weldon; the next
provided that if Thomas should die leaving no wife and
children, the property not used by him or for his education or benefit should pass to named persons. Thomas
died without wife or children. The court held that the
gift over was valid. The decision is probably sound and in
accordance with the general rule in like cases, inasmuch
as the defeasibility of Thomas's estate was not conditioned on his failure to alienate but on his death without
wife or children, a common contingency upon which
to base an executory limitation. The mere fact that he
had a limited power of disposition free of the defeas1&a Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §§9, 13; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2666, 2670;
Comp. Laws (1871) §§4149, 4153; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8864, 8868;
How. Stat. §§5598, 5602; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11600, 11604; Comp.
Laws (1929) §§13003, 13007; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.99, 26.103; Comp.
Laws (1948) §§556.9, 556.13.
.184 116 Mich. 180, 74 N.W. 472 (1898).
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ibility of his estate in general should not invalidate the
executory limitation. 185
There is dictum in Mandlebaum v. McDonell 186 that
"a man cannot by contract render his will irrevocable
during his life, for it is of the very essence of a will to
be revocable until death." Strictly speaking, this statement is correct. Notwithstanding a contract against revocation, a testator can revoke his will and the revoked
will is no longer eligible for probate. 187 Nevertheless,
the English courts have long recognized the validity of
a contract to transfer property by will. Such a contract
could be enforced by an action at law for breach against
the executor of the deceased promisor,188 or by a suit
in equity to compel the heir or devisee of the promisor
to hold the property upon constructive trust for the
promisee or beneficiary of the promise.189 The Michigan
decisions are to the same effect. If the owner of land,
for an adequate consideration, contracts to devise it to
the other party to the contract and does not do so, the
promisee can compel the transferee, devisee, or heir of
the promisor to convey the land to him. 190 And a con.185 See Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests,"
44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 (1935); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Aliena·
tion of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §26.47a (1952). But
see §26.44.
1ss 29 Mich. 78 at 91 (1874). See Mertens v. Mertens, 314 Mich. 651
at 658, 23 N.W. (2d) 114 (1946).
18 7 Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 Add. 274, 162 Eng. Rep. 96 (1822);
Keasey v. Engles, 259 Mich. 178, 242 N.W. 878 (1932). See Eicholtz v.
Grunewald, 313 Mich. 666 at 675-676, 21 N.W. (2d) 914 (1946).
188 Silvester's Case, Poph. 148, 79 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1619).
1 89 Goilmere v. Battison, 1 Vern. 48, 23 Eng. Rep. 301
(1682);
Fortescue v. Hennah, 19 Ves. Jr. 67, 34 Eng. Rep. 443 (1812); Cf. Lord
Walpole v. Earl of Orford, 3 Ves. Jr. 402, 30 Eng. Rep. 1076 (1797);
Cochran v. Graham, 19 Ves. Jr. 63, 34 Eng. Rep. 442 (1811).
l9o Bird v. Pope, 73 Mich. 483, 41 N.W. 514 (1889); Jolls v. Burgess,
252 Mich. 437, 233 N.W. 372 (1930). See Faxton v. Faxton, 28 Mich.
159 (1873); Sword v. Keith, 31 Mich. 247 (1875); De Moss v. Robinson, 46 Mich. 62, 8 N.W. 712 (1881). There are numerous later cases
which assume the validity of contracts to make a will. E.g., Kelley v.
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tract to transmit property by will is enforcible by a beneficiary who is not a party to the contract. 191 Contracts
of the latter type usually are in the form of agreements
not to revoke a joint or mutual will. As has been seen,
such a contract does not prevent the revocation of the
will, but it does subject the devisee under a subsequent
will to a constructive trust for the benefit of the devisee
under the joint or mutual will. 192 Moreover, a contract
by an owner of land not to convey or devise it and to
allow it to descend to his heirs is specifically enforcible
by the heirs. 193
In form, a contract to make a will, not to revoke a will,
or not to make a will is a serious restraint on alienation
of an estate in fee simple, particularly when it is construed to restrain inter vivos alienation by the promisor.194 Upon analysis, however, it is seen that such
Dodge, 334 Mich. 499, 54 N.W. (2d) 730 (1952); Coull v. Piatt, 337
Mich. 334, 60 N.W. (2d) 157 (1953). In Mertens v. Mertens, 314 Mich.
651, 23 N.W. (2d) II4 (1946), a provision in a divorce decree requiring the husband to make a will and leave it unchanged was held
improper in the absence of a voluntary contract to do so. Such a
provision is proper, however, if it confirms a voluntary property settlement. Kull v. Losch, 328 Mich. 519, 44 N.W. (2d) 169 (1950).
191 Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76, 40 N.W. 173 (1888);
Smith v. Thompson, 250 Mich. 302, 230 N.W. 156 (1930); Getchell v.
Tinker, 291 Mich. 267, 289 N.W. 156 (1939). See Elmer v. Elmer, 271
Mich. 517, 260 N.W. 759 (1935). In such cases however, the parties to
the contract may rescind or modify it without the consent of the beneficiary. Sage v. Sage, 230 Mich. 477, 203 N.W. 90 (1925); Phelps v.
Pipher, 320 Mich. 663, 31 N.W. (2d) 836 (1948); Rose v. Southern
Michigan National Bank, 328 Mich. 639, 44 N.W. (2d) 192 {1950).
t92 Keasey v. Engles, 259 Mich. 178, 242 N.W. 878
(1932). See
Eicholtz v. Grunewald, 313 Mich. 666 at 675-676, 21 N.W. (2d) 914
(1946).
19a Ruch v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N.W. 52 (1909).
19 4 In Fortescue v. Hennah, note 189 supra, the contract was construed as not inhibiting inter vivos alienation. In Carmichael v. Carmichael, note 191 supra, Bird v. Pope, note 190 supra, Ruch v. Ruch,
note 193 supra, Jolls v. Burgess, note 190 supra, and Getchell v. Tinker,
note 191 supra, the contracts were construed to restrain inter vivos
transfer and enforced against the transferees. See Klever v. Klever, 333
Mich. 179, 52 N.W. {2d) 653 (1952); Trisch v. Fairman, 334 Mich.
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a contract is not intended to and does not operate to restrain alienation by an owner in fee simple. It is merely
an executory land contract binding the promisor to convey in the future by a particular mode of conveyance.
An executory land contract operates to create an equitable estate, usually contingent or defeasible, in the purchaser. This type of contract creates an equitable future
interest in the beneficiary. The promisor is not restrained from alienating his retained legal interest, but
any transfer which he makes is subject to the equitable
future interest of the contract beneficiary. The decisions
relative to these contracts, therefore, do not qualify the
general rule that restraints on the heritability or devisibility of estates in fee simple are void.
D.

RESTRAINTS ON PARTITION AND DIVISION

At common law, joint tenants and tenants in common,
because each had full power of inter vivos alienation of
his interest, could partition their land by voluntary action. One joint tenant or tenant in common could not,
however, compel partition. 195 A statute of 1539 empowered such a tenant to do so, by action at law or suit
in equity, in language which would seem to be designed
to annex the power to such estates as an inseparable in·
cident. 196 Nevertheless, the English courts appear to be
willing to enforce at least some restraints on compulsory
partition, 197 and the American courts are in conflict as
432, 54 N.W. (2d) 621 (1952). If the contract is construed as not
inhibiting inter vivos alienation the promisor is left with a life estate
and an unlimited power of disposition inter vivos, which raises the
problem involved in the cases cited in note 182 supra .
.1os Littleton, TENURES §§290, 318 (1481). A parcener could compel
partition. Id., §241.
l.96 31 Hen. VIII, c. 1, §2 (1539).
l. 97 Peck v. Cardwell, 2 Beav. 137, 48 Eng. Rep. 1131 (1839). Cf. Abel
v. Heathcote, 2 Ves. Jr. 98, 30 Eng. Rep. 542 (1793).
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to the validity of such restraints. 198 The Restatement of
Property takes the position that a restraint on voluntary
partition is no more valid than any other restraint on
alienation of a fee simple, but that a restraint upon the
power to compel partition is valid if limited in duration
to a reasonable time. 199 "Reasonable time" is defined
as lives in being or twenty-one years. 200 As Professor
Gray has pointed out, 201 a restraint upon compulsory
partition is not, strictly speaking, a restraint on alienation because it does not deprive the owner of an interest
of the power to transfer what he has or penalize him for
doing so. Yet it is a severe indirect restraint on alienation and, if the statutes of partition are intended to make
the power to compel partition an inseparable incident
of every joint tenancy and tenancy in common, enforcement of restraints on that power is inconsistent in principle with the treatment of restraints on alienation.
The Michigan statutes provide, "All persons holding
lands as joint tenants or tenants in common, may have
partition thereof, . . . . " 202 The decision in Smith v.
Smith 203 that a restraint on the power of a joint tenant
1 98 The cases are collected in Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed.,
24-25 (1895); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property,"
6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §26.74 (1952); Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 HARv. L. REv. 373 at
393-394 (1935); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal
Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186, 1380 at 1397-1403 (1935). Restraints
on compulsory partition have usually been held valid if limited in
duration to the period of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.
199 Sections 173 (1936), 412 (1944).
zoo Section 173, comment c (1936).
2 01 Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 25 (1895).
2° 2 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 109, §I; Comp. Laws (1857) §4616; Comp. Laws
(1871) §6266; How. Stat. §7850; Comp. Laws (1897) §11013; Comp.
Laws (1915) §13258; Comp. Laws (1929) §14995; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§27.2012; Comp. Laws (1948) §631.1. The earlier statutes were Act
April 24, 1820, 1 L. TERR. MICH. 633, Act April 12, 1827, 2 id., 388;
Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 481.
zo3 290 Mich. 143, 287 N.W. 411 (1939), note 167 supra.
·
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in fee simple to sever the tenancy by conveying his interest is void would seem to indicate that no restraint
could be imposed in this state upon voluntary partition, by joint tenants or tenants in common. If all of
the cotenants convey their interests in the entire tract
to a third person who conveys separate parts of the tract
in severalty to each of them, partition would be accomplished even if there could be a valid restraint on their
releasing directly to each other. The Michigan law as
to restraints on the statutory power of one joint tenant
or tenant in common to compel his cotenants to submit
to partition against their wishes is not so clear.
In Walton v. Torrey 204 a provision in a will devising
land to children that it should "remain undivided in the
use, occupation and possession of all my children now
living, until the youngest attains the age of 21 years" was
held not to prevent all of the devisees from conveying
to a third party. There was no occasion for determining
the validity of the provision as a restraint on partition,
voluntary or compulsory, but the decision demonstrates
the ineffectiveness, if not the invalidity, of a restraint
on voluntary partition.
Avery v. Payne 205 was a suit for partition under the
statute. The defendant had conveyed an undivided half
of a large tract of land to the plaintiff, the sole consideration being a mortgage on the interest conveyed securing
a bond for payment to the defendant of $25,000 from the
proceeds of sales of the land and a collateral contract by
which the plaintiff agreed to manage the subdivision
and sale of the land. The suit for partition was commenced some eight years after the execution of this conveyance and while much of the tract remained unsold.
204

2os

Harr. Ch. 259 (Mich. circa 1836), note 135 supra.
12 Mich. 540 (1864).
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The court denied partition on the ground that it would
be inconsistent with the contract, saying,
"We think the statute can only be considered imperative in its application to ordinary joint tenancies or tenancies in common, where the right of partition is left to
result as an ordinary legal incident of such tenancy; and
that it was never intended to intefere with contracts between such tenants modifying or limiting this otherwise
incidental right; nor to render it incompetent for parties
to make such contracts, either at the time of the creation
of the tenancy or afterwards." 206
Eberts v. Fisher 207 was a suit to terminate a lease and
compel partition brought by four of eleven devisees of
the reversion against the lessees, who had acquired the
interests of the other seven devisees of the reversion. The
lease, made in 1860 by the devisor, who died in 1876,
provided that it should run until 1880 and should be
extended automatically to 1890 unless the reversioners
elected in 1880 to pay the lessees for improvements made
by them. The reversioners did not so elect in 1880 but
instead brought this suit, contending that the lease was
forfeited by breach of several conditions. The court
held that there had been no breach of the conditions of
the lease and denied partition, saying,
"As a general rule it is a matter of right for a tenant
in common of lands to have partition. But this rule is
not of universal application. A party may enter into such
agreements with his co-tenant as to estop him from enforcing the right of partition. This principle was recognized and applied in Avery v. Paine) 12 Mich. 540; and
when in this case, instead of terminating the lease at the
:~oG I d. at 548-549. The opinion was written by Justice Christiancy
ten years before he wrote his great opinion in Mandlebaum v. McDonell, note 138 supra. See Swan v. !spas, 325 Mich. 39 at 44-45, 37
N.W. (2d) 704 (1949).
201 54 Mich. 294, 20 N.W. 80 (1884).
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end of twenty years, the complainants and defendants, by
mutual consent, obtained an appraisal of the premises,
it was in effect an agreement that the premises should be
held by the lessees ten years longer under the terms of
the lease; and in view of the relation of the parties to the
fee and reversion, it was as plainly implied that such
relations should not be interfered with by partition,
without mutual consent, so long as the terms of the lease
were kept and performed by the lessees. Counsel for
complainant (sic) admit that unless the lease has been
terminated by breach of the conditions thereof, a partition is neither desirable nor asked for." 208
Eberts v. Fisher is commonly cited in support of the
proposition that a restraint on compulsory partition of
an estate in fee simple is valid if limited in duration to
a reasonable period. In view of the facts that the plaintiffs did not ask for partition so long as the lease remained in force and the lease was held to be in force, the
language of the opinion relative to the validity of restraints on partition is only dictum.
In re Estate of Schilling 209 was an appeal from a probate order of distribution under a will which devised
land to four children of the testatrix and the children
of Caroline Moore, a fifth child,
"Provided always, that none of my said real estate shall
be sold or divided between my said heirs before my
youngest child is at the age of twenty-one (21) years."
!d. at 299.
102 Mich. 612, 61 N.W. 62 (1894), note 154 supra. The partition
in this case was ordered by the probate court under Rev. Stat. 1846,
c. 74, §5 [Comp. Laws (1857) §2995; Comp. Laws (1871) §4499; How.
Stat. §5967], relating to partition incident to administration among
heirs and devisees, rather than under the general statute authorizing
suits for partition in the circuit court, note 202 supra. There is no
difference between the statutes which would affect the problem under
consideration. The current statute governing partition by probate
courts is the Probate Code (Act 288, P.A. 1939), c. 2, §98; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §27.3178 (168); Comp. Laws (1948) §702.98.
2o8

209

80

PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS

The order appealed from, entered when the youngest
child of the testatrix was some seventeen years of age,
directed an immediate partition of the land between the
devisees in severalty. The appellants contended that the
division should not be made until this child reached
twenty-one. The court affirmed the order of distribution,
holding that the quoted provision of the will was "void
as repugnant to the nature of the estate" so far as vested
interests were concerned. As all interests under the will
vested upon the death of Caroline Moore, which occurred before the order complained of was entered, the
restraint was wholly ineffective when that order was
made.
It would be unwise to assert that the four cases discussed make the Michigan law as to restraints on partition definite and certain. The decisions in Walton v.
Torrey and In re Estate of Schilling indicate that a prohibition on partition in the instrument creating the cotenancy is void as repugnant to the estate created. As
In re Estate of Schilling relies upon Mandlebaum v. McDonell,210 it is probable that a provision in the instrument creating a joint tenancy or tenancy in common imposing a forfeiture or other penalty on partition would
likewise be void as repugnant to the grant. Avery v.
Payne and Eberts v. Fisher indicate, on the other hand,
that a contract against partition made by joint tenants
or tenants in common with each other will be enforced
specifically by denial of compulsory partition, thus making such a contract effective as a prohibition on partition. There is nothing in the last two cases to indicate
whether Michigan will follow the qualification suggested by the Restatement that such restraints on partition must be limited in duration to a reasonable period.
210

29 Mich. 78 (1874), note 138 supra.
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When knighthood was in flower, a feudal overlord
was more likely to object to his tenant's alienating part
of his land than to a transfer of all of it, since division
of the holding compelled the overlord to look to several tenants instead of one for performance of the services due from the land. The statute Quia Emptores Terrarum empowered every tenant in fee simple "to sell at
his own pleasure his lands and tenements, or part of
them" and devoted one of its three chapters exclusively
to regulating the division of services necessarily incident
to alienation of part of an estate. 211 It seems perfectly
clear that a provision in a conveyance of an estate in fee
simple that the tract must be kept intact and alienated,
if at all, only as a whole, should be considered void as
attempting to deprive the estate of the inseparable incident of alienability in part conferred on it by the statute.
Utujian v. Boldt 212 was a suit to restrain resubdivision.
The defendants had sold the plaintiff 2.8 acres according to an unrecorded plat of a larger tract showing no
lot smaller than an acre. Later the defendants recorded
a plat showing much smaller lots. The plaintiff sought
an injunction prohibiting the defendants from selling
21118 Edw. I, stat. 1 (1290). The Plat Act of 1929 [P.A. 172, as
amended; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13198 to 13276; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§26.431 to 26.509; Comp. Laws (1948) §§560.1 to 560.79] prohibits,
by penalty of $50 per lot sold, the partitioning or dividing of a lot,
tract, or parcel of land into ten or more lots for the purpose of sale
or occupancy for residential purposes, other than by recorded plat, and
authorizes a purchaser of a lot described by reference to an unrecorded
plat to rescind his purchase. The act requires approval of plats prior
to recording by various public authorities and permits townships to
regulate the width of lots, provided that residence lots may not be
required to be more than forty feet wide. The act has no application
to subdivision of agricultural land into lots of ten or more acres for
agricultural use. Nothing in the act appears to authorize private
restrictions on resubdivision which are more onerous than those imposed by it.
2 12 242 Mich. 331, 218 N.W. 692 (1928).
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lots of less than an acre in size. A decree for the plaintiff was reversed on the ground that the plaintiff had not
established the existence of a general scheme or plan restricting the tract to large lots. The opinion suggests
that such a restriction would be valid.
Bang v. Forman, 213 was a similar suit. The plaintiffs
and defendants had purchased lots according to a recorded plat which showed twenty-seven lots, each fifty
feet wide and extending some five hundred feet from
a beach to a road. The conveyance of each lot restricted
its use to dwelling purposes and conferred on the owner
a right to use the beach in common with other lot owners. The defendants resubdivided three of these large
lots into twenty-six small lots and sold some of the small
lots on executory contract to purchasers who erected
cottages. A decree for the plaintiffs was affirmed in an
opinion which stresses the fact that the occupation of
the three original lots by twenty-six families would overburden the easement of use of the beach.
Wilcox v. Mueller 214 was also a suit to restrain resubdivision. A subdivision containing lots of 3.7 acres each
was restricted throughout to a single dwelling on each
lot, except that certain lots might be subdivided so as
to build not more than one house on each 17 5 feet of
frontage. The original subdivider and all the then lot
owners signed an agreement permitting the owners of
four lots to subdivide these four into 75 foot lots, with
restrictions to one house on a lot. The owners of these
four lots did not take advantage of this agreement but
instead conveyed two of the lots to the original subdivider and two to the defendants, who sought to resub2 13 244 Mich. 571, 222 N.W. 96 (1928).
263 Mich. 140, 248 N.W. 574 (1933).
214 250 Mich. 167, 229 N.W. 600 (1930).

Cf. Henkle v. Go1denson,
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divide these two into 90 and 150 foot lots. A decree for
the defendants was reversed, the court holding that the
agreement permitted resubdivision only of the whole
four lots to which it related, not of the two alone.
In the decision of these three cases, the court failed
to take account of the distinction between use restrictions and restraints on alienation set out in Porter v.
Barrett. 215 A restriction against occupancy of a given
tract by more than one family or against erection of more
than one house on a parcel of land is valid under our
law, though such restraints may tend to promote snobbishness, foster the growth of a landed aristocracy, and
deter municipal development. A restraint on alienation
of part of a tract conveyed in fee simple is void under
the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum. 216 That the use
restrictions may have the same practical result as the
restraint on alienation is no answer to the mandate of
the statute, as the opinion in Porter v. Barrett clearly
points out. Insofar as Utujian v. Boldt~ Bang v. Forman~
and Wilcox v. Mueller hold that an owner in fee simple
can be restrained from alienating part of his land, they
are wrong in principle and ought to be overruled.

E. ILLUSORY RESTRAINTS
As has been seen, even after it was settled that every
restraint on barring an entail by common recovery or
statutory fine was void, it was possible to impose a valid
penalty restraint on forms of alienation by a tenant in
tail which had a purely tortious operation, putting the
heirs in tail or the remainderman to the trouble of more
difficult legal procedures to assert their rights. 217 Like233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925), note 158 supra.
Re Lunham's Estate, I.R. 5 Eq. 170 (1871).
217 Coke, INSTITUTES 223b-224a and Butler's note No. 132 to 13th ed.
(1787); note 80 supra.
215

z1s
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wise, a penalty restraint on wrongful alienation of a fee
simple, such as a tortious feoffment by a husband seised
in right of his wife, was valid at common law. 218 In
both cases what was restrained was not really alienation
but wrongful attempts to alienate that which the alienor
had no power to alienate, attempts which could operate
only to confuse and encumber the title. The same principle is observable in the decisions relative to contracts
to devise by will, to leave a will unaltered, or to refrain
from making a will. In form such contracts are restraints on alienation; in substance they are merely
awkward methods of conveying future interests and so
not objectionable as restraints on alienation.
At common law, when property was conveyed to a
public or charitable corporation with a restriction, express or implied, to use for the corporate purposes or
some of them, the corporation was incapable of alienating the property. 219 Michigan unquestionably recognizes the validity of such restricted gifts. 220 Such a conveyance does not, strictly speaking, create a trust, but
2 1 8 Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28 (1494); note 108
supra.
2 1 9 In the cases of ecclesiastical corporations, colleges, and hospitals,
this inalienability was declared by statute, except that leases for three
lives or twenty-one years reserving the customary rent could be made.
I Eliz., c. 19 (1558); 13 Eliz., cc. 10, 20 (1571); 14 Eliz., c. 11 (1572);
18 Eliz., c. 11 (1575); 1 Jac. I, c. 3 (1603). As to other public and charitable corporations, it was declared by judicial decision. Attorney-General v. Corporation of Plymouth, 9 Beav. 67, 50 Eng. Rep. 268 (1845).
See Mayor and Commonalty of Colchester v. Lowten, 1 V. & B. 226,
35 Eng. Rep. 89 (1813); Attorney-General v. Warren, 2 Swans. 291,
36 Eng. Rep. 627 (1818); Attorney-General v. Pembroke Hall, 2 Sim.
& St. 441, 57 Eng. Rep. 415 (1825); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 24 IowA L. REv. 1 at 12, 15 (1938).
220 Maynard v. Woodward, 36 Mich. 423 (1877); Hathaway v. Village of New Baltimore, 48 Mich. 251, 12 N.W. 186 (188,2); Penny v.
Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649 (1889); FitzGerald v. City of Big
Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900); German Corp. v. Negaunee
German Aid Soc., 172 Mich. 650, 138 N.W. 343 (1912); Hosmer v.
City of Detroit, 175 Mich. 267, 141 N.W. 657 (1913); Greenman v.
Phillips, 241 Mich. 464, 217 N.W. 1 (1928); Michigan Congregational
Conference v. United Church of Stanton, 330 Mich. 561, 48 N.W. (2d)
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the result is much like a perpetual charitable trust. 221 As
any alienation of such property is wrongful, it would
seem that a provision in the conveyance to the corporation for forfeiture of the property on an attempt to
alienate should be valid. 222 In County of Oakland v.
Mack 228 the Michigan Supreme Court treated as valid
a provision in a conveyance of land to a county for the
purpose of erecting a court house, that,
"if the above granted and described lots of land or
any or either of them be at any time used, appropriated
or sold otherwise than is herein expressed, limited and
declared, then the same shall revert back to the said
(grantor) ."
So far as conditions subsequent, that is, provisions
for forfeiture to the creator of the estate or his heirs, are
concerned, the law has been modified by a statute providing that,
"Whenever any lands shall heretofore or hereafter
be conveyed by any grant or devise to be held or used
108 (1951). See Act 280, P.A. 1915; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11099 to
11101; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13512 to 13514; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.1191
to 26.1193; Comp. Laws (1948,) §§554.351 to 554.353; Act 373, P.A.
1925; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13516 to 13517; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.1201
to 26.1202; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.381 to 554.382; But see Kemp v.
Sutton, 233 Mich. 249 at 260, 206 N.W. 366 (1925), note 277, infra.
There are numerous statutes regulating the powers of particular types
of eleemosynary and ecclesiastical corporations to convey land, some of
which restate and others of which relax the general common-law rule
of inalienability, e.g., Act 327, P.A. 1931, §§152, 161, 174, 183, Comp.
Laws (1948) §§450.152, 450.161, 450.174, 450.183; Act. 80, P.A. 1855,
§6, Comp. Laws (1948); §453.236; Act 235, P.A. 1849, §4, Comp. Laws
(1948) §457.234; Act. 63, P.A. 1917, §5, Comp. Laws (1948) §457.265;
Act 29, P.A. 1901, §7, Comp. Laws (1948) §458.8,7; Act 42, P.A. 1842,
§6, Comp. Laws (1948) §458.156.
221 3 Scott, TRUSTS §348.1 (1939); Blackwell, "The Charitable Corporation and the Charitable Trust," 24 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. REv. 1-45
(1938). But see Detroit Osteopathic Hospital v. Johnson, 290 Mich. 283
at 296-297, 287 N.W. 466 (1939).
222 St. Germain, DocTOR AND STUDENT, Dial. 2, c. 35 (ed. 1607). As
to the authority of which see 5 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
266-269 (1924).
22a 243 Mich. 279, 220 N.W. 801 (1928).
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for any religious, educational, charitable, benevolent or
public purpose, with a condition annexed in the instrument of conveyance that in event said lands shall at any
time cease to be held or used for the purpose set forth
in such conveyance, title thereto shall revert to the
grantor or devisor and his heirs, and . . . because of
changed conditions or circumstances since the execution of such conveyance it is impossible or impracticable
to longer hold or use said lands for the purposes limited
in such conveyance and that the religious, educational,
charitable, benevolent or public object of the grantor,
as set forth in such conveyance, may be defeated thereby,
a decree may be entered authorizing the grantor (sic) to
sell such lands ....
"No sale of lands under the decree of the court as
herein provided shall defeat the estate of the grantee
named in the original conveyance because of the failure
to longer hold or use the same for the purpose named
in such conveyance and shall be sufficient to convey to
the purchaser of such lands a good and sufficient title
in fee simple, free from all conditions or limitations
whatsoever, under which the same shall theretofore have
been held or used." 224
This statute makes a penalty restraint on alienation
by way of condition subsequent ineffective as against
alienation pursuant to decree under the statute. By
parity of reasoning with the cases holding valid penalty
restraints on tortious alienation by a tenant in tail even
where a restraint on the same tenant's levying a fine or
suffering a recovery would be void, it would seem that
the statute does not make such conditions subsequent
inoperative if the charitable or public corporation restrained attempts to convey without first securing a
decree under the statute. Moreover, the statute has no
application to provisions for forfeiture to someone other
224 Act. 258, P.A. 1925; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13518 to 13521; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §§26.1211 to 26.1214; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.401 to
554.404.

PRESENT LEGAL ESTATES IN FEE SIMPLE

87

than the original creator of the estate or his heirs. It
should be borne in mind, however, that unless the gift
over to another on alienation is to a charity, the provision for it must be so worded as to take effect, if at
all, within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 225
Another type of provision which restrains alienation
in form but not in fact is one for pre-emption. This may
be a provision in a conveyance of a fee simple that the
taker shall not sell the land without offering the donor
or someone else an opportunity to buy, or it may take
the form of a pre-emptive option contract by which the
owner of land agrees not to sell without first giving the
optionee an opportunity to buy. The Restatement of
Property takes the position that a pre-emptive provision
is a restraint on alienation. 226 It asserts, nevertheless,
that such a provision is valid if the optionee is required
to meet any offer received by the optionor as a condition
of exercising his option. If, however, the optionee need
pay only a fixed price or a percentage of any offered
price, the Restatement treats the provision as one governed by the general rules as to restraints on alienation
of estates in fee simple. 227 The latter rule, if applied
strictly, would avoid all such pre-emptive provisions in
Michigan, inasmuch as our law does not admit the validity of limited restraints on alienation of a fee simple.
Probably the leading case adopting the Restatement's
view that a pre-emptive provision is a direct restraint
on alienation is In re Rosher/ 28 a nineteenth century
English decision. That case involved a devise of land in
fee simple with a proviso that if the devisee should wish
225 Scott, TRUSTS §401.6 (1939); PROPERTY
ment a (1944); Chapters 9, 15, infra.
226 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §418 (1944).
227Jbid.
22s [1884] 26 Ch. Div. 801.
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to sell during the life of the testator's wife, she should
have an option to purchase for a fixed price which, at
the time of the decision, was approximately a fifth of the
value of the land. This proviso was held void as a restraint on alienation inconsistent with the nature of an
estate in fee simple. The decisions in this country are
far from uniform, but there appears to be some tendency
to follow the rules laid down by the Restatement of
Property. 229 As an option is essentially a future interest
in land which remains contingent until exercised, it
must not, in jurisdictions which follow that rule, exceed
in duration the period of the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities, except when it is an option reserved by
the creator of the estate subject to it for his own benefit.230 Consequently pre-emptive provisions are frequently invalid because they violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, even though they may not offend the rule
against restraints on alienation of estates in fee simple.
Windiate v. Lorman 231 was a suit to remove a cloud
from title. In 1910 the plaintiff executed an instrument providing,
229 The cases are collected in Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.67 (1952):
Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE
L.J. 961, 1186 at 1390-1395 (1935).
zso PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT §§393, 394 (1944); Gray, RuLE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., 308-310 (1915); Part Two, notes 362, 364, infra.
There is dictum in Chief Justice Cooley's opinion in Smith v. Barrie,
56 Mich. 314 at 317, 22 N.W. 816 (1885), in favor of the validity of a
condition in a conveyance of an estate in fee simple that no sale of the
property should be made without first giving to the grantor, or his
heirs, the opportunity to purchase. Such a condition does not violate
the Rule Against Perpetuities, but it does impose a potentially perpetual indirect restraint on alienation.
23 1 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926). The facts are more fully
stated in the companion case, Windiate v. Leland, 246 Mich. 659, 225
N.W. 620 (1929). In Livonia Township School District v. Wilson, 339
Mich. 454, sub nom. Wayne County v. Wilson, 64 N.W. (2d) 563
(1954), a provision in a 1944 deed giving the grantor an option to
repurchase for $80 if, within 25 years, the land should not be used for
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"If I ever desire to sell, or if my heirs or devisees shall
ever desire to sell (certain land), I will give to Janette
Lorman, her heirs, devisees and assigns the first opportunity to buy the said land at the best price, not to exceed $1,000, which I can get for it from anyone else ...
and upon payment or tender of such price by her, her
heirs or assigns, to me, my heirs and devisees, that the
land shall be conveyed to her, her heirs or assigns, in
. I e .... "
f ee simp

The plaintiff, at a time when the land was worth some
$8,000, contended that this pre-emptive option was void
and sought its removal as a cloud upon his title. An
assignee of the optionee intervened as party defendant
and filed a cross-bill for specific performance of the option. The court affirmed a decree for the defendant
granting specific performance of the option, saying that
the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities was not in
force in Michigan so far as real property was concerned
and that the option did not offend a statute then in
force which forbade suspension of the absolute power
of alienation for a period in excess of two lives in being.
In a later opinion involving the same option, the court
intimated that the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities has no application to option contracts, citing as
school purposes, was treated as valid. The validity of pre-emptive option
contracts which required the optionee to meet any offer received by the
optionor was assumed in Hake v. Groff, 232 Mich. 233, 205 N.W. 145
(1925); Nu-Way Service Stations, Inc. v. Vandenberg Oil Co., 283 Mich.
551, 278 N.W. 683 (1938); Digby v. Thorson, 319 Mich. 524, 30 N.W.
(2d) 266 (1948); and Laevin v. St. Vincent de Paul Society, 323 Mich.
607, 36 N.W. (2d) 163 (1949). Specific performance of such a contract
was granted in Brenner v. Duncan, 318 Mich. 1, 27 N.W. (2d) 320
(1947). Cf. Harlow v. Lake Superior Iron Co. 36 Mich. 105 (1877);
Braun v. Klug, 335 Mich. 691, 57 N.W. (2d) 299 (1953), note 162, supra.
In Epstean v. Mintz, 226 Mich. 660, 198 N.W. 225 (1924), the defendant, owning land in fee simple, contracted with the plaintiff, a real
estate broker, to sell it when the plaintiff so advised and pay the
plaintiff a commission on the sale. It was held that the plaintiff was
entitled to a commission upon the defendant's refusal to sell when so
advised, the court saying that the contract did not restrain alienation
but encouraged it.
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authority for that statement Section 339 of Gray's Rule
Against Perpetuities and failing to note that, when the
following section of that work is read, it appears that
Professor Gray was of the opinion that specifically enforcible options are governed by the Rule. The common-law Rule Against Perpetuities now applies to real
property in Michigan. 232 Whether the court will follow
this doubtful dictum as to its inapplicability to options
remains to be seen.
Apart from the Rule Against Perpetuities problem,
Windiate v. Lorman seems to establish in Michigan a
rule, contrary to that of England and the Restatement of
Property, that a pre-emptive option is never a direct
restraint on alienation and is not void under the law
of restraints on alienation even when the optionee is
entitled to buy at a price which is a small fraction of
that offered by others. If the dictum as to the inapplicability of the Rule Against Perpetuities is followed,
such an option may have the practical effect of restraining all alienation in perpetuity. Michigan is probably
logically correct in holding that a pre-emptive option
is not a direct restraint on alienation, but it is certainly
a very serious indirect restraint, and it may be questioned whether such restraints should be specifically
enforcible in perpetuity. 233
232 Act 38, P.A. 1949; §1; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.49 (1); Comp. Laws
(1949) §554.51.
233 See: Schnebly, "Restraint Upon the Alienation of Property," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.66 (1952). The use of a pre-emptive
option for the sole purpose of restraining alienation is illustrated by
Stoney Pointe Peninsula Assn. v. Broderick, 321 Mich. 124, 32 N.W.
(2d) 363 (1948). There restrictions in a subdivision provided that if
the subdivider did not approve of a vendee to whom a lot owner
proposed to sell, the subdivider might repurchase the lot for the original sale price, without compensation for improvements. The circuit
court held the option void as a restraint on alienation. The Supreme
Court denied specific performance on another ground, without deciding
whether the option was a restraint on alienation.

CHAPTER

4

Present Legal Estates for Life
((ESTATE for life" is a generic term embracing
interests in land of several types. The duration of such an estate may be measured by the
life of the tenant himself, by the life of some other person, by the joint lives of a group of persons (i.e., the
life of the member of the group who first dies), or by
the life of the survivor of a group of persons. In the
last two cases the tenant himself may or may not be a
member of the group. When the duration of the estate
is measured by the life of someone other than the tenant,
that person is known as the cestui que vie and the estate
as one pur autre vie. An estate for life may arise by
operation of law, as in the case of dower, curtesy, and
tenancy in tail after possibility of issue extinct, or it may
be created by express limitation or implication in a
conveyance or devise. A conveyance creating a life
estate may form part of a family settlement, it may be
an outright sale, or it may be a commercial lease, reserving rent and differing from an estate for years only
in that duration is measured in lives. The incidents of
these several types of estate for life are not precisely
uniform, but, for most present purposes, they may be
considered together. 234
As has been seen, opposition to the alienability of
estates in fee simple arose from three sources, the owner's feudal overlord, his tenant, and his heir. As an
234 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 41b-42b; Challis, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3d
ed., 339-348, 356-363 (1911); Plucknett, CoNCISE HISTORY oF THE CoMMON LAW 363-364 (1929).
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estate for life is not an estate of inheritance, the heir
could have no serious opposition to its alienation. 235
Tenants of life tenants have only a slight interest.
Alienation of a life estate would rarely interfere with
the most valuable of the feudal overlord's incidents of
tenure, wardship, marriage, and escheat. There was
probably little opposition to the alienability of life
estates, and it was unnecessary to provide for it by statute. The common law seems always to have recognized
the power of a tenant for life to make an inter vivos
transfer of his estate. 236 It will be recalled that freehold
estates were not transmissible by will at common law 237
and the Statute of Wills of 1540 did not empower the
tenant pur autre vie to devise his estate. 288 He could,
however, accomplish nearly the same result by making
a lease to commence at his death, 239 and power to transmit estates pur autre vie by will was conferred by statute in 1676. 240 Strictly speaking, a life estate was not
heritable but, if limited to the tenant and his heirs, or
235 If an estate pur autre vie was limited to a tenant and his heirs,
the heir was entitled to it as special occupant after the death of the
tenant. Challis, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., 358 (1911). Such a right is,
however, trivial comr.ared with a right to inherit in fee simple or tail.
2ae Anonymous, Ltber Assissarum, 27 Edw. III, pl. 31 (1353); Utty
Dale's Case, Cro. Eliz. 182, 78 Eng. Rep. 439 (1590); 1 Coke, INSTITUTES
4lb; 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 123 (1923).
237 Pollock 8e Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME
OF EDWARD I, 312-328 (1895); note 8 supra.
23s Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1540) as explained by Stat. 34 8e 35 Hen.
VIII, c. 5, §3 (1542); 1 Coke, INSTITUTES lllb (Hargrave's Note No.
141 to 13th ed. 1787).
2 39 Barwick's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 93b, 94b, 77 Eng. Rep. 199 at 201
(1598).
240 Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II, c. §12 (1676), explained by Stat.
14 Geo. II, c. 20, §9 (1741). The latter statute provided that, when an
estate pur autre vie was not disposed of by will and there was no special
occupant (i.e., the estate was limited to the deceased tenant without
mention of his heirs), it should be distributed as personal property of
the deceased tenant.
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to him and the heirs of his body, the heir took upon
intestacy as special occupant. 241
As in the case of the fee simple, the English common
law did not permit the creation of an inalienable life
estate. A restraint on alienation by way of prohibition,
which would force the life tenant to remain such against
his will, was both impossible and void. It was impossible because the life tenant could always destroy his
estate by making a tortious conveyance in fee or committing waste. 242 It has been seen that entailment is essentially the designation of a peculiar course of descent
coupled with a prohibition on alienation. Entailment of
an estate pur autre vie was effective as a designation of
the special occupant but wholly ineffective as a prohibition on alienation; The life tenant could bar the
entail by the ordinary forms of inter vivos conveyance
and possibly by will. 243 That a prohibition on alienation
Note 235 supra.
Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 102, 79 Eng. Rep. 691 (1628) (feoffment in fee); Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, cc. 5, 7 (1278) (waste;
tortious conveyance by dowress); 2 Coke, INSTITUTES 309. There were
several other ways in which a tenant for life could divest himself of his
estate by forfeiture. 1 Cruise, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY *112-*114. The Michigan statutes provide
that a conveyance of the fee by a life tenant shall not work a forfeiture
of his estate [Rev. Stat. 1816. c. 65, §4; Comp Laws (1857 §2723;
Comp. Laws (1871) §4206; How. Stat. §5654; Comp. Laws (1897) §8958;
Comp. Laws (1915) §11690; Comp. Laws (1929) §13280; Mich. Stat.
Ann. §26.523; Comp. Laws (1948) §565.4] and probably eliminate
forfeiture for waste [Rev. Stat. 1846. c. 110, §6; Comp. Laws (1857)
§4703; Comp. Laws (1871) §6358; How. Stat., §7945; Comp. Laws
(1897) §11121; Comp. Laws (1915) §14945; Comp. Laws (1929) §15120;
Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.2146; Comp. Laws (1948) §690.406]. They recognize, however, that life estates may be destroyed by disseisin, forfeiture,
surrender or merger. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §32; Comp. Laws (1857)
§2616; Comp. Laws (1871) §4099; Comp. Laws (1897) §8814; How.
Stat., §5548; Comp. Laws (1915) §11550; Comp. Laws (1929) §12952;
Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.32; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.32. See note 263
infra.
24 3 Doe ex dem. Blake v. Luxton, 6 T.R. 289, 101 Eng. Rep. 558
(1795); 1 Cruise, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL
PRoPERTY *106-*108; Challis, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., 362-363
(1911).
2n
242
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in a conveyance of an estate for life is void is well settled
in England 244 and is the prevailing view in this country.24s
The position of the English common law as to the
validity of a penalty restraint on alienation of a legal
estate for life is not so certain. At common law a conveyance by a life tenant of a greater estate than he had
forfeited his estate and destroyed reversions and remainders expectant upon it. There is dictum in a fifteenth century opinion that a condition against alienating in fee may be imposed upon a life estate.246 This
is no doubt sound because, as has been seen, tortious
alienation may always be restrained by penalty. The
two grounds upon which the fourteenth and fifteenth
century judges ruled that penalty restraints on alienation of estates in fee simple were void, that the statute
Quia Emptores Terrarum conferred an inseparable incident of alienability upon every estate in fee simple
and prohibited a reversion or remainder following such
an estate, 247 have no application to estates for life. The
statute did not apply to life estates and they may, indeed,
must, be followed by a reversion or remainder. The
stress laid upon the existence of a reversion or remain244 Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. Jr. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (18ll);
Graves v. Dolphin, 1 Sim. 66, 57 Eng. Rep. 503 (1826); see Rochford
v. Hackman, 9 Hare 475 at 482, 68 Eng. Rep. 597 (1852). These cases
involved equitable life estates but the rule applies with greater force
to legal life estates. Sweet, "Restraints on Alienation," 33 L.Q. REv.
236 at 244 (1917).
245 The cases are collected in Gray, REsTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d
ed., 134-277 (1895); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of
Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §26.49 (1952); Manning,
"The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 HARv.
L. REv. 373 at 394-398 (1935); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1208 (1935). Accord:
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §405 (1944).
246 Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28 (1494). See notes
242 supra and 263 infra.
247 Notes 114, 115 supra.
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der in the cases holding valid penalty restraints on
alienation of estates in fee tail and for years 248 suggests
the validity of such restraints on life estates. The reversioner or remainderman whose estate follows a life
estate has a greater interest in the personal characteristics
of the life tenant than have reversioners and remaindermen whose interests succeed estates tail or long terms
of years. Professor John Chipman Gray thought that
penalty restraints on alienation of legal estates for life
were valid under the English common law but, with one
exception, the cases he cited in support of this proposition involved equitable life estates. 249 There are nineteenth century English cases which assume the validity
of such a restraint on a legal estate for life. 250 Although
the rule as to equitable life estates is probably otherwise, 251 it would seem that the English law permits such
248 Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443); Anonymous,
Y.B. 8 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 3 (1493); Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII,
Mich., pl. 28 (1494); Anonymous, Y.B. 13 Hen. VII, Pasch., pl. 9
(1498); Anonymous, 1 Dyer 45a, 73 Eng. Rep. 97 (1539); Newis v.
Lark, 2 Plow. 403, 75 Eng. Rep. 609 (1571); Earl of Arundel's Case,
3 Dyer 342b, 73 Eng. Rep. 771 (1575); Croker v. Trevethin, Cro.
Eliz. 35, 78 Eng. Rep. 301 (1584); Ruddall v. Miller, 1 Leon. 298, 74
Eng. Rep. 271 (1586); Arton v. Hare, Poph. 97, 79 Eng. Rep. 1207
(1595); Sharington v. Minors, Moore K.B. 543, 72 Eng. Rep. 746
(1599); Anonymous, l Brownl. & Golds. 44, 123 Eng. Rep. 655 (1616);
Muschamp v. Bluet, J. Bridg. 132, 123 Eng. Rep. 1253 (1617); Crusoe
ex dem. Blencowe v. Bugby, 3 Wils. K.B. 234, 95 Eng. Rep. 1030
(1771); Roe ex dem. Hunter v. Galliers, 2 T.R. 133, 100 Eng. Rep. 72
(1787); Doe ex dem. Mitchinson v. Carter, 8 T.R. 57, 101 Eng. Rep.
1264 (1798). Lord Kenyon's opinion in the last case seems to approve
all penalty restraints on alienation except those on estates in fee simple
and on barring an entail by common recovery or statutory fine. Id.
at 61.
249 RESTRAINTS oN ALIENATION, 2d ed., 72-73 (1895). As Gray pointed
out, the ratio decidendi of the first case holding valid a penalty restraint on alienation of an equitable life estate, Lockyer v. Savage, 2
Strange 947, 93 Eng. Rep. 959 (1733), is the analogy to restraints in
leases for years. This reasoning is equally applicable to a legal life
estate. The one exception is the first case cited in note 250 infra.
25
~ Craven v. Brady, L.R. 4 Eq. 209 (1867); Blackman v. Fysh, [1892]
3 Ch. 209 (Ct. App.).
251 Re Mair, Williamson v. French, [1909] 2 Ch. 280.
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restraints on legal estates only if they benefit the reversion or remainder, and that they are void if solely for
the protection of the life tenant himself or of a stranger
to the title to the land involved. 252
The American cases tend, like the English, to hold
valid a provision in a conveyance creating an estate for
life for forfeiture of the estate upon alienation, voluntary or involuntary, although there are a few cases holding such provisions invalid and a few holding, illogically,
a provision for forfeiture to someone other than the creator of the estate valid, but one for forfeiture to the creator
of the estate void. 253 The Restatement of Property takes
the position that a provision in a conveyance of a life
estate for forfeiture upon alienation is valid whether the
forfeiture is to the creator of the estate or another. 254 So
far it reflects settled English law. The Restatement goes
beyond this,, however, by asserting the validity of penalty
restraints on alienation of estates for life which are not
imposed for the benefit of the reversioner or remainderman. Thus it declares that a life tenant may provide
validly in a conveyance of his entire estate that the transferee will forfeit the estate by alienation. 255 Such a
252 Sweet, "Restraints on Alienation," 33 L.Q. REv. 236 at 244
(1917); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 23 IowA L. REv.
1 at 11-13 (1938). This conclusion seems inevitable from the principles
upon which the cases referred to in notes 247 and 248, supra, are
grounded.
253 The cases are collected in Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d
ed., 72-89 (1895); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.50 (1952); Manning, "The
Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 HARv. L.
REV. 373 at 394-398 (1935); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation
of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1207-1211 (1935).
254 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §409, Illustrations 1, 6 (1944).
2 5 5 I d. Illustration 3. Comment a states that the normal objective
of a restraint on alienation of an estate for life is the protection of the
life tenant against his own indiscretions. It asserts that this is a
worthy objective which ought to be carried out in the absence of
substantial social objection. This was not the normal objective sought
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provision violates the rule implicit in the English cases
that a valid restraint upon alienation of a legal estate
may be imposed only by the creator of the estate for
the benefit of his reversion or of a remainder limited
after the estate. Although it does not explicitly so state,
the Restatement would appear to consider valid a contract against alienation entered into between a life
tenant and a stranger to the title, such as a neighboring
proprietor. These extensions of the rules governing the
validity of restraints on alienation of legal life estates
seem inconsistent in principle with the doctrine of estates upon which our land law is founded. 256
In general, the Michigan statutes recognize legal life
estates and accord to them the incidents which they had
at common law. From 1847 to 1949 there were some
statutory provisions which made important changes in
the common law of estates for life, and there are still
to be accomplished by such a restraint in the period during which the
incidents of legal life estates became fixed. 7 Holdsworth, HISTORY
oF ENGLlSH LAw 240-241 (1926). The normal objective in that period
was the protection of the reversioner against having his land and
buildings injured by an evil or incompetent tenant, and it was the
worthiness of this objective which led to decisions that restraints on
alienation of life estates were valid. The preface to the second edition
of Gray's RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION (1895) is a forceful refutation
of the view that "the protection of the life tenant against his own
indiscretion" is a "worthy objective." As he points out, the placing
of an owner of property of full age and sound mind under a sort of
guardianship to ensure that his wrongdoing will injure only others
and not himself is likely to weaken his character and harm society.
Despite Gray's vigorous objections, the objective of protecting the
owner has been recognized as a proper basis for restraints on alienation of interests under trusts. This is no reason for extending such
recognition to legal estates. As Mr. Manning has observed, the legal
life tenant who is in possession of the land is much more likely to
secure credit on the basis of his apparent power of alienation than
is the beneficiary under a trust of land in the possession of a trustee.
Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray,"
48 HARV. L. REV. 373 at 398 (1935).
256 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS 310 (1936).
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some provisions which have a bearing on the validity
and effect of restraints on alienation of such estates. 257
Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 provided as follows:
"Sec. 5. Estates . . . for life shall be denominated estates of freehold; ...
"Sec. 6. An estate for the life of a third person, whether limited to
heirs or otherwise, shall be deemed a freehold only during the life of
the grantee or devisee, but after his death it shall be deemed a chattel real.
"Sec. 17. Successive estates for life shall not be limited unless to persons in being at the creation thereof; and when a remainder shall be
limited on more than two (2) successive estates for life, all the life
estates subsequent to those of the two (2) persons first entitled thereto,
shall be void, and upon the death of these persons, the remainder shall
take effect, in the same manner as if no other life estate had been
created.
"Sec. 18. No remainder shall be created upon an estate for the life
of any other person or persons than the grantee or devisee of such
estate, unless such remainder be in fee; nor shall any remainder be
created upon such an estate in a term for years, unless it be for the
whole residue of the term.
"Sec. 19. When a remainder shall be created upon any such life
estate, and more than two (2) persons shall be named as the persons
during whose lives the estate shall continue, the remainder shall take
effect upon the death of the two (2) persons first named, in the same
manner, as if no other lives had been introduced.
"Sec. 21. No estate for life shall be limited as a remainder on a
term of years, except to a person in being at the creation of such
estate.
"Sec. 24. Subject to the rules established in the preceding sections
of this chapter, a freehold estate, as well as a chattel real, may be
created to commence at a future day, an estate for life may be created
in a term of years, and a remainder limited thereon.
"Sec. 27. A remainder may be limited on a contingency, which,
in case it should happen, will operate to abridge or determine the
precedent estate; and every such remainder shall be construed a conditional limitation and shall have the same effect as such a limitation
would have by law.
"Sec. 29. When a remainder on an estate for life, or for years,
shall not be limited on a contingency, defeating or avoiding such
precedent estate, it shall be construed as intended to take effect only
on the death of the first taker, or the expiration, by lapse of time,
of such term of years."-Comp. Laws (1857) §§2589, 2590, 2601, 2602,
2603, 2605, 2608, 2611, 2613; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4072, 4073, 4084,
4085, 4086, 4088, 4091, 4094, 4096; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8787, 8788,
8799, 8800, 8801, 8803, 8806, 8809, 8811; How. Stat. §§5521, 5522,
5533, 5534, 5535, 5537, 5540, 5543, 5545; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11523,
11524, 11535, 11536, 11537, 11539, 11542, 11545, 11547; Comp. Laws
(1929) §§12925, 12926, 12937, 12938, 12939, 12941, 12944, 12947,
12949; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.5, 26.6, 26.17, 26.18, 26.19, 26.21, 26.24,
25 7
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St. Amour v. Rivard 268 was a suit to construe a will
which was executed in 1837 and became effective upon
the death of the testator in 1841. After devising life
estates in land to nine persons, the will provided,
"Every single disposal of real estate made in this my
testament, is only for the use and benefit of him or her
in whose favor it is made, his or her life lasting, and that
it is my formal will that neither my real estate nor any
parcel thereof, will ever be sold or alienated in whatsoever manner-but that after the decease of those several
to which shares or parcels of my real estate have been
assigned, the said shares or parcels will remain for the
use and benefit of the descendants of him or her to whom
a shares (sic) has been assigned, their lives lasting, and
so on, and in case of demise without posterity, the said
share will accrue to the use and benefit of the owner or
of the owners being of my relation or descendants, their
life lasting, of the next share or shares, and so on as long
as any posterity will exist, and in case of extinction to
the next heirs."
The named devisees, who were also some of the heirs
at law of the testator, conveyed their interests to the
plaintiff, who sought a determination that the will was
void in toto and that he was entitled to partition. The
court decided that the will was designed to set up a perpetual succession of inalienable life estates. Rejecting
a suggestion of counsel that the testator's intention could
be carried out in part by ruling that the named devisees
took estates for life with remainders in fee simple to
their heirs, the court held that the entire will was void
under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, in
26.27, 26.29; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.5, 554.6, 554.17, 554.18, 554.19,
554.21 554.24, 554.27, 554.29. The effect of these statutes is discussed
in detail in Chapter 19, infra. Sections 17, 18 and 19 were repealed
by Act 38, P.A. 1949, §2, Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.49 (2); Comp. Laws
(1948) §554.52, as to conveyances executed and wills becoming effective after September 23, 1949.
25 8 2 Mich. 294 (1852), Part Two, notes 39, 536, infra.
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force in Michigan before 1847 and since 1949. Consequently the heirs of the testator took the land in fee
simple, free of the prohibition on alienation imposed
by the will. 2511
Hayward v. Kinney 260 was a suit to foreclose a mortgage given by Francis H. Strong in November, 1866. In
June, 1866, when Francis H. Strong, Joseph T. Strong,
Chester W. Strong, and Gertrude J. Cole were tenants
in common in fee simple of the land, the last three
united in a quit-claim deed to Francis H. Strong,
"during his natural life-time, and his heirs and assigns of his heirs, forever, but not to be conveyed during the life-time of the said Francis H. Strong."
The defendant Kinney, a purchaser on execution
sale against Francis H. Strong, contended that the quoted
language imposed an effective prohibition on alienation of the life estate in three-quarters of the land conveyed by the deed, so as to make a voluntary conveyance
or mortgage by Francis H. Strong ineffective. The court
rejected this contention, saying,
"These words, if effectual for any purpose, operate,
and were evidently intended, as a condition subsequent.
The deed created a life-estate merely in three-fourths of
the premises, and the insertion of the words served to
25 9 It may be that such a perpetual succession of life estates should
be held void under the ancient common-law rule that a remainder
may not be limited to the unborn child of an unborn person, rather
than under the more recently developed Rule Against Perpetuities.
See Whitby v. Mitchell, L.R. 44 Ch. Div. 85 (1890); 1 Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, 10th ed., 251, 565 (Butler's note) (1844); Sir
Hugh Cholmley's Case, 2 Co. Rep. 50a, 51b, 76 Eng. Rep. 527 at 530
(1597); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 25 IowA L. REv.
1 at 9-22 (1939); Part Two, note 13, infra. This is known variously
as the old rule against perpetuities, the rule against double possibilities,
and the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell. But see 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE
INTERESTS 339-341 (1936). In any event, the result reached in St.
Amour v. Rivard seems sound. Simes, id., 428-429.
2so 84 Mich. 591, 48 N.W. 170 (1891).
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make that an express condition which at common law
was implied in every estate for life or years. 2 Bl. Comm.
153. Such a condition, however, defeats the estate to
which it is annexed only at the election of him who has
a right to enforce it." 261
The decision construes language of prohibition as a
condition imposing a penalty restraint of forfeiture on
alienation. As the cited passage in Blackstone relates
to the common-law rule that a conveyance in fee by a
life tenant forfeited his estate, it would seem that the
court thought the condition was only against tortious
alienation of the fee, not against mere alienation of the
life estate itsel£. 262 If so, the validity of the condition is
supported by ancient authority. 263 The case does not,
then, decide whether a restraint on alienation of a life
estate, by prohibition or penalty, is valid.
Lariverre v. Rains 264 was a suit to quiet title brought
by Peter Lariverre and Joseph Lariverre, Jr. In 1883
Julia L. White executed an instrument which was, in
effect, a covenant to stand seized, conveying to her husband, Edward, "the use and occupancy as long as he
u1 I d. at 599.
Note 242 supra.
268 Note 246 supra. At common law a conveyance by a life tenant
of a greater estate than he had, by feoffment, fine or recovery, forfeited his estate, destroyed contingent remainders dependent upon it,
and complicated the enforcement of reversions and vested remainders.
Until 1540, his suffering a common recovery barred even reversions
and vested remainders. Stats. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 31 (1540); 14 Eliz., c.
8 (1572); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 24 IowA L. REv.
1 at 57-58 (1938); 25 IowA L. REv. 1 at 24 (1939). Such a conveyance
by lease and release, bargain and sale, or covenant to stand seised did
not have these effects, however, these being deemed "innocent" conveyances which passed only such estates as the conveyor had. As the
innocent types of conveyances were invented after 1494 and as our
statutes make all types of conveyance innocent (note 242 supra) it
could be argued that a penalty restraint upon alienation in fee by a
life tenant should have no greater validity than one upon alienation
of the life estate itself. See 4 Kent, CoMMENTARIES oN AMERICAN LAw
•82-84, •427-428; PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §124, comment e (1936).
26 4 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583 (1897).
262
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shall live, in case he lives with her as long as she shall
live, and sees fit to occupy the same as a residence and
home" the west half of the tract of land involved. The
instrument then conveyed to Joseph Lariverre, Sr., s~n
of the donor and father of the plaintiffs, "the use and
occupancy of the east half of (the tract) during his life,
providing he sees fit to use and occupy the same so long
as a home and residence," and proceeded as follows:
"and by these presents conveys absolutely, subject
to the above conditions, all of said (tract of land) to her
said grandchildren, Joseph and Peter Lariverre, children
of the said Joseph, her son, or to his heirs; it being expressly understood that, if her said son Joseph shall have
more children at the time of his death, they shall share
and share alike the said property. It is further understood that in case of her death, and the death of her
said husband, before the death of her said son Joseph,
then he, her said son Joseph, shall have the use and
occupancy during his life of (the whole tract) on the
terms and conditions above specified, to wit, to be used
and occupied by him as a home and residence. It being
expressly understood and agreed that the right to use
and occupy, as above stated, is intended to be a life interest, and not transferable so far as the said Edward
White and Joseph Lariverre, Sr., are concerned."
In 1889 Julia L. White executed a conveyance in fee
of the east half of the tract to her son Joseph Lariverre,
Sr. and he executed a like conveyance to Maria B. Doyle.
In the same year Julia L. White and Edward White
executed a conveyance in fee of the west half of the tract
to Maria B. Doyle. Maria B. Doyle took possession of
the whole tract in 1889 and conveyed it to the defendants in 1890. Julia L. White died while the suit was
pending, but Edward White and Joseph Lariverre, Sr.,
were alive when the case was decided. The court held
that the actions of Edward White and Joseph Lariverre,
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Sr., in ceasing to occupy the land and attempting to
convey to Maria B. Doyle, terminated their life estates
and that the plaintiffs, remaindermen, were entitled to
immediate possession, notwithstanding the fact that the
two life tenants were still alive. The opinion contains
no discussion of the validity of restraints on alienation
and cites as authority for the result reached only Ryder
v. Flanders/ 65 a case which has little bearing on the real
problems involved.
As it had in Hayward v. Kinney/ 66 the court in Lariverre v. Rains construed language which, taken literally,
purported to prohibit alienation, as a provision for forfeiture on alienation. As the provisions of the instrument relative to occupancy were couched in language of
limitation, this construction was probably sound. The
court did not consider the possible application to that
part of the instrument which concerned the west half
of the tract of the Michigan statute then in force which
invalidated more than two successive life estates. 267 Probably the application of that statute would not have affected the result. The court also failed to consider the
statute, which is still in force, providing that when a
remainder on an estate for life shall not be limited on
a contingency, defeating or avoiding the life estate, it
shall be construed as intended to take effect only on the
death of the life tenant. 268 If the latter statute applied
2 6 5 30 Mich. 336 (1874). This case involved a devise to the testator's
widow during the term of her natural life, should she so long remain
his widow and unmarried, and then "in either case" to his children.
The widow remarried and, after one child had died, joined with some
of the children in a conveyance to the other children. All that was
decided was that the grantees in this deed owned the whole fee which,
as the court pointed ,put, would be the case whether or not the limitation over on remarriage was valid.
266 Note 260 supra.
267 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §17, note 257 supra.
268 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §29, note 257 supra.
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to the disposition in Lariverre v. Rains, it would seem
that, upon the forfeiture of the estates of Edward White
and Joseph Lariverre, Sr., the land would revert to Julia
L. White and her heirs until the death of Edward and
Joseph, Sr. It may be that the language limiting theremainder to the grandchildren was sufficient to prevent
the operation of the statute; that is, to provide that they
should take whenever and however the life estates were
terminated.
Lariverre v. Rains has been cited as something of a
leading case in support of the proposition that penalty
restraints on alienation of estates for life are valid. The
opinion throws disappointingly little light on the problem. The conveyances by the life tenants were in fee,
so the case may stand only for the ancient rule that
restraints on tortious alienation are valid. 269 Moreover,
the occupancy provisions of the instrument involved
seemed to be given more weight by the court in reaching its conclusion than the language prohibiting alienation.
Hamilton v. Wickson 270 was a suit to enjoin an action
of ejectment. In 1870 Norman Hamilton leased 160
acres to John and Adah Hamilton for the life of the survivor, reserving rent of a dollar a year. The lease provided,
"And it is expressly understood, declared, and agreed
by and between the parties hereto, and these presents are
made upon the express condition, that the term hereby
created sball not in any case be assignable by the said
parties of the second part, or either of them, or by the
survivor of them, nor shall the same be taken in execution, or be mortgaged, pledged, or in any way aliened;
and that in the event of the said term hereby granted
269
210

See notes 246 and 263 supra.
131 Mich. 71, 90 N.W. 1032 (1902).
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and created, or the said demised premises, being assigned,
mortgaged, pledged, or in any way aliened, sold, or taken
in execution, or the said parties of the second part, or
either of them or the survivor of them, becoming bankrupt or insolvent, or in case of the nonperformance of
the covenants aforesaid, that then in either or any of such
case or cases, the said term or estate hereby created or
intended so to be shall immediately cease and determine,
and these presents become void, and the said demised
premises at once revert to the said party of the first part,
his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, and he or
they be thereupon at liberty to enter upon said demised
premises, either with or without formal demand for possession thereof, and the same to have again as of his or
their forever (sic) estate, notwithstanding the said parties
of the second part, or the survivor of them, may still be
alive, anything herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding."
·
Norman Hamilton died in 1874, devising the premises,
subject to the lease, to the defendants pur autre vie, with
contingent remainder to the sons of John Hamilton living at the death of the survivor of John and Adah Hamilton. In 1888 John and Adah Hamilton executed a deed
purporting to convey a 50-foot strip of the land to a railroad. John Hamilton died in 1891, and the defendants
commenced the action of ejectment sought to be enjoined
against Adah Hamilton, claiming that the life estate was
forfeited by breach of a covenant to repair and of the
condition against alienation. The court reversed a decree
which enjoined prosecution of the action of ejectment,
saying, without other discussion or citation of authority
on the restraint on alienation problem,
"It seems not to be contested that, if the lease is a subsisting, binding agreement, its covenants have been brok-
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en in such manner as to entitle the remainder-men to
re-enter." 271
The decision in Hamilton v. Wickson probably supports the proposition that a provision in a conveyance
of a life estate that the estate shall be forfeited to the reversioner upon alienation by the life tenant is valid. Yet
in it, as in the earlier cases, the alienation by the life
tenants was a conveyance in fee. 272 Moreover, the effect
of the decision is much weakened by the fact that it is
based in part upon breach of the covenant to repair. In
view of the facts that Norman and John Hamilton were
brothers and that the life lease was, in some sense, a
family settlement, it seems doubtful that the condition
against alienation should be construed to forfeit the entire 160 acres upon alienation of a 50-foot strip. 273
Heinze v. Heinze 214 was an action of assumpsit for use
and occupation. The defendant, in consideration of one
dollar, gave his mother a life lease of land providing that
the lessee should not sublet without the written consent
of the lessor. The defendant remained in possession and
the mother's administrator brought this action after her
death. The court, without discussion of the validity of
the provision against subletting, held that consent in
writing was not required for a subletting to the lessor
himself.
271 I d. at 76. The plaintiffs, Adah Hamilton, widow of John, and
their children, relied primarily on a theory of resulting trust arising
from the fact that John had paid the consideration for the original
conveyance in fee to Norman, made prior to 1860. The court rejected
this theory on the grounds the acceptance of the lease estopped the
lessees from asserting title in fee and that the Michigan statutes have
abolished resulting trusts. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §7; Comp. Laws
(1857) §2637; Comp. Laws (1871) §4120; How. Stat. §5569; Comp. Laws
(1897) §8835; Comp. Laws (1915) §11571; Comp. Laws (1929) §12973;
Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.57; Comp. Laws (1948) §555.7.
212 See notes 246 and 263 supra.
218 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §409, comment g.
274 195 Mich. 365, 162 N.W. 121 (1917).
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Hess v. Haas 275 was a suit to enjoin assertion of a forfeiture of a life estate. In September, 1913, James Hess
executed a lease of a farm to the plaintiff for the term
of her life, to commence at his death. The lease contained a covenant against assignment, transfer, or subletting without the written assent of the lessor, and a
provision for termination and re-entry by the lessor upon
breach of any covenant. James Hess married the plaintiff in November 1913, divorced her in 1917, and died
in 1922, devising the land to the defendants. The plaintiff leased the farm to one Laskey for a term of three
years, and the defendants declared a forfeiture. The circuit court entered a decree for the plaintiff on the ground
that a covenant against alienation of a life estate is void
as an unreasonable restraint on alienation. This decree
was affirmed on the ground that the covenant against
alienation, which was part of a printed form of lease,
had been inserted by mutual mistake. Three justices
dissented, asserting that Lariverre v. Rains 276 had held
that forfeiture restraints upon assignment or subletting,
inserted for the protection of the lessor, were valid in
leases for life to the same extent as in leases for years.
The majority opinion does not categorically deny this
proposition but, by pointing out that the decision in
Lariverre v. Rains was based largely upon the occupancy
limitations involved in that case, throws some doubt
upon the assertion of the dissenting justices.
Kemp v. Sutton 277 was a suit to construe a will devising
230 Mich. 646, 203 N.W. 471 (1925).
Note 264 supra. In Braun v. Klug, 335 Mich. 691 at 695, 57
N.W. (2d) 299 (1953), note 162 supra, there is dictum to the effect
that a restriction on alienation is not repugnant to the grant of a life
esta.te. Tl_le ca~e held that a covenant in a conveyance in fee simple
agamst alienation to anyone except the grantors and their heirs was
void.
277
233 Mich. 249, 206 N.W. 366 (1925), Part Three, notes 61,
338, infra.
275
27 6
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land to the testator's widow and four sons and the survivors and survivor of them during their natural lives,
remainder upon the death of the survivor to the City of
Sault Ste. Marie in fee simple. The will provided,

''I further order and direct as a condition precedent
to the enjoyment, devise and ownership and use of the
life estates and interests herein devised, that each and all
of the said devisees above named are absolutely prohibited, from in any wise selling, mortgaging or incumbering, in any manner whatever, any part or portion of
the said property above devised to them and each of
them, and upon any violation of the same by any or all
of the said devisees as to the same in this item set out;
then I direct that each devisee or devisees so violating
this item shall forfeit the share and portion herein devised to them and the same shall revert to, and become
the property of the other devisees above mentioned in the
shares and under the terms herein set out in this my
will."
The court held that the will gave the individual devisees a single legal joint life estate for the life of the
survivor, 278 and that this disposition did not violate a statute which was in force from 1847 to 1949 providing that
the absolute power of alienation should not be suspended
by a limitation, condition, or future estate for longer than
two lives in being. 279 The opinion does not mention the
27 8 This seems irreconcilable with other decisions that a conveyance
to several persons as joint tenants and to the survivor creates a joint
estate for the life of the first to die, with remainder to the survivor.
Note 167 supra.
27 9 Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 provided,
"Sec. 14. Every future estate shall be void in its creation, which
shall suspend the absolute power of alienation for a longer period than
is prescribed in this chapter; such power of alienation is suspended
when there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute fee in
possession can be conveyed.
"Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended
by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the continuance of two (2) lives in being at the creation of the
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Michigan statutes then in force which prohibited more
than two successive life estates 280 and does not discuss
the validity of the quoted provision for forfeiture upon
alienation other than to say that all the life tenants could
unite with the city to convey a fee or release to a purchaser from the city. The opinion has an important bearing on the validity of restraints on alienation imposed
between 1847 and 1949, however, in that it indicates that
such a restraint was not affected by the mentioned statute prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of
alienation so long as persons in being could unite to convey a fee simple.
The Michigan law of restraints on alienation of estates
for life is not so certain as that relating to restraints on
estates in fee simple. The denial in Mandlebaum v. McDonell281 of the validity of prohibitions on alienation,
which would operate to force an owner to remain such
against his will, probably extends to all legal estates.
None of the cases involving restraints on life estates contains a thorough discussion of the problem, but it is
probable that our law as to penalty restraints is the same
as the English, that is, a provision for forfeiture on alienestate, except in the single case mentioned in the next section.
"Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a
prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the persons to
whom the first (1st) remainder is limited shall die under the age of
twenty-one (21) years, or upon any other contingency by which the
estate of such persons may be determined before they attain their full
age."-Comp. Laws (1857) §§2598, 2599, 2600; Comp. Laws (1871)
§§4081, 4082, 4083; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8796, 8797, 8798; How.
Stat. §§5530, 5531, 5532; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11532, 11533, 11534;
Comp. Laws (1929) §§12934, 12935, 12936; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.14,
26.15, 26.16; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.14, 554.15, 554.16; repealed as
to conveyance executed and wills becoming effective after September
23, 1949 by Act 38, P.A. 1949, §2; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.49 (2); Comp.
Laws (1948) §554.52. These statutes are discussed in detail in Chapters 18, 20, and 21, infra.
280
Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§17, 18, 19, note 257 supra, discussed in
detail in Chapter 19, infra.
281 29 Mich. 78 at 83-91 (1874).
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er the forfeiture is to the creator of the estate or another.
As to inter vivos conveyances, the statute avoiding conditions which are merely nominal and evince no intention
of actual and substantial benefit to the party in whose
favor they are to be performed must be borne in mind. 282
ation in a conveyance creating a life estate is valid whethThere is certainly nothing in the Michigan cases to suggest that a restraint imposed for the benefit of anyone
other than a reversioner or remainderman would be enforced.
The Michigan statutes empower the circuit courts in
chancery to direct the sale of land in fee simple upon
petition by a legal life tenant and a showing that the
rights of the interested parties would otherwise be jeop·
ardized. 283 The statute itself provides that,
"No sale or conveyance of any kind shall be made of
any property contrary to any specific provisions in regard
thereto contained in the deed of conveyance, or in the
will under which the petitioner holds the said property." 284
Accordingly, it would seem that a prohibition on the
life tenant's compelling a sale of the remainder would be
valid. The validity of a provision in a conveyance creating a life estate for forfeiture of his estate in the event
of the life tenant's filing a petition under the statute remains undecided. 285
Comp. Laws (1948) §554.46, notes 143, 145 supra.
Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 19, §§62 to 70; Comp. Laws (1915) §§12716
to 12724; Comp. Laws (1929) §§14404 to 14412; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§27.1188 to 27.1196; Comp. Laws (1948) §§619.62 to 619.70. This is
a reenactment of Act 233, P.A. 1887, as amended, Comp. Laws (1897)
§§9234 to 9242. See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §124, comment i; §179,
note (1936).
284 Sec. 70.
285 See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Div. IV, Pt. II, Introductory Note
(1944); Cf. id., §§428, 437.
2s2
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Present Legal Estates for Years
EASES for years were known as early as the twelfth
century, but they can scarcely be said to have
created estates in land until the latter part of the
fifteenth. Until the third decade of the thirteenth cenury, the lessee's interest was a purely contractual right,
specifically enforcible by means of the action of covenant, against the lessor and the latter's heir. He had no
rights at all against the lessor's overlord, persons to whom
the lessor transferred the fee, or strangers. 286 After 1235
the lessee had a remedy for recovery of possession from
a transferee of the lessor who ejected him. 287 In the early
part of the fourteenth century he acquired a right to
maintain an action of trespass for money damages against
a stranger who ousted him, 288 but he could not recover
possession from such a stranger 289 until late in the following century. 290
From the fact that the interest of a lessee for years was
looked upon as being in the nature of a chose in action
rather than property, it might be assumed that it was
inalienable. Such was not the case. From an early period
a term of years was held to be assignable inter vivos, 291

L

2 8 6 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw BEFORE THE
TIME OF EDWARD I, 105-117 (1895).
287 Snane v. Rumenal, Bract. N.B., pl. 1140 (1235).
2 88 Star v. Anonymous, Y.B. 15 Edw. II, Hil., ff. 458, 458b (1321).
2 89 Anonymous, Y.B. 33 Hen. VI, Mich., pl. 19 (1455).
290 Anonymous, Y.B. 7 Edw. IV. Pasch., pl. 16 (1467); Anonymous,
Y.B. 21 Edw. IV, Mich., pl. 2 (1482); 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 213-217 (1923).
291 Fitz Henry v. Utdeners, Bract. N.B., pl. 804 (1233); Littleton,
TENURES §319 (1481).
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and, as it was looked upon as a chattel rather than as an
estate in land, it was always transmissible by will. 292 Involuntary alienability of terms for years was more complete than that of estates in fee and for life. Whereas, in
the case of freehold estates, creditors could not acquire
title but only a right to occupy until their claims were
paid, 298 a leasehold estate could be seized and sold outright on execution. 294
As in the case of the estate for life, it was practically
impossible at common law to create an inalienable estate
for years, one which the tenant was bound to keep against
his will, because a tortious conveyance by the tenant of
a greater estate than he held 295 or the commission of
waste 296 forfeited his estate. It is probable that the common law asserted the nullity of prohibitory restraints on
alienation of estates for years before the era of reported
cases. 297 The dearth of English authority on the point
indicates that conveyancers always believed that restraints
on alienation of leasehold interests by way of prohibition
2 92 Note 286 supra; 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed.,
213-217 (1923).
2 9 8 Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 18 (1285).
2 9 4 Ibid.; Gilbert, LAw OF EXECUTIONS 19 (1763); Doe ex dem.
Mitchinson v. Carter, 8 T.R. 57, 101 Eng. Rep. 1264 (1798).
29 5 Metteforde's Case, 3 Dyer 362b, 73 Eng. Rep. 813 (1578); Read
v. Erington, Cro. Eliz. 322, 78 Eng. Rep. 571 (1594). 1 Coke, INSTI·
TUTES 25lb, 330a (Butler's Note No. 285 to 13th ed. 1787).
296 Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 5 (1278). These rules of forfeiture for the tenant's voluntary act would not, however, preclude
the possibility of an effective prohibition of involuntary alienation.
29 7 The Statute of Wales, 12 Edw. I, c. 10 (1284), which, while
applicable only to Wales, reflects the English common law of the
period, prohibited specific enforcement of covenants against alienation.
At this period the term "covenant" was virtually synonymous with the
later term "lease," and the action of covenant was that used for the
specific enforcement of provisions of leases. Foresta v. Villy, Bract.
N.B., pl. 1739 (1226); 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw BEFoRE THE TIME oF EDWARD I, 106 (1895).
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were void. The American writers and such case law as
there is are in accord with this belief. 298
As to penalty restraints, it was decided in 1443 that a
condition in a lease for years that the lessee not grant
his estate was valid and entitled the lessor, upon breach,
to enter and so terminate the estate for years. 299 The
reason given for the validity of such a restraint was the
protection it afforded to the reversion. It should be noted
that the point was decided at a time when long terms of
years were little known, the rights of a lessee for years
were still looked upon as primarily contractual and his
interest had not yet attained the status of an estate in
land. Nevertheless, the decision was followed in anumber of cases decided after terms of years had become
estates, and terms of five hundred and a thousand years
had become common. 300 It was later settled that a condi298 Gray, REsTRAINTS oN ALIENATION, 2d ed., 277 (1895); Schnebly,
"Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY, §26.51 (1952); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of
Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1211-1212 (1935). Accord:
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §405 (1944). Professor Schnebly notes, however, that there are some cases granting specific performance, by way
of injunction, of covenants against alienation in leases, e.g., McEacharn v. Colton [1902] A.C. 104 (Judicial Committee; decided under
the provisions of a peculiar statute in force in South Australia).
299 Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443), Paston, J-, dissenting. At the time of this decision long-term leases were virtually
unknown because of the precariousness of the lessee's interest arising
from the fact that the lessor could destroy it by suffering a common
recovery. 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 46a (1628). See Wind v. Jekyl, I P. Wms.
572, 24 Eng. Rep. 522 at 523 (1719). The Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw.
I, c. 11 (1278), 2 Coke, INSTITUTES 321-324 (1641), empowered certain
urban lessees to attack such collusive recoveries and Stat. 21 Hen.
VIII, c. 15, §3 (1529) made them ineffective as against all lessees for
years. Cf. Fratcher, "Defeasance as a Restrictive Device in Michigan,"
52 Mich. L. Rev. 505 at 534 (1954).
soo Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 3 (1493); Anonymous, 21
Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 12 (I505); Anonymous, I Dyer 6b, 73 Eng. Rep. I5
(1537); Anonymous, 1 Dyer 45a, 73 Eng. Rep. 97 (1539); Earl of
Arundel v. Lord Windsor, I Dyer 65a, 73 Eng. Rep. I38 (1549);
Anonymous, Moore K.B. 11, pl. 40, 72 Eng. Rep. 405 (1550); Paschall
v. Keterich, 2 Dyer 15lb, 73 Eng. Rep. 330 (1557); Anonymous, 3
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tion of forfeiture upon involuntary alienation, as by
bankruptcy, was likewise valid. 301 The cases evidence,
however, a tendency to put a very narrow construction
upon such conditions, so that no form of alienation is a
breach unless clearly penalized by the language of the
condition. The validity at common law of a provision in
a lease that the term should be forfeited to someone other
than the lessor upon alienation by the tenant is not clear
because of the undeveloped state of the law of future
interests in legal terms for years. If valid at all, such a
gift over would have to be limited so as to take effect, if
at all, within the period of the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities. 302 It would seem that a condition of forfeiture upon alienation in an assignment by a lessee of
Leon. 67, 74 Eng. Rep. 545 (1576); Parry v. Herbert, 4 Leon. 5, 74
Eng. Rep. 688 (1576); Moor v. Farrand, 1 Leon. 3, 74 Eng. Rep. 3
(1587); Sir William More's Case, Cro. Eliz. 26, 78 Eng. Rep. 291
(1583); Stewkley v. Butler, Moore K.B. 880, 72 Eng. Rep. 970, sub
nom. Stukeley v. Butler, Hobart 168, 80 Eng. Rep. 316 (1615); Crusoe
ex dem. Bleucowe v. Bugby, 3 Wils. K.B. 234, 95 Eng. Rep. 1030
(1771); Doe ex dem. Mitchinson v. Carter, 8 T.R. 57, 101 Eng. Rep.
1264 (1798). It is noteworthy that two of these cases held the condition
effective to restrain testamentary disposition of the estate. Anonymous,
3 Leon. 67; Parry v. Herbert, supra. The clearest statement of the
rule and its basis is the dictum in Sir Anthony Mildmay's Case, 6 Co.
Rep. 40a at 43a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311 at 317 (1605): "So if a man makes
a gift in tail, on condition that he shall not make a lease for his own
life, it is void and repugnant; but if a man makes a lease for life or
years, on condition that he shall not alien or lease the lands, it is
good. For at the common law, lessee for life or years might commit
waste, which was ad exhaereditationem of the lessor, and therefore
there was a confidence betwixt the lessor and lessee, and therefore the
lessor might restrain the lessee from aliening or demising to another, in
whom perhaps the lessor had not such confidence. And therefore it
is reasonable that when he who has the inheritance makes a lease for
life or years, that he may restrain such particular tenants from aliening or demising for the benefit of his inheritance."
so1 Roe ex dem. Hunter v. Galliers, 2 T.R. 133, 100 Eng. Rep. 72
(1787). But an ordinary condition against alienation was not construed to penalize involuntary alienation, Doe ex dem. Mitchinson v.
Carter, 8 T.R. 57, 101 Eng. Rep. 1264 (1798).
ao2 See Simes, FuTURE INTERESTS §199 (1936). Professor Simes thinks
that such a special limitation would be valid (§466).
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his entire term is void at common law because not imposed for the benefit of a reversion. 303
The American cases follow the English rule that conditions against alienation in leases for years are valid. 304
The Restatement of Property makes a distinction between leases for years which are executed as commercial
transactions and those which are donative in character,
such as terms limited in family settlements. 305 As to the
former, the Restatement affirms the validity of penalty
restraints, including forfeiture to either the lessor or another, when imposed for the benefit of the lessor and not
in violation of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. It would permit the assignor of a term to restrain
future alienation, even though he retains no reversion,
if he remains liable on the covenants of the lease. As to
the latter, the Restatement would impose the rules which
govern restraints on alienation on freehold estates of like
duration, treating any lease which is not limited in duration by lives in being as governed by the rules applicable
to estates in fee simple.
The Constitution of Michigan provides that "No lease
or grant of agricultural land for agricultural purpose for
a longer period than 12 years, reserving any rent or serv8os 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 223a; Sweet, "Restraints on Alienation," 33
L.Q. REv. 236, 238 (n. 3), 244 (1917); Gray, REsTRAINTS ON ALIENATION,
2d ed., 90 (1895); Simes, FUTURE INTERESTs §466. Cf. Doe ex dem.
Duke of Norfolk v. Hawke, 2 East 481, 102 Eng. Rep. 453 (1802).
304 Some are collected in Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation
of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §26.51 (1952); Schnebly,
"Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J.
961, 1186 at 1211 (1935), and Simes, FuTURE INTERESTS §466 (1936).
305 Sec. 410 (1944). Cf. Johnston v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.,
337 Mich. 572 at 582, 60 N.W. (2d) 464 (1953), where Property Restatement, §489 (1944), making a similar distinction between commercial and donative easements in gross, was quoted with approval.
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ice of any kind, shall be valid." 306 Our statutes give estates for years substantially the same incidents which they
had at common law and codify the law of future interests
in and following estates for years so as to make the rules
governing such interests coincide, so far as possible, with
the rules which govern like future interests in and following freehold estates. 307 The statutes appear to make it
clear that a term of years may be so limited as to pass to
someone other than the lessor on the happening of a
so6 CoNsT. 1908, Art. XVI, §10. CoNsT. 1850, Art. 18, §12, provided,
"No lease or grant hereafter of agricultural land for a longer period
than twelve years, reserving any rent or service of any kind, shall be
valid."
so1 Rev. Stat. 1946, c. 62, provided:
"Sec. 5. . .. estates for years shall be denominated chattels real...•
"Sec. 20. A contingent remainder shall not be created on a term
for years, unless the nature of the contingency upon which it is
limited be such that the remainder must vest in interest, during continuance of not more than 2 lives in being at the creation of such
remainder, or upon the termination thereof.
"Sec. 21. No estate for life shall be limited as a remainder on a
term of years, except to a person in being at the creation of such estate.
"Sec. 23. All the provisions in this chapter contained relative to
future estates, shall be construed to apply. to limitations of chattels
real, as well as of freehold estates, so that the absolute ownership of
a term of years, shall not be suspended for a longer period than the
absolute power of alienation can be suspended, in respect to a fee.
[Cf. §15, note 279 supra.]
"Sec. 24. Subject to the rules established in the preceding sections
of this chapter, a freehold estate, as well as a chattel real, may be
created to commence at a future day; an estate for life may be created
in a term of years, and a remainder limited thereon.
"Sec. 27. A remainder may be limited on a contingency, which in
case it should happen, will operate to abridge or determine the precedent estate; and every such remainder shall be construed a conditional
limitation and shall have the same effect as such a limitation would
have by law."-Comp. Laws (1857) §§2589, 2604, 2605, 2607, 2608,
2611; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4072, 4087, 4088, 4090, 4091, 4094; How.
Stat., §§5521, 5536, 5537, 5539, 5540, 5543; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8787,
8802, 8803, 8805, 8806, 8809; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11523, 11538,
11539, 11541, 11542, 11545; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12925, 12940, 12941,
12943, 12944, 12947; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.5, 26.20, 26.21, 26.23, 26.24,
26.27; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.5, 554.20, 554.21, 554.23, 554.24, 554.27.
Sections 20 and 23 were repealed, as to conveyances executed and
wills becoming effective after September 23, 1949, by Act 38, P.A. 1949,
§2, Mich. Stat. Ann §26.49 (2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52.
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contingency, provided there is no violation of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities or other applicable
rules of laW. 308
In Lee v. Payne/09 a decision affirming a judgment for
the lessor in an .action for waste against an assignee of
the lessee, the court said,
"A lessee for years may assign his entire interest in the
lease and premises, unless restrained by covenant not to
assign without leave of the landlord, or he may underlet
the whole or a part of the premises, for any less number
of years than he himself holds." 310
Copland v. Parker 811 was a proceeding by a lessor to
recover possession of the demised premises before the
end of the term on the ground the lessees had breached
a covenant, "not to transfer this lease without the consent
of the party of the first part." The report does not state
whether the lease contained an express provision for forfeiture on breach of covenant. The lessee appears to
have let part of the premises for the whole of the unexpired term. The court, in an oral opinion, held that
there had been only a subletting and that an instruction
sos The repeal in 1949 of Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §23, note 307 supra,
makes it less clear than it was before that it is possible to create future
interests in legal terms of years.
3o9 4 Mich. 106 (1856).
310 Id. at 117. In Craig v. Crossman, 209 Mich. 462, 177 N.W. 400
(1920), the court rejected a contention that a lease without provision
against assignment was inalienable, saying that it was "by nature,
assignable." In Patterson v. Butterfield, 244 Mich. 330, 221 N.W. 293
(1928), the court, in answer to an argument that an obligation resting
upon the lessee in a 99-year lease to erect a building precluded his
subleasing, said (at 338), "In the absence of statutory or contractual
restrictions, a lessee for years may assign or sublet his leasehold interest
without the lessor's consent or an express provision in the lease
giving him such right. . . ."
311 4 Mich. 660 (1857). The plaintiff was represented by James V.
Campbell, later Chief Justice of Michigan and Dean of the University
of Michigan Law School. He contended that there had been an assignment. Counsel on both sides assumed the validity of the covenant and
cited English cases as to its proper construction.
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by the trial court that the covenant extended to both
assignment and subletting, was erroneous.
Harlow v. Lake Superior Iron Company 312 was an action of ejectment for mining land. The plaintiff claimed
under a 99-year lease of an undivided half of the mining
rights given by the owner of the fee to one Graveraet,
who assigned his interest to the plaintiff and another.
The lease contained no provision against assignment by
the lessee and expressly conferred rights on his assigns.
The court affirmed a judgment for the defendant on the
ground the lease conveyed only an incorporeal interest
which could not be enforced in ejectment and said that,
while the lessee in such a lease may assign the whole to
a single individual or corporation, he may not, because
of the nature of the interest, assign undivided interests
to several persons.
Randall v. Chubb 813 was a summary proceeding for
possession of land. The plaintiff leased the land to Stoddard by an instrument which did not expressly restrain
assignment, but which obligated the lessee to work the
farm, using the lessor's implements but providing his
own seed, and to deliver a third of the crops to the lessor.
Stoddard assigned his interest to the defendant. The
court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, saying that
such a lease is personal and nonassignable, and that an
attempt to assign forfeits the lessee's estate.
s12 36 Mich. 105 (1877). It is generally held that a profit a prendre
in gross may not be assigned in parts to different persons, so that each
assignee may exercise it separately, but that it may be assigned to
several persons for exercise in common. Earl of Huntington v. Lord
Mountjoy, Moore K.B. 174, 72 Eng. Rep. 513; 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 164b
(1583); 3 Tiffany, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §847 (1939).
8 1 3 46 Mich. 311, 9 N.W. 429 (1881). Accord: Lewis v. Sheldon, 103
Mich. 102, 61 N.W. 269 (1894). Cf. Gravenburgh v. McKeough, 117
Mich. 555, 76 N.W. 77 (1898); Vincent v. Crane, 134 Mich. 700, 97
N.W. 34 (1903); Lowe v. Radecke, 204 Mich. 646, 171 N.W. 408 (1919).
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Leduke v. Barnett
was a summary proceeding for
possession of land. The plaintiff demised the premises
to Sachen by a lease providing that the lessee should not
release or assign the lease without the lessor's consent,
and that in case of default in performance of any of the
covenants the lessor might re-enter. The lessee gave the
defendant permission to use one room for thirty days.
The court affirmed a judgment for the defendant on the
ground the plaintiff had failed to prove that the underletting was without his consent. Although assuming the
validity of the condition, the court doubted whether
there had been a breach, suggesting that a mere license
was not a release or assignment.
Walsh v. Martin 315 was an action of assumpsit for use
and occupation. The plaintiff leased to Shatto for three
years from 1877, the lessee covenanting not to assign or
release without the written consent of the lessor and the
lessor to be entitled to re-enter on breach of covenant.
In 1879 the parties indorsed on the lease an extension to
1884, "without altering the conditions thereof." In 1881,
in consideration of the lessee's agreement to make improvements, the lessor endorsed on the lease, "I hereby
give Shatto the privilege of occupying the store mentioned in this lease for ten years from 1884, the rent to
be the same as at present." In 1886 Shatto assigned the
lease to the defendant, whereupon the plaintiff attempted
to raise the rent. The court assumed the validity of the
covenant against assignment in the original lease but
reversed a judgment for the plaintiff on the ground the
1881 endorsement was a new lease, to begin in futuro~
without any provision against alienation, so that the assignment was effective against the lessor.
314

314

47 Mich. 158, 10 N.W. 182 (1881).

a1s 69 Mich. 29, 37 N.W. 40 (1888).
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Wertheimer v. Hosmer 316 was a proceeding in mandamus to compel dissolution of an injunction. Clark and
Lane leased a store to Michell for four years, to be used
for the sale of teas, coffees, spices, and similar goods, the
lease providing that Michell should not sublet or permit
the occupancy by any other party, without the written
consent of the lessors. The report does not indicate
whether the lease provided expressly for re-entry on
breach of covenant. Michell, with the oral consent of
the lessors, sublet the store to Sprague, to be used for
the sale of musical instruments and sheet music. Sprague
assigned his interest to William and Max Wertheimer,
who began altering the premises for use as a "misfitclothing house." Clark and Lane then sued Michell,
Sprague, and the Wertheimers in equity and procured
ex parte an injunction restraining Michell and Sprague
from using the premises for any purpose except the sale
of teas, coffee, spices, similar goods and musical instruments and restraining the W ertheimers from using or
occupying the store or any part thereof. The court declined to interfere with this injunction by mandamus.
As to the contention of the defendants that the permission to sublet to Sprague terminated the provision against
assignment, the court said,
"A covenant not to assign or underlet the leased premises without the assent of the lessor is frequently inserted
in a lease, and is regarded as a fair and reasonable covenant. But a license once given removes the restriction
forever, as the condition is treated as entire, and therefore not capable of being waived or released as to part;
but in order to have that effect it must be such a license
as is contemplated in the lease,-that is, if the lease provides that the license shall be in writing, an oral license
:ne 83 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890).
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is not good. It is not to be understood, however, that this
written stipulation not to sublet unless by consent of the
lessor, in writing, may not be waived by an oral agreement; .... The agreement to waive the condition as to
Sprague, however, was not a waiver of the condition in
the lease as to other parties, .... " 817

If the injunction in this case had been limited to enforcement of the use restriction, there could be no doubt
of the soundness of the result. The injunction went
farther, however, in that it restrained the assignees from
occupying the premises for any purpose, despite the fact
that the lessors had not elected to declare a forfeiture of
the lease and had indicated their intention of holding
the original lessee liable for rent. The effect of such
specific performance of a covenant against alienation is
to make it effective as a prohibition on alienation, forcing the lessee to remain such against his will. Enforcement of such a prohibition may have seriously undesirable results which mere forfeiture would not. Although
an effective assignment of his lease does not ordinarily
free the lessee from liability to the lessor for performance
of its covenants, it does free him from other types of
liability. The owner of a legal possessory estate in land
is commonly personally liable to the state and its subdivisions for property taxes, bound to perform labor on
the roads, criminally responsible for removal of snow
and noxious weeds, and liable in tort to members of the
817 I d. at 61. At common law a condition against assignment without
the permission of the lessor was destroyed by the giving of permission
for a single assignment; that is, the lessor had no right of entry if the
assignee assigned without permission. Dumper's Case, 4 Co. Rep.
119b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (1603); see Anonymous, 1 Dyer 45a, 73 Eng.
Rep. 97 (1539); Fox v. Whitchcocke, 2 Buist. 290, 80 Eng. Rep. 1129
(1614). It would seem, however, that a covenant against assignment
without the permission of the lessor may, by apt words, be made to
run with the land, so that when an assignment is made with permission,
the first assignee will be liable in damages for breach of covenant if he
reassigns without permission. Williams v. Earle, L.R. 3 Q.B. 739 (1868).
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public for non-repair of buildings. A tenant whose
health or business has failed may be able to escape pecuniary liability to his lessor by forfeiture of his estate or
bankruptcy, but if he is forced by injunction to retain
the estate against his will he cannot escape these public
obligations. The effect of such an injunction in connection with a long-term lease may be to reduce the tenant
to a status of serfdom or peonage in which he is bound
to the land and from which he can escape only by
death. 318
Sommers v. Reynolds 819 was a summary proceeding for
possession of a hall. The plantiff demised the hall to the
trustees of the Royal Adelphia Godfrey Conclave No.
131 by a lease which provided that the lessees should not
release, assign, or sublet, except for society purposes,
without the written consent of the lessor, and that the
lessor might re-enter upon breach. The Royal Adelphia
and Godfrey Conclave were dissolved, and twelve members of the latter formed a Godfrey Club, which sublet
the hall five nights a week to other societies. A judgment
for the defendants was affirmed on the ground the coven~
ant was not breached by the dissolution or subletting.
Darmstaetter v. Hoffman 320 was an action of assumpsit
s1s See note 298 supra. If the doctrine of Wertheimer v. Hosmer
should be extended so as to compel the lessee's next of kin, taking on
intestacy, to retain the estate, it might permit the creation of a system
of perpetual, hereditary serfdom, without the ameliorating customs
which eased the lot of the mediaeval peasant. One may speculate as
to whether the lessee's great-grandson could break his bond to the land
by escape and hiding for a year and a day.
3t9 103 Mich. 307, 61 N.W. 501 (1894). Cf. Struble v. Community
Club, 218 Mich. 604, 188 N.W. 292 (1922).
320 120 Mich. 48, 78 N.W. 1014 (1899). In Smith v. Applebaum, 241
Mich. 493, 217 N.W. 401 (1928), a 99-year lease provided that the
lessee might "not sell or assign this lease and be released from liability
thereon" without providing a bond to secure performance of the
covenants. The lessee assigned the lease without providing a bond.
After accepting payments of rent from the assignee, the lessor sued the
original lessee for rent which accrued later. The court affirmed a judg-
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for rent. Hubbard and King leased a saloon to the plaintiffs, who covenanted to pay the rent and not to assign
or transfer the lease without the written consent of the
lessors. Without obtaining the consent of the lessors,
the plaintiffs assigned the lease to Kudner, and Kudner
assigned to the defendant. The plaintiffs sued for rent
which they had not paid to Hubbard and King. A judgment for them was affirmed, the court saying that when
a lease is properly assigned, the assignee is bound to pay
the rent directly to the lessor, and the assignor cannot
hold the assignee for rent unless he has first paid it to the
lessor. The opinion states that where, however, there is
a covenant against assignment which the lessor has not
waived, the assignee is the assignor's tenant and liable to
him rather than the assignor. The theory of this decision
is that the original lessee could not divest himself of his
estate without the consent of the lessor. If this is so, then
a covenant against assignment is effective as a prohibition
on alienation or disabling restraint which forces the
lessee to remain such against his will. The unsoundness
and undesirability of such a view have already been made
manifest.
Marvin v. Hartz 321 was a summary proceeding for possession of land. The plaintiff demised to Berlin, the
lessee covenanting not to assign, transfer, or sublet withment for the lessor, saying that acceptance of rent "would not establish
the fact that the realty company had been substituted as lessee in the
place of the defendant," and that the assignment "in no way changed
the relation of the parties." The result reached is sound, because an
assignment does not relieve a lessee from performance of a covenant
to pay rent in the absence of novation. The quoted language is unfortunate, however, in suggesting that an assignment without permission
has no effect at all. Unless effective prohibitions on alienation are
possible, such an assignment does destroy privity of estate and liability
based thereon. Cf. Mooradian v. Petroff, 254 Mich. 278, 236 N.W. 780
(1931); Buhl Land Co. v. Franklin Co., 258 Mich. 377, 242 N.W. 772
(1932).
s21 130 Mich. 26, 89 N.W. 557 (1902).
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out the written assent of the lessor, and the lease providing that the lessor might re-enter upon breach of covenant. Berlin assigned to the defendant without the consent of the lessor. A judgment for the defendant based
on a directed verdict was reversed. This appears to be
the only Michigan case in which a condition of forfeiture
on alienation in a lease for years was enforced according to its terms.
Crouse v. Michell 822 was a suit to foreclose a lien on an
estate for years. Parker leased land to Michell for a term
of fifteen years, the lease providing that the lessee should
not assign, transfer, or sublet without the written consent of the lessor, and that the lessor might re-enter on
breach of covenant. Michell, without the consent or
knowledge of the lessor, assigned the lease to the plaintiffs as security for a debt. Later, Michell, with the written consent of the lessor, assigned the lease to Ives and
Sons, who did not know of the prior assignment. Counsel for the defense contended that a court of equity
should not enforce an assignment of a lease made in
violation of its covenants, even against parties other than
the lessor. The court, without deciding whether this contention is correct, affirmed a decree for the plaintiffs on
the ground that a mortgage of an estate for years or assignment for security is not a breach of a covenant against
assignment. The opinion contains language to the effect that covenants against assignment of leases are not
favored and will be strictly construed.
Negaunee Iron Company v. Iron Cliffs Company 323
was a suit to quiet title. In 1857, when the lessee had a
two-stack furnace on nearby land, Harvey, in consideration of a lump sum of $25,000, leased 646 acres to the
322
a23

130 Mich. 347, 90 N.W. 32 (1902).
134 Mich. 264, 96 N.W. 468 (1903).
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Pioneer Iron Company for 99 years for the purpose of
mining and quarrying ores and marble. The lease,
which did not reserve rent, read,
"Provided, it shall not quarry, mine, or remove any
ores on said land except such as it shall actually convert
into merchantable iron in its own furnaces or forges ....
The rights and easements above mentioned shall descend
to the corporate successors of the party of the second part,
but not to its assigns."
In 1866 the Pioneer Iron Company leased all its lands
to the defendant Iron Cliffs Company, which soon after
acquired the entire capital stock of the Pioneer Company. The charter of the Pioneer Company expired in
1887 but was revived in 1889 under constitutional and
statutory provisions adopted in the latter year. The
furnace was dismantled in 1894. The plaintiffs acquired
the reversion and used the land from 1870 to 1900, when
the revived Pioneer Iron Company asserted a right to
mine under the 1857 lease. The court affirmed a decree
for the plaintiffs on the ground the lease conveyed only
an incorporeal right which was appurtenant to the furnace and was extinguished by the dismantling of the
furnace. Having reached a decision on this ground, the
court declined to consider the validity or effect of the
provision that the lease should not "descend" to assigns
of the lessee. That provision might be construed as
either a prohibition on alienation or a limitation intended to make the estate cease on alienation. The court
agreed, in general, with a contention of the defendants
that a court of equity should not enforce provisions for
forfeiture in a lease, but should leave the lessor to his
remedy at law. It pointed out, however, that in this case
the reversioners had already effected a forfeiture by reentry and occupation for thirty years, so that all equity
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was being requested to do was to enjoin threatened trespasses.
Wray-Austin Machinery Company v. Flower 324 was a
suit for subrogation to the rights of the lessee under a
lease. Flower leased to Wray by an instrument which
contained a covenant against assignment but not against
subletting and an express provision for forfeiture on
breach. Wray sublet to the plaintiff for the balance of
the term. Wray having defaulted in payment of rent,
Flower served him with a notice to quit, commenced a
summary proceeding for possession before a circuit court
commissioner, and took judgment by default. The statute then in force provided that no writ of restitution
should issue on such a judgment if the defendant paid
the rent due and double the costs within five days after
entry of judgment. 325 The day after the judgment was
entered the plaintiff learned of it and paid the commissioner the rent due and the exact amount of the costs.
Flower refused to accept this money and commenced
proceedings in mandamus to compel issuance of a writ
of restitution. The plaintiff then sued Wray and Flower
in equity, claiming that it was equitably entitled to an
assignment of the lease and to be subrogated to Wray's
statutory right of redemption. The court reversed a
decree for the plaintiff, holding that, as against the lessor,
:m 140 Mich. 452, 103 N.W. 873 (1905). In Ladas v. Psiharis, 241
Mich. 101, 216 N.W. 458 (1927), a lease had been assigned to a partnership with the consent of the lessor. The lessor secretly gave one
of the partners a renewal lease containing a covenant against assignment without the consent of the lessor. It was held that the other
partners were entitled to share in the lease, not only as against the
lessee but as against the lessor who, under these circumstances, could
be compelled to assent to an assignment to the firm.
325 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 123, §26, as amended, Comp. Laws
(1897)
§11177. The present statute omits the word "double." Act 314, P.A.
1915, c. 30, §25, as amended; Comp. Laws (1915) §13253; Comp. Laws
1929, §14988; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.1999; Comp. Laws (1948) §630.25.

PRESENT LEGAL ESTATES FOR YEARS

127

the plaintiff could not assert a right to an assignment of
the lease, because such an assignment would entitle the
lessor to a forfeiture of the estate. As the plaintiff had
not tendered the full amount required by the statute, the
court thought it unnecessary to decide whether a subtenant, as such, could exercise the lessee's statutory right
of redemption.
Hilsendegen v. Hartz Clothing Company 826 was a summary proceeding for possession of parts of a store building. The plaintiff demised three connected stores and a
basement to Hartz by a lease containing a covenant
against assigning or subletting without the written consent of the lessor, which was modified by a provision that,
"Permission is hereby given second party to sublet
portions or departments of said store for the same line
of business, also the basement for any unobjectionable
business, other than for saloon, restaurant, pawnshop
and jewelry business."
When the lease was made, Hartz was operating a clothing business in two of the stores and subletting the third
to persons running a hat hospital and tailor shop. Hartz
later organized the defendant clothing company and sublet the first two stores to it, excepting a space measuring
fifteen by twenty feet in one corner. The court reversed
a judgment for the plaintiff, holding that there had been
no breach of the covenant and saying that provisions involving forfeiture are not favored and should be construed most strongly against the lessor.
Hammond v. Hibler 327 was a suit for an injunction
against sale of liquor. The plaintiffs leased land to
326 160 Mich. 255, 130 N.W. 646 (1911). The lease contained an
express provision for re-entry on breach of covenant.
327
168 Mich. 66, 133 N.W. 932 (1911). The lease contained an
express provision for re-entry on breach of covenant.
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Hinkle and Nolin for ten years, the lease providing "that
no building or part thereof be sublet for or used as a
saloon, or that the sale of intoxicating liquors of any form
be permitted on said premises." Hinkle and Nolin assigned the lease to a corporation which sublet part of the
premises to Harrington. The plaintiffs, in consideration
of his paying them $100 a month, gave written permission for sale of liquor to Harrington "but not to his
heirs, assigns, executors or administrators." A judgment
creditor of Harrington levied on his leasehold interest,
bought at the sale, and assigned the sublease to the defendant. A decree for the plaintiffs was affirmed by a
majority of four justices on the ground the permission
given Harrington was inalienable. Three justices dissented, relying on the statement in the opinion in Wertheimer v. Hosmer~ quoted above, 328 that a condition
against alienation is entire, cannot be waived in part,
and is removed in toto by any waiver. One justice did
not sit. The majority opinion is probably sound. What
was waived was not the covenant against alienation but
the use restriction and that by a license to Harrington
which would be personal and nonassignable even without express provision to that effect. Unlike Wertheimer
v. Hosmer~ the decree in this case did not enforce a covenant against alienation as a prohibition compelling a
lessee to retain his estate against his will.
Flynn v. Bachner 329 was a summery proceeding for
possession of land. Plaintiff leased a store to defendants,
s2 s Notes 316 and 317 supra. The dissenting justices were concerned
by the fact that the plaintiffs were willing to give the defendant permission to sell liquor for a substantial consideration. Curiously, in
view of its theory, the dissenting opinion would have conditioned a
decree for the defendant on his paying the $100 a month which Harrington agreed to pay for his license.
s29 168 Mich. 424, 134 N.W. 451 (1912). The lease contained an
express provision for re-entry on breach of covenant.
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"for the term of three years . . . with the privilege of
two years more at the expiration of said first three years,
making, if said privilege of two years more is exercised,
a total of five years, ... to be occupied for a glove store
. . . . Said parties of the second part further covenant
that they will not assign nor transfer this lease, but can
sublet if the business is satisfactory to the party of the
fi rst part. "
The defendants, with the plaintiff's oral permission,
sublet part of the store to Darr for the manufacture and
sale of belts. Defendants elected to extend the lease for
the additional two years. After the first three years had
passed the plaintiff brought this proceeding on the theory
that the permission to sublet expired at the end of that
period. A judgment for the defendants was affirmed on
the ground the lease was for five years at the option of
the lessee and the permission was coextensive with the
lease.
Patterson v. Carrel 330 was a summary proceeding for
possession of land. Mars leased the premises to Castner,
who covenanted not to sublet without the written assent
of the lessor. The lease contained an express provision
for re-entry on breach of covenant. The defendant purchased Castner's business, took possession of the premises
without formal assignment of the lease, and made repairs. Mars accepted rent from the defendant and made
no objection to the repairs. Mars conveyed the reversion
to the plaintiffs. A judgment for the defendant was affirmed on the ground that, if there was any breach of the
330
171 Mich. 296, 137 N.W. 158 (1912). Accord: Pearson v. Sullivan,
209 Mich. 306, 176 N.W. 597 (1920). Acceptance of rent from the head
lessee, with knowledge that he had sublet, was held to waive the breach
in Struble v. Community Club, 218 Mich. 604, 188 N.W. 292 (1922).
Cf. Weber v. Van Blerck Motor Co., 186 Mich. 449, 152 N.W. 1036
(1915).
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covenant against subletting, it was waived by Mars, and
the waiver bound his transferees.
Great Lakes Realty and Building Company v. Turner 331 was a suit to restrain forfeiture of a lease. The
defendant demised land to Brown for 99 years by a lease
in which the lessee covenanted to erect a building and
not to assign, except by way of mortgage, until the building was completed. Express permission to release or sublet at any time was granted in the lease. Brown sublet
the entire tract to the plaintiff for a term of fifty years
and, by a separate instrument executed on the same day,
contracted to assign the head lease to the plaintiff when
the building was erected. The court affirmed an order
overruling a demurrer to the bill of complaint, holding
that a contract to assign is not a breach of a covenant
against assignment. The case is significant in that it assumes the validity of a condition against assignment in a
lease for a term longer than twenty-one years. The building was to be erected in ten years, however, so the restraint on alienation was not coextensive in duration
with the lease itself.
McDonald v. Andrews 382 was a suit for specific performance of an option. The defendants leased land to
the plaintiff for five years, with an option to purchase.
The lease contained a covenant against assigning or subletting without the written assent of the lessors. The
lease was not executed with the formalities required for
recording and, to obtain a recordable instrument, the
plaintiff assigned the lease to his sister, who quit-claimed
back without taking possession. A decree for the plain3 3 1 190 Mich. 582,
express provision for
332
199 Mich. 160,
express provision for

157 N.W. 57 (1916). The lease contained an
re-entry on breach of covenant.
165 N.W. 797 (1917). The lease contained an
re-entry on breach of covenant.
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tiff was affirmed on the ground an assignment without
transfer of possession is not a breach of a covenant against
assignment. This seems a sound application of the ancient common-law rule that restraints on alienation are
enforced only to protect a reversioner or remainderman
against waste.
Miller v. Pond 333 was a summary proceeding for possession of land. Sarah Burr leased to "Ische Bros., Will
C. Ische and Chas. E. Ische, copartners" for five years,
with the privilege of a five year extension. The lease
contained a covenant not to assign, transfer, or sublet in
whole or part without the written assent of the lessor
and an express provision for re-entry on breach of covenant. The plaintiff purchased the reversion. The Isches
sold Pond a two-thirds interest in their business and admitted him into their partnership. A judgment for the
defendants was affirmed on the ground that adding a
partner to a lessee firm is not a breach of a covenant
against assignment. The court said that the words "in
whole or part" applied only to subletting.
C. ]. Netting Company v. Sillman 334 was a suit torestrain summary proceedings for possession of land. The
Sillmans leased land to the Chinese-American Realty
Company for fifty years by an instrument which provided,
"Said lessee shall not sell or assign this lease without
the consent of the lessors in writing . . . . If this lease
shall by operation of law devolve upon or pass to any
person or persons other than said lessee (the foregoing
being hereinafter referred to as events of defeasance) ,
333 214 Mich. 186, 183 N.W. 24 (1921). Cf. Tierney v. McKay, 232
Mich. 609, 206 N.W. 325 (1925), where the withdrawal of one of two
partners from the lessee firm was held not to be a breach of a similar
covenant.
33 4 226 Mich. 307, 197 N.W. 545 (1924).
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then the lessors may elect to declare the terms of this
lease ended and exercise the right of reentry and re-possession herein elsewhere conferred in case of default."
The lessee erected a valuable building and mortgaged
it for $75,000 to the Peninsular State Bank. The plaintiff
levied on the leasehold under a judgment against the
lessee and bought at execution sale. The lessors commenced summary proceedings to enforce a forfeiture,
and the plaintiff started this suit, asserting equity jurisdiction on the ground, inter alia, that the condition was
ambiguous. The court reversed an order denying a motion to dismiss, saying that the condition was not ambiguous and that the only question was as to its validity,
which could be determined at law. The opinion gives no
intimation of the court's view as to the validity of a
condition against involuntary alienation except to suggest, indirectly, that it depends upon whether the statute permitting sale of estates for years on execution 885
confers upon such estates an inseparable incident which
cannot be restrained by condition.
McPheeters v. Birkholz 886 was an action of trespass on
the case for wrongful eviction. The defendants leased
a farm to the plaintiff on shares for a year from June,
1917. The plaintiff left on September 15, to be with
his wife in another state during her confinement, leaving a hired man in charge of the farm. A few days later
the defendants seized possession of the farm by force.
The court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff for triple
385 "Leasehold interests in lands shall be subject to levy and sale
upon execution. Proceedings to and including the sale shall be the
same in all respects as in the case of real estate sold on execution."
Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 23, §141; Comp. Laws (1915) §12956; Comp.
Laws (1929) §14676; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.1640; Comp. Laws (1948)
§623.141.
sse 232 Mich. 370, 206 N.W. 196 (1925).
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damages under the statute of forcible entry and detainer,337 saying that, although a lease on shares implies a
covenant that the lessee will give the farm his personal
attention, there was no breach in this instance and, even
if there had been a breach, it would not have entitled
the lessors to declare a forfeiture in the absence of an
express provision therefor in the lease. The opinion
states that, in general, breach of a covenant in a lease does
not work a forfeiture in the absence of a provision for reentry but suggests that there may be an exception to
that rule in the case of covenants against alienation. 338
Webb v. Knauss 339 was a summary proceeding for possession of land. The plaintiff demised land to Unger for
99 years by a lease containing a covenant against assignment without the written consent of the lessor and a
provision permitting the lessee to sublet in whole or in
part without such consent. Unger assigned to Knauss
with the written permission of the lessor. Knauss died,
and his widow succeeded to his interest. Mrs. Knauss, by
an instrument purporting to be a sublease, transferred
the whole of the unexpired term to the Houghtens. The
Houghtens assigned to Flint. After learning of these assignments the plaintiff commenced a summary proceeding for possession for nonpayment of rent against Mrs.
Knauss, the Houghtens, and Flint, and took a judgment
against all of them, which was paid by Mrs. Knauss. The
337 Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 33, §19; Comp. Laws (1915) §13376; Comp.
Laws (1929) §15113; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.2130; Comp. Laws (1948)
§633.19; reenacting Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 111, §3; Comp. Laws (1857)
§4717; Comp. Laws (1871) §6372; How. Stat., §7957; Comp. Laws
(1897) §11206.
sss 232 Mich. 377, 205 N.W. 199, citing Wray-Austin Machinery Co.
v. Flower, 140 Mich. 452, 103 N.W. 873 (1905), note 324 supra.
339 253 Mich. 197, 234 N.W. 154 (1931). The lease contained an
express provision for re-entry on breach of condition. The estate for
years passed to Mrs. Knauss by will.
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plaintiff then commenced a summary proceeding for possession against the same defendants on the ground the
purported sublease from Mrs. Knauss to the Houghtens
was an assignment and worked a forfeiture. The defendants contended that the permission to assign to Knauss
destroyed the whole covenant against assignment 340 and
that, even if it did not, the lessor's taking a judgment for
rent against the assignees waived the breach. The court
held that the purported sublease was an assignment but
affirmed a judgment for the defendants on the second
ground urged by them, without discussing the first. The
case is significant in that it assumes the validity of a restraint on alienation in a 99-year lease which is operative for the full term of the lease.
The Michigan decisions clearly affirm the validity of
a provision in a commercial lease for forfeiture to the
lessor on alienation by the lessee. There is nothing in
them to indicate that the rule is otherwise in the case of
a provision intended to be operative for the full period
of a lease for a very long term, such as a thousand years
or 99 years renewable forever. There are no Michigan
decisions on restraints on alienation of noncommercial
leasehold interests, and there is nothing to suggest that
the rule governing them is any different from that which
applies to like restraints in commercial leases. 341 No
Michigan case deals with a provision for forfeiture to
someone other than the lessor, but such a provision is
probably valid. 342
Three Michigan decisions suggest that a covenant
against alienation in a lease for years is, or may be made
340 As to this contention, see the language in Wertheimer v. Hosmer,
83 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890), quoted at note 317 supra.
341 Cf. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §410 (1944), note 305 supra.
342 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §27, note 307 supra.
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through specific performance by injunction to operate
as, a prohibition on alienation which disables the lessee
from transferring his estate and forces him to retain it,
with all its burdens and public obligations, against his
will,3 43 If this is so, the law of Michigan on this point
is out of harmony with that of England and the great
majority of jurisdictions in this country. 344 It does not
appear that the Michigan Supreme Court was fully
aware when it rendered these decisions of their inconsistency with the principles of the common law as those
principles have stood since the abolition of perpetually
unbarrable entails in 1472. It is to be hoped that the
court will overrule those three decisions and replace
them with the sound rule of Mandlebaum v. McDonell 345
that all prohibitory restraints on alienation of legal estates in land are void.
Public policy is no explanation of why every restraint
on alienation of an estate in fee simple, even if limited
in duration to a single day, is absolutely void, whereas
restraints on alienation of estates for years are fully valid,
although general in scope and extending for the full duration of the term, and although the term may be for a
thousand years or more. The reversioner under a short
term lease has a real interest in the integrity and good
husbandry of his tenant; the reversioner under a thousand year lease, particularly if no rent is reserved, has no
substantial interest in his tenant's character or behavior;
a restraint on alienation for his benefit means merely
that he may impose a pecuniary mulct on the tenant as
3 4 3 Wertheimer v. Hosmer, 83 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890); Darmstaetter v. Hoffman, 120 Mich. 48, 78 N.W. 1014 (1899); Smith v.
Applebaum, 241 Mich. 493, 217 N.W. 401 (1928).
344 Notes 297 and 298 supra.
3 45 29 Mich. 78 (1874), note 138 supra. Accord with the rule proposed by the text: PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §405 (1944).
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a condition of assenting to a transfer. This was the practice of feudal overlords of tenants in fee simple until it
was stopped by the enactment of the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum. 846 Restraints on estates for long terms
of years are as objectionable as those upon estates in fee
simple. If the restraint extends to involuntary alienation, the impediment to creditors is manifest. Moreover,
such restraints impede the economic utilization of land
to its full capacity. An industrial concern may be financially unable to move its operations to a new and more
suitable location if it cannot transfer its existing plant to
another concern without paying a lessor a prohibitive
fee. When land under a long term lease should have a
new building and the lessee cannot finance construction
without assigning or encumbering his estate, if the lessor
insists upon the full anticipated gain from the venture
as a condition of his assent, no building is likely to be
built. Such restraints may also impede maximum utilization of human capacities by restricting mobility. For
example, a professional man whose chief asset is a rentfree long-term lease of a house, subject to forfeiture on
alienation, is financially bound to exercise his talents
in the vicinity of the house although they might develop
more fully and be of greater social utility in some other
locality. 847 It is probable that general restraints on alienation of long-term leases will be used to evade the recent
United States Supreme Court decisions prohibiting the
enforcement of use restrictions ·against occupancy by
members of a particular race. 348
346 Statute of Westminster III, 18 Edw. I, stat. 1 (1290). See notes 7,
104 supra.
347 This is especially true of clergymen and university professors
whose social value is high hut whose incomes are so low that the
availability of a free house is likely to be decisive as to their location.
See note 318 supra.
a4s McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), reversing Sipes v. McGhee,
316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W. (2d) 638 (1947).
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It may be that we need a new statute Quia Emptores
Terrarum to prohibit restraints on alienation of estates
for years which are imposed for undesirably long periods.349 Extension of the existing constitutional prohibition on long-term leases of agricultural land 350 to all
types of leases would accomplish the purpose but might
interfere unduly with flexibility in conveyancing. Perhaps a statute providing that no restraint on alienation
in a lease should be valid for more than twenty-one years
after its execution would be desirable.
349 Professor

Gray suggested the need for legislation on the subject.
2d ed., 90 (1895).
aoo Note 306 supra. It should be noted that the prohibition has no
application to a lease which does no't reserve rent or services. Hence
the constitutional provision fails to regulate nonconunercial leases, the
type which, as the Restatement of Property recognizes, are most likely
to be used to set up objectionable perpetuities.
RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION,

CHAPTER

6

Expectant Legal Interests in Land
HE common law recognized a number of interests
in land which were not presently possessory but
would or might become so. These included the
interest of an owner of a freehold estate who had leased
the land for a term of years, the interest of the owner of
an estate for years who had sublet for a lesser term, and
the interest of an owner of a freehold estate who had conveyed a lesser freehold estate. These interests were all
known as reversions, but their incidents differed because
the reversioner of the first type had seisin, whereas those
of the other two types did not. From the end of the thirteenth century, the common law recognized the remainder, an estate limited in a conveyance to commence in
possession upon the termination of a prior estate in tail,
for life or for years created by the same conveyance. 351
The validity of contingent remainders was not recognized
until the fifteenth century and then only when preceded
by an estate of freehold. 352 From a very early period the
law recognized the interesse termini) the interest of the
owner of an estate for years which is to commence in the
future. 353 The reversion, the remainder, and the interesse

T

Fitz William v. Anonymous, R.S.Y.B. 33 Edw. I, 20 (1305).
Sir Thomas Littleton seems to have considered contingent remainders invalid. TENUREs, §72I (I481). Butler v. Bray, 2 Dyer I89b
at I90b, 73 Eng. Rep. 4I8 at 420 (I560); Chudleigh's Case, I Co. Rep.
I20a at I30a, I34b, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 at 296, 304 (I589-95); Goodright
v. Cornish, I Salk. 226, 91 Eng. Rep. 200 (I694); 3 Holdsworth, HrsTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., I34-I37 (I923); 7 id. 85 (I926).
353 I Coke, INSTITUTES 45b, 46b.
Strictly speaking, the interesse
termini was not an estate, but it was much more than a mere possibility or right of entry or action. Saffyn's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 123b at
35 1

352
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termini were the only estates in expectancy known to the
common law, but it also recognized certain other interests
in expectancy which did not rise to the dignity of estates.
These included the right of entry or of action of the disseised or dispossessed owner of a possessory estate, the
right of action of a reversioner or remainderman whose
estate had been discontinued by the tortious operation of
a conveyance made by the owner of the possessory estate,
the right of entry retained by one who conveyed an estate
subject to a condition subsequent, inchoate dower, and
unassigned dower consummate. Whether the common
law recognized the possibility of reverter, which is the
interest, if any there can be, retained by one who has
conveyed a determinable estate which is not on condition subsequent, is not clear. 354 The Statutes of Uses and
Wills added four types of estates in expectancy, the
springing use, the shifting use, the springing executory
devise, and the shifting executory devise. 355
124b, 77 Eng. Rep. 248 at 250 (1605); 7 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw 247 (1923); Bordwell, "Interests in Chattels Real and
Personal," I Mo. L. REv. 119 at 133-137 (1936).
354 E.g., the interest retained by A after conveying "to B and his
heirs so long as the Penobscot Building shall stand." Challis, LAw OF
REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., 263-268, 437-439 (1911); Gray, RuLE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., 24-44, 579-587 (1915). Professor Gray thought
that the possibility of reverter was a form of reversion and that the
statute Quia Emptores Terrarum prohibited the retention of any type
of reversion on a conveyance in fee simple. Unfortunately, the courts
in this country have not always been careful to distinguish, on the
one hand, between the possibility of reverter and the right of entry
for breach of condition subsequent, both of which are reversionary
possibilities created according to the rules of the common law unmodified by statute, and, on the other hand, between these reversionary
possibilities and the shifting use limited in favor of the grantor,
operating under the Statute of Uses, which is not a reversionary
possibility but a future estate. As to such shifting uses, see Digby,
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 4th ed., 354-356 (1892).
355 Brooke, GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT, "Feffements al Uses," pl. 30, 50
(1573); Digby, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 4th ed., 357359 (1892); 4 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 440, 474 (1924);
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, Introductory Note to Div. III (1936).
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Reversions of all three types 356 and interessia termini 357 were, from an early period, as freely alienable
inter vivos as like possessory estates. There is doubt as
to the alienability of remainders at the early common
law, but it was settled by the sixteenth century that vested
remainders were transferable inter vivos. 358 Contingent
remainders and all of the other mentioned types of interests in expectancy were inalienable at common law, 359
356 Freehold reversion expectant upon a term for years: Pesehale v.
Fitz Aucher, Bract. N.B., pl. 533 (1231); Reversion in a term for years:
Rawlyns's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 52a, 76 Eng. Rep. 1007 (1587); Reversion
in fee expectant upon a lesser freehold: Cambridge v. Risle, R.S.Y.B.
34 Edw. I, 314 (1306); Edward Fox's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 93b, 77 Eng.
Rep. 616 (1609). So far as present rights against the tenant in possession (rent due under a lease or sublease, etc.) attornment, voluntary
or compulsory, was necessary to complete the transfer until Stat. 4
Ann., c. 16, §9 (1705), but the reversion, so far as it was an interest
in expectancy, passed by the grant or assignment, without attornment.
Rawlyns's Case, supra.
357 Bruerton v. Rainsford, Cro. Eliz. 15, 78 Eng. Rep. 281 (1583);
Wheeler v. Thorogood, Cro. Eliz. 127, 78 Eng. Rep. 384 (1589); Saffyn's
Case, 5 Co. Rep. 123b, 77 Eng. Rep. 248, sub nom. Saffyn v. Adams,
Cro. Jac. 60, 79 Eng. Rep. 50 (1605).
358 N. v. Crowe, R.S.Y.B. 21 Edw. I, 185, 189 (1293); Sheppard,
TouCHSTONE oF CoMMON AssURANCEs 238 (1648).
359 Contingent estates (remainders, uses, and executory interests), see:
Lampet's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (1612); King v.
Withers, Cases T. Talbot 117 at 123, 25 Eng. Rep. 693 at 695 (1735);
Doe ex dem. Brune v. Martyn, 8 B. & C. 497 at 516, 108 Eng. Rep.
1127 at 1134 (1828). A transfer for consideration of a shifting use was
given effect in equity after the contingency occurred in Wright v.
Wright, 1 Ves. Sr. 409, 27 Eng. Rep. 1111 (1749-50) and it was decided in the nineteenth century that a contingent future estate could
be transferred, by way of estoppel, by levying a fine, Doe ex dem.
Christmas v. Oliver, 10 B. & C. 181, 109 Eng. Rep. 418 (1829), but the
confusion in the authorities reflected in Doe ex dem. Brune v.
Martyn, supra, indicates that the possibility of making an effective
voluntary transfer of a contingent future estate in any way was, to
say the least, highly doubtful throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A contingent estate could be transferred by the commissioners in bankruptcy of the owner. Higden v. Williamson, 3 P.
Wms. 132, 24 Eng. Rep. 1000 (1732); 1 Co. Rep. 66b, Fraser's Note z.
Right of entry: Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, §1 (1540); Partridge v. Strange,
I Plowden 77 at 88, 75 Eng. Rep. 123 at 140 (1552) (holding that
such interests were inalienable at common law and that the statute
subjected them to forfeiture for attempted alienation); Sir Moyle
Finch's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 63a at 70a, 77 Eng. Rep. 348 at 362 (1606);

EXPECTANT LEGAL INTERESTS IN LAND

141

except that a right of entry on breach of condition subsequent which was appurtenant to a reversion could be
transferred with the reversion/ 60 and an otherwise inalienable interest in expectancy could be released to the
owner of a present estate. 361 Reversions in estates for
years, the second type of reversion mentioned above, and
interessia termini passed as chattel interests on the death
of the owner and could always be bequeathed by will. 862
Reversions, remainders, and other interests in expectancy
in fee were heritable, and those which were estates were
devisable. 863 This was the state of the English law when
it was brought to Michigan by the Upper Canada statute
of 1792.364
The English authority on the validity of restraints on
alienation of interests in expectancy is scanty. In 1382
it was decided that a condition in a life lease, that if the
Goodright ex dem. Fowler v. Forrester, 8 East 552, 103 Eng. Rep. 454
(1809); Littleton, TENURES §347 (1481); 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 265a
(Butler's Note No. 212 to 13th ed., 1787); Dower: See 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 32b.
3so Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, §1 (1540).
S61 Lampet's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (1612). A
married woman could not make an ordinary conveyance to her husband or anyone else, but dower could be released by the husband and
wife levying a fine or suffering a common recovery in favor of a purchaser of the husband's estate. Id. at 49b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1000; I
Cruise, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY
187; 5 id., 178-179, 417. Curtesy initiate was not an interest in expectancy but a present possessory estate for life.
362 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 46b.
3 6 3 King v. Withers, Cases T. Talbot 117 at 123, 25 Eng. Rep. 693
at 695 (1735) (intestate succession); Selwyn v. Selwyn, 2 Burr. 1131,
97 Eng. Rep. 750 (1761) (contingent executory interest devisable);
Roe ex dem. Perry v. Jones, 1 H. Bl. 30, 126 Eng. Rep. 20 (1788)
(contingent remainder devisable); Goodright ex dem. Fowler v. Forrester, & East 552, 103 Eng. Rep. 454 (1809) (right of entry not devisable). The descent of a future interest was peculiar in that, when
it became possessory, the heir of the person who had last acquired it
by purchase (i.e., other than by descent) took. This was not necessarily the heir of the last person who had owned the interest. 3 Simes,
FUTURE INTERESTS 169 (1936).
364 32 Geo. III, (Upper Canada), c. §3 (1792), note 33 supra.
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lessor conveyed the reversion it should be forfeited to the
life tenant, was void. 365 In 1587 a provision in a will that
if devisees of a contingent remainder in fee simple "go
about to sell" before the remainder vested they should
forfeit their estate was treated as valid. 366 As contingent
remainders were inalienable at that time, the decision is
not conclusive as to the validity of a penalty restraint on
alienation of a contingent future interest. The modern
English cases indicate that such a restraint is valid, but
they are not in harmony as to the validity of restraints
on vested interests in expectancy. 367 The weight of American authority tends toward the view that penalty restraints on alienation of contingent future interests intended to operate only while they remain contingent, are
valid, but that restraints on alienation of indefeasibly
vested estates in expectancy are valid only to the extent
that they would be valid as applied to like possessory
estates. 368
365 Plesyngton's Case, Bellewe 101, 72 Eng. Rep. 43 (1382); Statham,
ABRIDGEMENT, Condicions, pl. 14. But see Perkins, PROFITABLE BooKE
§§729, 730 (1642). It may be that this case was decided on the basis of
the common-law rule that a condition could not enure to the benefit
of anyone other than the lessor. The case was cited in support of this
rule in Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 12 (1505). See Brooke,
GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT, Conditions, pl. 83 (1573). If this is the basis
of the decision in Plesyngton's Case, it is not of much help in determining the law of restraints on alienation.
366 Large's Case, 2 Leon. 82, 3 Leon. 182, 74 Eng. Rep. 376, 620
(1587). It was held that the giving of a 240-year lease by one of the remaindermen was not a breach of the restraint.
367 Gray, REsTRAINTS oN ALIENATION, 2d ed., 33-38 (1895); Schnebly,
"Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF
PRoPERTY, §26.54 (1952); Sweet, "Restraints on Alienation," 33 L.Q.
REv. 236 at 246 (1917); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation
of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1214-1215 (1935); 2
Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS 311-312 (1936).
36 8 The cases have been collected by Professors Schnebly and Simes,
note 367 supra. Professor Schnebly says (AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
§26.53; p. 1213 of article), "No authority has been found which has
divided the restraint, and upheld it for the period of time during which
the future interest may remain non-possessory."

EXPECTANT LEGAL INTERESTS IN LAND

143

The Restatement of Property takes the position that
all prohibitory restraints on alienation of future estates
which would otherwise be alienable, that is, restraints
which would compel the owner to remain such against
his will, are void. 369 As to penalty restraints, the Restatement considers a restraint which may last until after the
interest becomes possessory or becomes indefeasibly
vested is valid only if a like restraint on a possessory estate
of the same duration would be. It takes no position on the
validity of penalty restraints which are certain not to
operate after the estate becomes possessory or indefeasibly
vested. 370
The Michigan statutes codify the law of estates in expectancy and provide that they are descendible, devisable, and alienable, in the same manner as estates in possession.371 Consequently the question of the alienability
ss9 Section 405 and §411, comment a (1944).
370 Section 411. The Restatement, unlike the Michigan statutes,
treats reversions, possibilities of reverter, and rights of entry on breach
of condition subsequent as future interests. Sec. 153, comment a;
§154, comment e; §155; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §9; note 371 infra. The
Restatement does not treat possibilities of reverter and rights of entry
as future estates, however, and it does not deal with inchoate dower
and curtesy initiate. Sections 154 (3), 155, 153 (I) (2).
371Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 266, §24, provided: "When any contingent remainder, executory devise, or other estate in expectancy, is so granted
or limited to any person, that in case of his death before the happening
of the contingency, the estate would descend to his heirs in fee simple,
such person may, before the happening of the contingency, sell, assign,
or devise the premises, subject to the contingency." This was superseded by the following provisions of Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, which are
still in force:
"Sec. 7. Estates, as respects the time of their enjoyment, are divided into estates in possession, and estates in expectancy.
"Sec. 8. An estate in possession is where the owner has an immediate right to the possession of the land; an estate in expectancy is
where the right to the possession is postponed to a future period.
"Sec. 9. Estates in expectancy are divided into, First. Estates commencing at a future day, denominated future estates; and, Second.
Reversions.
"Sec. 10. A future estate is an estate limited to commence in possession at a future day, either without the intervention of a precedent
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of contingent future estates has not been in doubt here. 372
The questions which have caused difficulty have been
those which involve interests in expectancy which are
not estates. Until the rule was changed by statute in
1847, Michigan held that a disseisee, that is, the owner
estate, or on the determination, by lapse of time or otherwise, of a
precedent estate, created at the same time.
"Sec. 11. When a future estate is dependent upon a precedent
estate, it may be termed a remainder, and may be created and transferred by that name.
"Sec. 12. A reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor
or his heirs, or in the heirs of a testator, commencing in possession on
the determination of a particular estate granted or devised.
"Sec. 13. Future estates are either vested or contingent: They are
vested when there is a person in being who would have an immediate
right to the possession of the lands, upon the ceasing of the intermediate or precedent estate. They are contingent whilst the person
to whom, or the event upon which they are limited to take effect
remains uncertain.
"Sec. 35. Expectant estates are descendible, devisable and alienable in the same manner as estates in possession.
"Sec. 42. All expectant estates, except such as are enumerated and
defined in this chapter, are abolished."-Comp. Laws (1857) §§2591
to 2597, 2619, 2626; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4074 to 4080, 4102, 4109;
Comp. Laws (1897) §§8789 to 8795, 8817, 8825; How. Stat., §§5523 to
5529, 5551, 5558; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11525 to 11531, 11553, 11560;
Comp. Laws (1929) §§12927 to 12933, 12955, 12962; Mich. Stat. Ann.,
§§26.7 to 26.13, 35, 42; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.7 to 554.13, 554.35,
554.42. See also §§14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, notes 257, 279,
307 supra. The effect of these statutes is discussed in Chapter 11, Sec'
tion C., infra.
Despite sections 9 and 10, it has been held that a reversion expectant upon an estate for years is a present estate in possession. Toms
v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 572, 2 N.W. 814 (1879). See PROPERTY
REsTATEMENT §154, comment f; Cf. Challis, LAW OF REAL PRoPERTY,
3d ed., 99-100 (1911).
37 2 Inter vivos transfer: Russell v. Musson, 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W.
428 (1927). But see Menard v. Campbell, 180 Mich. 583, 147 N.W.
556 (1914) (holding that a conveyance by a contingent remainderman
was void because she was a married woman). Transfer by bankruptcy:
Horton v. Moore, (6th Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 189, cert. den., Moore
v. Horton, 311 U.S. 692 (1940), rehearing den. 311 U.S. 728 (1940).
Transfer by will: see L'Etourneau v. Henquenet, 89 Mich. 428, 50
N.W. 1077 (1891). Intestate descent: Curtis v. Fowler, 66 Mich. 696,
33 N.W. 804 (1887). The problem was complicated, however, by
decisions finding an implied condition of survivorship until the estate
vested. Thus, in Hadley v. Henderson, 214 Mich. 157, 183 N.W. 75
(1921) a shifting executory interest to a daughter in case a devisee in fee
died without issue was held to "lapse" upon the death of the daughter
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of land in the adverse possession of another, could not
convey it to anyone except the person in possession. 373
Similarly, until the rule was abrogated by statute in 1931,
it was held that a right of entry on breach of condition
subsequent not appurtenant to a reversion was inalienable and that an attempt to transfer such a right forfeited it. 374 A right of entry on breach of condition subbefore the first devisee, and in In re Coots' Estate, 253 Mich. 208, 234
N.W. 141 (1931), cert den. sub nom. Dellbridge v. Oldfield, 284 U.S.
665 (1931) a contingent remainder to nieces and nephews if a life
tenant should die without issue was held to "lapse" as to nieces and
nephews who predeceased the life tenant. See 2 Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS 90-95 (1936). In an attempt to overrule these decisions the
legislature, by Act 2ll, P.A. 1931; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.47; Comp. Laws
(1948) §554.101, provided: "In all cases where the owner of an expectant estate, right or interest in real or personal property, shall die
prior to the termination of the precedent or intermediate estate, if the
contingency arises by which such owner would have been entitled to an
estate in possession if living, his heirs at law if he died intestate, or
his devisees or grantees and assigns if he shall have devised or conveyed such right or interest, shall be entitled to the same estate in
possession." The statute has been treated as effective for the intended
purpose but not retroactive. Stevens v. Wildy, 281 Mich. 377, 275
N.W. 179 (1937); Dodge v. Detroit Trust Company, 300 Mich. 575,
2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942). See part Two at notes 261-266 infra.
sn Bruckner's Lessee v. Lawrence, 1 Doug. 19 (Mich. 1843) [holding that Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, §1 (1540) note 359 supra, to the same
effect, was not in force here, but that a conveyance by a disseisee was
void at common law as an act of maintenance]; Stockton v. Williams,
I Doug. 546 (Mich. 1845) (giving limited effect to the conveyance);
Hubbard v. Smith, 2 Mich. 207 (1851); Crane v. Reeder, 21 Mich. 24
(1870). Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 65, §7, provided, "No grant or conveyance
of lands or interest therein, shall be void for the reason that, at the
time of the execution thereof such lands shall be in the actual possession of another claiming adversely." Comp. Laws (1857) §2726;
Comp. Laws (1871) §4209; How. Stat. §5657; Comp. Laws (1897)
§8961; Comp. Laws (1915) §ll693; Comp. Laws (1929) §13283; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §26.526; Comp. Laws (1948) §565.7. Probably the statute
transforms the right of entry of a disseisee into a present possessory
estate.
374 Halpin v. Rural Agricultural School District No. 9, 224 Mich.
308, 194 N.W. 1005 (1923); County of Oakland v. Mack, 243 Mich.
279, 220 N.W. 801 (1928); Fractional School District No. 9 v. Beardslee, 248 Mich. ll2, 226 N.W. 867 (1929); Quinn v. Pere Marquette Ry.
Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931); Avery v. Consumers Power
Co., 265 Mich. 696, 253 N.W. 189 (1934); Dolby v. State Highway
Commissioner, 283 Mich. 609, 278 N.W. 694 (1938); Juif v. State
Highway Commissioner, 287 Mich. 35, 282 N.W. 892 (1938). Contra,
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sequent appurtenant to a reversion expectant upon an
estate for years is alienable with the reversion, 375 and the
same seems to be true as to a right of entry on breach of
condition subsequent appurtenant to a reversion expectant upon a freehold estate, even though created after
the repeal of the English statutes and before the enactment of the Michigan statute of 1931. 376 Michigan probably recognizes the existence of possibilities of reverter
and holds them inalienable, the 1931 statute being
limited to rights of entry on breach of condition subsequent.377 Inchoate dower may be released to the husas to the forfeiture: PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §160, Comment C. (1948
Supp.). Act 219, P.A. 1931; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.851; Comp. Laws
(1948) §554.ll1, provides: "The reversionary interest in lands conveyed on a condition subsequent may be granted, conveyed, transferred or devised by the owner of such interest, and by the subsequent
grantees or devisees thereof, either before or after the right of re-entry
becomes effective: Provided, That this act shall not affect any such
interest created before it takes effect." A right of entry on breach of
condition subsequent reserved in a conveyance in fee must be distinguished from the title remaining in an owner in fee who has granted
an easement determinable upon cessation of the prescribed use. The
fee subject to the easement may be transferred. Mahar v. Grand Rapids
Terminal Ry. Co., 174 Mich. 138, 140 N.W. 535 (1913). See Quinn v.
Pere Marquette Ry. Co., supra.
375 Patterson v. Carrel, 171 Mich. 296, 137 N.W. 158 (1912); Miller
v. Pond, 214 Mich. 186, 183 N.W. 24 (1921).
376 Hamilton v. Wickson, 131 Mich. 71, 90 N.W. 1032 (1902); Hess
v. Haas, 230 Mich. 646, 203 N.W. 471 (1925); 3 Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS
162 (1936).
377 Thayer v. McGee, 20 Mich. 195 (1870); School District No. 5 of
Delhi v. Everett, 52 Mich. 314, 17 N.W. 926 (1883); Fractional School
District No. 9 v. Beardslee, 248 Mich. 112, 226 N.W. 867 (1929). See
Quinn v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376
(1931). The Michigan Supreme Court has not always been careful
of its terminology and has sometimes tended to confuse the commonlaw possibility of reverter with the right of entry on breach of condition subsequent. Although both of these interests are inalienable if
created before the 1931 statute and the possibility of reverter is
probably still inalienable, it would seem that a shifting use limited to
the grantor should be alienable like any other future estate. See note
354 supra; 3 Simes, FuTURE INTERESTS 159-160 (1936). As to the
validity of a limitation of a shifting use to the grantor, see 1 Simes,
273-274.
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band 378 or to a purchaser of the fee, 379 but unassigned
dower is otherwise inalienable, even after it has become
consummate by the death of the husband. 380
Walton v. Torrey 381 was a suit to restrain eviction proceedings. A testator devised land to his widow for life,
remainder to his children in fee simple with a proviso
that it should "remain undivided in the use, occupation
and possession of all my children now living, until the
youngest child attains the age of 21 years." The widow
and those children who were of age executed conveyances purporting to transfer their interests to the defendant, and later, before the youngest child was 21, brought
378 Randall v. Randall, 37 Mich. 563
(1877); Rhoades v. Davis,
51 Mich. 306, 16 N.W. 659 (1883); Owen v. Yale, 75 Mich. 256, 42
N.W. 817 (1889); Wright v. Wright, 79 Mich. 527, 44 N.W. 944 (1890);
Dakin v. Dakin, 93 Mich. 284, 56 N.W. 562 (1893); Chittock v. Chittock,
101 Mich. 367, 59 N.W. 655 (1894); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 112 Mich.
274, 70 N.W. 582 (1897); La Plant v. Lester, 150 Mich. 336, 113
N.W. 1115 (1907); In re Berner's Estates, 217 Mich. 612, 187 N.W.
(1912); Hagerty v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 258 Mich. 133, 244 N.W.
211. (1932). As between the husband and wife, the consideration for
such a release must be adequate: Wright v. Wright, supra; Bechtel
v. Barton, 147 Mich. 318, 110 N.W. 935 (1907).
379 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 66, §13; Comp. Laws (1857) §2784; Comp.
Laws (1871) §4281; Comp. Laws (1897) §8930; How. Stat. §5745;
Comp. Laws (1915) §11662; Comp. Laws (1929) §13080; Mich. Stat.
Ann. §26.229; Comp. Laws (1948) §558.13. Inchoate dower is bound by
the wife's joinder in the husband's mortgage, Oades v. Standard Savings
& Loan Assn., 257 Mich. 469, 241 N.W. 262 (1932), or executory land
contract, Hendricks v. Wolf, 279 Mich. 598, 273 N.W. 282 (1937).
Cf. Richmond v. Robinson, 12 Mich. 193 (1864). A wife may give
her husband a power of attorney to bar dower by joining her in his
conveyances. Continental National Bank v. Gustin, 297 Mich. 134,
297 N.W. 214 (1941).
sso Inchoate dower: Lott v. Lott, 146 Mich. 580, 109 N.W. 1126
(1906); Cf. Raynor v. Lee, 20 Mich. 384 (1870); Unassigned dower
consummate: Galbraith v. Fleming, 60 Mich. 408, 27 N.W. 583 (1886).
However, in Johnston v. Loose, 201 Mich. 259, 167 N.W. 1021 (1918),
where the widow quit-claimed unassigned dower to the plaintiff and
later released it to the heirs, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled
in equity as against both the widow and the heirs to compel the
widow to secure admeasurement of her dower and convey it to him.
3 8 1 Harr. Ch. 259 (Mich, circa 1836). The restraint also involved
possessory estates. This aspect of the case has been discussed above
at note 135.
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this suit. The interests of the minor children had been
conveyed to the defendant under probate court license.
An injunction was dissolved, the Chancellor holding that
the restraint was upon partition, not upon alienation,
and that its validity need not be decided. He stated that
provisions in restraint of alienation are not to be favored.
Mandlebaum v. McDonell 382 was a suit to quiet title.
A will, as construed by the court, devised land to the
testator's widow for life with remainder in fee simple to
his three sons, a grandson, Ellen Daily and Ann Baxter,
the interests of the latter two being subject to a condition subsequent requiring them to live with the widow
until they married. The will provided:
"the same to remain unsold until (the grandson) shall
be twenty-five years of age, or until twenty-one years from
the date hereof, in case of his death, and not then to be
sold in case my wife is still living, and that she remains
my widow, and until after her death."
The will also stated that the devises were upon condition that, until the period mentioned had elapsed,
"it shall not be competent for any of my devisees hereinbefore named to either dispose of, alienate, mortgage,
barter, pledge or transfer any portion of the real estate
... , either directly or indirectly, upon any pretext whatever, .... All documents or instruments whatever, executed by any of my devisees, which shall be in contravention of the true intent and meaning of this, my last
will and testament, shall be deemed and be taken to be
null and void and of no effect whatever."
The three sons and the grandson were the sole heirs
at law. Ann Baxter did not live with the widow until
her marriage; Ellen Daily did. The widow did not
remarry. After the marriage of Ellen Daily, she, the
38 2

29 Mich. 78 (1874). Also discussed above at note 138.
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widow, the three sons and the grandson, who was not
yet 25, executed conveyances under which the plaintiff
claimed. The court affirmed a decree for the plaintiff,
holding that the conveyances were effective to give the
plaintiff an absolute title in fee simple. The court
thought the language of the will was intended to impose
a prohibition on alienation and held that such a restraint
upon a vested remainder in fee simple is void, saying
also that a forfeiture restraint upon alienation of a
vested remainder in fee simple is likewise void. The
opinion states,
"Nor does the fact that, in the case of an executory
devise, or in that of a contingent remainder, or any other
interest not vested, a restriction upon the power of the
devisees to sell before it shall become vested in interest,
would be good, in any manner tend to sustain such a
restriction upon a vested estate in fee." 888

Harlow v. Lake Superior Iron Company 884 was an
action of ejectment brought by an assignee of an undivided half of a 99-year lease. The lease, given by the
owner in fee simple of the land, demised an undivided
half of the land for mining purposes, and provided,
"I hereby agree and bind myself not to sell, assign,
or encumber said undivided interest hereby leased,
unless said (lessee), his heirs or assigns, shall have the
first refusal to purchase said undivided one-half, .... "
A judgment for the defendants was affirmed on the
ground the lease demised only an incorporeal interest
which could not be subdivided or recovered in ejectment. The opinion contains language suggesting the
validity of the pre-emptive option granted by the quoted
provision of the lease. 885
sss 29 Mich. 78 at 88-89 (1874).
36 Mich. 105 (1877). Also mentioned above at note 312.
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Lariverre v. Rains 386 was a suit to set aside conveyances as a cloud on title. Mrs. White executed an instrument conveying to her husband an estate for his life to
commence at her death, then to her son Joseph an estate
for his life, providing each "sees fit to use and occupy
the same so long as a home and residence," and the fee
simple expectant upon the prior life estates to the children of Joseph,
"It being expressly understood and agreed that the
right to use and occupy, as above stated, is intended to
be a life interest, and not transferable,"
so far as the husband and Joseph were concerned. Later
Mr. and Mrs. White conveyed the land in fee to Doyle,
who conveyed to the defendants. Mrs. White died and
the children of Joseph brought this suit in the lifetime
of Mr. White and Joseph. The court reversed a decree
for the defendants, holding that the life estates of Mr.
White and Joseph were forfeited by alienation and ceasing to occupy the land. The opinion takes no account
of the facts that Joseph had not attempted to convey his
future life estate and that he could have no right to
occupy before that estate became possessory. As both
life estates were future interests, the decision seems to
stand for the proposition that a penalty restraint upon
alienation of a vested future estate for life is valid even
though so phrased as to continue after the estate becomes
possessory.
Portage Grange No. 16 v. Portage Lodge No. 340 881
was a suit to restraint interference with the plaintiff's
lessee. The plaintiff leased a lodge room to the defen386 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583 (1897). Also discussed at note 264
supra.
s87 141 Mich. 402, 104 N.W. 667 (1905). Also discussed above at note
168.
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dant, for use in common by both parties, the lease providing that the premises "cannot be leased or rented to
any lodge" without the consent of both. The plaintiff,
without the consent of the defendant, leased the room to
the Ladies of the Modern Maccabees, for use in common
with the defendant. The defendant refused to allow the
ladies to use the room. The court affirmed a decree
for the defendant, assuming without discussion the validity of the restraint on alienation. If the plaintiff was
the owner in fee simple, 888 the decision operates to enforce as a prohibition a restraint on alienation of a reversion in fee. This is clearly in conflict with Mandlebaum
v. McDonell. 889 Even if the interest of the plaintiff was
less than a fee, the decision is in conflict with the wellsettled rules that no prohibitory restraint on alienation
of a legal interest is valid and that restraints on alienation
may be imposed only for the benefit of a reversion or
remainder in the land.
Des Grand Champ v. Duflo 890 was a suit to construe
a will which devised a life estate to the testator's brother,
remainder to some of the testator's heirs. A clause of
the will relating to the remainder provided, "It is my
wish that the property .... remain unsold .... I make
a8s The pleadings indicate that, some twenty-five years before this
litigation, the two organizations which were the principal parties to
it, agreed informally to purchase land and erect a hall on it cooperatively with a view to use in common. Title was taken in the name
of the plaintiff grange alone because the defendant lodge was unincorporated. The defendant lodge contended that the 99-year lease
involved in the litigation did not correctly represent the original
understanding. Record, pp. I, II, 12, 19, 20. The opinions of both
the circuit and supreme courts treat the plaintiff grange, however, as
owning a fee simple in severalty, subject only to the 99-year lease.
If, as perhaps should have been done, the plaintiff grange had been
treated as holding the legal fee on trust for itself and the defendant
lodge, the problem involved would have been one of the law of trusts.
389 Note 382 supra.
39o 169 Mich. 104, 135 N.W. 98 (1912).
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this request because it was the wish of my father that
the Fisheries remain unsold and be known as the Duflo
property." The court held that this provision was not
intended to be mandatory, but that if it were it would
be void.
Con-ant v. Stone 891 was a suit to construe a will providing,
"My said son to have the use and income from said
estate so long as Lizzie Rice, his present wife, remains
as his legal wife, but in case of her death or in case of a
legal separation and divorce from my said son, I then
give, devise and bequeath to my said son and to his heirs
and assigns forever, said above mentioned interest in my
estate."
Later clauses provided that the son should forfeit his
interest in the income if he attempted to transfer it and
directed the executors to sell all real esate and reinvest
within seven years. The son died a month after the
testator, still living with his wife Lizzie. The court held
that the condition regarding the wife being precedent,
it made no difference whether it was contrary to public
policy. The condition not having been performed, the
fee did not pass to the son under the will. Although the
condition in question was the one which related to mar391176 Mich. 654, 143 N.W. 39 (1913). The case involved real
estate only. There is dictum in Dusbiber v. Melville, 178 Mich. 601
at 603, 146 N.W. 208 (1914), that when an illegal condition precedent,
interfering with the marriage relationship, is annexed to a bequest
of personal property, only the condition is void and the bequest is
effective as if there had been no condition. The Restatement of
Property applies the rule of the Dusbiber case, as to conditions
precedent which are illegal for some other reason than as restraints on
alienation, to both real and personal property. §424, comment d;
§425, comment h; §426, comment e; §427, comment f; §428, comment
l; §429, comment j; §433, comment f (1944). Both the rule laid down
by Conant v. Stone and that of the Restatement are criticized in
Browder, "Illegal Conditions and Limitations: Effect of Illegality," 47
MrcH. L. REv. 759-774 (1949).
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riage rather than the one which restrained alienation,
the decision is significant for purposes of the law of restraints on alienation because it indicates that a restraint,
although illegal, will be effective if so imposed as to be a
condition precedent to the vesting of a future interest.
Watkins v. Minor 392 was a suit for specific performance of an option. Elizabeth Minor conveyed land in
fee simple to her son Clarence, his estate to commence
at her death, by a deed providing, "said second party is
not to convey or encumber said property during the lifetime of said first party." Clarence, during his mother's
lifetime, gave the option in question, and the mother
was alive during the pendency of this suit to enforce it.
A decree for the plaintiff was affirmed on the ground the
restraint on alienation was void. The court relied upon
Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 898 using language indicating
that every restraint on alienation of an. indefeasibly
vested future estate in fee simple, whether by way of
prohibition or of penalty, is void. The case is significant in establishing that all such restraints are void, even
though so worded as not to be operative after the estate
becomes possessory.
Portage Grange No. 16 v. Portage Lodge No. 340 894 is
clearly wrong and ought to be overruled. Disregarding
it entirely and giving full scope to the opinion in Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 895 it is possible to sum up the
Michigan law of restraints on alienation of legal interests
in expectancy as follows: Every prohibitory restraint on
s92 214 Mich. 308, 183 N.W. 186 (1921). At common law the interest
conveyed to Clarence would have been a springing use. Our statutes
permit the creation of such an interest (Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §24,
uote 257, supra) but probably term it a remainder. Part Two, note 180
infra.
a9s Note 282 supra.
s94 Note 387 supra.
895 Note 382 supra.
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an otherwise alienable interest in expectancy, designed
to compel the owner of the interest to remain such in
spite of his efforts to rid himself of it, is void. All penalty
restraints on alienation of indefeasibly vested estates in
expectancy are void, even though so phrased as to be
operative only while the estate remains non-possessory,
unless a similar restraint on a like possessory estate would
be valid. Penalty restraints on contingent interests in
expectancy, so phrased as to be conditions precedent to
the vesting of the interest and to terminate on the vesting
of the interest are probably valid, even though the expectant interest is in fee simple. 896 Whether penalty restraints on alienation of expectant interests in fee which
are vested subject to open or subject to divestment, remains undecided. Doubt exists as to whether a penalty
restraint on a contingent or defeasibly vested interest in
expectancy, so phrased as to remain operative after the
interest becomes indefeasibly vested, is valid in part, as
to the period before the interest vests indefeasibly. Upon
principle, restraints of the types described in the last
two sentences should be held to be invalid, unless a
similar restraint upon a present possessory interest would
be valid.
396 It should be borne in mind that the Michigan statutory definitions
of vested and contingent interests may not be wholly in accord with
the common-law rules of distinction between such interests. 1 Simes,
FuTURE INTERESTS §89 (1936); Roberts, "Transfer of Future Interests,"
30 MicH. L. REv. 349 at 350-351 (1932); Chapter 11, Section C, infra.

CHAPTER

7

Legal Interests in Chattels Personal
A. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LAND AND CHATTELS

IR EDWARD COKE, in commenting on Section
360 of Littleton's Tenures/ 01 said,

S

"if a man be possessed of a lease for years, or of a
horse, or of any other chattell reall or personall, and
give or sell his whole interest or propertie therein upon
condition that the donee or vendee shall not alien the
same, the same is void, because his whole interest and
propertie is out of him, so as he hath no possibilitie of
reverter, and it is against trade and traffique, and bargaining and contracting between man and man: ... " 402

The precise meaning of the Lord Chief Justice is not
as clear as might be desired, but the passage probably
asserts two reasons for the invalidity of a condition subsequent, providing for forfeiture on alienation, incident
to a transfer of a chattel: (1) that a legal interest analogous to a possibility of reverter or right of entry on breach
of condition subsequent cannot exist in a chattel personal, and (2) that such a condition is in illegal restraint
of trade.
The first asserted reason involves the problem of the
possibility of creating legal interests in expectancy in
chattels personal. As Professor Maitland remarked, the
law of personal property is "backward and meagre." 403
By comparison to the land law, the law of chattels personal is relatively undeveloped and such full developNote 110 supra.
1 INSTITUTES 223a.
403 2 Pollock & Maitland,
OF EDWARD l, 181 (1895).
401
402
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ment as there is is fragmentary and disconnected. The
reasons are largely historical. In the centuries when the
doctrine of estates in land was being developed and defined, the common chattels, animals, foodstuffs, and
clothing, were not of a nature to encourage attempts to
create complex and divided titles. The Mediaeval
Church's prohibition of interest prevented extensive
security transactions. The tremendous current investment of wealth in bonds, corporate stock, and life insurance policies, which we look upon as property for some
purposes, is wholly a modern development. Moreover,
whereas the law of land was developed and unified by a
single tribunal, the Court of Common Pleas, the law of
chattels was created by numerous courts with divergent
systems of jurisprudence and varying concepts of policy.
The ecclesiastical courts of the English dioceses handled
probate of wills and administration of estates according
to rules of canon law which varied with the customs of
the several sees. Their jurisdiction was of doubtful extent, interfered with by the jealousy of the common-law
courts and eventually absorbed in large part by the High
Court of Chancery. The courts of common law provided most of the protection of chattels against crime
and tort, but the High Court of Admiralty, administering a system based on the Roman civil law, had a part
in developing the law of ships and other marine property. Until its competing courts, administering divergent systems of law, were consolidated in the nineteenth
century, England was in no position to develop a complete and unified law of personal property which could
stand beside the elaborate scheme of the land law!04
The law of chattels developed by the common-law
4A>4 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 351-360, 534595 (1923); 7 id. 447-515 (1926).
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courts has two striking omissions. First, it contains no
concept of ownership of chattels like that of ownership
of land. It is, rather, a law of rights to possession of
chattels and injuries to such rights. The only commonlaw actions for specific recovery of chattels, replevin
and detinue, could be converted into actions for money
damages at the will of the defendant. 405 The owner of
a freehold interest in land had remedies at law, the real
actions and, later, ejectment, by which he could secure
the land itself. As has been seen, the owner of a chattel
real acquired a like remedy. 406 The "owner" of chattels
personal never did. So far as the common-law courts
are concerned, his only right was to bring an action for
money damages for wrongful taking or detention. 407
Second, the law of chattels has no doctrine of estates,
of ownership divided into temporal segments. At the
beginning of the thirteenth century the common law
was consistent in requiring, as to both land and chattels,
a delivery of possession to effectuate a transfer of a proprietary interest.408 During that century the requirement
was modified as to land by the recognition of the remainder. A single livery of seisin to A could be made
to pass a life estate to A and a remainder in fee, a present
proprietary right to future possession, to B. 409 The en4()5 Anonymous R.S.Y.B. 14, 15, Ed. III, 30 (1340); Anonymous, Y.B.
1 Hen. V, Hil., pl. 4 (1413); Peters v. Heyward, Cro. Jac. 682, 79
Eng. Rep. 591 (1624).
4()6 Snane v. Rumenal, Bract. N.B., pl. 1140
(1235); Anonymous,
Y.B. 7 Ed. IV, Pasch., pl. 16 (1468); Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Ed. IV,
Mich., pl. 2 (1482).
~
407 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 322 (1923);
7 id., 455-456 (1926). Equity will, under some circumstances, compel
delivery of unique chattels. Pusey v. Pusey, 1 Vern. 273, 23 Eng. Rep.
465 (1684); Duke of Somerset v. Cookson, 3 P. Wms. 390, 24 Eng. Rep.
1114 (1735); Fells v. Read, 3 Ves. Jr. 70, 30 Eng. Rep. 899 (1796).
4<lS 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 354 (1923).
409 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw BEFORE THE
TIME OF EDWARD I, 25 (1895).
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actment in 1535 of the Statute of Uses,uo which converted
the Chancery-developed uses into legal estates, made it
possible to create legal future interests, by way of springing and shifting use, without any livery of seisin. 411
Neither modification was extended to chattels. The
common-law courts would not permit delivery of a chattel personal to A to operate to create a limited interest in
A and a future interest in B; it passed the whole title to
A. 412 The Statute of Uses applied only to interests in
land, so interests in chattels created by way of use remained purely equitable, without recognition or means
of enforcement by the common-law courts.413 The only
temporally divided ownership in chattels recognized at
common law was the bailment. The bailor has a proprietary interest in expectancy analogous to a reversion
expectant upon an estate at will or for years in land.
Unlike the lessor, however, he has no effective commonlaw means of compelling the bailee to return the goods
at the expiration of the term. 414 Probably because of
this lack of a specific remedy, the law of bailment has
developed along contract, as distinguished from property,
lines. Apart from the quasi-reversionary interest of the
bailor, English law to this day does not permit the creation inter vivos of a legal property interest in expectancy in chattels personal.'ns
27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535).
7 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 83 (1926).
412 Anonymous, BRooK's NEw CAsES 60, 73 Eng. Rep. 874 (15091546).
413 Bacon, READING UPON THE STATUTES OF UsES 43 (1804).
414 Notes 405, 407, supra.
415 7 Holdsworth, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 470-471 (1926); Goodeve, MoDERN LAW oF PERSONAL PROPERTY, 8th ed., 10-11 (1937); Williams, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY, 18th ed., 48,
438 (1926); Oliver, "Interests for Life and Quasi-Remainders in
Chattels Personal," 24 L.Q. REv. 431-439 (1908). Professor Gray
thought that chattels personal could be transferred subject to a condition subsequent, but he cited no authority for the proposition.
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §78 (1915). Accord: with Gray:
Perkins, PROFITABLE BooKE §712 (1642).
410

411
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The local canon law administered by the ecclesiastical
courts, to whose judgments the courts of common law
gave grudging recognition, permitted the transmission
of chattels personal by will. Until the late seventeenth
century, testamentary power of disposition of personalty
by will was, however, much restricted by local custom,
a married man usually having such power over only a
third of his goods. 416 Unlike a devise of land under the
sixteenth century Statute of Wills,m a bequest of chattels was not a direct transfer of legal title to the legatee.
Legal title to all personal property of the deceased passed
to his executor, 418 and the only right of a legatee was to
have the ecclesiastical court compel the executor to carry
out the provisions of the will. Except for the fact that
he was controlled by the ordinary of the diocese rather
than the High Court of Chancery, the executor was, for
all essential purposes, a trustee, holding legal title subject
to duties owed to creditors and legatees. 419
Even by will it was not possible to make a temporal
division in the legal title to chattels personal. They
could not be bequeathed to A for life, remainder to B.
When the executor transferred them to A, A took the
whole title.' 20 In the fifteenth century, however, a method
3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 550-563 (1923).
32 Hen. VIII, c. I (1540).
418 Anonymous, Y.B. 14 Hen. IV, Hil., pl. 37 (1412); Anonymous,
Y. B. 2 Ed. IV, Mich., pl. 1 (1462).
419 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 519-595 (1923).
By the seventeenth century the High Court of Chancery had assumed
concurrent jurisdiction with the ecclesiastical courts to compel executors to carry out legacies, acting on the theory that an executor
was a trustee, liable to account in equity as such. Cliffe v. Cliffe,
Monro, ACTA CANCELLARIAE 425 (1575); Browne v. Purton, Tothill 86,
21 Eng. Rep. 131 (1589); Yelverton v. Newport, Tothill 129, 21 Eng.
Rep. 144 (1593); Bloomer's Case, Cary 27, 21 Eng. Rep. 15 (1604);
Wickham v. Dighton, Monro, AcTA CANCELLARIAE 109 (1607); Earl
of Pembroke v. Zouch, Tothill 130, 21 Eng. Rep. 145 (1631); Goffin,
THE TESTAMENTARY EXECUTOR IN ENGLAND AND ELSEWHERE 74 (1901).
4zo Note 412 supra; Anonymous, March 106, pl. 183, 82 Eng. Rep.
432 (1641).
416
417
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of creating future interests in chattels by will was developed. Chattels could be bequeathed to the executor,
with directions to permit A to use and occupy them for
life, then to transfer them to B.421 In later centuries,
when most of the enforcement and interpretation of wills
shifted to the High Court of Chancery, wills purporting
to create legal future interests in chattels tended to be
construed as bequests of use and occupation, thus permitting their enforcement.422
It appears, therefore, that Sir Edward Coke's first
reason 423 suggests one major difference between the law
of restraints on alienation of land and that of restraints on
alienation of chattels, namely, that the limited possibilities of creating interests in expectancy in chattels greatly restrict the available devices for imposing restraints.
His second reason suggests another major difference.
Land was not looked upon as an article of commerce in
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and that remained so, as to estates of inheritance, throughout the
mediaeval period. Hence the law of restraints on alienation of estates in fee simple and fee tail, developed during that period, is a law governing donative and testa421. Anonymous, 37 Hen. VI, Trin., pl. 11 (1459); Fitz-James's Case,
Owen 33, 74 Eng. Rep. 879 (1565); note 412 supra. See Welcden v.
Elkington, 2 Plowd. 516, 75 Eng. Rep. 763 (1578); Paramour v. Yardley,
2 Plowd. 539, 75 Eng. Rep. 794 (1578). The trust being a much
more satisfactory device for creating future interests in chattels, the
law of legal future interests in chattels was never developed fully in
England and there is much doubt as to their incidents and theoretical
basis. Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §§77-86, 789-856
(1915); 7 Holdsworth,. HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 471-478 (1926); Bordwell, "Interests in Chattels Real and Personal," 1 Mo. L. REv. 119,
127-132, 137-141 (1936); Oliver, "Interests for Life and Quasi-Remainders in Chattels Personal," 24 L.Q. REv. 431-439 (1908); Simes,
"Future Interests in Chattels Personal," 39 YALE L.J. 771-803 (1930).
See Part Two, note 167 infra.
422 Catchmay v. Nicholas, Rep. temp. Finch 116, 23 Eng. Rep. 63
(1673). Other cases are collected in Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUmEs
§85n (1915).
423 Note 402 supra.
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mentary transactions. In the later Middle Ages leasehold interests did become articles of commerce, and,
as has been seen, a different set of rules developed as to
them. The mediaeval reason for restraining alienation
of estates in fee was to keep land in the family. This
type of restraint was not permitted. The mediaeval reason for restraining alienation of leasehold interests was
to protect reversioners and remaindermen against waste.
This type of restraint, imposed largely for commercial
reasons, was permitted. In modern times land has become an article of commerce and a new reason for restraining alienation of estates in fee, to protect the
character of a neighborhood, has appeared. But the law
as to restraints on estates of inheritance had become
too well settled for change, and the old rules, developed
when land was not a commercial commodity, were applied to a new situation. Chattels, on the other hand,
have always been articles of commerce, and rules governing restraints on their alienation did not become fixed
during the mediaeval period. The mediaeval rules governing donative and testamentary dispositions of land
may be followed as to like dispositions of chattels, but
we cannot be certain that they are applicable to commercial transactions involving chattels. Certainly there
are substantial differences in the considerations of policy
which affect the two types of transactions.
A third major difference between the law of restraints
on alienation of land and that of restraints on alienation
of chattels should be noted. The law as to land developed fully centuries ago; that as to chattels is relatively modern, incomplete, and rapidly developing. The
rules as to land were developed in connection with the
doctrine of estates and became fixed in the mediaeval
period, when status was dominant. Indeed, the very
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word "estate" is a variant of "status." 424 English law
knows no estates in chattels, and the rules governing
restraint on their alienation, so far as there are any, were
developed in an era when the concept of contract was
dominant; when courts were impatient with the fixed
and arbitrary rules of the mediaeval common law and
anxious to enforce the intention of parties to contracts
so long as they did not contravene current concepts of
public policy. The era of laissez faire has waned. 425 We
have entered upon a new era of status, of fixed and arbitrary rules imposed by government fiat. It seems probable that the law of restraints on alienation of chattels
will complete its development in a setting of strict government regulation of property, business, and human
relationships. Already legislative and administrative restrictions have an important place in the field. Very
likely there will eventually be rules as to restraints on
alienation of chattels as complete, precise, and strict as
those which relate to land. We cannot predict their
exact nature, but we can be reasonably sure that, insofar
as commercial transactions are concerned, they will not
be the same rules which the judges of the Plantagenet
period developed as to restraints on alienation of land.
424 Pollock 8c Maitland, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw BEFORE THE TIME
OF EDWARD I, 11 (1895); Turner, THE EQUITY oF REDEMPTION 1-3
(1931). It should be borne in mind, too, that the legislative declaration
[stat. Quia Emptores Terrarum, 18 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1290)] that
estates in fee simple were alienable and the judicial declaration
[Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, Mich., pl. 25 (1472), note 67
supra] that entails were barrable were the results of socio-economic
conflicts in which powerful interests were opposed to alienability. The
general alienability of chattels has never been questioned or opposed
and there has never been a problem of preventing potent economic
forces from making chattels generally inalienable.
425 Keynes, THE END OF LAisSEZ-FAIRE (1926).
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B. DONATIVE AND TESTAMENTARY TRANSACTIONS

In England the impossibility of inter vivos creation of
interests in expectancy in chattels and the unsuitability
for the purpose of the devices of bailment and contract
have tended to restrict attempts to restrain the alienation
of chattels to the trust device and provisions in wills for
forfeiture on alienation. The possibilities of the trust
will be explored with restraints on equitable interests.
In connection with a bequest of the use and occupation
of chattels for life or a term of years, the English courts
would probably sustain the validity of a provision for
forfeiture on alienation by way of executory bequest to
another. 4!26 They have held such a provision void when
attached to a bequest of the general property in chattels.427 As to testamentary restraints, then, the English
law of chattels appears to follow that of land.
Probably because of misinterpretation of a passage in
Blackstone's Commentaries/28 most American courts
have tended to assume that interests in expectancy in
chattels, of the types permissible in land, can be created
426 This is the rule as to life interests in chattels bequeathed in
trust. The cases are collected in Gray, REsTRAINTS oN ALIENATION, 2d
ed., §7!J (1895). In England the rules governing restraints on alienation of equitable interests tend to follow those which apply to
equivalent legal interests.
427 Bradley v. Peixoto, 3 Ves. Jr. 324, 30 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1797);
Rishton v. Cobb, 5 Myl. & Cr. 145, 41 Eng. Rep. 326 (1839). In
Powell v. Boggis, 35 Beav. 535, 55 Eng. Rep. 1004 (1866) there was a
bequest of corporate stock to a sister for life, then to be sold by the
executors and the proceeds divided among nephews and nieces. A
provision of the will that the legacy of any nephew or niece should
be forfeited if he aliened his interest before distribution was held to
be a void restraint on alienation.
428 "If a man either by deed or will limits his books or furniture to
A for life, with remainder over to B, this remainder is good." 2
COMMENTARIES •398; see 7 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 471
(1926). Professor Bordwell has suggested that Blackstone probably
had a deed of trust in mind. "Interests in Chattels Real and Personal,"
1 Mo. L. REv. 119 at 141 (1936).
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by deed as well as by wil1. 429 There is substantial authority in this country for the validity of legal interests in
non-consumable chattels which correspond to the reversion, the remainder, the shifting use, and the shifting
executory devise in land.430 It has been suggested that
interests analogous to the possibility of reverter and the
right of entry on breach of condition subsequent are
possible.431 In the setting of this development the American writers have maintained and such decisions as there
are tend to confirm the view that the rules governing the
validity of prohibitions and provisions for forfeiture on
alienation of legal interests in chattels are the same
as those which apply to similar restraints on alienation
of estates in land of like duration.482 For this purpose,
429 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §§88-98 (1915) Bordwell, "Interests in Chattels Real and Personal," 1 Mo. L. REv. 119 at
141-144 (1936); Simes, "Future Interests in Chattels Personal," 39 YALE
L.J. 771-803 (1930).
4so The cases are collected in Simes, "Future Interests in Chattels
Personal," 39 YALE L.J. 771 at 783-785 (1930). The validity of future
interests in personalty corresponding to remainders, created by will,
was recognized in Glover v. Reid, 80 Mich. 228, 45 N.W. 91 (1890);
Michigan Trust Co. v. Hertzig, 133 Mich. 513, 95 N.W. 531 (1903);
Sellick v. Sellick, 207 Mich. 194, 173 N.W. 609 (1919), and Hankey v.
French, 281 Mich. 454, 275 N.W. 206 (1937). A transfer of corporate
stock, reserving a life interest, which is really a conveyance of a springing executory interest in personalty, was held valid in Bloodgood v.
Terry, 134 Mich. 305, 96 N.W. 446 (1903). See Part Two, note 167
infra.
4 31 Simes, "Future Interests in Chattels Personal," 39 YALE L.J.
771 at 785-787 (1930); 2 Schouler, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL
PRoPERTY, 3rd ed., §309 (1896); see Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUmEs
§78. See Gamble v. Gates, 92 Mich. 510, 52 N.W. 941 (1892).
4 3 2 Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., §§27, 28, 78, 105, 134
(1895); 2 Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS §§446, 447, 456, 457, 463, 465
(1936); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.18 (1952). The articles of Professor Schnebly ["Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961-995, 1186-1215, 1380-1408 (1935)] and Mr.
Manning ["The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray,"
48 HARV. L. REv. 376-406 (1935)] do not discuss the law of chattels
personal. The RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY does not discuss restraints
on alienation of chattels personal, saying, "The problems thereby
raised and the considerations which enter into their solution are to
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the general property in a chattel is assimilated to an
estate in fee simple in land, a treatment suggested by the
passage from Coke quoted at the beginning of this
section. 433
State v. Dunbar Estate 434 was a claim against the
guardian of a lunatic for the cost of the ward's care in
an asylum. The only assets in the hands of the guardian
were funds bequeathed to the ward by a will which provided,
"I direct that income and principal also shall be received by all beneficiaries free and clear of their debts,
contracts, anticipations, and alienations, and of all
liability for or by reason of the same, and from all levies,
attachments and executions. Payments must be made
either directly to the beneficiaries, or upon their respective orders, signed not more than three months beforehand."
A judgment allowing the claim was affirmed, the court
saying,
"We do not think the language open to the construction that, after the fund had in fact come into the hands
of the legatee, it should not be liable for his subsequent
engagements." 435
Abrey v. Duffield 436 was a suit to construe a will, a
codicil to which provided that, "my son Thomas is to
have the use and possession of [a piano] during his life,
but that the same is not to be disposed of by him." The
validity of this restraint on alienation was not decided or
discussed.
such an extent different, in a state of flux and subjected to statutory
provisions, that it is undesirable to treat them. . . ." Div. IV, Part II,
Introductory Note.
433 Note 402 supra.
m 99 Mich. 99, 57 N.W. 1103 (1894).
435 99 Mich. 104-105, 57 N.W. 1104.
436 149 Mich. 248, 112 N.W. 936 (1907).
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Turnbull v. Johnson 437 was a suit to rescind for fraud
a sale of corporate stock. The stock, with other property,
had been bequeathed to the testator's widow, "to be
hers absolutely during her lifetime, and at her death
what of the same might be left to my two sons, . . . ,
share and share alike, and their heirs forever." The
widow, the sons, and a bank to which the stock had been
pledged assigned the stock to the defendant. The sons
brought suit, claiming that their joinder in the assignment had been procured by fraud. A decree for the
defendant was affirmed on the general ground the will
operated to place the entire title to the stock in the
widow, so that the sons had no interest in it. The court
cited Jones v. Jones 438 and some of the line of cases following it which hold, in effect, that a gift over on failure
of the first taker to alienate inter vivos is repugnant to
a grant or devise in fee simple because it is a restraint
on testation and intestate descent. 439 The decision in
Turnbull v. Johnson follows what is probably the general rule in this country, that an executory bequest over
on failure of a legatee of the entire title to personalty
to alienate inter vivos is void as a restraint on testation
and intestate distribution. 440
W essborg v. Merrill 441 was an appeal from a probate
order of distribution. The testator bequeathed corporate stock to three trustees to pay the income to his wife
and five children "and to their respective heirs, share and
share alike," until August 11, 1914. The will provided,
153 Mich. 228, 116 N.W. 1009 (1908).
25 Mich. 401 (1872), note 181 supra.
439 Note 182 supra. Glover v. Reid, 80 Mich. 228, 45 N.W. 91 (1890),
which involved personalty, held such a gift over valid where the first
taker was given only a life interest with a limited power of disposition
inter vivos.
440 Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., §56a; cf. §65 (1895).
Annotation, 17 A.L.R. (2d) 7-227 (1951).
441195 Mich. 556, 162 N.W. 102 (1917).
437

438
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"After August 11, 1914, the stock shall be equally divided among them ... , and each may dispose of his or
her own stock at will, under this condition, however, that
the stock shall be sold to one of their own number, to
keep it in the family, providing the price obtained is as
good as any outsider will give."
One of the daughters died in 1913, bequeathing her
estate to the respondent in trust. The probate order,
which distributed a child's share in the stock to the respondent, was affirmed without comment on the validity
of the restraint on alienation. Inasmuch as the respondent was not one of the children, the effect of the decision
was to hold the restraint inoperative as to a disposition
by will. The restraint was, in effect, a pre-emptive option which, in the case of land, would seem to be valid
under Michigan law despite the fact that it was perpetual
and so, under the law of most jurisdictions, in violation
of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 442
Hankey v. French 443 was a suit to construe a will. Testator bequeathed to his wife,
"the use and income of my share or interest in the business of R. T. French & Sons, wheresoever conducted,
provided, however, that my interest in said business is
not to be sold or disposed of, but that the business is to
be continued and that my share of the profits arising
from the conduct of said business is to be paid to my
wife, ... , so long as she shall remain my widow.
"Paragraph 3. I give, devise and bequeath to my
children, ... , in equal shares, my interest in the partnership of R. T. French & Sons, after the death of my
wife, ... , or in the event of her remarriage, and I do
further especially direct that my interest in the partner442 Windiate v. Leland, 246 Mich. 659, 225 N.W. 620 (1929); notes
230, 231 supra.
443 281 Mich. 454, 275 N.W. 206 (1937).
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ship of R. T. French & Sons shall not be sold or disposed of during the minority of either of my said sons."
The circuit court held that the interest in the partnership, which owned land, was personalty, that the restraints
on alienation imposed by the second and third paragraphs of the will were void, 444 and that the bequest was
adeemed by a change in the partnership which occurred
between the date of the will and the death of the testator.
There was no appeal from the first two conclusions. The
decree was reversed and a decree ordered in "accordance with the quoted language of the will," the Supreme
Court holding that there had been no ademption. The
opinion does not discuss the validity of either restraint
on alienation, but, in view of the nature of a chancery
appeal, the decision is probably some authority for the
proposition that a prohibition on alienation in a bequest
of personalty is void, both as to a life interest and as to
a succeeding interest in the nature of a remainder in
fee.
The authorities are scanty but, such as they are, they
indicate that, in donative and testamentary transactions,
Michigan tends to apply to restraints on alienation of
interests in chattels personal the rules which govern the
validity of similar restraints on estates in land of like
duration. If so, it may be assumed that all prohibitory
restraints, those which would compel the owner of a
legal interest in a chattel to remain owner in spite of
his attempt to transfer it, are void. Penalty restraints by
way of forfeiture on alienation are void if attached to a
gift or bequest of the otherwise absolute general prop444 The Supreme Court opinion indicates that the decree below held
only the restraint imposed by paragraph 3 void. 281 Mich. 454 at 459.
The actual decree of the circuit court, however, determined that the
restraints imposed by paragraphs 2 and 3 were both void. Record,
p. 29.
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erty in chattels. Penalty restraints on a bequest of an
interest in chattels for life or years, by way of a provision
for an executory bequest to another in the event of
alienation, are probably valid. A provision in a gratuitous bailment for life or a term of years that the bailor
may treat the bailment as terminated and retake possession if the bailee transfers his interest to another is
almost certainly valid. 445 Whether a provision in a gratuitous bailment for forfeiture on alienation to someone
other than the bailor would be valid is highly doubtful,
in view of the lack of authority for the creation of future
interests in chattels by transactions inter vivos.
C. COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS

The interest of a bailee of chattels under a pawn or
under that type of hiring known in the Roman law as
locatio rei 4416 corresponds to the interest of a lessee of
land for life or years. In the thirteenth century the lease
of land was commonly given as security for money lent,
thus serving the same purpose as the pawn. 447 The similarity between a demise of land to be used for commercial operations of the lessee and the demise of a ship for
like use is evident. At the beginning of that century
the interests of the lessee of land and the bailee of chattels were treated much alike, primarily as personal contract rights against the lessor or bailor rather than as
interests in property in rem. 448 Although estates for years
in land remained personal property, the development of
remedies for their specific enforcement and their use in
See Bringloe v. Morrice, 1 Mod. 210, 86 Eng. Rep. 834 (1675).
For the classification of bailments see Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld.
Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703); Story, LAW OF BAILMENTS, 9th ed.,
§§3-9 (1878).
44 7 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 215 (1923).
448 I d. at 213, 336-351.
4 45

4416
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donative and testamentary transactions tended toward
their treatment more as property than as personal contract rights. The bailment, on the other hand, has remained a topic of the law of contract and tort, more an
aspect of commercial law than that of property. Hence,
whereas the interest of the lessee for life or years is
prima facie alienable, 449 the interest of the bailee is
treated as personal to himself and inalienable in most
cases, even when his interest is not terminable at the
will of the bailor. 450
The general rule that the interest of a bailee is inalienable has some exceptions. The pawnee may transfer his
interest in the pawn with an assignment of the debt. 451
Although the English view is that the interest of a bailee
who has a common-law artisan's lien is inalienable/52
some American states, including Michigan, permit such
a bailee to assign the lien with his claim against the
bailor. 453 The interest of a hirer under a hire-purchase
contract is assignable, 454 as is that of a purchaser under a
conditional sale contract. 455 Assignments and subcharters
«9 Notes 236, 291, 292 supra.
4so Story, BAILMENTS §234; I Williston, SALES oF Goons, 2d ed., 332
(1924).
451 Mores v. Conham, Owen 123, 74 Eng. Rep. 946 (1609); Donald
v. Suckling, L.R. I Q.B. 585 (1866); Drake v. Cloonan, 99 Mich. 121,
57 N.W. 1098 (1894); other American cases are collected in Brown,
PERSONAL PROPERTY 579n (1936).
452 Legg v. Evans, 6 M. & W. 36, 151 Eng. Rep. 311 (1840).
458 Gardner v. LeFevre, 180 Mich. 219, 146 N.W. 653 (1914). Other
cases are collected in Brown, PERSONAL PROPERTY 534n (1936).
454 Whiteley, Ltd. v. Hilt, [1918] 2 K.B. 808 (C.A.). This is assumed
by the Hire-Purchase Act, I & 2 Geo. VI, c. 53, §21 (1938).
455 The cases are collected in I Williston, SALES §332n (1924). Hoar,
CoNDITIONAL SALES 59, 345 (1937). As to the right of possession of a
chattel mortgagor, see Cadwell v. Pray, 41 Mich. 307, 2 N.W. 52
(1879); Daggett, Bassett & Hills Co. v. McClintock, 56 Mich. 51, 22
N.W. 105 (1885). In Michigan, however, it is dangerous for a chattel
mortgagor or conditional sale contract vendee to assign his interest.
Act 328, P.A. 1931, §175, Mich. Stat. Ann. §28.374, Comp. Laws (1948)
§750.177, provides: "Any person who shall ... dispose of any personal
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are common in connection with the demise of ships. 456
Normally the bailee under a fixed-term bailment or bailment lease may transfer his interest. 457
The theory of the cases holding the interest of the
bailee under some types of bailment alienable is that,
in those situations, the element of personal trust is not
so prominent as in the ordinary bailment relationship.
Even in such situations, the terms of the bailment may
indicate that personal trust is intended. Hence, the textwriters assert that the terms of a bailment under which
the bailee's interest would otherwise be alienable may
validly restrain alienation by providing that alienation
by the bailee will terminate the bailment and entitle the
bailor to immediate possession. 458 This is closely analogous to a provision for forfeiture on alienation in a lease
of land for life or years, inserted for the protection of the
reversioner. It would seem, therefore, that the law of
restraints on alienation of the bailee's interest in a chatproperty held by him subject to any chattel mortgage or written
instrument intended to operate as a chattel mortgage, or any lease or
written instrument intended to operate as a lease, or any contract to
purchase not yet fulfilled with intent to injure or defraud the mortgagee, lessor or vendor under such contract or any assignee thereof,
shall ... be guilty of a felony." It has been held under this statute
that mere proof of a sale raises a presumption of intent to defraud.
Bowen v. Borland, 257 Mich. 306, 241 N.W. 201 (1932). As the word
"injure" might mean mere inconvenience, the lessee or conditional
vendee of chattels assumes a serious risk in transferring his interest.
45 6 E.g., Rutherford, Sender 8c Co. v. Goldthorpe, Scott 8c Wright,
Ltd. [1922] 1 K.B. 508.
457 Dean v. Whittaker, 1 Car. 8c P. 347, 171 Eng. Rep. 1225 (1824);
Duffell v. Spottiswoode, 3 Car. 8c P. 435, 172 Eng. Rep. 490 (1828);
Goddard, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS, 2d ed.,
§120 (1928); Story, CoMMENTARIEs oN THE LAw oF BAILMENTS, 9th ed.,
§§324, 413n (1878); see Legg v. Evans, 6 M. 8c W. 36, 151 Eng. Rep.
311 (1840); Donald v. Suckling, L.R. 1 Q.B. 585 (1866).
45 8 1 Halsbury, LAws oF ENGLAND 555 (1907); Pereira, LAw OF HIRE
AND HIRE-PURCHASE 120 (1939); Brown, PERSONAL PROPERTY 579n
(1936). The Hire-Purchase Act, 1 8c 2 Geo. VI, c. 53, §7 (1938) and
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, §13, assume the validity of suci1
provisions. See Whitney v. McConnell, 29 Mich. 12 (1874).
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tel is in general accord with the law as to restraints
on estates in land of like duration. Unlike the case of
land, however, it is probable that the provision for for~
feiture must be in favor of the bailor; the bailee's interest
probably cannot be made to shift to a third party on
alienation.
Commercial sales in the early Middle Ages were
normally direct transactions between producer and con~
sumer. The farmer brought his produce to market and
sold to the town housewife. The artisan sold his manufactures in his own shop or the local market to purchasers who bought for personal use. In this setting the
Mediaeval Church developed its doctrine of just price,
which applied to both prices and wages. Under this doctrine the just price was, in general, the actual cost of
production plus an amount sufficient to enable the producer to maintain himself and his family in the customary manner of persons of his status; the just wage
was an amount sufficient to enable the laborer to maintain himself and his family according to his status. The
just price did not fluctuate with supply and demand.
For the seller to raise prices because of scarcity was to
make an unearned and immoral profit. For the buyer
to seek a lower price because of a glut on the market was
to take an unfair advantage of the producer. For the
laborer to ask higher wages because of a shortage of labor
or because the product of his labor was more valuable
than that of other persons of like status was wrongful.
Thus the doctrine tended to condemn competition and
all profits and wages which were more than the amount
necessary for the subsistence of the producer or laborer
according to the fixed customs of his social status. 459
Cunningham, GROWTH oF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND CoMMERCE DuRTHE EARLY AND MIDDLE AGES, 6th ed., 461 (1915); O'Brien, AN
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The theory of this early period had no place for the
trader, the person who purchased goods for resale,
whether wholesaler or retailer. With the growth of
towns and the expansion of foreign commerce in the
later Middle Ages, however, the necessity and value of
the labor of those who provided transportation and storage of goods received grudging ecclesiastical recognition.
Trade was still regarded as fraught with temptation to
sin, however, and the wholesaler was looked upon with
particular suspicion. Resale by traders was governed by
the doctrine of just price. The resale price should be
the cost price plus the actual cost of transportation, storage, or labor performed in improving the goods, plus an
amount sufficient to enable the trader to maintain himself and his family in the manner customary to persons
of his status. Speculative trading, purchasing with a
view to deriving profit from an advance in the market
price, was improper in all circumstances.460
Corollary to the doctrine of just price was a doctrine
that the parties to sales, because of ignorance and the
temptation to seek an unjust profit, were ordinarily
unfit to fix the just price with accuracy. Hence prices,
wages, the quality of goods and the details of commerce
should be prescribed by public authority and enforced
by governmental agencies. 461
ESSAY ON MEDIAEVAL ECONOMIC TEACHING 102-106, 109-123 (1920).
Dr. O'Brien suggests that, in some circumstances, elements other than
the cost of production and the labor of the producer might enter
into the computation of the just price, but these two elements were
dominant in the process, pp. 112-120. Tawney, RELIGION AND THE
RISE OF CAPITALISM, 1950 ed., 27-28, 35, 38.
46o O'Brien, AN EssAY oN MEDIAEVAL EcoNOMIC TEACHING 144-151,
152-155 (1920). It should be noted that, as an aspect of the prohibition
of usury, the price in a credit sale was not allowed to be larger than
in a cash transaction and, of course, the seller might not charge interest
on the unpaid balance. Id. at 119. Tawney, RELIGION AND THE RISE
OF CAPITALISM, 1950 ed., 37-38.
4 61 O'Brien, AN EssAY oN MEDIAEVAL EcoNOMIC TEACHING 106-109
(1920); Tawney, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM, 1950 ed., 41-42.
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Mediaeval English law reflects the doctrine of just
price and its corollary. From Norman to Tudor times
prices, wages, quality of goods, the training of artisans,
and the most minute details of commercial activity were
strictly regulated to eliminate competition, "unjust"
prices, and unearned profits. Some of this regulation was
done by the central government directly, through statutes, orders in council, and royal proclamations. Most
of it was delegated to chartered companies, boroughs and
markets, which exercised their powers under the supervision of the central government. Competition was eliminated in many fields by the grant of monopolies to individuals or chartered companies. 4~ 2 Evasion of local
regulations and speculation in commodities were forbidden by drastic provisions of the criminal law which denounced as "forestalling" purchasing or contracting to
purchase merchandise en route to any city, port, market,
or fair from inland or overseas, and attempts to raise the
prices or encourage the withholding from sale of such
merchandise. 463 This operated to confine trading to areas
where regulation could be effective.
The Reformation weakened the influence of the Roman Catholic doctrine of just price, but it did not result
in any relaxation of government controls of commerce.
Instead, they became more extensive and better enm 2 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 314-387 (1924); I Cunningham, GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE IN MoDERN
TIMES, 4th ed., 285-308 (1907); Bindoff, TUDOR ENGLAND, 288-289, 305306 (1950).
463 Stat. 51 Hen. III, stat. 6, c. 3, §5 (1266); 25 Edw. III, stat. 4, c. 3
(1350); confirmed by 2 Ric. II, stat. 1, c. 2 (1378); explained by 5 & 6
Edw. VI, c. 14, §I (1552). The statute of 51 Hen. III forbade purchase
at a market before it opened. This suggests the primary purpose of
these penal statutes: to confine trading to public markets where it
could be regulated effectively. The mediaeval authorities were trying
to eliminate "under the counter" sales. There were other statutes on
the subject. Herbruck, "Forestalling, Regrating and Engrossing," 27
MICH. L. REV. 365-376 (1929).
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forced. In the Tudor, Stuart, and Hanoverian periods,
the motive of regulation ceased to be the enforcement
of just prices and the elimination of unjust profits and
became that of the mercantile system, the enhancement
of the power, prestige, and wealth of the national state in
peace and war. The new regulation permitted large
profits when they served to encourage the growth of industries deemed desirable. It did not, however, tolerate
profiteering in food. 464 By a statute of Henry VIII, the
central government assumed direct control of the regulation of food prices. 465 A statute of Edward VI restated
the old criminal law of forestalling and prohibited "regrating," reselling of foodstuffs purchased in a fair or
market, in a fair or market held at the same place or
within four miles thereof, and "ingrossing," which the
statute declared was committed when any person or persons,
"get into his or their hands, by buying, contracting or
promise-taking, other than by demise, grant, or lease of
land or tithe, any corn growing in the fields, or any other
corn or grain, butter, cheese, fish, or other dead victuals
whatsoever, within the realm of England, to the intent
to sell the same again.'' 466
Sir Edward Coke thought that the quoted language
was only designed to prohibit resale in gross and did not
prevent purchase of foodstuffs for resale at retail, <WT but
464 Note 462 supra; Cunningham, GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND
CoMMERCE DuRING THE EARLY AND MIDDLE AGES, 6th ed., 470-472,
481-483 (1915); Tawney, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM, 1950
ed., cc. II, III, IV.
465 Stat. 25 Hen. VIII, c. 2 (1533). This act did not abolish local price
regulation but authorized price-fixing by the Council when local regulation was inadequate. For the operation of the price and wage regulation systems under Elizabeth, see Cunningham, GROWTH OF ENGLISH
INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE IN MoDERN TIMES, 6th ed., 25-36, 85-99 (1919).
466 Stat. 5 8c 6 Edw. VI, c. 14, §§2, 3 (1552).
467 3 INsTITUTES, *195-196. Sheppard, GRAND ABRIDGEMENT, Part II,
226-227 (1675) is positive on this point, stating that resale at retail
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the broad language of the statute appears to condemn the
whole business of trading in groceries, wholesale and retail alike. In 1620 a grocer was prosecuted for buying
twenty quarters of wheat, making it into starch, and
selling the starch to several persons. The Court of King's
Bench held that this was not a violation of the statute,
which tends to confirm Coke's view. 468 However, prosecutions under the statute were begun against ordinary
retailers of butter and cheese who sold in the normal
course of business. 4611 A statute of 1623 declares that the
statute of Edward VI made "no proviso" for retailers,
that they had been troubled by prosecutions under it,
and provides that it shall not prevent licensed cheesemongers from retailing butter and cheese in London. 410
After the Restoration, the central government ceased
to enforce or supervise the enforcement of regulations
governing prices, wages, and the quality of goods. Local
regulatory bodies tended to relax or break down enwas ingrossing if, but only if, the resale price was unreasonable. The
first statutory use of the term "ingross" seems to have been in 37
Edw. III, c. 5 (1363), which complains "that the merchants, called
grocers, do ingross all manner of merchandise vendible; and suddenly
do enhance the price of such merchandise within the realm, putting
to sale by covin and ordinance made betwixt them, called the fraternity and gild of merchants, the merchandises, which be most dear,
and keep in store the other, till the time that dearth or scarcity be of
the same...." This suggests that the offense was hoarding with a view
to making an unjust profit on resale;· not the mere business of engaging
in the wholesale or retail grocery trade.
468 Davison v. Culier, J. Bridg. 5, 123 Eng. Rep. ll60 (1620). Similar
decisions are collected in Herbruck, "Forestalling, Regrating and Engrossing," 27 MicH. L. REv. 365 at 378n (1929).
469 E.g. Bedoe v. Alpe, W. Jones 156, 82 Eng. Rep. 83 (1622). The
vague language of the statute worked a serious hardship on legitimate
merchants because the mode of enforcement was by qui tam actions
brought by mercenary informers. It was probably cheaper to buy off
these informers than to defend even groundless prosecutions.
47o Stat. 21 Jac. I, c. 22
(1623). This statute also freed London
retailers from the inhibitions of Stat. 3 & 4 Edw. VI, c. 21 (1549)
which explicitly forbade wholesale dealing in butter and cheese and
restricted retail sales to quantities not in excess of a waye of cheese or a
barrel of butter.
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tirely. There was little to prevent speculators from
making large profits through resale of commodities except the occasional activities of informers who brought
qui tam actions for penalties under the old statutes. 471
The statute of Edward VI was repealed in 1772,472 but
as late as 1800 a person was convicted of ingrossing by
buying a fifth of the hops on sale at Worcester Market
with a view to resale when the price went up. 413 The
court held that the repeal of the statute did not abolish
the common-law crime of ingrossing and rejected the
contention of the defendant's counsel that there could
not be a conviction without proof of intent to resell in
gross, that is, wholesale.
The writings of the Physiocratic School in France and
of the English economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo effected a profound change in the general attitude
toward commerce and resulted by 1846 in a revolution
in British policy. The new view was that prosperity
could best be served by removing all restrictions from
industry and trade, by allowing prices and wages to be
471 Cunningham, GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE IN
MoDERN TIMES, 6th ed., 202-206 (1919).
4 7 2 Stat. 12 Geo. III, c. 71 (1772). This also repealed Stat. 3 & 4
Edw. VI, c. 21 (1549), note 470 supra.
473 The King v. Waddington, I East 143, 102 Eng. Rep. 56 (1800).
Lord Kenyon's opinion states that he had read Adam Smith's Wealth
of Nat ions to inform himself on the economic problems involved but
was not convinced of the advantages of unregulated trade. 1 East
157, 102 Eng. Rep. 62. Senator Benjamin thought that the crime was
committed only when the purchase was of large quantities [TREATISE
ON THE LAw OF SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY, 7th ed., 530 (1931)]
but the butter and cheese cases throw some doubt on this. The opinions in The King v. Waddington do indicate, however, that the evil
of the offense lay in the tendency to enhance prices. Compare 3 Coke,
INSTITUTES, *195-196. This definition of the evil accords with the
language of a statute of Henry III or Edward I. 1 Stat. of the Realm,
203-204; Herbruck, "Forestalling, Regrating and Engrossing," 27 MicH.
L. REV. 365 at 374-375 (1929). Theoretically market manipulations
could not enhance prices fixed by law, but mediaeval regulators, like
modern ones, had troubles with the "black market."
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fixed by supply and demand, by the enlightened selfinterest of the individuals concerned in free and unregulated competition. Under it, competition was seen as
a public good instead of an evil to be suppressed by
elaborate regulation. The old statutes fixing wages and
prices, regulating the quality of goods, limiting by licensing the persons who could engage in trades, and prohibiting unjust profits, were repealed. The crimes of
forestalling, regrating, and engrossing were abolished. 474
The era of laissez faire had begun; for the first time individuals were free to fix prices, wages, and the terms of
commercial transactions by private contract, subject only
to newly developed doctrines that contracts must not be
in restraint of trade.
The term "restraint of trade" was not new, but it
acquired a wholly new meaning. Cases decided as early
as the fifteenth century had declared that all contracts
in restraint of trade were contrary to public policy and
void. 475 But those cases were decided in an era when
wages, prices, quality of goods, the right to engage in
trade, and the terms of commercial transactions were
governed by minute regulations. These regulations left
474 Stats. 3 Geo. IV, c. 41 (1822); 5 Geo. IV, c. 66 (1824); 5 Geo. IV,
c. 95 (1824); 7 & 8 Viet., c. 24 (1844). The list of statutes repealed by
the last act gives some indication of the elaborateness of the mediaeval
and mercantile systems of regulation. See Herbruck, "Forestalling,
Regrating and Engrossing," 27 MICH. L. REv. 365 (1929).
475 Dyers' Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. V, Pasch., pl. 26 (1415); Colgate v.
Bachelor, Cro. Eliz. 872, 78 Eng. Rep. 1097 (1601); Ipswich Tailors'
Case, 11 Co. Rep. 53a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (1614). In a period when
the Crown was granting patents of absolute monopoly of the manu·
facture and sale of common commodities to court favorites who were
not businessmen at all, for the sole purpose of permitting the patentees
to make enormous profits out of licensing such manufacture and sale,
the word "monopoly" also had a meaning quite different from the
current use of the term. See The Case of Monopolies, 11 Co. Rep.
84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (1602); 4 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 349-353 (1924); Formoy, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN
CoMPANY LAw 11-16 (1923).
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virtually no sphere of operation for private commercial
contracts; such a contract was in "restraint of trade" if
it attempted to vary the applicable regulations. It was
void for the same reason that private contracts purporting to fix prices or rents higher than those set by the
American war time price and rent control regulations
were void. The whole mediaeval system was designed
to prevent competition; hence a contract designed to
foster competition was void. Under the new system of
laissez faire, free competition was looked upon as an important object of public policy. In its new sense, "restraint of trade" means restraint of competition. This
radical change in the meaning of the term must be borne
in mind in the use of old authorities on the subject.
Moreover, the old cases involved contracts by skilled
artisans not to engage in their trades. In an era when
the right to engage in a skilled trade involved seven
years' apprenticeship and membership in a local guild,
enforcement of such a contract meant a change of status
for the artisan. In the mediaeval view, everyone was born
to his status, and the policy of the law was to keep him
in it. The doctrine of just price, allowing the producer
exactly enough profit to enable him to maintain his
status, tended toward this end by preventing the seller
of goods from rising above or falling below his fixed
status. In this view, a contract in "restraint of trade"
was objectionable because it was an attempt to change
hereditary status by contract. It is strange that nineteenth century judges who admired the heroes of Horatio
Alger should have applied precedents based on such
principles to invalidate contracts regulating resale of
goods.
The reign of laissez faire in England lasted for about a
century, the period between the end of the Napoleonic
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wars and the beginning of World War I and the longest
period during which Europe has been free of general
wars. Since then there has been increasing governmental
regulation of wages, prices, and the terms of commercial
transactions. The current tendency is toward government ownership of industry. Freedom of private contract in commercial transactions had a brief existence,
and it is not surprising that the law governing the extent
to which restraints may be placed on resale of chattels
by that means has not attained complete development.
It has attained some development, and that development
merits examination.
The growth of the practices of marketing commodities under brand names and of advertising the merits of
these products in media of wide circulation creates in
the manufacturer of such a product a strong economic
interest in controlling its resale for the protection of the
good will achieved by the brand name. To ensure that
his product is effectively marketed throughout the
country he is likely to wish to allot areas for resale to
wholesalers and retailers. He has an interest in seeing
that the public everywhere can depend upon his product
being marketed in quantities and quality which are uniform and consistent with his advertising. He has an interest in controlling resale prices, both to enhance the effectiveness of his advertising and to prevent seriously
adverse effects on his whole scheme of distribution. If
one druggist in a community sells Dr. Galen's Kidney
Pills at a price below wholesale cost with a view to inducing customers to come to his store and buy other goods,
the other druggists in the community cannot afford to
sell them at all and will persuade their customers to buy
a substitute, with the result, in the long run, that much
of the value of the manufacturer's advertising is lost.
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The manufacturer may, of course, control all this by
retailing his own product, but this is scarcely feasible
for the manufacturer of a single drug or a few types of
canned foods. Hence the manufacturer has an interest
in binding wholesalers and retailers of his product to
abide by the conditions he imposes upon resale.
English manufacturers have placed chief reliance, in
their efforts to control the prices and conditions of resale of their products, on trade associations comprising
all or virtually all the manufacturers and wholesalers in
a given field. The Tobacco Trade Association, the Proprietary Articles Trade Association (drugs), and the
Motor Trade Association are examples. The rules of
these associations prohibit wholesalers from selling to retailers who have not agreed to sell only at prices fixed by
the manufacturers and approved by the association. If
a retailer sells in violation of the restrictions imposed
upon him, his name is placed on a "stop list," and no
wholesaler will sell him anything. 476 Thus if a druggist
attempts to sell Dr. Galen's Kidney Pills at a cut price,
he will be unable to buy any drugs at all from any
British wholesaler. The British courts have upheld the
lawfulness of these associations and their "stop-list" device.477
The trade association device is not always available and
effective. The manufacturer may wish to seek enforcement in the courts of direct contracts with retailers regu47& Dix, LAW RELATIVE To CoMPETITIVE TRADING 83-109 (1938); REPORT OF THE CoMMITTEE ON REsALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (Cmd. 7696,
1949). The committee recommended that these practices be made
illegal.
477 Thorne v. Motor Trade Association, [1937] A.C. 797. Combinations which restrict competition against the public interest may, in
some cases, be prohibited or regulated by administrative bodies under
the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act,
1948, 11 & 12 Geo. VI, c. 66.
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lating resale prices and of contracts binding wholesalers
to sell only to retailers who agree to maintain the prices
prescribed by the manufacturer. The British courts are
willing to enforce both types of contract specifically by
injunction against the contracting parties. 478 There are
suggestions in the opinions that such a contract might
be illegal if calculated to produce a pernicious monopoly,
but none seems to have been held invalid on that
ground. 4711
Sometimes a retailer who is not a party to a price
maintenance contract secures a stock of brand-name
goods by deceiving a wholesaler or retailer who is a party
to such a contract or through mistake or deliberate
breach of contract on the part of such a party. Such a
retailer might conceivably, under some circumstances,
be liable to the manufacturer in tort for inducing breach
of contract.480 Manufacturers have sought to bind him
by their price regulations on the theory that an equitable
restriction was imposed on the goods, either by the contract with the wholesaler or through notice attached to
the goods. The equitable restriction on use of land was
developed in the nineteenth century by extension of the
rules of covenants running with the land and has been
buttressed by analogies to conditions subsequent and
easements. 481 Easements and transfers on condition subsequent are unknown in the law of chattels. Dictum in
478 Elliman, Sons & Co. v. Carrington and Son, Ltd., [19011 2 Ch.
275; Palmolive Co., Ltd. v. Freedman, [1928] Ch. 264 (C.A.). Enforcement will be denied if the contract is clearly unreasonable as
between the parties. Joseph Evans & Co. v. Heathcote, [1918] I K.B.
418.
479 Attorney-General v. Adelaide Steamship Co., [1913] A.C. 781, 795.
48Q Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
481 Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848); Clark,
REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND"
149-157 (1929); Elphinstone, CoVENANTS AFFECTING LAND 69-76 (1946);
Jolly, RESTRICTIVE CoVENANTS AFFECTING LAND, 2d ed., 1-18 (1931).
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a sixteenth century case denied that covenants could run
with the title to chattels as they may with the title to
land. 482 In consequence, the English courts have held
that ordinary chattels cannot be subjected to equitable
use restrictions. 483 Hence price maintenance schemes are
not enforcible by judicial means against dealers who are
not parties to contracts binding them to observe the
scheme. The British courts make an exception in the
case of patented articles, holding that the patent entitles
the patentee to impose restrictions on their resale which
run with the goods and bind every taker with notice. 484
The law of commercial dealing in chattels is complicated in the United States by the fact that the Federal
Constitution empowers Congress to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian tribes, but leaves the regulation of other
commerce to the states. 485 Nineteenth century federal
policy favored, in general, freedom of contract and freedom of competition in domestic commerce. A feeling
that freedom of contract was being used to hamper free
competition to an undesirable extent led to the enactment in 1890 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which provided,
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
482 Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 16b-17a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 74
(1583). There is another difficulty: equitable restrictions on the use
of land must be appurtenant to an estate in the same or neighboring
land. Milbourn v. Lyons, [1914] 2 Ch. 231 (C.A.); London County
Council v. Allen, [1914] 3 K.B. 642 (C.A.); Torbay Hotel Co. v.
Jenkins, [1927] 2 Ch. 225.
48 3 Taddy v. Sterious, [1904]
1 Ch. 354; McGruther v. Pitcher,
[1904] 2 Ch. 306 (C.A.); Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co., Ltd. v. Selfridge &: Co., Ltd., [1915] A.C. 847; Chafee, "Equitable Servitudes on
Chattels," 41 HARv. L. REv. 945-1013 (1928). Some contrary decisions
in this country are discussed in Waite, "Public Policy and Personal
Opinion," 19 MrcH. L. REv. 265-282 (1921).
4 84 National Phonograph Co. v. Menck, [19ll] A.C. 336.
485 Art. I, §VIII, d. 3; Amendment X.
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otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal." 486
It has been suggested that the generality of the language of this act made it forbid the normal transactions
of business, that "Business men now enjoy liberty only
according as the prosecuting authorities indulge them in
the open breach of the law." 487 In this respect the act
resembles the statute of Edward VI against ingrossing
which, if read literally, forbade all trade in foodstuffs. 488
The interpretation of the statute in the federal courts
tends to justify this criticism. The earlier federal decisions, both before and after the statute, affirmed the
validity of resale price maintenance contracts and suggested that our law would follow the British. 489 Then,
beginning in 1907, a series of decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Circuit Courts of Appeals completely reversed the rules, holding, in effect, that schemes for retail
price maintenance by contract or equitable restriction
are illegal at common law and· under the statute and
seriously curtailing even the manufacturer's right to refuse to sell to dealers who habitually cut prices. 490
Act July 2, 1890, §1, 26 Stat. L. 209, 15 U.S.C. (1946) 1.
Montague, "Business Enterprise and the Law," 193 N. AM. REv.
694 at 704 (1910).
488 Stat. 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 14, §3 (1552); notes 466-470, 472 supra.
489 The cases are collected in Seligman and Love, PRICE CuTTING AND
PRICE MAINTENANCE 43-52 (1932).
49o E.g., John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, (6th Cir. 1907) 153
F. 24; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, 31 S.Ct. 376 (1911); United States v. Schrader's Sons, 252 U.S.
85, 40 S.Ct. 251 (1920). Other cases are collected in Seligman and
Love, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE 52-82 (1932). This line
of cases is effectively criticized in Waite, "Public Policy and Personal
Opinion," 19 MicH. L. REv. 265-282 (1921). This is not the place for
an extended discussion of the intricacies of interpretation of the federal
antitrust laws and related statutes. As to the special problem created
by patent monopolies, see United States v. New Wrinkle, 342 U.S.
371, 72 S.Ct. 350 (1952).
486
487
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The Miller-Tydings Amendment of 1937 491 inserted a
proviso in the Sherman Act to the effect that contracts
permitted by state law prescribing minimum prices for
products sold under trade-mark or brand name should
not be illegal by reason of that act or the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 492 The proviso does not permit contracts between producers, between wholesalers, between
retailers, or between others in competition with each
other; that is, it limits them to contracts between a producer and his distributors or between a wholesaler and
his retail outlets. By the end of 1936, 14 states had
enacted statutes, commonly called "fair trade" laws, 493
authorizing resale price maintenance contracts as to
trade-marked and brand named goods. In 1937, 28 more
states enacted such statutes, and by 1950, 45 states had
such legislation in force. 494 State statutes enacted in 1933
and thereafter contained a "non-signer" provision to the
effect that whenever a producer has entered into a pricemaintenance contract, price-cutting by anyone, whether
or not a party to the contract, is actionable. The Supreme Court had held in 1936 that such a provision was
valid, under the Fourteenth Amendment, as to transactions in intra-state commerce. 495 It was decided in 1953
that a 1952 amendment to the Sherman and Federal
Trade Commission Acts permitted the enforcement of
m Act Aug. 17, 1937, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. L. 693, 15 U.S.C. 1.

Act Sept. 26, 1914, 38 Stat. L. 717, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 41, et seq.
It is of interest to note that seventeenth century smugglers who
violated the trade regulations imposed under the mercantile system
referred to their operations as "fair trade." Scott, GuY MANNERING, c. 4.
494 Dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Schwegmann Brothers
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 at 398, 71 S.Ct. 745 (1951). See
Grether, PRICE CoNTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION (1939).
495 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299
U.S. 183, 57 S.Ct. 139 (1936).
492
493
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such "non-signer" provisions as to transactions in interstate and foreign commerce. 496
A Michigan statute enacted in 1899 makes illegal and
unenforcible contracts fixing resale prices in terms so
broad as to make it questionable whether even an agreement between partners as to the prices at which their
firm will sell is not illegal. 497 This statute, like the Sher496 Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205
F. (2d) 788 (5th Cir. 1953), certiorari denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 71 (1953).
The amendment was made by the McGuire Act of July 14, 1952, 66
Stat. 632, 15 U.S.C. 45, which was designed to overcome the decision
in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 71
S.Ct. 745 (1951) that the Miller-Tydings Amendment did not permit
their enforcement in interstate and foreign transactions.
497 "Sec. 1.
That a trust is a combination of capital, skill or arts
by two or more persons, firms, partnerships, corporations or associations
of persons, or of any two or more of them, for either, any or all of
the following purposes:
"1. To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce;
"2. To limit or reduce the production, or increase or reduce the
price of, merchandise or any commodity;
"3. To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transportation, sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or any commodity;
"4. To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public
or consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any
article or commodity of merchandise, produce or commerce intended
for sale, barter, use or consumption in this State;
"5. It shall hereafter be unlawful for two or more persons, firms,
partnerships, corporations or associations of persons, or of any two or
more of them, to make or enter into or execute or carry out any contracts, obligations or agreements of any kind or description, by which
they shall bind or have bound themselves not to sell, dispose of or
transport any article or any commodity or any article of trade, use,
merchandise, commerce or consumption below a common standard
figure or fixed value, or by which they shall agree in any manner to
keep the price of such article, commodity or transportation at a fixed
or graduated figure, or by which they shall in any manner establish or
settle the price of any article, commodity or transportation between
them or themselves and others, so as to directly or indirectly preclude
a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchasers or consumers, in the sale or transportation of any such article
or commodity, or by which they shall agree to pool, combine or directly
or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with
the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its
price might in any manner be affected. Every such trust as is defined
herein is declared to be unlawful, against public policy and void....
"Sec. 8. That any contract or agreement in violation of the provisions of this act shall be absolutely void and not enforceable either
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man Anti-Trust Act 498 and the statute of Edward VI, 41111
if literally interpreted, would forbid virtually all trade.
Like them it is an example of a type of legislation which
is an invitation to tyranny, branding legitimate businessmen as criminals and subjecting them to the caprice of
prosecuting officials. There are mischievous types of
monopoly which ought to be criminal. It is unfortunate
that our legislatures have been unwilling to undertake
the difficult task of defining them with precision so that
traders who wish to abide by the law might be able to
determine what activities are permitted and what are not.
Hunt v. Riverside Co-operative Club 500 was a proceeding to restrain violation of the act of 1899. The defendant was an association comprising all seven of the
plumbing supply dealers and 131 of 168 master plumbers
in the City of Detroit. Its rules provided that the wholesalers would sell only to master plumbers at prices fixed
by a committee of the association, the prices to master
plumbers who were not members to be 15% to 30%
higher than those charged members. An injunction
against enforcement of these rules was granted, the court
saying that such a price-fixing arrangement, designed to
create a monopoly, was illegal at common law. Unquestionably the arrangement violated the act of 1899, so
there can be no proper criticism of the result reached.
in law or equity."-Act 255, P.A. 1899, Comp. Laws (1915) §§15013,
15020; Comp. Laws (1929) §§16647, 16654; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§28.31,
28.36; Comp. Laws (1948) §§445.701, 445.708. Sec. 1 was amended by
Act 60, P.A. 1925, to exempt farm and dairy cooperatives. Act 229,
P.A. 1905, Comp. Laws (1915) §§15027 to 15032; Comp. Laws (1929)
§§16661 to 16666; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§28.51 to 28.55; Comp. Laws
(1948) §§445.761 to 445.767 supplemented the Act of 1899 by prohibiting contracts requiring dealers to handle only one make of machinery,
tools, implements, vehicles, or appliances designed for use in productive industry.
498 Note 486 supra.
49 9 Stat. 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 14, §3 (1552); notes 466, 470, 472 supra.
5oo 140 Mich. 538, 104 N.W. 40 (1905).
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If by "common law" is meant the English law of 1607,
however, it will be recalled that such price-fixing by
local gilds was looked upon as the normal and proper
method of determining just prices.
W. H. Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester 501 was a suit by a
drug manufacturer against a retailer to restrain pricecutting. The plaintiff manufactured Hill's Cascara Bromide Quinine and marketed it through wholesalers who
contracted not to resell to retailers disapproved by the
plaintiff. In order to secure approval, retailers were required to contract with the plaintiff not to sell at less
than the price marked on each package of the drug. The
defendant entered into such a contract in March, 1906,
and complied with it until December, 1907, when it was
rescinded by mutual consent. Soon after, the defendant
secured a supply of Hill's Cascara Bromide Quinine from
a wholesaler, who did not know of the rescission of the
contract, and began retailing the product at a cut price.
A decree dismissing the bill of complaint was affirmed.
The court held that the plaintiff's system of retail price
maintenance was illegal, both under the statute and at
common law, relying entirely upon the federal decisions
in John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman 502 and Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. 503 and quoting the following from Judge Lurton's opinion in the Hartman case:

"'A prime objection to the enforceability to [sic] such
a system of restraint upon sales and prices is that they
offend against the ordinary and usual freedom of traffic
in chattels or articles which pass by mere delivery. The
right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a
right of general property in moveables, and restraints
163 Mich. 12, 127 N.W. 803 (1910).
(6th Cir. 1907) 153 F. 24, note 490 supra.
(6th Cir. 1908) 164 F. 803, affd. 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376 (1911),
note 490 supra.
5{)1
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upon alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxious to public policy, which is best subserved by great
freedom of traffic in such things as pass from hand to
hand. General restraint in the alienation of articles,
things, chattels, except when a very special kind of property is involved, such as a slave, or an heirloom, have
been generally held void. "If a man," says Lord Coke,
in Coke on Littleton, s. 360, "be possessed of a horse or
any other chattel real or personal, and give his whole interest or property therein, upon condition that the donee
or vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void, because his whole interest and property is out of him so as
he hath no possibility of reverter; and it is against trade
and traffic and bargaining and contracting between man
and man." It is also a general rule of the common law
that a contract restricting the use or controlling subsales
cannot be annexed to a chattel, so as to follow the article
and obligate the subpurchaser by operation of notice.' " 504
The quotation from Sir Edward Coke suggests that
the rule laid down by these cases proscribes even a single
contract restricting resale of a single chattel under circumstances which involve neither monopoly nor any effect on general market conditions. The fact that Coke is
disqualified as an authority in this field by the vastly
different economic and legal setting in which he wrote
has already been suggested. Despite this reliance upon
a line of reasoning which would apply to a single contract as well as to an extensive system designed to establish a monopoly, the opinions in both the Hartman and
Gray and Worcester cases expressly state that a single
contract is not governed by the same rule of illegality. 505
504 163 Mich. 12 at 23-24, 127 N.W. 803, quoting from 153 F. 24
at 39.
005 153 F. 24 at 37; 163 Mich. 12 at 21, 127 N.W. 803. "A single contract, although it be such as, taken alone, may not be within the rule at
common law against contracts in restraint of trade, which is one of a
great number of identical contracts made between the producer of an
unpatented article of commerce and dealers therein, forming a
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In their attempt to state the common law in a situation
governed by statute, these opinions add confusion to the
common law. It seems unfortunate that the court was
not content to rest its decision in W. H. Hill Co. v. Gray
& Worcester on the Michigan statute of 1899.506
Mulliken v. Naph-Sol Refining Co. 507 was an action for
damages for breach of contract. The plaintiff, a wholesaler and retailer of gasoline, sent a letter to the defendant, agreeing to buy his gasoline requirements for a year
from defendant at one and three quarters cents per gallon below the retail price set by the defendant for the
Grand Rapids area. It contained no agreement by the
plaintiff to abide by the retail prices so set. The parties
dealt on this basis for nine months. There was dispute
as to whether the plaintiff or the defendant refused to
deal. The circuit judge directed a verdict for the defendant on the ground that, although the plaintiff had
promised to buy gasoline, the defendant had not contracted to sell it. A judgment for the defendant was affirmed on the sole ground that the contract was illegal
'system' of contracts, which, taken as a whole, materially affects the
public interests by stifling competition and trade in said article, is an
unreasonable restraint, and within the rule at common law against
contracts in restraint of trade, if, from an examination of the workings
of the whole system, it appears that the restraint is actually, though
not ostensibly, the main result and object of the system of contracts,
and not merely ancillary or incidental to another and legitimate
object." Ibid. One could wish that the common law prohibited such
sentences as that quoted.
soo The opinion concludes with this passage: "But we place our
decision upon the ground that complainant's system of contracts deals
with the manufactured product of its secret process, and not with the
process itself, and that the system of contracts, being a restraint upon
free competition, falls within the common-law prohibition of restraints
of trade, and is void.
"Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary to decide whether
or not such contracts are illegal and void under the statute of this
State." 163 Mich. 12 at 26, 127 N.W. 803.
5()7 302 Mich. 410, 4 N.W. (2d) 707 (1942). The facts are not made
clear in the opinion but are brought out in the record.
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because it provided for the setting of retail prices by
the defendant, the court citing Hunt v. Riverside Cooperative Club 508 and the Act of 1899. 509 The opinion
contains the following language:
"In a reply brief appellant contends that the opening
statement did not disclose a void contract and that the
agreement 'was a good deal like a lease arrangement.' A
lease is a contract and would be void under the statute
quoted if it was for a purpose prohibited by law. So far
as we are able to determine from this record, the arrangement between the parties was more nearly that of principal and agent, and an agency for an illegal purpose is
void, just as is a contract for an illegal purpose." 510
This language would seem to condemn as illegal a retail merchant's prescribing the prices at which his sales
clerks are to sell his goods. Such a construction of the
Act of 1899 is certainly possible, but one may question
whether the legislature really meant to restrain ordinary
trade practices to such an extent.
Staebler-Kempf Oil Co. v. Mac's Auto Mart, Inc. 511
was a suit to restrain the sale of gasoline at prices below
those fixed by the plaintiff. In 1946 the plaintiff conveyed land in Ann Arbor to Martin Sales & Service Co.
in fee simple by a deed containing a covenant by the
grantee that if it built a filling station on the land it
would purchase all its requirements of gasoline, oil, and
lubricants from the plaintiff and would retail such products at the prices customarily furnished to other dealers
in the area. The covenant provided that it should run
with the land and be operative for ten years. In 194 7
Note 500 supra.
Note 497 supra.
51o 302 Mich. 410 at 413-414, 4 N.W. (2d) 707.
511
329 Mich. 351, 45 N.W. (2d) 316 (1951). Cf. Knoop v. Penn
Eaton Motor Oil Co., 331 Mich. 693, 50 N.W. (2d) 329 (1951).
5o8

509
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Martin Sales & Service Co. conveyed the land to the defendant by a deed containing the same covenant. The
plaintiff sold 1,600 gallons of gasoline to the defendant
and then requested the defendant to enter into a resale
price maintenance contract of the type the plaintiff required of its retail dealers. The defendant declined. A
decree restraining the defendant from selling at prices
below those which the plaintiff prescribed for retailers
bound by contract to it was affirmed. Without referring
to the well-settled rule that use restrictions on land must
be appurtenant to neighboring land,S 12 the court held
that the covenant imposed a reasonable and valid use
restriction which ran with the land and bound the defendant. As to the Act of 1899, the court said:
"The statute, if read literally, would seem to support
the defendant's contentions. However, the statute does
not define restraint of trade, and the definition has been
judicially supplied. It has long been held that a contract
would not be construed as in restraint of trade unless
the restraint was unreasonable ....
"The cases cited by the appellant are not in point.
Hunt v. Riverside Co-Operative Club, supra,513 and Mulliken v. Naph-Sol Refining Co., supra,514 involved agreements which were patently injurious to the interests of
the public. W. H. Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester, supra,515
was decided prior to our Court's interpretation of the
act of 1899 in People, ex rel. Attorney General v. Detroit
512 Note 482 supra; Baxter v. Ogooshevitz, 205 Mich. 249, 171 N.W.
385 (1919). A condition subsequent against sale of liquor in a conveyance of land in fee, inserted for the purpose of keeping employees of
the grantor's saw mill sober, was enforced in an action of ejectment in
Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314, 22 N.W. 816 (1885). A similar condition,
inserted for the purpose of protecting the grantor's saloon against competition, was enforced by injunction in Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich.
362, 24 N.W. 104 (1885).
513 Note 500 supra.
514 Note 507 supra.
515 Note 501 supra.
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Asphalt Paving Co.~ supra~ and does not represent the
current judicial interpretation of the statute, nor do the
facts present as fair and compelling a business purpose
as is present in the instant case.
"In view of our decision there is no need to discuss the
effect of the Michigan fair trade act, ... on this covenant." 517
The Michigan Fair Trade Law of 1937 518 provides
that contracts relating to the sale or resale of a commodity bearing the trade-mark, brand, or name of the
producer or owner and which is in fair and open competition with similar commodities produced by others
shall not be deemed in violation of state law because
they provide that the buyer will not resell at less than
the price fixed by the seller or that the buyer will not
resell except to persons who agree to maintain resale
prices. The act contains a "non-signer" provision, as
follows:
"Sec. 2. Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering
for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price
stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the
provisions of section 1 of this act, whether the person so
51 6 244 Mich. 119, 221 N.W. 122 (1928). This was a quo warranto
proceeding under the Act of 1899 against a corporation organized by
the four principal paving contractors in Detroit to effect a partial
consolidation of their businesses.
s11 329 Mich. 351 at 356, 358, 45 N.W. (2d) 316 (1951).
518 Act 50, P.A. 1937, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§19.321 to 19.324; Comp.
Laws (1948) §§445.151 to 445.154. Act 135, P.A. 1913, Comp. Laws
(1915) §§15041 to 15048; Comp. Laws (1929) §§16683 to 16690; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §§28.71 to 28.77; Comp. Laws (1948) §§445.791 to 445.798,
prohibits petroleum distributors from making geographical price discriminations for the purpose of destroying the business of a competitor. This, of course, was an earlier legislative recognition of the fact
that unregulated competition is not always of public benefit. Such contracts intended to injure or destroy a competitor were prohibited in
the petroleum and bakery trades by Act 282, P.A. 1937, Mich. Stat. Ann.
§§28.78 (1) to 28.78 (14); Comp. Laws (1948) §§445.171 to 445.184.
The latter act also prohibits sale of petroleum and bakery products
below cost with intent to injure or destroy a competitor.
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advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party
to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable
at the suit of any person damaged thereby, and may be
enjoined by a court of competent jurisdiction."
Notwithstanding the earlier decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States that such a "non-signer" provision did not violate the Federal Constitution, 519 the
Michigan Supreme Court held in Shakespeare Company
v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Company 520
that Section 2 was void under the State Constitution as
to a "non-signer."
Except as to transactions governed by the Fair Trade
Act, the law of restraints on resale of chattels is in an unhappily confused state. The old common law developed
in a period when competition was looked upon as evil,
and close public regulation of prices and commercial
transactions was the normal rule. The nineteenth century revolution in thought and public policy, which
exalted free competition and unregulated trade as an important object of society, made it difficult for the courts
to make wise use of the precedents laid down in the old
era. The anti-trust legislation of the turn of the century, which tended to class all restraints on competition,
regardless of size or importance, with pernicious monopolies, added to the confusion. The recent realization,
partly recognized by statute, that completely unregulated
5 1 9 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299
U.S. 183, 57 S.Ct. 139 (1936), note 495 supra.
520 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W. (2d) 268 (1952). In Weco Products Co.
v. Sam's Cut Rate, Inc., 296 Mich. 190, 295 N.W. 6ll (1941) an
injunction against a "non-signer" was dissolved on the grounds that
its price-cutting was not wilful and knowing and that the plaintiff
had been guilty of inequitable behavior. An injunction against a "nonsigner" was denied in Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Simon, (D.C. Mich.
1940) 33 F. Supp. 962 on the ground that the defendant's practice of
selling at the price set by the producer, without adding the state sales
tax, was not a violation of the act.

LEGAL INTERESTS IN CHATTELS PERSONAL 195

competition is not always publicly desirable has complicated the situation still further. In the present state
of the authorities it would be unwise to attempt to predict the validity of restraints on resale of chattels imposed in a commercial transaction where no elements of
pernicious monopoly are present. May, for example, an
artist who sells a painting to a museum at a low price in
consideration of the vendee's contracting not to resell to
a private collector for ten years, enforce the contract? His
object, keeping the painting on public display, could be
accomplished by means of the trust device. Whether the
law of restraints on alienation of legal interests prevents
its being accomplished by the device of contract, we do
not know.
Shares in business enterprises, including partnerships,
joint-stock companies, and corporations, have come to be
treated as property for some purposes. The same may be
said as to certain types of contract rights, notably such
evidences of debt as bonds, debentures, and notes, insurance policies, and annuity contracts. Indeed, much
of the wealth of the modern community is invested in
property of these types. Shares in partnerships involve
not only property interests but mutual agency, mutual
trust and confidence in business skill, and liability for
debts. Hence their alienability may be and usually is,
much restricted. 521 Shares in joint-stock companies and
corporations involve powers of management and rights
of association; corporations often perform quasi-governmental functions. Both the shareholder and the public
have an interest in ensuring competency and continuity
of management, which is sometimes protected by re5 2 1 Lindley, LAw oF PARTNERSHIP •186-187; •593-594
(ed. 1860);
Uniform Partnership Act, Act 72, P.A. 1917, §§24 to 28; Comp. Laws
(1929) §§9864 to 9868; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§20.24 to 20.28; Comp. Laws
(1948) §§449.24 to 449.28.
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straints on alienation of shares. 522 Their free alienability has been further restricted by statute to protect the
public against the promotion of fraudulent schemes and
unsound enterprises. 523 The rules as to transferability
of bonds and notes have evolved as parts of the law of
contracts and negotiable instruments. Insurance policies
and annuity contracts involve elements which are peculiarly personal, relating to the character, health, and habits
of the holders. 524 In consequence of their peculiarities,
special rules of law, much of it statutory, governing the
transferability of shares in business enterprises and the
mentioned types of intangible property, have developed.
522 Annotation: Validity of restrictions by corporations on alienation
or transfer of corporate stock, 65 A.L.R. 1159-1186 (1930); 138 A.L.R.
647-657 (1942). Our statutes expressly permit restraints on the alienation of stock in nonprofit corporations, co-operative corporations and
partnership associations limited. Act 327, P.A. 1931, §§102, 119; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §§21.103, 21.120; Comp. Laws (1948) §§450.102, 450.119;
Act. 191, P.A. 1877, §4, as amended, How. Stat. §2368; Comp. Laws
(1897) §6082; Comp. Laws (1915) §7953; Comp. Laws (1929) §9912;
Mich. Stat. Ann. §20.94; Comp. Laws (1948) §449.304. The Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, Act 106, P.A. 1913, §15, Comp. Laws (1915)
§II934, Comp Laws (1929) §9534, Mich. Stat. Ann. §19.345; Comp.
Laws (1948) §441.15, appears to recognize such restraints as to stock
of profit corporations, but see Lufkin Rule Co. v. Secretary of State,
163 Mich. 30, 127 N.W. 784 (1910). Compare Bronson Electric Co. v.
Rheubottom, 122 Mich. 608, 81 N.W. 563 (1900); Weiland v. Hogan,
177 Mich. 626, 143 N.W. 599 (1913); Halsey v. Boomer, 236 Mich. 328,
210 N.W. 209 (1926); Bohnsack v. Detroit Trust Co., 292 Mich. 167,
290 N.W. 367 (1940); Weber v. Lane, 315 Mich. 678, 24 N.W. (2d)
418 (1946). In Barnes Co., Inc. v. Folsinski, 337 Mich. 370, 60 N.W.
(2d) 302 (1953), an agreement between a corporation and one of its
officers to whom it sold stock that the stock should be inalienable
except to the corporation and should be repurchased by the corporation when, by reason of death or otherwise, he ceased to be employed
by it, was enforced. Cf. Part Two, note 385 infra.
523 Bubble Act, 6 Geo. I, c. 18, §§18-21 (1720); Formoy, HISTORICAL
FouNDATIONS oF MoDERN CoMPANY LAw 47-88 (1923); Dubois, THE
ENGLISH BusiNESs CoMPANY AFTER THE BuBBLE ACT 1720-1800, 1-12
(1938); Lindley, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP *145-154 (ed. 1860); Blue Sky
Law, Act 220, P.A. 1923, as amended, Comp. Laws (1929) §§9769 to
9801; Mich. Stat. Ann §§19.741 to 19.773; Comp. Laws (1948) §§451.101
to 451.133.
524 Grismore, "Effect of a Restriction on Assignment in a Contract,"
31 MICH. L. REV. 299-319 (1933).
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These rules sometimes permit, incident to the creation
of the interests or to commercial transactions involving
them, restraints on alienation of types which would be
invalid if applied to ordinary legal interests in land or
chattels. Discussion of the validity of restraints on alienation of these special types of "property" which arise from
or are related to their peculiar character is beyond the
scope of this study.

CHAPTER

8

Equitable Interests and Interests
Subject Thereto
A. THE ORIGIN OF EQUITABLE ESTATES

N THE Middle Ages a conveyance of land to a monastic corporation resulted in a serious loss of income
to the feudal overlord. As such corporations never
died, the overlord ceased to receive the reliefs payable
on the death of a tenant and to enjoy the feudal incidents
of wardship and marriage of minor heirs. Monks could
not be compelled to perform military services, and it
was difficult or impossible to compel a monastery to perform other services incident to tenure. The twelfth and
thirteenth centuries saw great expansion in monastic
land holdings and consequent loss to the king and other
overlords in income and military strength. A statute
was enacted in 1279 to put an end to conveyances to monastic corporations without the consent of the injured
overlords. It provided that, when such a conveyance was
made, the overlord might enter within the year and forfeit the tenant's estate. 525
The great Benedictine and Cistercian orders, which
specialized in agriculture, already owned many estates
and probably were not greatly hurt by the new statute. 526

I

Statute of Mortmain, 7 Edw. I, stat. 2 (1279).
The Cistercians, for example, reached England in 1127, built a
hundred monasteries in the century which followed, and added only
one between 1227 and the dissolution of the monasteries under Henry
VIII. Butler, "Cistercians," ENcYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, lith ed. (1910).
It would seem from this that the order had reached its full development some fifty years before the Statute of Mortmain.
525
52 6
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Their corporate wealth enabled them to pay for licenses
from the overlords to purchase land. The newer Dominican and Franciscan orders of friars, who preached and
ministered unto the poor, the sick, and the aged in towns,
much like the modern Salvation Army, were, however,
hampered in their efforts to acquire sites for hospitals
and homes for the poor and aged. To avoid the statute
they resorted to the device of having land conveyed to
the municipal corporation, which agreed informally to
allow them to use it. 527 That this palpable evasion of the
statute of 1279 was tolerated for over a century was probably due to the facts that the friars usually acquired only
relatively small parcels in towns, rather than large tracts
of agricultural land, and that their activities were of
recognized public benefit. The friars' device was deprived of its efficacy by a statute of 1391, which attacked
it from two directions by providing that conveyances to
municipal corporations should be within the statute of
1279 and that conveyances to anyone to the use of religious persons should also be within that statute. 528
Long before 1391, the advantage of the use device to
lay landowners was seen, and it was adopted by their conveyancers. An elderly landowner whose heir was a minor
daughter could avoid the onerous feudal burdens of relief, wardship, and marriage which would otherwise arise
upon his death by conveying to several young friends as
joint tenants to hold to the use of himself and his heirs.
The feudal dues incident to death would not then arise
until the death of the last joint tenant and even this could
be avoided by adding new tenants as the original ones
527 Maitland, EQUITY, 2d ed., 24-25 (1936). The use device seems to
have been known before the statute. See Quency v. Prior of Barnwell,
Bract., N.B., pl. 999 (1224).
528 Stat. 15 Ric. II, c. 5, §§5, 7 (1391). See 23 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1531).
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died. The rule prohibiting devise of freehold estates 529
could be avoided by a conveyance to the use of the conveyor for life and thereafter to such uses as he might by
will appoint. 530 The Wars of the Roses, with their frequent changes of dynasty and numerous prosecutions for
treason, gave every politically active landowner a strong
motive for placing the title to his land in the names of
persons who were unlikely to be attainted of treason, since
attainder involved forfeiture of all lands to the Crown. 531
Conveyances to the use of laymen were not interfered
with by legislation for some two centuries, except to the
extent that they were used to defraud creditors or to defeat a reversioner's action for waste. 532 It would seem that
most of the land in England was conveyed to uses during
this period.m
The common-law courts would not enforce the rights
of the cestui que use or beneficiary against the feoffee to
uses, who held the legal title. 534 From the end of the
fourteenth century, however, the lord high chancellors,
who were nearly always bishops, did so. 535 After some
hesitation, the chancellors undertook to enforce the use
5 2 9 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE
TIME OF EDWARD I, 312-328 (1895); note 8 supra.
53 0 Bacon thought that this was the chief reason for the rise of the
use device. READING UPoN THE STATUTES oF UsEs 20-21 (ed. 1804). See
Maitland, EQUITY, 2d ed., 25-26 (1936); Jenks, SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, new ed., 104 (1934); Sullivan, HISTORICAL TREATISE ON THE
FEUDAL LAw 166-167 (1772); Stat. 4 Hen. VII, c. 4 (1487); 7 Hen. VII,
c. 3 (1490); 3 Hen. VIII, c. 4 (15ll).
531 Sanders, UsEs AND TRusTs, 5th ed., 16-17 (1844).
53 2 Stat. 50 Edw. III, c. 6, §2 (1376); I Ric. II, c. 9 (1377); 4 Hen.
IV, c. 7 (1402); II Hen. VI, cc. 3, 5 (1433).
5 33 1 Coke, INSTITUTES •272a; Sanders, USES AND TRUSTS, 5th ed., 17
(1844).
534 Anonymous, Y.B. 4 Edw. IV, Pasch., pl. 9 (1464).
53 5 Godwyn v. Profyt, Sel. Cases in Chancery (S.S.) 48 (1396-1399);
Ames, "Origin of Uses and Trusts," 21 HARv. L. REV. 261 at 262, 274
(1908); Brown, "Ecclesiastical Origin of the Use," 10 NoTRE DAME
LAWYER 353 at 361-366 (1935).
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against the heir of the feoffee to uses 536 and against persons to whom the feoffee conveyed the legal title, if they
had notice of the use or had not paid a valuable consideration.537 As the cestui que use was nearly always in actual
possession of the land, it followed as a practical matter
that the feoffee to uses could not convey the legal title
free of the use.
The use device was intended to give the cestui que use
all the advantages of full ownership of the land, less some
of the burdens of ownership, and with the additional
power of devising his interest. In its enforcement of uses,
the High Court of Chancery brought this intention to
full realization. It enforced estates in uses, in fee simple,
in fee tail, for life and for years, which corresponded to
the legal estates in land. 538 Estates in expectancy by way
of reversion, remainder, and springing and shifting use
were possible. The estate of the cestui que use was devisable by will 539 and alienable inter vivos. 540 By a statute of 1483 he was empowered to convey the legal title
without the consent of its holder. 541 Thus the cestui que
use had greater powers of alienation than a legal owner.
Then, in 1535, the Statute of Uses converted the equitable estate of the cestui que use into a legal estate of like
Anonymous, Keilway 42, 72 Eng. Rep. 200 (1502).
Anonymous, Y.B. 11 Edw. IV, Trin., pl. 13 (1471); Anonymous,
Y.B. 14 Hen. VIII, Mich., pl. 5 (1523); Abbot of Bury v. Bokenham,
1 Dyer 7b, 73 Eng. Rep. 19 (1536). The arguments in this case are
an elaborate discussion of the effect of a conveyance by the feoffee
to uses.
5ss Turner, THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION 7-8 (1931).
539 Rothanhale v. Wychingham, 2 Cal. Proc. Ch. iii
(1413-1422);
Williamson v. Cook, Sel. Cas. in Chan. (S.S.), pl. 118 (1417-1424); note
530 supra.
540 Bacon, READING UPON THE STATUTES OF UsEs 16 (1642); Cruise,
EssAY ON UsEs §36 (1795); Gilbert, LAw OF UsES AND TRUSTS, 2d ed., 26
(1741); Holmes, CoMMON LAW 408 (1881); Sanders, EssAY ON UsES AND
TRUSTS, 4th ed., 65 (1823).
541 Stat. 1 Ric. Ill, c. 1 (1483).
536
5 31
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quantity. 542 This put an end to uses as such. Nevertheless, in the two centuries which followed, the High Court
of Chancery developed three types of equitable estates
which resembled the old use in many respects and had
most of its characteristics, the trust, the equity of redemption, and the vendee's interest under an executory land
contract. These three have much in common, but the
latter two differ from the former in that the legal title
of the mortgagee and the vendor is, in part, beneficial to
him, whereas that of the trustee is not. Hence separate
treatment is desirable.
B. TRUSTS IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTE

The Statute of Uses in terms deprived the High Court
of Chancery of all jurisdiction over uses created on freehold estates in land. It had no application to estates for
years and uses in chattels. 543 Soon after the enactment of
the statute, it was held that it did not apply, even though
the feoffee to uses had an estate of freehold, if the conveyance imposed active duties upon him. 544 A century
after the statute, the High Court of Chancery began to
enforce as an equitable estate, the use on a use. 545 In
these four situations, namely, those of estates for years,
chattels personal, active trusts, and the use on a use, reStat. 27 Hen. VIII, c. lO (1535).
It should be noted that it is the freehold or non-freehold character
of the legal estate of the feoffee to uses or trustee which governs the
applicability of the statute, not the character of the estate of the
cestui que use or cestui que trust. See Bacon, READING UPON THE STA·
TUTE OF USES 42 (1642); Sanders, USES AND TRUSTS, 4th ed., 87 (1823).
5 44 Anonymous, Brook's New Cases 94, 73 Eng. Rep. 888
(1545);
Nevil v. Saunders, I Vern. 415, 23 Eng. Rep. 555 (1686).
545 Tyrrel's Case, 2 Dyer 155a, 73 Eng. Rep. 336 (1557) (commonlaw decision that use on a use is not within the statute); Sambach v.
Dalston, Tothill 188, 21 Eng. Rep. 164 (1634) (chancery decision
that use on a use is enforceable in Chancery); Ames, "Origin of Uses
and Trusts," 21 HARV. L. REv. 261 at 270-274 (1908).
542
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lationships much like that of the old use were treated in
Chancery as trusts. The holder of the legal title was a
trustee and the equitable beneficiary a cestui que trust.
The High Court of Chancery developed and enforced
the rights of the cestui que trust by analogy to those of
the old cestui que use. In the law of trusts the development of equitable estates and interests corresponding to
legal estates and interests has been more full and elaborate than that of estates in uses. As Lord Mansfield
said in a Chancery case,
"The forum where they are adjudged is the only difference between trusts and legal estates. Trusts are here
considered as between cestuy que trust and trustee (and
all claiming by, through, or under them, or in consequence of their estates), as the ownership or legal estate,
except when it can be pleaded in bar of the exercise of
this right of jurisdiction. Whatever would be the rule
of law, if it was a legal estate, is applied in equity to a
trust estate ..... the trust is the estate at law in this court,
and governed by the same rules in general, as all real
property is, by limitation ..... cestuy que trust is actually
and absolutely seised of the freehold in consideration of
this court; and therefore .... the legal consequences of
an actual seisin of a freehold, shall, in this court, follow .... " 546
The rules as to alienation by a trustee were the same
as those which applied to conveyances by a feoffee to
uses. 547 If the trustee conveyed the trust property to a
purchaser who had notice of the trust or who had not
paid value, the purchaser took subject to the trust. 548
Moreover, unless, under the terms of the trust, the
546 Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden 177, 223-226, 28 Eng. Rep. 652, 670-671
(1759).
547 Note 537 supra.
s4s Bovey v. Smith, 1 Vern. 144, 23 Eng. Rep. 377 (1682, 1692);
Saunders v. Dehew, 2 Vern, 271, 23 Eng. Rep. 775 (1692); Pye v.
Gorge, 1 P. Wms. 128, 24 Eng. Rep. 323 (1710).
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trustee had power to make such a sale or power to appoint his own successor, the alienee would be compelled
to reconvey or to convey to a new trustee appointed by
the High Court of Chancery. 549 The heir, devisee, and
levying creditor of the trustee likewise took subject to
the trust. 550 A bona fide purchaser for value of the legal
estate of the trustee took free of the trust, 551 but the
trustee who conveyed to a bona fide purchaser for value
in breach of trust would be compelled to make restitution to the trust estate by repurchasing the property or
purchasing property of like type and value. 552 Thus the
trust became a very effective means of restraining alienation of the legal title to interests in land or chattels. The
trustee, however, does not hold his title beneficially. It
is beneficial ownership, the actual right to use and enjoy
land and goods, which is the primary concern of the law
of restraints on alienation.
The cestui que use was usually in possession of the
land; the cestui que trust normally is not in possession of
the trust property. The rights of the cestui que use were
established by custom as a property interest before the
High Court of Chancery began to enforce them; the
rights of the cestui que trust were a creation of that court
and so appeared more like a chose in action than a prop5 4 9 Anonymous, 3 Swanst. 79a, 36 Eng. Rep. 781
(c. 1800); note
548 supra.
550 Heir, devisee, or legatee; Mortimer v. Ireland, 6 Hare 196, 67 Eng.
Rep. 1138 (1847); note 536 supra. The dower of the trustee's widow
was also subject to the trust, which meant, practically, that she had
no dower. Noel v. Jevon, 2 Freeman 43, 22 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1678);
Hinton v. Hinton, 2 Ves. Sr. 631 at 634, 28 Eng. Rep. 402 at 404
(1755). Creditor levying without notice of the trust: Newlands v.
Newlands, 4 My. & Cr. 408, 41 Eng. Rep. 158 (1840); Whitworth v.
Gaugain, 3 Hare 416, 67 Eng. Rep. 444 (1844).
551 See Bassett v. Nosworthy, Rep. temp. Finch 102, 23 Eng. Rep. 55
(1673); note 537 supra.
552 Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 678, 24 Eng. Rep. 913 (1732); see
Tipping v. Piggot, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 385, 21 Eng. Rep. ll20 (1711).
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erty interest. Choses in action were generally inalienable.553 In consequence of these differences between the
estate of the cestui que use and the interest of the cestui
que trust, the early decisions treated the interest of the
beneficiary of a trust as a chose in action which could be
transmitted by will but was not transferable inter vivos. 554
By the seventeenth century, however, the property analogy prevailed, and a cestui que trust could transfer his
interest inter vivos as freely as he could an equivalent
legal estate. 555
It having been determined that equitable estates and
interests correspond to legal estates and interests of the
same duration and that, like legal estates and interests,
they have an incident of alienability, it would seem to
follow that the rules which govern restraints on alienation of legal estates and interests apply as well to equitable estates and interests of the same types. Such, with
an exception which is more apparent than real, was the
English law. It will be recalled that restraints on alienation assume two forms, the prohibition, which, if valid,
would make a conveyance by the owner or a levy by his
creditors wholly ineffective, leaving the ownership in
him, and the penalty restraint, designed to penalize
alienation by forfeiture of the interest or otherwise. As
has been seen, prohibitions on alienation of legal interests in property are always void, whether the property
is land or chattels and whether the interest is perpetual,
for life, or for a term. In England the same rule of nulls5s Ames, "The Inalienability of Choses in Action," LECTuREs oN
LEGAL HISTORY 210-218 (1913).
554 Anonymous, 3 Dyer 369a, 73 Eng. Rep. 827, Jenk. 245, 145 Eng.
Rep. 172 (1580); Earl of Worcester v. Finch, 4 Coke, INSTITUTES 85,
2 Anderson 162, 123 Eng. Rep. 600 (1600); Holmes, COMMON LAW
409 (1881).
555 Warmstrey v. Lady Tanfield, 1 Ch. R. 29, 21 Eng. Rep. 498
(1628).
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.ity was applied to prohibitions on alienation of the interest of a cestui que trust. 556 The rule had one ex:ception
in that an effective prohibition could be imposed on
alienation by a married woman of her separate equitable
estate. 557 As Professor Gray has observed, this exception
was not really in conflict with the rule as to legal interests, since a married woman could not hold legal title
to chattels at common law and could not convey her
legal title to land by ordinary means. 558 As to penalty
restraints, the English equity rules likewise follow the
rules at law. A provision for forfeiture on any alienation
of an equitable estate in fee simple or an equivalent interest in chattels is void. 559 A provision for forfeiture on
alienation of an equitable life estate is valid, whether the
556 Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. Jr. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (1811);
Jones v. Salter, 2 Russ. & M. 208, 39 Eng. Rep. 374 (1815); Barton v.
Briscoe, Jac. 603, 37 Eng. Rep. 978 (1822); Graves v. Dolphin, I Sim.
66, 57 Eng. Rep. 503 (1826); Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Russ. & M.
197, 39 Eng. Rep. 370 (1831); Brown v. Pocock, 2 Russ. & M. 210,
39 Eng. Rep. 374 (1833). Other cases are collected in Gray, REsTRAINTS
ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., §§105-112, 134-168 (1895). If the cestui's interest
is limited to a right to support or to such sums as the trustees in their
discretion choose to pay him, the purchaser or creditor may not
acquire much.
557 Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483, 35 Eng. Rep. 1025 (1817);
Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 My. & Cr. 377, 41 Eng. Rep. 147 (1840); Baggett
v. Meux, I Ph. 627, 41 Eng. Rep. 771 (1846). The restraint was
effective, however, only while the woman was married, ceasing upon
her husband's death. Jones v. Salter; Barton v. Briscoe, note 556
supra. The Married Women (Restraint Upon Anticipation) Act. 1949,
12, 13 & I4 Geo. VI, c. 78, §I (I), provides, "No restriction upon
anticipation or alienation attached, or purported to be attached, to
the enjoyment of any property by a woman which could not have
been attached to the enjoyment of that property by a man shall be
of any effect after the passing of this Act." This statute replaced a
similar enactment which applied only to restraints imposed after
1935. The Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935,
25 & 26 Geo. V, c. 30, §2.
55S Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., §§140-141, 269 (1895).
55 9 Re Dugdale, [ 1888] 38 Ch. Div. 176; Corbett v. Corbett, [1888]
13 P. Div. 136, 14 P. Div. 7; Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed.,
§20 (1895). As in the case of legal estates in fee simple (as to which
see note 128 supra), the rules as to restraints which are limited as to
proscribed alienees are confused. Gray, id., §§35-39.
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alienation restrained be voluntary or involuntary, if the
trust is created by someone other than the life cestui. 560
If, however, the cestui que trust for life or years is the
settlor of the trust, a provision for forfeiture of his estate
on involuntary alienation is void. 561
Where it has not been affected by statute, American
law follows, in general, the English view as to the effect
of a trust in restraining alienation of the legal title to
property. That is to say, a transfer by the trustee under
power expressly or impliedly granted by the instrument
creating the trust conveys the property to the transferee
free of trust; 5~ 2 a transfer by the trustee which violates
the provisions of the trust conveys the legal title but not
necessarily free of the trust. If the transfer is to a purchaser who has notice of the trust, 563 or to a donee, 564 the
transferee takes subject to the trust and may be compelled to reconvey to the trustee or to a successor trustee.
If the transfer is to a bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of the trust, the transferee takes free of the
trust, 565 but the trustee may be compelled to make resti56o Lockyer v. Savage, 2 Strange 947, 93 Eng. Rep. 959
(1733).
Numerous cases in accord are collected in Gray, RESTRAINTS oN ALIENATION, 2d ed., §78 (1895).
561 Higinbotham v. Holme, 19 Ves. Jr. 88, 34 Eng. Rep. 451 (1812).
Other cases are collected in Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed.,
§§91, 93-95. The validity of a restraint on voluntary alienation of the
life interest of a cestui que trust who is also the settlor of the trust
is doubtful. I d., §§96-100.
562 TRusTs REsTATEMENT §283 (1935); 2 Scott, LAw OF TRUSTS §283
(1939).
5~3 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §288 (1935); 2 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS §288
(1939). The cases are collected in 1 Perry, LAW oF TRusTs AND
TRUSTEES, 7th ed. §217n (1929).
564 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §289 (1935); 2 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS §289
(1939). The cases are collected in Scott and in Perry, note 563 supra.
56 5 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §284 (1935); 2 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS §284
(1939). The cases are collected in Perry, supra note 563, §§218-22lnn.
One who purchases in good faith and for value, without notice of the
trust, from a transferee of the trustee who had notice or who did not
pay value, also takes free of the trust. TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §287
(1935); 2 Scott, LAw OF TRUSTS §287 (1939).
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tution to the trust estate. 566
As to penalty restraints on alienation by the cestui que
trust of his equitable interest, American law likewise
tends to follow the English view. That is to say, provisions for forfeiture on alienation are generally void
when annexed to an equitable estate in fee simple or an
interest in personal property of equivalent duration/67
and they are generally valid when annexed to an equitable interest for life or years. 5 8 As to restraints on alienation by way of prohibition, however, the American law
has diverged widely from the English and from the rules
governing restraints on legal interests. Where the only
interest of a cestui que trust is to receive the income from
the trust property for his life, part of his life, or a term
of years, most American courts will enforce specifically
a provision in the instrument creating the trust prohibiting the cestui que trust from transferring his interest and
his creditors from reaching it. 569 This "spendthrift trust"
doctrine is an extension of the English enforcement of
prohibitions on alienation of the equitable estates of
married women, but it is not restricted to married women or incompetents. Moreover, the American decisions
treat the interest of the cestui que trust under a trust for
his support as inalienable even in the absence of an ex(1

566 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §§202, 205, 208 (1935); 2 Scott, LAW OF
TRUSTS §§202, 205 208 (1939). This is not so, generally, if the cestui
que trust consented to the transfer at or before the time it was made,
even though there are valid prohibitory restraints on alienation by
the cestui of his own interest. TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §216; Scott, §216.
567 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §150 (1935); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS §150
(1939); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.92 (1952).
56 8 Ibid.
569 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §152 (1935); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS §152
(1939); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6
AMERICAN LAw oF PRoPERTY, §26.94 (1952). The cases are collected and
discussed in Scott, §§152.1 to 152.6 and Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRusTs,
2d ed., §§53-60 (1947).
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press prohibition on alienation. 570 As to equitable interests in fee simple, whether in present enjoyment or in
expectancy, and interests in personal property of like
duration, there is considerable confusion in the American cases. 571 The Restatement of Trusts takes the position that prohibitory restraints on alienation of such in~
terests are invalid except that where, by the terms of the
trust, the cestui que trust is entitled to have the income
paid to him for life or a term of years, and thereafter to
have the trust property conveyed to him or to those deriving title through him, a prohibition on voluntary or
involuntary alienation of the right to income accruing
during his life is valid. 512 Spendthrift trust prohibitions
are generally treated as ineffective against claims for
necessaries supplied the cestui que trust, for services and
supplies which preserve or benefit his interest in the
trust, and for support or alimony of his wife and children. 573 They are considered invalid as to a trust created
by the cestui que trust himself. 574
s1o TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §154 (1935); 1 Scott, LAw oF TRUSTS §154
(1939); Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§430 to 434 (1947).
This is not so where the amount to be paid or applied by the trustee
is a specified sum or is not limited to what is necessary for the education and support of the cestui que trust, even though the primary
purpose of the trust is support. TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, comment d;
Griswold, §433.
571 1 Scott, LAw oF TRUSTS §§153-153.3 (1939); Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT
TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§81-97, 102-106 (1947); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon
the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §26.96
(1952).
572 Sections 151, 153 (1935).
573 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §157 (1935); 1 Scott, LAw OF TRUSTS §§157157.3 (1939); Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., c. 6 (1947). Section
157 of the Restatement of Trusts was amended by the 1948 Supplement to add claims by the United States or a state or subdivision
thereof, to the list of claims against which spendthrift provisions are
ineffective.
574 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §156 (1935); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS §§156156.3 (1939); Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., c. 8, §282,1 (1947);
Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.122 (1952).
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C. MICHIGAN STATUTORY CHANGES IN THE LAW OF TRUSTS

During the years 1825 through 1828, a commission of
three eminent lawyers prepared a revision of the statutes
of the State of New York which, with some changes, was
adopted by the legislature and published as the Revised
Statutes of 1829, effective January 1, 1830. 575 According
to tradition, the plan of the revision was drafted by
Judge Henry Wheaton, a lifelong admirer of France who
had studied civil law at Poitiers and translated the Code
Napoleon into English. The revisers' notes, which discuss the history of uses and trusts in England, reflect this
influence. They admit that uses had utility in relieving
the burdens of the feudal system and introducing flexibility in conveyancing, but they compare unfavorably
the complexity of the English law caused by divided titles,
legal and equitable, with the simple property provisions
of the Code Napoleon and deplore the extent to which
the High Court of Chancery nullified the Statute of Uses.
The revisers thought that, if all feudal tenures and their
incidents were abolished and a simple system of conveying legal title was provided, there would be no need for
uses or trusts, except those for the benefit of creditors
and for the protection of incompetents. 576 They accordingly proposed a "modified abolition of uses and trusts,"
saymg,
575

Preface, R.S.N.Y. 1829; 3 R.S.N.Y. 1829, 409 (ed. 1836); Butler,

THE REviSION OF THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND THE

REVISERS (1889). The original commission consisted of John Duer,
Benjamin F. Butler and Henry Wheaton. Judge Wheaton accepted a
diplomatic appointment in 1827 and was replaced by John C. Spencer.
Butler later served as Attorney General under Jackson. Wheaton was
reporter of the United States Supreme Court, had a long career as a
diplomat, and became an autl!ority on international law. Duer later
became a New York judge. Spencer was Secretary of War and of the
Treasury under Tyler.
s1s 3 R.S.N.Y., 579-587 (ed. 1836).
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"As the creation of trusts is always in a greater or less
degree the source of inconvenience and expense, by embarrassing the title, and requiring the frequent aid of a
court of equity, it is desirable that express trusts should
be limited as far as possible, and the purposes for which
they may be created, strictly defined. The object of the
Revisers in this section is to allow the creation of express
trusts, in those cases and in those cases only where the
purposes of the trust require that the legal estate should
pass to the trustees. An assignment for the benefit of
creditors, would in most cases be entirely defeated, if the
title were to remain in the debtor, and where the trust
is to receive the rents and profits of lands, and to apply
them to the education of a minor, the separate use of
a married woman, or the support of a lunatic or spendthrift, (the general objects of trusts of this description)
the utility of vesting the title and possession in the
trustees, is sufficiently apparent. After much reflection,
the Revisers have not been able to satisfy themselves
that there are any cases not enumerated in this section,
in which, in order to secure the execution of the trust,
it is necessary that the title or possession should vest in
the trustees .... " 577
As enacted in 1828, the New York Revised Statutes
provided,
"S. 45. Uses and trusts, except as authorized and
modified in this Article, are abolished; and every estate
and interest in lands, shall be deemed a legal right, cognizable as such in the courts of law, except when otherwise provided in this Chapter.
"S. 47. Every person, who, by virtue of any grant,
assignment or devise, now is, or hereafter shall be entitled
to the actual possession of lands, and the receipt of the
rents and profits thereof, in law or in equity, shall be
deemed to have a legal estate therein, of the same quality
and duration, and subject to the same conditions, as his
beneficial interest.
577

I d. at 585.
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"S. 55. Express trusts may be created, for any or
either of the following purposes:
1. To sell lands for the benefit of creditors:
2. To sell, mortgage or lease lands, for the benefit of
legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any charge
thereon:
3. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and
apply them to the education and support) or either) 578 of
any person, during the life of such person, or for any
shorter term, subject to the rules prescribed in the first
Article of this Title:
4. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to
accumulate the same, for the purposes and within the
limits prescribed in the first Article of this Title. 579
"57. Where a trust is created to receive the rents and
profits of lands, and no valid direction for accumulation
is given, the surplus of such rents and profits, beyond
the sum that may be necessary for the education and
support of the person for whose benefit the trust is
created, shall be liable, in equity, to the claims of the
creditors of such person, in the same manner as other
personal property, which cannot be reached by an execution at law.
"60. Every express trust, valid, as such, in its creation, except as herein otherwise provided, shall vest the
whole estate in the trustees, in law and in equity, subject only to the execution of the trust. The persons for
whose benefit the trust is created, shall take no estate or
interest in the lands, but may enforce performance of the
trust in equity.
"63. No person beneficially interested in a trust for
the receipt of the rents and profits of lands, can assign
or in any manner dispose of such interest; but the rights
and interest of every person for whose benefit a trust for
the payment of a sum in gross is created, are assignable.
s1s Emphasis supplied.
579 Part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. First, §37, limits accumulations to those
for the benefit of minors during minority. Chapter 16, infra.
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"64. Where an express trust is created, but is not contained or declared in the conveyance to the trustees, such
conveyance shall be deemed absolute, as against the subsequent creditors of the trustees, not having notice of
the trust, and as against purchasers from such trustees,
without notice, and for a valuable consideration.
"65. Where the trust shall be expressed in the instrument creating the estate, every sale, conveyance or
other act of the trustees, in contravention of the trust
shall be absolutely void.
"68. Upon the death of the surviving trustee of an
express trust, the trust estate shall not descend to his
heirs, nor pass to his personal representatives; but the
trust, if then unexecuted, shall vest in the court of chancery, with all the powers and duties of the original
trustee, and shall be executed by some person appointed
for that purpose, under the direction of the court." 580
In 1830, upon advice of the revisers, Subsection 3 of
Section 55 was amended by striking out the words "education and support, or either," and substituting the word
"use." 581
During the years 1844 through 1846, a revision of the
statutes of Michigan was prepared by a single commissioner, Judge Sanford M. Green, a former New York
lawyer. 582 Judge Green's draft contained a chapter on
uses and trusts which incorporated, without change in
Part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §§45, 47, 55, 57, 60, 63, 64, 65, 68.
3 R.S.N.Y., 579 (ed. 1836). As to this, the revisers said, "The
word 'use' includes education and support, and each of them. It will
also include other purposes, which ought to be provided for." Ibid.
As to the effect of the amendment, see Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS,
2d ed., §§65, 66 (1947).
5182 Rev. Stat. 1846, p. III; Weadock, "The Public Services of Sanford
M. Green,'' 17 MicH. PIONEER AND HrsT. CoLLECTioNs, 2d ed., 357-369
(1910); Howell N.P. 308; 117 MicH. xlvi. Green practiced at Brownsville, New York, 1833-1835, and married the daughter of a New York
judge. He moved to Owosso, Michigan, in 1837 and became a state
senator. He was a judge of the Michigan Supreme Court, 1848-1857,
circuit judge at Pontiac, 1857-1867, and circuit judge at Bay City,
1872-1887.
580

581
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substance, the provisions of the New York statutes quoted
above, as they had been amended in 1830. This was
enacted, with two changes, as Chapter 63 of the Michigan
Revised Statutes of 1846, which became effective March
1, 1847, and is still in force. 583 The two changes made by
the legislature were in the section listing permissible
trusts (Sec. 55, New York; Sec. 11, Michigan):' 84 Subsection 4 was amended to permit accumulations for married women, not limited to minority, and a new Subsection 5 was added. The section, as enacted and in
force in Michigan reads,
"Sec. 11. Express trusts may be created for any or
either of the following purposes:
l. To sell lands for the benefit of creditors:
2. To sell, mortgage or lease lands, for the benefit
of legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any charge
thereon:
3. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and
apply them to the use of any person, during the life of
such person, or for any shorter term, subject to the rules
prescribed in the last preceding chapter:
4. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to
accumulate the same for the benefit of any married
5ss Comp. Laws (1857) §§2631 to 2657; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4114
to 4140; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8829 to 8855; How. Stat., §§5563 to
5589; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11565 to 11591; Comp. Laws (1929)
§§12967 to 12993; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.51 to 26.77; Comp. Laws
(1948) §§555.1 to 555.27. Sections I, 3, 11, 13, 16, 19, 20, 21, and 24,
Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, correspond, respectively, to §§45, 47, 55, 57, 60,
63, 64, 65, and 68, R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second. Rev.
Stat. 1846, c. 63, §2, copied from R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II,
art. Second, §46, provides, "Every estate which is now held as an use,
executed under the laws of this state as they formerly existed, is
confirmed as a legal estate." As the Statute of Uses was in force in
New York prior to the revision of 1829, this section had extensive
application there. It having been held in Trask v. Green, 9 Mich.
358 (1861) that the Statute of Uses was repealed in Michigan by the
Act of September 16, 1810, note 38 supra, the section's application
here is limited to uses created before 1810.
584 Rev. Stat. 1846, p. V.
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woman) or for either of the purposes and within the limits
prescribed in the preceding chapter: 585
5. For the beneficial interest of any person or persons, when such trust is fully expressed and dearly defined upon the face of the instrument creating it, subject
to the limitations as to time prescribed in this title." 586
The addition of Subsection 5 wholly altered the nature of the legislation. As has been seen, the New York
revisers intended to abolish all continuing trusts except
those for the support and education of minors, married
women, and incompetents. Their provisions as to the
nature and inalienability of the interest of the cestui que
trust were inserted with this in mind. The original New
York statute did not carry out this intention perfectly
because it failed to define the persons who could be beneficiaries of a trust for education and support. Probably
the revisers did not anticipate the creation of spendthrift
trusts for the benefit of persons who were not incompetent. The New York amendment of Subsection 3, made
in 1830, altered the scheme to some extent by permitting
trusts, for the life of any cestui que trust) not limited to
education and support. The Michigan addition of Subsection 5 changed it wholly by permitting trusts for any
purpose whatever, so long as the cestui que trust is not
in possession. Yet the Michigan statutes retain the provisions which make the interest of the cestui que trust
5B 5Emphasis supplied to show words not in the New York subsection.
The reference to the "preceding chapter" is to Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62,
§37; Comp. Laws (1857) §2621; Comp. Laws (1871) §4104; Comp. Laws
(1897) §8819; How. Stat. §5553; Comp. Laws (1915) §11555; Comp.
Laws (1929) §12957; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.37; Comp. Laws (1948)
§554.37, which was the same as N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II,
art. First, §37, note 579 supra. This section [Comp. Laws (1948)
§554.37] was amended by Act 227, P.A. 1949, and repealed by Act 6,
P.A. 1952. Chapter 16, infra.
s.sa Rev. Stat. 1946, c. 63, §11, note 583 supra.
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an inalienable chose in action, 587 despite their inappropriateness to trusts which are not for the education or
support of minors, married women, or incompetents.
Both the New York and Michigan statutes abolish
trusts of land under which the cestui que trust is entitled to beneficial possession. 588 This eliminates several
types of trust which would have been valid in England
after the High Court of Chancery had created the exceptions to the Statute of Uses discussed above. 589 These
are the trust of an estate for years, the use on a use, and
the trust under which the trustee has active duties. None
of these was executed by the English Statute of Uses,
whether or not the cestui que trust was entitled to possession. The New York and Michigan statutes execute
them, that is, destroy the estate of the trustee and convert the interest of the cestui que trust into a legal estate,
when the cestui is entitled to possession and the receipt
of the rents and profits.
D. PERMISSIBLE DURATION OF TRUSTS OF LAND

English law imposes no limit on the duration of trusts.
If a conveyance is made to A and his heirs upon trust for
B and his heirs, A holds a legal fee simple and B an
equitable fee simple, both of which are potentially perpetual. Inasmuch as the estates of both are alienable,
B can terminate the trust at any time by having A convey to him, by conveying to A, or by joining A in a
conveyance to a third party. When the estates of the
trustee and the cestui que trust are inalienable, however,
as they are in New York and Michigan in the case of
587 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §§57, 60, 63,
note 580 supra; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§13, 16, 19, note 583 supra.
5 88 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §47, note 580
supra; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §3, note 583 supra.
589 At notes 543-545.
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trusts for the receipt of the rents and profits of lands/90
the trust is indestructible and some limit on duration is
desirable. The language of Subsection 3 of the New
York and Michigan statutes defining permissible trusts
might have been construed to limit the duration of any
trust created thereunder to the life of a single beneficiary.
It has not been so construed in either New York of Michigan. However, the preceding article of the New York
statutes provided,
"S. 15. The absolute power of alienation, shall not
be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever,
for a longer period than during the continuance of not
more than two lives in being at the creation of the estate,
except in the single case mentioned in the next section." 691
Before the Revised Statutes of 1846 were adopted, the
New York courts had held that, because of the inalienability of the interest of the cestui que trust~ a trust for
the receipt of the rents and profits of lands suspended the
absolute power of alienation, and, therefore, Section 15
limited the duration of such trusts to two lives in being.592
590 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. I, tit. II, art. Second, §63, note 580
supra; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §19, note 583 supra, quoted in the text
at note 621 infra.
59 1 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. First, §15. Rev. Stat. 1846,
c. 62, §15, Comp. Laws (1857) §2599; Comp. Laws (1871) §4082;
Comp. Laws (1897) §8797; How. Stat. §5531; Comp. Laws (1915)
§11533; Comp. Laws (1929) §12935; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.15; Comp.
Laws (1948) §554.15 was identical. The next section originally provided: "s. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a
prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the persons
to whom the first remainder is limited, shall die under the age of
twenty-one years, or upon any other contingency, by which the estate
of such persons may be determined before they attain their full age."
The meaning and effect of §16 are discussed in Chapter 21, Section
D, infra. Sections 554.14 to 554.20 of Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) were
repealed by P.A. 38 in 1949. See note 594 infra.
592 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (1835); Hawley v. James, 16
Wend. 61 (1836); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT App., c. A, 1[17 (1944); see
Powell and Whiteside, THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEw YoRK CoN-
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Section 15 was adopted here in 1846, and the decisions
under it were to the same effect. 593 A Michigan statute
of 1949 repealed Section 15 and reestablished the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities as to interests in land
created by wills becoming effective and deeds executed
after September 23, 1949. 594 This repeal raises the question of the permissible duration of a trust for receipt of
the rents and profits of lands.
Subsection 3 permits only trusts, "to receive the rents
and profits of lands, and apply them to the use of any
person, during the life of such person, or for any shorter
term." Although, as has been noted, this does not limit
the duration of trusts, it does limit in quantity the equitable interest of any one beneficiary to a life interest.
This being so, there can be no such thing as an equitable
CERNING PERPETUITIES AND RELATED MATTERS 63-73 [New York Legislative Document (1936) No. 65 (H)].
5'93 Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); Foster v.
Stevens, 146 Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906); Otis v. Arntz, 198 Mich.
196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917); Scheibner v. Scheibner, 199 Mich. 630, 165
N.W. 660 (1917); Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321,
190 N.W. 250 (1922); Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588,
242 N.W. 760 (1932); Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267
Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934); In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich.
485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938). The types of trusts affected by §15 are
discussed in Chapter 20, Section C, infra. The computation of the
permissible period is discussed in Chapter 21, infra. In most of
the cases the problem was complicated by contentions that not only the
trust itself but future interests subject to it or expectant upon it
offended section 15. It was held formerly that section 15 limited the
duration of charitable trusts. Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark
v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207 (1879); see Scudder v. Security
Trust Co., 238 Mich. 318, 213 N.W. 131 (1927). This effect of the
section was eliminated by Act 122, P.A. 1907, superseded by Act 280,
P.A. 1915, Comp. Laws (1915) §11099; Comp. Laws (1929) §13512;
Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.1191; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.351, and supplemented by Act 373, P.A. 1925, Comp. Laws (1929) §13517; Mich. Stat.
Ann. §26.1201; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.381. The history and present
status of charitable trusts in Michigan are discussed in Chapter 15,
infra.
594 Act 38; P.A. 1949, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.49 (1), 26.49 (2), 26.49 (3);
Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.51, 554.52, 554.53. See Miller v. Curtiss,
328 Mich. 239, 43 N.W. (2d) 834 (1950).
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fee simple under Subsection 3. There can be a succession
of equitable life interests followed by a legal remainder
in fee, but each life interest and the remainder must vest
within the period of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities which is, generally speaking, lives in being and
twenty-one years. Thus the Rule Against Perpetuities,
although not itself a rule limiting the duration of trusts,
operates in conjunction with the language of Subsection 3 to impose what amounts to a limitation on the
duration of trusts created under that subsection.
Subsection 5, which is peculiar to Michigan, permits
trusts for "the beneficial interest of any person or persons ..... subject to the limitations as to time prescribed
in this title." The reference was to Section 15, now repealed, so it would seem that there is now no limitation
on the duration of trusts created under this subsection;
that is, the interest of the cestui que trust may be an
equitable fee simple. As the interest of the cestui que
trust under a trust for the receipt of the rents and profits
of lands is inalienable, it becomes material to inquire
whether it is permissible to create a trust for the receipt
of the rents and profits of lands under Subsection 5. If
so, it may now be possible to set up a perpetual trust of
land under which the interest of the cestui que trust)
although in fee simple, will always be inalienable, except
to the extent that the statutes permit his creditors to
reach the surplus of income beyond that necessary for
his education and support. 595 Such a trust would have
595 Rev. Stat. (1846) c. 63, §§13, 19, note 583 supra. These sections
correspond to sections 57 and 63 of the New York statute, quoted in the
text at note 580 supra. The Restatement of Trusts takes the position
that a trust may not be made indestructible beyond the period of the
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. Section 62, comment k (1935).
Professor Scott agrees with th1s position but cites no authority for it.
LAw oF TRUSTS §62.10 (1939). This problem is discussed further in
Chapter 15, Section B (4), infra. As England has not made trusts
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the undesirable characteristics of the perpetually unbarrable entail, which the English courts abolished in
1472.500
Two types of trusts for the receipt of the rents and
profits of land may possibly be sustainable under Subsection 5. Subsection 3 permits only trusts to "apply"
the rents and profits of land to the use of any person. It
could be argued that when the trust is to receive the rents
and profits and pay them over to the cestui que trust,
the trust falls under Subsection 5 rather than Subsection
3. The New York courts have decided that a trust to
receive the rents and profits and pay them over to the
beneficiary falls under Subsection 3, 597 but these decisions
might not be followed in Michigan because they were
rendered after 1846 and because, as New York has no
Subsection 5, the only alternative there to sustaining such
trusts under Subsection 3 would be to hold them void.
Subsection 3 permits trusts to apply the rents and profits
of lands to the use of any person only "during the life of
such person, or for any shorter term." It could be argued
that, if the trust is to apply the rents and profits to the use
of B and his heirs, it cannot be sustained under Subsection 3 but can be under Subsection 5. To maintain this
argument it is necessary to assert that Subsection 3 does
not prohibit the creation of any trust to apply the rents
and profits of land to the use of beneficiaries so long as it
is not created under that subsection. In view of the undesirability of permitting perpetual trusts under which
the interest of the cestui que trust is inalienable, the
indestructible by statute and does hot permit them to be made indestructible by restraints on alienation, the question cannot arise there.
5 9 6 Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, Mich., pl. 25 (1472), note
67 supra.
59 7 Leggett v. Perkins, 2 N.Y. 297 (1849); Cochrane v. Schell, 140
N.Y. 516 (1894); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT App., c. A, 1!18 (1944).
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Michigan Supreme Court may hold that Subsections 3
and 4 are the only authority for the creation of trusts for
the receipt of the rents and profits of lands. If so, the
menace of perpetually inalienable equitable estates in
fee simple will be averted.
E. STATUTORY INALIENABILITY OF INTERESTS
UNDER TRUSTS OF LAND

As to alienation by the trustee, the New York and
Michigan statutes introduce three changes in the English law. First, when the trust is not contained or declared in the conveyance to the trustees, subsequent creditors of the trustee without notice of the trust may levy
on the trust property free of the trust. 598 The English
rule was otherwise. 599 Second, the legal estate of the
trustee is not devisable and does not pass to the trustee's
heir upon intestacy.~oo As to this, also, the English rule
was otherwise.601 Third, when the trust is contained or
declared in the conveyance to the trustee, a transfer by
the trustee in breach of trust is absolutely void.602 In
England such a transfer effectively conveyed the legal
title to the transferee, who took it subject to the trust. 603
This provision that the trustee's transfer in breach of
trust is a complete nullity, even when the cestui que trust
requests a transfer, can cause seriously undesirable situa59 8 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §64, note 580
supra; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §20, note 583 supra.
599 Note 550 supra.
600 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §68, note 580
supra; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §24, note 583 supra.
601 Note 550 supra.
60 2 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §65, note 580
supra; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §21, note 583 supra.
60 3 Note 551 supra. There can be no problem of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the trust in this situation because
the declaration of trust in the trustee's chain of title is notice to purchasers from him.
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tions where the trust property is salable but is deteriorating, requires repairs which the trustee cannot finance, or
will produce no income without improvements which
the trustee cannot finance or is not empowered to make.
Under the English law, a conveyance by the trustee would
carry the legal title and the concurrence of the cestui
que trust would bar his interest.~ 05 A statute enacted in
1887 was designed to ameliorate the situation by empowering the circuit court in chancery to authorize testamentary trustees without power of sale to sell the trust
property free of trust and hold the proceeds in trust.~
The 1887 act provides however, that,
06

"No sale or conveyance of any kind shall be made of
any property contrary to any specific provision in regard
thereto contained in the deed of conveyance, or in the
will under which the petitioner holds the said
property." 607

Young v.
sion to sell
plaintiffs in
persons for

Young 608 was a suit by trustees for permisland in fee. The land was devised to the
trust to pay the rents and profits to named
ten years, if either of two children of the

See note 566 supra.
Act 233, P.A. 1887, as amended, Comp. Laws (1897) §§9234 to
9242. Re-enacted, Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 19, §§62 to 70; Comp. Laws
(1915) §§12716 to 12724; Comp. Laws (1929) §§14404 to 14412; Mich.
Stat. Ann., §§27.1188 to 27.1196; Comp. Laws (1948) §§619.62 to
619.70; note 283 supra. Cf. Act 258, P.A. 1925, Comp. Laws (1929)
§§13518 to 13521; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.1211 to 26.1214; Comp. Laws
(1948) §§554.401 to 554.404, relating to charitable dispositions, note
224 supra.
607 Act. 233, P.A. 1887, §9; Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 19, §70; Comp.
Laws (1915) §12724; Comp. Laws (1929) §14412; Mich. Stat. Ann.
§27.1196; Comp. Laws (1948) §619.70. The term "deed of conveyance" is explicable by the fact that the statute permits legal life
tenants holding under deed or will to petition for sale of the fee,
although it applies only to trustees under wills.
6os 255 Mich. 173, 237 N.W. 535 (1931). See Garrison v. Hecker,
128 Mich. 539, 87 N.W. 642 (1901); Hall v. Williamson, 304 Mich.
657, 8 N.W. (2d) 869 (1943). Cf. Trustees of the M.J. Clark Memorial
Home v. Jewell, 240 Mich. 250, 215 N.W. 378 (1927).
605
60 6
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testator should so long live, legal remainder to the two
children for their lives, legal remainder in fee to their
issue or the issue of the survivor of them. The will
expressly denied the trustees power to sell and directed
them to hold the property intact during the term of the
trust. It also provided that the children should not
have power to sell or mortgage during their lives. Before
the ten years expired, a hotel building on the land
burned and the trustees could not finance construction
of any building which would produce income or pay
the taxes without income. A decree directing sale and
the substitution of the proceeds for the original trust
property was affirmed after the expiration of the ten
years. The court held that courts of equity have inherent power, independent of statute, to permit deviation from terms of trusts restricting alienation and that
the quoted section of the 1887 act did not restrict this
non-statutory power. The opinion does not refer to the
section of the Revised Statutes which makes "absolutely
void" every sale or conveyance by trustees in contravention of the trust 609 and does not discuss the validity of
the provisions of the will imposing a prohibition on
alienation of the legal life estate of the children. The
result reached in Young v. Young is clearly desirable and
in harmony with the general Anglo-American law of
trusts. 610 Nevertheless, it flatly contravenes the Michigan statutes. The decision amounts to a partial judicial
repeal of the arbitrary and virtually unworkable system
set up by the New York revisers and a return to the
so9 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §21, note 583 supra, adopting R.S.N.Y.
1829, part II, c. 1, art. Second, §65, note 580 supra. The New York
statute has been amended to permit the result reached in Young v.
Young. N.Y. Real Property Law §105.
610 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §167 (1935); Scott, LAw OF TRUSTS §167
(1939).

224

PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS

principles of the English law of trusts, which those revisers sought to abolish.
Bennett v. Chapin illl was a suit to construe a will.
The testatrix devised two lots and other property to her
executors upon trust to provide for the education and
support of her daughter during minority, then to pay
her a thousand dollars a year until she reached the age
of thirty-five, when the property was to be transferred
to her. If the daughter died before reaching thirty-five,
her issue were to succeed to her rights and, if she was
not survived by issue, the property was to be conveyed
to testatrix's husband. The will provided that the lots
should not be sold for less than $16,500. After the death
of the testatrix's husband, the daughter, aged thirty-one
and without issue, sued for a determination that she had
power to terminate the trust and sell the two lots for
$10,000. A decree dismissing her bill was reversed. The
court held that the daughter had an indefeasibly vested
il 11 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889). See Part Two, note 466, infra.
The case is not followed when there are non-consenting contingent
beneficiaries. Ward v. Ward, 163 Mich. 570, 128 N.W. 761 (1910);
In re Dingler's Estate, 319 Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947). In
Blossom v. Anketell, (D.C. Mich. 1921) 275 F. 947, the sole beneficiary was not allowed to terminate a trust, the terms of which did
not entitle him to the principal during his life-time unless the trustees,
in their discretion, chose to convey it to him. The decision seems
inconsistent, in principle, with Bennett v. Chapin. In Hunt v. Hunt,
124 Mich. 502, 83 N.W. 371 (1900), land was devised to trustees to
convert into personalty and pay the income to a son for life, then to
pay over to the heirs, devisees or legatees of the son. It was held that
the son was not entitled to terminate the trust. In Conover v. Hewitt,
125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900), land was conveyed to a trustee
to apply the rents and profits to the use of William Fitzhugh during
his life and after his death to apply them to the use of his wife and
children during the life of the wife, remainder at her death to the
children. After the death of William his widow released her interest
to the other beneficiaries. They sued to compel immediate termination of the trust and were granted the relief sought. This decision
goes further than Bennett v. Chapin by holding not only that the
beneficiaries of a trust for receipt of the rents and profits of land may
compel its termination but that one such beneficiary may transfer his
interest to another.
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estate in fee simple and that the restraint on alienation
was void, citing Mandlebaum v. McDonell 612 and a passage in Gray's Rule Against Perpetuities stating the English rule that when property is given to trustees to transfer to a beneficiary upon his reaching a certain age and
there is no one else beneficially interested, the beneficiary may compel the trustees to convey to him before
he reaches the specified age, despite the fact that termination will defeat a material purpose of the trust.618 The
opinion does not mention the Michigan statutes relative
to trusts of land. That the decision is in conflict with
those statutes is abundantly clear from the New York
decisions on the point.614 It is also in conflict with the
rule generally followed in this country in the absence
of statute.615 In this case, as in Young v. Young~ the
result reached is desirable and in harmony with the English law of trusts.
Fredericks v. Near 616 was an action of assumpsit. The
defendants conveyed land owned by them by the entirety to the plaintiff. The plaintiff and defendants
entered into a substantially contemporaneous agreement
providing that the plaintiff held as trustee for the purpose of selling the land and paying a debt owed by the
defendant husband, and that the defendants jointly and
severally agreed to pay any deficiency. Being unable
29 Mich. 78 (1874), note 138 supra.
The passage quoted by the court is in §120, 3d ed. (1915). It
collects the English cases and follows the English view that all prohibitions on alienation, on legal or equitable interests, are void, except
on the separate equitable estate of a married woman.
614 See Matter of Wentworth, 230 N.Y. 176, 129 N.E. 646 (1920)
and other cases cited in Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRusTs, 2d ed., 526
(1947).
615 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §337, comments j, k (1935); 3 Scott, LAw
OF TRUSTS §337.3 (1939); Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §513
(1947). This is known as the Rule in Claflin v. Claflin [149 Mass. 19,
20 N.E. 454 (1899)].
616 260 Mich. 627, 245 N.W. 537 (1932).
e12
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to effect a sale, the plaintiff, with the consent of the
creditor, reconveyed the land to the defendants. The
defendant husband was later discharged in bankruptcy.
The plaintiff sought to hold the defendant wife liable
personally on the assumption of liability in the trust
agreement. A judgment for the defendants was affirmed,
the court saying,
"We recognize the rule that a trustee, without the
consent or acquiescence of the beneficiary, cannot surrender the trust estate, but, in the case at bar, the trustee,
the cestui que trust and settlors were all sui juris and
could, by mutual consent, terminate the trust and restore the status quo." 617
1

1

This language appears to be a statement of the rule,
which is well settled in England and in states where it
has not been altered by statute, that the settlor and
cestui que trust may always terminate a trust, even
though termination will defeat a material purpose of the
trust, provided the cestui que trust is fully competent
and there are no other beneficiaries affected.618 In New
York this rule is not applicable to trusts for receipt of
the rents and profits of land created under Subsections
3 and 4 because the statutes make the interests of both
trustee and cestui que trust inalienable.619 It would seem
that the New York rule should apply in Michigan to
trusts created under Subsections 3, 4, and 5, and that, if
the opinion in Fredericks v. Near holds otherwise, it is
wrong. The trust involved in the case was, however,
created under Subsection 1 of the statute, and the right
of the beneficiary was to receive a sum in gross. Conse617

ld. at 631.

§338 (1935); Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS §338
(1939). In England the consent of the settlor is not required.
619 Note 614 supra.
618 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT
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quently the interest of the beneficiary was alienable by
the express provisions of the statute, and the decision is
sound on its factS. 620
The statutory prohibition on voluntary alienation of
the cestui's interest under a trust for the receipt of the
rents and the profits of land has no express exceptions.
It reads, "No person beneficially interested in a trust
for the receipt of the rents and profits of lands, can assign
or in any manner dispose of such interest." 621 The decision in Bennett v. Chapin 622 makes an exception to the
statute, permitting a cestui que trust, who is entitled
to a conveyance of the trust property in fee upon reaching a stipulated age, to terminate prematurely a trust
for the receipt of the rents and profits of lands. The
New York courts hold that the statutory prohibition on
voluntary alienation does not apply to the interest of a
cestui que trust who was the settlor of the trust. 623 The
Michigan Supreme Court has given some indication that
it may not follow this view.62" Apart from these two
situations, there appears to be no exception to the statutory rule that the cestui of a trust for the receipt of the
rents and profits of land cannot voluntarily alienate his
interest.625
62o Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §19, note 583 supra, corresponding to
R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §63, quoted at note
580 supra.
621 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §19, note 583 supra. But see note 611 supra.
622 Note 611 supra.
623 Newton v. Hunt, 134 App. Div. 325, 119 N.Y.S. 3 (1909), affd.
201 N.Y. 599, 95 N.E. 1134 (1909); see Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N.Y.
316, 50 N.E. 967 (1898.)
62 4 See Hackley v. Littell, 150 Mich. 106 at 116, 113 N.W. 787 (1907).
625 See Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355 at 380, 36 N.W. 419 (1888);
Ward v. Ward, 163 Mich. 570 at 575, 128 N.W. 761 (1910); In re
Allen's Estate, 240 Mich. 661 at 664-665, 216 N.W. 446 (1927) (implying that the cestui's interest is not transmissible by will). But see
Alberts v. Steiner, 237 Mich. 143, 211 N.W. 46 (1926), where the
cestui que trust did not contest the validity of her mortgage and the
mortgagee was allowed to reach the rents and profits. The opinion
does not refer to the statute.
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With regard to involuntary alienation, Chapter 63
of the Revised Statutes of 1846 provides,
"Sec. 13. When a trust is created to receive the
rents and profits of lands, and no valid direction for
accumulation is given, the surplus of such rents and
profits, beyond the sum that may be necessary for the
education and support of the person for whose benefit
the trust is created, shall be liable in equity, to the claims
of creditors of such person, in the same manner as other
personal property which cannot be reached by an execution at law." 626
As was to be expected, this provision was interpreted
to mean that creditors cannot reach the rents and profits
to the extent that they are necessary for the education
and support of the cestui que trust.fl 21 The right of
creditors to reach the surplus was complicated by contradictory provisions of Chapter 90 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 which permitted judgment creditors of a
cestui que trust to reach his interest under the trust,
"except where such trust has been created by, or the
fund so held in trust has proceeded from, some person
other than the defendant." 628 If the provisions of Chapters 63 and 90 are read literally, it would appear that
the interest of a cestui que trust under a trust for the
receipt of the rents and profits of land could not be
reached by his creditors at all if he was not the settlor
Note 583 supra.
Cummings v. Corey, 58 Mich. 494, 25 N.W. 481 (1885). In this
case the life beneficiary, whose interest was in question, was also the
trustee. The trust was created by the will of another.
628 Emphasis supplied. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 90, §§24, 25. Repealed,
Act 184, P.A. 1851. Reenacted, Act 120, P.A. 1855; Comp. Laws (1857)
§§3478, 3479; Comp. Laws (1871) §§5060, 5061; How. Stat. §§6614,
6615; Comp. Laws (1897) §§436, 437. Reenacted, Act 314, P.A. 1915,
c. 6, §4 (6); Comp. Laws (1915) §12302; Comp. Laws (1929) §13944;
Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.545 (b); Comp. Laws (1948) 606.4 (6). These
sections correspond to R.S.N.Y. 1829, part III, c. 1, tit. 2, art. Second,
§§38, 39. See: Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property,"
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.105 (1952).
626
627
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of the trust, and could be reached only as to the surplus
income above his needs for education and support if he
was the settlor.629 Such is not the present judicial interpretation. The courts hold that, if the cestui que trust
was the settlor, Chapter 63 has no application and Chapter 90 has full application, so that the entire income,
not merely the surplus above what is necessary for support and education, may be reached by creditors.630 If
the cestui que trust was not the settlor, Chapter 90 has
no application and Chapter 63 applies, so that the surplus of rents and profits beyond what is necessary for
the support and education of the cestui is accessible in
equity by his creditors.631 Of course, in no case may
his interest be reached by attachment at law.632
F. SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS OF PERSONALTY

The New York statute "Of Uses and Trusts" is Article
Second of Title II of Chapter I of Part II of the Revised
629 This was the result reached by the earlier New York cases. They
are collected in Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §70n (1947).
630 Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N.Y. 316, 50 N.E. 967 (1898); Gilkey v.
Gilkey, 162 Mich. 664, 127 N.W. 715 (1910).
631 Spring v. Randall, 107 Mich. 103, 64 N.W. 1063 (1895). But in
Gilkey v. Gilkey, note 630 supra, it was held that no part of the interest
of the beneficiary under a trust for support from the rents and profits
of land created by another could be reached to satisfy a decree for
alimony. The court made no mention of either statute, saying merely
that payment of alimony was not within the uses to which the trustee
was authorized to apply the income. See notes 570, 573 sup11a as to
the treatment of trusts for support in states where the law has not
been altered by statute. See Sprague v. Moore, 130 Mich. 92, 89
N.W. 712 (1902).
632 Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 358 (1861); Allen v. Merrill, Lynch &
Co., 223 Mich. 467, 194 N.W. 131 (1923). Neither may it be reached
by execution at law, id.; Gorham v. Arnold, 22 Mich. 247 (1871), or
by garnishment, Peninsular Savings Bank v. Union Trust Co., 127 Mich.
355, 86 N.W. 798 (1901). That is, the interest of a cestui que trust
being purely equitable, is accessible to creditors only in equity. Obligations created by the trustee which bind the trust estate would seem,
also, to be enforcible against the trust property only in equity. Feldman v. Preston, 194 Mich. 352, 160 N.W. 655 (1916). See: Packard v.
Kingman, 109 Mich. 497 at 507-508, 67 N.W. 551 (1896).

230

PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS

Statutes of 1829. Title II is entitled, "Of the Nature and
Qualities of Estates in Real Property, and the Alienation
Thereof." Chapter I is entitled, "Of Real Property,
and of the Nature, Qualities and Alienation of Estates
Therein." This gives the impression that the statute was
intended to govern only trusts of freehold estates in land.
N everthe1ess, Article First of Title II contains several
provisions relative to estates for years, which it declares
shall be chattels real, 633 and the revisers' notes make it
clear that they intended the section abolishing trusts
which entitle the cestui que trust to possession ~ to
apply to trusts of estates for years. 635 There seems never
to have been any doubt that the section limiting the
purposes for which trusts might be created did not apply
to trusts of other types of personal property, and New
York decisions rendered as late as 1862 held that the
sections making the interest of the cestui que trust inalienable did not apply to such trusts. 686 Nevertheless,
on the basis of New York statutes governing personal
property, it was settled in 1865 that the interest of the
cestui of a trust for the receipt of income from personal
property was subject to the same inalienability as that
of the cestui of a trust for the receipt of the rents and
profits of land.637
The Michigan statute "Of Uses and Trusts" is part
of Title XIV of the Revised Statutes of 1846, which
bears the same title as Chapter I of Part II of the New
York Revised Statutes of 1829. Michigan never adopted
34

633 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. I, tit. II, art. First, §5. Rev. Stat. 1846,
c. 62, §5, is the same.
634 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c 1, tit. II, art. Second, §47. Rev. Stat.
1846, c. 63, §3, is the same.
~35 3 R.S.N.Y. 584 (ed. 1836).
636 The cases are collected in Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed.,
§69 (1947).
637 Graff v. Bonnett, 31 N.Y. 9 (1865).
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the New York personal property statutes. Consequently
the Michigan statute "Of Uses and Trusts," Chapter 63
of the Revised Statutes of 1846, has no application to
trusts of personal property, other than chattels real,
and they are governed by the English rules of equity, as
modified by judicial decision. 638 Moreover, when the
trust instrument directs the trustee to convert land into
personalty, the doctrine of equitable conversion applies,
and the trust is treated as one of personal property, unaffected by the provisions of Chapters 62 and 63 of the
Revised Statutes of 1846.639
If, then, a trust is of personal property, other than
chattels real, or is treated as such, the normal Anglo638 Ledyard's Appeal, 51 Mich. 623, 17 N.W. 208 (1883); Hopkins v.
Crossley, 132 Mich. 612, 96 N.W. 499 (1903); Moore v. O'Leary, 180
Mich. 261, 146 N.W. 661 (1914).
639 Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649 (1889); Ford v. Ford,
80 Mich. 42, 44 N.W. 1057 (1890) (direction to convert Michigan land
into Missouri land exempted trust from the statutes); Michigan Trust
Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924); Gettins v. Grand
Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930); Floyd v. Smith,
303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942); Van Tyne v. Pratt, 291 Mich.
626, 289 N.W. 275 (1939). These cases involved the question of
whether Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §15, note 591 supra, applied to the
trusts involved, but the same result should be reached as to the application of Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§13, 19, note 583 supra. It was suggested in Thatcher v. Wardens and Vestrymen of St. Andrew's Church
of Ann Arbor, 37 Mich. 264 (1877), that if the terms of a trust give
the trustee power of sale, a trust does not offend Rev. Stat. 1846, c.
62, §15, regardless of duration. It does not follow that such a trust
would cease to be one for receipt of the rents and profits of land and
so free from the prohibition on alienation of the cestui que trust's
interest imposed by Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§13, 19, until the land is
actually sold. The suggestion in the Thatcher case was questioned in
Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355 at 386, 36 N.W. 419 (1888), and later
overruled by a decision that a power of sale for reinvestment does not
exempt a trust of land from the provisions of Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62,
§15. Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. 1100 (1901). See Chapter
20, Section B (3) infra. Of course, if a trust of land is valid and the
trustee actually does sell the land and reinvest in personalty under a
power conferred on him by the terms of the trust, the trust ceases to
be one for receipt of the rents and profits of land and the statutory
prohibition on alienation of the beneficiary's interest imposed by Rev.
Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§13, 19, ceases to operate.
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American rules of equity apply to transfers of the legal
title by the trustee, and the interest of the cestui que
trust is freely alienable and accessible to his creditors
unless the terms of the trust itself validly restrain alienation.640 As has been seen, the "spendthrift trust" doctrine accepted in most American states permits the imposition of a prohibitory restraint on alienation when
the only rights of the cestui que trust are to receive the
income from the trust property during his life or some
shorter period. 641 When the cestui que trust also has
rights in the principal, there is less harmony as to the
validity of such a prohibitory restraint, especially when
it purports to restrain alienation of the interest in the
principal as well as the right to the income.'642
Hackley v. Littell 643 was a proceeding in equity,
brought by the trustee, to set aside assignments of her
interest made by a cestui que trust. In 1887 Mrs. Littell
transferred $50,000 to a trustee, to pay the income to her
during her lifetime and transfer the principal to others
upon her death. The trust instrument provided that
Mrs. Littell could not anticipate, transfer, or assign any
part of the income or principal. In 1901 the trustee
sued Mrs. Littell in equity and in 1902 a decree was
entered declaring that the trust was a valid spendthrift
trust which Mrs .. Littell had no right to terminate and
under which she was entitled only to the income. In
1905 Mrs. Littell made several security assignments of
her interest under the trust and the assignees claimed
the income. A decree determining that the assignments
were "void and of no effect," and directing the trustee
640 Alienability of cestui's interest: Sprague v. Moore, 130 Mich. 92.
89 N.W. 712 (1902).
641 Note 569 supra.
642 Notes 571, 572 supra.
643 150 Mich. 106, 113 N.W. 787 (1907).
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to continue paying the income directly to Mrs. Littell,
was affirmed on the ground the 1902 decree was res
judicata of the spendthrift character of the trust. All
of the justices seemed to assume the validity of spendthrift trusts. One justice dissented on the ground that
spendthrift provisions are ineffective as to the interest
of a cestui que trust who is also the settlor; that is, that
a person may not set up a spendthrift trust for himsel£.644
The majority of the court agreed that, in view of the
provisions of Chapter 90 of the Revised Statutes of
1846,645 "one may not declare a trust in his own property,
reserving a beneficial interest in himself, which interest
shall not be subject to proceedings by a judgment creditor" 646 but questioned whether the settlor of a trust
may not bar his own voluntary alienation of his interest
under it. The form of the litigation suggests a factor
in the spendthrift trust problem which is seldom emphasized, that spendthrift provisions are often inserted in
trust instruments not so much to protect the cestui que
trust against his own folly as to protect the trustee against
the trouble of dealing with the claims of creditors and
assignees.
Rose v. Southern Michigan National Bank 641 was a
proceeding for approval of a compromise brought under
a statute permitting the competent living persons whose
interests will be affected to compromise any good faith
contest of the admission of a will to probate, or any good
644 See note 574 supra; Gilkey v. Gilkey, 162 Mich. 664, 127 N.W.
715 (1910).
645 Note 628 supra.
646 150 Mich. 116, 113 N.W. 791. Accord: Gilkey v. Gilkey, 162
Mich. 664, 127 N.W. 715 (1910).
647255 Mich. 275, 238 N.W. 284 (1931). Accord: Hay v. LeBus, 317
Mich. 698, 27 N.W. (2d) 309 (1947). It is not made certain in the
opinion or the record in the Rose case that there was no land involved,
but the will contained a direction to convert land to personalty. The
Hay case involved a trust of both land and personalty.
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faith controversy as to the construction of a will, subject
to approval of the probate or circuit court. 648 The
statute provided for the appointment of a guardian ad
litem to represent unborn and unascertained persons
with contingent interests. The will involved, which was
contested on the ground of mental incapacity of the
testator, bequeathed personal property to a trustee to
pay the income to the testator's son during his lifetime
and, upon his death, to transfer the property to the
then living lawful heirs of the testator. The will directed
that the son's interest should not be liable for his debts.
The compromise agreement provided that the property
covered by the trust should be turned over to the son,
free of trust. The trustee and the guardian ad litem for
future contingent interests appealed from a decree approving the compromise. The decree was reversed on
the grounds that the trust set up by the will was a
spendthrift trust under which the beneficiary's interest
was inalienable by virtue of Section 19 of Chapter 63,
Revised Statutes of 1846, and that a court of equity has
no power to terminate a spendthrift trust prematurely.
The opinion overlooks the facts that the will imposed
no restraint on voluntary alienation by the son and that
64 8 Act 249, P.A. 1921, Comp. Laws (1929) §§15581 to 15584; reenacted, Act 288, P.A. 1939, c. 2, §§45 to 48; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§27.3178
(115-118); Comp. Laws (1948) §§702.45 to 702.48. Sec. 47 provides,
in part, "such court shall, if such contest or controversy shall appear
to be in good faith and if the effects of such agreement upon the estates
and interests of the persons and interests so represented by any
fiduciary or guardian ad litem and upon any inalienable estate or
interest shall be found to be just and reasonable, make an order approving such agreement. . . ." Emphasis supplied. The underlined
words were in the statute when the compromise involved in the Rose
case was entered into. Compromise agreements modifying trusts without spendthrift provisions have been approved, even when the modification involved acceleration of payments to beneficiaries. Metzner v.
Newman, 224 Mich. 324, 194 N.W. 1008 (1923); Detroit Trust Co. v.
Neubauer, 325 Mich. 319, 38 N.W. (2d) 371 (1949).
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Chapter 63 has no application to trusts of personal property. It also fails to distinguish between an attempt to
terminate prematurely a valid trust and a compromise
agreement made under the statute where there is real
question as to whether the will creating the trust is
valid. If the decision had been based on the unfairness
of the agreement to the unascertained contingent remaindermen, no quarrel could be found with it. It would
also be justified if based on a finding that the will contest was not in good faith but a mere subterfuge for getting rid of the spendthrift trust. 649 The opinion as written seems unsound and leaves the law on the points
involved in an unhappily confused state.
In re Ford's Estate 650 was a proceeding under the
statute involved in the Rose case for approval of a compromise agreement as to the construction of a will. The
will provided that, on the death of the testator's widow,
certain assets should be used to create two trusts, one
for the benefit of each of the testator's sons and the issue
of such son. It authorized the trustees, in their discretion, to pay $100 a month from income to each son and
directed them to pay a third of the corpus of his trust
to each son on reaching 30, a third on reaching 35, and
the balance on reaching 40. Other paragraphs provided,
"Should either or both of my sons at any time or times
develop spendthrift or disorderly habits, my trustees are
authorized and empowered to withhold from such son
any part of the income and any part of the distributable
corpus provided herein directed to be paid to any beneficiary.
"The trustee shall not be permitted nor authorized to
See Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRusTs, 2d ed., §522 (1947).
331 Mich. 220, 49 N.W. (2d) 154 (1951). The trustees had converted the real property in the estate into personalty before the date
of the compromise agreement.
649
65o
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recognize any assignment of interest or principal herein
directed to be paid to any beneficiary."
The testator died in 1942, when his son Milton was
29 and his son Melvin was 27. Milton died in 1944,
after his thirtieth birthday. After Melvin reached 35,
he, Milton's administratrix, guardians for the living children of the two sons, and the widow of the testator,
entered into the compromise agreement, providing for
immediate distribution of the entire corpus of Milton's
trust, one-third to his estate and two-thirds to his child,
immediate distribution of two-thirds of the corpus of
Melvin's trust to him, the payment of the full income
of the balance of Melvin's trust to him, and the distribution of the remaining corpus to him on reaching 40. A
guardian ad litem for interested persons not in being
appealed from a judgment approving the compromise
on the grounds that the will did not authorize any distribution prior to the death of the testator's widow and
that immediate distribution would constitute premature
termination of spendthrift trusts. The judgment was
affirmed on the ground that the trusts were not spendthrift trusts because of the cestuis' interest in principal.
The decision appears to stand for the proposition that,
if the cestui has an interest in the principal, spendthrift
provisions are void, even as to his interest in income.
Roberts v. Michigan Trust Co.651 was a suit to surcharge trustees for breach of trust. Catherine A. Peck
bequeathed personal propertyvalued at about $415,000
to the Michigan Trust Company and Percy S. Peck, upon
trust to pay the income to Percy S. Peck during his lifeest 273 Mich. 91, 262 N.W. 744 (1935). The trust consisted exclusively of personalty at the time it was created. The trustees later
acquired real estate valued at $1,579.68, evidently by foreclosure of a
mortgage and a land contract.
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time, remainder as he should by will appoint or, in
default of appointment, to his issue. The will provided,
"No person beneficially interested in any legacy or
devise given by this will to my said Trustee or Trustees
shall have power to assign, convey, pledge, hypothecate
or anticipate the payment of any sum or delivery of any
property which may at any time be or become due or
payable by way of income or principal, under the terms
of this will; and if any such assignment, conveyance,
pledge, hypothecation or other instrument by way of
anticipation is executed, the same shall be void and of
no effect, and shall not be recognized by my Trustee
or Trustees, and it or they shall have power to withhold
further payment to such person so beneficially interested
in such legacy or devise, until such assignment, conveyance, pledge, hypothecation or other instrument shall
be withdrawn or canceled, in such manner as shall be
satisfactory to my said Trustee or Trustees."
The trustees lent $162,000 of trust funds to Percy S.
Peck, taking as security mortgages on land valued at
about twice that amount which he owned individually.
The children of Percy S. Peck brought this suit in their
father's lifetime, contending that the loans to him were
in violation of the spendthrift clause and impaired their
interests as contingent remaindermen. The court held
that the transactions in question did not violate the
spendthrift clause, which the court treated as valid. The
case is interesting in that it suggests the validity of a
prohibitory restraint on alienation of a beneficiary's
right to receive income for life, even though the beneficiary has a power of disposition of the remainder interest in the principal.652 The particular spendthrift clause
es2 In re Peck Estates, 320 Mich. 692, 32 N.W. (2d) 14 (1948), involved the same trust. Percy S. Peck was adjudicated a bankrupt in
1935 and his interest under the trust assigned to the plaintiff by his
trustee in bankruptcy. The court held no interest under the trust, in
income or principal, passed to the trustee in bankruptcy.
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is also interesting because it contained a provision for
forfeiture on alienation as well as a general prohibition
on alienation. 653
Wyrzykowski v. Budds 654 was a garnishment proceeding against a city to reach instalments of pension due
the principal defendant, a retired city policeman. The
pension fund, comprising employer and employee contributions, was established by the city charter, which provided that pensioners could not assign their rights and
that pension payments due should not be subject to
legal process for the debts of the pensioner. The writ
was served after a check had been drawn in favor of the
principal defendant but before it had been delivered
to him. A judgment quashing the writ was affirmed.
The court thought that the pension payments were gifts
rather than income payable under a trust, but it sustained the validity of the charter provisions by analogy
to like provisions of spendthrift trusts.

It is apparent from the cases that Michigan sustains
the validity of spendthrift trusts of personal property.
The precise limits of the spendthrift trust doctrine in
this state have not yet been set. Whether as a matter
of policy spendthrift trusts should be allowed, that is,
whether prohibitions on alienation of equitable interests
in property should be enforced, is gravely doubtful. As
Dean Griswold has pointed out, the whole spendthrift
trust doctrine in this country has probably grown up
as a result of misunderstanding and confusion.655 Pro653 For an example of a discretionary trust, of the type which is used
in England to serve the purpose of spendthrift trusts, because they
are invalid there, see Boyer v. Backus, 282 Mich. 593, 276 N.W. 564
(1937).
654 324 Mich. 731, 37 N.W. (2d) 686 (1949); accord: Wyrzykowski
v. City of Hamtramck, 324 Mich. 738, 37 N.W. (2d) 689 (1949).
655 SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§25-32 (1947).
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fessor John Chipman Gray's classic work on Restraints
on Alienation 656 is an eloquent attack on the whole doctrine, based on history, logic, and policy. No satisfactory
answer to the arguments against spendthrift trusts advanced in the Preface to the Second Edition of that work
has been made. Even if spendthrift trusts are to be
allowed, there is no adequate reason for the distinctions
which exist in this state between trusts of land and trusts
of personal property. Some arguments can be made in
favor of permitting the settlor of a trust to impose prohibitory restraints on the alienation of the interest of
the cestui que trust. None can be advanced in favor of
the Michigan statutes which make the interest of the
beneficiary of a trust for receipt of the rents and profits
of land inalienable even though the settlor wishes it to
be alienable. Those statutes have caused much confusion. Their application to trusts which involve both
land and personal property raises serious questions. Regardless of the desirability of spendthrift trusts, those
statutes should be repealed.
G. CHARITABLE TRUSTS

As has been seen, although a condition subsequent
in general restraint of alienation in a conveyance of
legal title in fee simple to a private person is always
void,j\57 such a condition in a conveyance of legal title
in fee simple to a charitable or public corporation is
valid. 658 The same problem can arise as to a conveyance
sss (1st ed. 1885); (2d ed. 1895). See note 255 supra and Schnebly,
"Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, §26.100 (1952).
657 Notes 108, 109 supra; Mand1ebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78
(1874), note 138 supra.
658 Note 222 supra; County of Oakland v. Mack, 243 Mich. 279, 220
N.W. 801 (1928), note 223 supra; Trustees of the M. J. Clark Memorial
Home v. Jewell, 240 Mich. 250, 215 N.W. 378 (1927).
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to the trustee of a charitable trust. Michigan refused to
enforce charitable trusts until they were authorized by
statute in 1907.659 A statute enacted in 1925 provides
that when land is conveyed to a charitable use, subject
to such a condition, and it becomes impossible or impracticable to use the land in the manner specified, the circuit court may authorize sale of the land free of the condition of forfeiture. 660 It would seem that such conditions in general restraint of alienation are still valid,
however, and will entitle the grantor to assert a forfeiture upon alienation other than pursuant to the
statute.
H. MORTGAGES AND EXECUTORY LAND CONTRACTS

The Mediaeval Church did not permit Christians to
charge interest on a loan of money 661 or on the unpaid
balance of the purchase price due under a sale on
credit.662 The Law of Moses prohibited Jews charging
interest on loans to Jews 1163 but not on loans to Gentiles.664 As the Jews in England were liquidated or ex659 Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730,
3 N.W. 207 (1879); Wheelock v. American Tract Society, 109 Mich.
141, 66 N.W. 955 (1896); Hopkins v. Crossley, 132 Mich. 612, 96 N.W.
499 (1903); Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155 Mich. 126, 118 N.W. 938 (1908);
McPherson v. Byrne, 155 Mich. 338, US N.W. 985 (1909); Stoepel v.
Satterthwaite, 162 Mich. 457, 127 N.W. 673 (1910); Act 122, P.A.
1907, note 593 supra; Chapter 15 infra.
66o Act 258, P.A. 1925; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13518 to 13521; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §§26.12ll to 26.1214; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.401 to
554.404, quoted in the text at note 224 supra.
661 O'Brien, AN EssAY oN MEDIAEVAL EcoNOMic TEACHING 166-193
(1920). The rule was based on Aristotle's theory of the sterility of
money and upon LuKE, 6:34, 35 (Authorized Version 1611).
ss2 O'Brien, AN EssAY ON MEDIAEVAL EcoNoMIC TEACHING 119 (1920).
Similarly, it was sinful to charge a larger price in a credit sale than in
a cash sale. Id. at 119, 187-189.
663 EXODUS,
22:25; LEVITICUS} 25:36, 37; DEUTERONOMY} 23:19
(Authorized Version 1611).
664 DEUTERONOMY} 23:20 (Authorized Version 1611).
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iled under Edward I and Jews were not permitted in
the country from then until the seventeenth century,
their exemption from the ban was not a factor in the
development of the later mediaeval law. Throughout
the Middle Ages, English law reinforced the prohibition of canon laW.665 Consequently, one in need could
borrow money commercially only by means of a subterfuge. The needy landowner could make an outright
sale of an estate for years; the needy merchant could sell
a share in his business. The doctrine of just price would,
of course, require such sales to be at that price.
Security transactions were permissible, so long as the
lender did not seek interest. One early form was that
of giving the lender a lease for years with a provision
that he should have a fee if the loan was not repaid by
the expiration of the term. 666 A later form was substantially that of the modern mortgage, a conveyance in fee
simple to the lender, subject to a condition subsequent
which entitled the borrower to re-enter upon payment
of the debt, or to a covenant by the lender that he would
reconvey the fee upon payment of the debt. 667 Under
either form of mortgage the lender took possession immediately upon the execution of the mortgage and held
it until the debt was paid in full. He was expected, in
theory, to apply the entire rents and profits in reduction of the debt. In practice, mortgagees must have
contrived to make a surreptitious profit out of their possss LEGES EDw. CoNFEssoRis, c. 37 (1043; re-enacted, 1066; ed. 1840);
Stat. 15 Edw. III, stat. 1, c. 5 (1341), 1 Statutes of the Realm 296;
3 Hen. VII, cc. 5, 6 (1487), 2 Statutes of the Realm 514, 515; 8 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 100-102 (1926).
6661 Coke, INSTITUTES 217a; 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME oF EDWARD I, 25, 117-122 (1895); Turner,
THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION 18 (1931).
667 1 Coke, INsTITUTES 208a-208b; Turner, THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION 18 (1931).
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session of the mortgaged land, or such transactions would
not have been as common as they were. In the condition
type of mortgage in fee, the interest in the land retained
by the mortgagor was a mere right of entry. In the
covenant type his retained interest was a pure chose in
action, a right to sue for specific performance of the covenant. Neither of these interests was alienable,668 and
neither entitled the mortgagor to possession until the
debt was paid in full. If the debt was not paid in full
by the due date, the fee simple title of the mortgagee became absolute, and the mortgagor had nothing.
As commercial activity increased, the Church relaxed
slightly in its attitude toward credit transactions, permitting a lender to receive damages if the debt was not paid
on time, at least if he could show that he suffered loss
due to the default. 669 By the fifteenth century it was
recognized that inability to take advantage of an opportunity for a profitable investment constituted such loss.
As a merchant or trader could always show "loss" of
this type, it became common to make gratuitous loans
for very short periods with a provision for payment of
interest in the form of liquidated damages, to begin on
the nominal due date of the loan.670 In such a transaction neither party expected that the debt would be
paid on the nominal due date. These ecclesiastical relaxations of the prohibition on interest were reflected in
668 1 Coke, INSTITUTES, 210a; Turner, THE EQUITY oF REDEMPTION 19
(1931).
669 O'Brien, AN EssAY oN MEDIAEVAL EcoNOMIC TEACHING 184-187
(1920). If the penalty for default (poena conventionalis) was stated
in the instrument evidencing the debt, the creditor could collect it
without proof of damage; if not, he had the burden of proving injury
(damnum emergens). The loss usually shown was some calamity which
necessitated the creditor himself borrowing money.
67o !d. at 187-193; 8 Holdsworth, HisTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 103
(1926). Compensation for this type of loss was called "lucrum cessans."
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an English statute of 1494.671 Nevertheless, neither the
Mediaeval Church nor the mediaeval law permitted a
loan of money upon interest which was payable from the
date of the loan.
The Protestant Reformation brought a change in attitude. Some of the reformers, notably Calvin and Melancthon, approved of interest at fair rates, and it had
become evident to many that to permit the charging of
interest at regulated rates was better than to drive borrowers to the use of subterfuges which really entailed
greater expense to them. A statute of 1545 permitted
charging up to ten per cent per annum interest on loans,
including those secured by mortgage on land.612 Some
Protestant leaders retained the mediaeval attitude toward interest, however, and the statute was repealed in
1552.678 A statute of 1623 permitted collection of interest at not to exceed eight per cent per annum, 674 and the
charging of interest has been lawful, so far as the secular
government is concerned, since then.
The permission to charge interest made it possible for
a mortgagee to make a reasonable return on his investment without taking possession of the land. In the seventeenth century it became common for the mortgagee to
permit the mortgagor to remain in possession until default. The mortgagor still had no right to possession in
Stat. 11 Hen. VII, c. 8 (1494), 2 Statutes of the Realm 574.
Stat. 37 Hen. VIII, c. 9, §§3, 4 (1545); 8 Holdsworth, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 108-109 (1926).
673 Stat. 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 20 (1552). The statute imposed penalties
of forfeiture of the sum lent, imprisonment, and fine for charging interest. The penalties were removed, where the interest did not exceed
10%, by 13 Eliz. c. 8, §§2, 5, 9 (1570) and 39 Eliz. c. 18, §§12, 33 (1597),
but these statutes did not permit collection of the interest.
674 Stat. 21 Jac. I, c. 17, §2 (1623), made permanent, 3 Car. I, c. 4,
§5 (1627). The rate was reduced to 6% by 12 Car. II, c. 13, §2 (1660),
and to 5% by 12 Anne, stat. 2, c. 16, §1 (1713). All statutory restrictions on charging interest were repealed by 17-18 Viet. c. 90 (1854).
671
s12
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the absence of express agreement. 675 So far as the law
was concerned, the mortgagor in possession was a mere
tenant at will or for years of the mortgagee.676 At common law, if the mortgage debt was not paid on the due
date, the mortgagee became the absolute owner of the
fee. 677
By default in payment on the due date, the mortgagor
was likely to lose his land for an inadequate consideration. In the course of the seventeenth century, the High
Court of Chancery began to grant relief from these forfeitures, considering that interest was adequate compensation to the mortgagee for delayed payment. The
mortgagor who had defaulted in payment and so had
lost all his rights in the land at law was permitted to
sue in equity for redemption. Upon payment of the
debt, with interest, the mortgagee would be compelled
to reconvey the land to the mortgagor. 678 The High
Court of Chancery did not, however, interfere with the
mortgagee's right to possession pending full redemption.679 If the mortgage entitled him to possession from
its date, he retained that right. If it entitled him to take
possession on default, he could still do so, and could
keep possession until redemption. The equity of re675 Turner, THE EQUITY oF REDEMPTION 88-90 (1931); see Christophers v. Sparke, 2 Jac. & W. 223 at 234, 37 Eng. Rep. 612 (1820).
676 Turner, THE EQUITY oF REDEMPTION 91-105 (19lH).
677 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 205a and Butler's Note 96 to Uth ed. (1787).
e1s Turner, THE EQUITY oF REDEMPTION 17-42 (1931); Master and
Fellows of Emanuel College, Cambridge, v. Evans, 1 Chan. Rep. 18,
21 Eng. Rep. 494 (1625). As a necessary corollary to this creation of
an equity of redemption without definite limitation in duration, the
High Court of Chancery developed a correlative remedy for the mortgagee who wanted his money. He could sue for foreclosure of the
equity of redemption, that is, for a decree requiring the debtor to
pay by a fixed date or lose his equity of redemption through sale of
the land to satisfy the debt. How v. Vigures, 1 Chan. Rep. 32, 21
Eng. Rep. 499 (1628).
679 See Marquis Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 Mer. 171, 359, 35
Eng. Rep. 905, 976 (1817).
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demption was only a right of the mortgagor to pay the
debt and recover the land after the due date of the
mortgage.
It will be recalled that, at law, the rights of the mortgagor under the condition for re-entry or covenant for
reconveyance were personal and inalienable.680 In Chancery, however, the equity of redemption became an
equitable estate in land, equivalent in quantity to the
mortgagor's former legal estate. It was as freely alienable 6 s1 and devisable 682 as like legal estates. By the
eighteenth century, Lord Hardwicke could say:

"An equity of redemption has always been considered
as an estate in the land, for it may be devised, granted,
or entailed with remainders, and such entail and remainders may be barred by a fine and recovery, and therefore cannot be considered as a mere right only, but such
an estate whereof there may be a seisin; the. person
therefore intitled to the equity of redemption is considered as the owner of the land, and a mortgage in fee
is considered as personal assets." 683
The High Court of Chancery would not countenance
any provision in a mortgage which would defeat, dog,
or fetter the equity of redemption. In the words of
Lord Northington,
"A mortgagee can never provide at the time of making
the loan for any event or condition on which the equity
of redemption shall be discharged, and the conveyance
absolute. And there is great reason and justice in this
rule, for necessitous men are not truly speaking, free
Note 668 supra.
Notes 683, 686 infra. It was accessible, in equity, to the creditors
of the mortgagor. Cole v. Warden, 1 Vern. 410, 23 Eng. Rep. 550
(1686); Plucknet v. Kirk, 1 Vern. 411, 23 Eng. Rep. 551 (1686).
682 Cooper v. Cooper, Nelson 153, 21 Eng. Rep. 813 (1689).
683 Casborne v. Scarfe, 1 Atk. 603 at 605, 26 Eng. Rep. 377 (1737).
There is similar language in Frederick v. Aynscombe, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr.
594, 22 Eng. Rep. 499 (1667-1744).
680

681
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men, but, to answer a present exigency, will submit to
any terms that the crafty may impose upon them." 684
From these principles it followed that any provision
in a mortgage restricting devolution of the equity of
redemption upon the death of the mortgagor 685 or restraining inter vivos alienation by him,686 is void. Even
a provision giving the mortgagee an option to purchase
the land for a fair price upon default is unenforcible.687
As the mortgagee is the legal owner of the land, his
estate, too, is freely alienable. 688
Most American states now treat the mortgagor as the
legal owner of the land and the interest of the mortgagee
as a mere lien. Where this is so, the validity of restraints
on alienation of the mortgagor's interest is determined
by the rules applicable to legal estates. Where the equity
of redemption remains an equitable estate, the Restatement of Property takes the position that restraints on
its alienation are valid only if a like restraint would be
valid as to an equivalent legal estate.689 Such cases as
6 8 4 Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden. 110 at 113, 28 Eng. Rep. 838 (1762).
Lord Hardwicke stated the rule in similar language in Toomes v.
Conset, 3 Atk. 261, 26 Eng. Rep. 952 (1745), adding, "and the reason
is, because it puts the borrower too much in the power of the lender,
who, being distressed at the time, is too inclinable to submit to any
terms proposed on the part of the lender."
s8s Anonymous, 2 Freeman 84, 22 Eng. Rep. 1073 (1681); Ord v.
Smith, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 600, 22 Eng. Rep. 504 (1725). In the latter
case the mortgagor's heir was allowed to redeem 26 years after default.
The rule was otherwise at law. Littleton, TENURES, §337 (1481).
686 Howard v. Harris, 1 Vern. 190, 23 Eng. Rep. 406 (1683); see
Floyer v. Lavington, 1 P. Wms. 268, 24 Eng. Rep. 384 (1714).
687 Willett v. Winnell, 1 Vern. 488, 23 Eng. Rep. 611 (1687); Jennings v. Ward, 2 Vern. 520, 23 Eng. Rep. 935 (1705); Orby v. Trigg,
9 Mod. 2, 88 Eng. Rep. 276, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 599, 22 Eng. Rep. 503
(1722) (pre-emptive option).
sss Baker v. Kellet, 3 Ch. Rep. 23, 21 Eng. Rep. 717 (1668); Phillips
v. Vaughan, 1 Vern. 336, 23 Eng. Rep. 504 (1685); Williams v. Springfield, 1 Vern. 476, 23 Eng. Rep. 602 (1687).
689 Section 415 (1944).
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there are appear to support this proposition.e90 Therefore, if the equitable estate of the mortgagor is in fee
simple, every prohibition on alienation or condition in
general restraint of its alienation is void.
Before the Statute of U ses,691 legal possessory estates
in land could not be conveyed without a formal livery
of seisin. In equity a bargain and sale, that is, an executed contract of present sale, raised a use in the bargainee. That is to say, although a mere agreement of
present sale and payment of the purchase price did not
transfer the legal title, the vendor stood seised to the
use of the vendee. After the Statute of Uses, this use
became a legal estate.692 In consequence, after the statute
the deed of bargain and sale became a common method
of conveying the legal title to land.
In later centuries the High Court of Chancery, through
the device of granting specific performance of executory
contracts for the sale of land, developed the rights of
the vendee under such a contract by analogy to the old
rights of the bargainee under an executed bargain and
sale. When a contract was entered into, binding the
vendee to pay the purchase price in the future and the
vendor to convey upon receipt of the price, the vendee
became the owner in equity and the vendor a sort of
trustee of the legal title. Lord Hardwicke stated the
basis of the doctrine in these words:
"that which is contracted for valuable consideration to
be done, will by the court be considered as done; all the
consequences arising as if it had been so, and as if a
e9o Goddard, "Non-Assignment Provisions in Land Contracts," 31
MICH. L. REV. 1 at 6-8 (1932); Campau v. Chene, 1 Mich. 400 (1850),
note 136 supra.
691 Stat. 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535).
692 Tyrrel's Case, 2 Dyer 155a, 73 Eng. Rep. 336 (1557).
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conveyance had been made of the land at the time to
the vendee." 698
In holding that the vendee bears the risk of loss by
fire, Lord Eldon said,
"for if the party by the contract has become in equity
the owner of the premises, they are his to all intents
and purposes. They are vendible as his, chargeable as
his, capable of being incumbered as his; they may be devised as his; they may be assets; and they would descend
to his heirs." 694
As these statements indicate, the rights of the vendee
under an executory contract for sale of land are not a
mere chose in action, they are an equitable estate in the
land of the same duration as the legal estate contracted
for. This being so, the equitable estate of the vendee is
freely alienable and his transferee is entitled to specific performance of the contract against the vendor.695
As Lord Eldon put it,
"Being, as I say they were, the owners of the estate
in equity, they had a right, .... to sell such right, title,
and interest as they had. . . . It is extremely clear that
an equitable interest under a contract of purchase, may
be the subject of sale." 696
It will be apparent that, as developed by the High
Court of Chancery, the rights of a vendee under an
693 Attorney-General v. Day, 1 Ves. Sr. 218 at 220, 27 Eng. Rep. 992
(1748).
694 Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. Jr. 349 at 352, 31 Eng. Ree. 1088 (1801).
See Capel v. Girdler, 9 Ves. Jr. 509, 32 Eng. Rep. 700 (1804).
695 Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. Jr. 265, 32 Eng. Rep. 108 (1802); Wood v.
Griffith, 1 Swans. 43, 36 Eng. Rep. 291 (1818); Nelthorpe v. Holgate,
1 Coli. 203, 63 Eng. Rep. 384 (1844); see Dyer v. Pulteney, Barn. C.
160, 27 Eng. Rep. 596 (1740); Anonymous v. Walford, 4 Russ. 372, 38
Eng. Rep. 845 (1828).
696 Wood v. Griffith, note 695 supra, at 1 Swans. 53, 55-56, 36 Eng.
Rep. 295 (1818). The vendor's interest is also alienable. Turner v.
Wright, 4 Beav. 40, 49 Eng. Rep. 252 (1841); Hadley v. The London
Bank of Scotland, Ltd., 3 De G., J. & S. 63, 46 Eng. Rep. 562 (1865).
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executory contract for the sale of land were virtually
identical with those of a mortgagor under the type of
mortgage which was, in form, an absolute conveyance
in fee to a mortgagee who covenanted to reconvey upon
payment of the debt secured. In each case the legal title
was held as security for a debt and subject to a covenant
to convey upon payment. In each case the beneficiary
of the covenant was entitled to specific performance of
it upon payment and, pending payment, was treated as
~quitable owner of the land, with full power of alienadon inter vivos and by will. In each case the equitable
owner was not entitled to possession prior to payment
in full unless the terms of the transaction gave him such
a right, and, if they did, his possession was merely that
of a tenant for years or at will, subject to the restrictions
which apply to such tenancies. In each case equity
deemed time not to be of the essence and would compel conveyance even though the payment was not made
on time.~97 The one difference between them was that
whereas, in the case of a mortgage, the High Court of
Chancery would never give effect to any provision which
tended to make time of the essence and so shorten or cut
off the equity of redemption, in the case of the executory
land contract, time could be made of the essence by
express stipulation.698 Inasmuch as the typical English
executory land contract contemplated a cash sale, so that
cutting off the vendee's right to performance upon default in payment deprived him only of the bargain and,
perhaps, a small deposit, whereas cutting off an equity
of redemption meant allowing the mortgagee to have
the land for an inadequate price, this difference is
understandable and appropriate.
Seton v. Slade, note 695 supra.
698Jbid.

697
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The early Michigan cases treat the mortgage as it was
treated in England. The mortgagee was entitled to take
possession of the land upon default and to keep it until
the mortgagor redeemed, without bringing foreclosure
proceedings, and equity would not interfere with the
mortgagee's doing so. 699 The mortgagee could maintain
an action of ejectment immediately upon default, without foreclosing/ 00 A statute of 1843 changed the situation as to mortgages of land by providing,
"That no action of ejectment shall hereafter he maintained by a mortgagee or his assigns or representatives,
for the recovery of the mortgaged premises, until after a
foreclosure of the mortgage, and the time for redemption thereof shall have expired." 701
The Michigan Supreme Court has given the statute a
very broad interpretation, holding that it prevents the
mortgagee from taking possession by self-help 70·2 and
that it invalidates every provision in a mortgage which
would give the mortgagee a right to possession or the
rents and profits before foreclosure and the expiration
699 Stevens v. Brown, Walk. Ch. 41 (Mich. 1842); see Stout v. Keyes,
2 Dougl. 184 (Mich. 1845).
1oo Mundy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 68 (1848), holding Act. 62, P.A.
1843, unconstitutional insofar as it puported to deprive mortgagees
under mortgages executed before its effective date of this right. As to
chattel mortgages the old rule still prevails: the mortgagee may bring
replevin immediately upon default. Tannahill v. Tuttle, 3 Mich. 104
(1854). See: Daggett, Bassett & Hills Co. v. McClintock, 56 Mich. 51,
22 N.W. 105 (1885); Woods v. Gaar, Scott & Co., 93 Mich. 143, 53
N. W. 14 (1892).
101 Act 62, P.A. 1843; superseded by Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 108,
§61, Comp. Laws (1857) §4614; Comp. Laws (1871) §6263; How. Stat.
§7847; Comp. Laws (1897) §11006; re·enacted, Act 314, P.A. 1915, c.
29, §54, Comp. Laws (1915) §13221; Comp. Laws (1929) §14956; Mich.
Stat. Ann. §27.1967; Comp. Laws (1948) §629.54, which provides, "No
action of ejectment shall hereafter be maintained by a mortgagee, or
his assigns or representatives, for the recovery of the mortgaged
premises, until the title thereto shall have become absolute upon the
foreclosure of the mortgage."
102 Baker v. Pierson, 5 Mich. 456
(1858); Newton v. McKay, M
Mich. 380 (1874); Albright v. Cobb, 34 Mich. 316 (1876).
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of the period of redemption allowed therein.
Michigan has adopted the view that the mortgagor's interest
is a legal estate and that of the mortgagee a mere lien. 704
Michigan follows the English rule that the vendee
under an executory contract for the sale of land
is the equitable owner of the land. 705 A land contract
does not necessarily entitle the vendee to possession, and
the act of 1843 has no application to land contracts.
Therefore, a provision in a land contract which authorizes the vendor to take possession on default is
valid. 706 In consequence of these differences between
703

1oa Hazeltine v. Granger, 44 Mich. 503, 7 N.W. 74 (1880); Nusbaum
v. Shapero, 249 Mich. 252, 228 N.W. 785 (1930); Equitable Trust
Co. v. Milton Realty Co., 261 Mich. 571, 246 N.W. 500 {1933); Bankers
Trust Co. of Detroit v. Russell, 261 Mich. 579, 246 N.W. 504 (1933);
American Trust Co. v. Michigan Trust Co., 263 Mich. 337, 248 N.W.
829 (1933); Equitable Trust Co. v. Wetsman, 264 Mich. 26, 242 N.W.
480 (1933); Lambrecht v. Lee, 264 Mich. 56, 249 N.W. 490 (1933);
Detroit Trust Co. v. Lipsitz, 264 Mich. 404, 249 N.W. 892 (1933);
Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Witt, 264 Mich. 536, 250 N.W. 301
(1933); Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Commercial Realty Co., 265
Mich. 604, 251 N.W. 786 (1933); but see Michigan Trust Co. v.
Lansing Lumber Co., 103 Mich. 392, 61 N.W. 668 (1894); Kelly v.
Bowerman, 113 Mich. 446, 71 N.W. 836 (1897); First National Bank
of Ionia v. Gillam, 123 Mich. 112, 81 N.W. 979 (1900). Cf. Hogsett v.
Ellis, 17 Mich. 351 (1868); Wagar v. Stone, 36 Mich. 364 (1877);
Beecher v. Marquette & Pacific Rolling Mill Co., 40 Mich. 307 (1879);
Fifth National Bank v. Pierce, 117 Mich. 376, 75 N.W. 1058 (1898);
Straus v. Barbee, 262 Mich. 113, 247 N.W. 125 (1933); Bennos v. Waderlow, 291 Mich. 595, 289 N.W. 267 (1939); Lendzion v. Senstock, 300
Mich. 346, I N.W. (2d) 567 (1942). The rule has been modified by a
statute which permits a trust mortgage to contain an assignment of
rents and profits. Act 228, P.A. 1925, Comp. Laws (1929) §§13498 to
13499; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.1131, 26.1132; Comp. Laws (1948)
§§554.211, 554.212. There are numerous cases construing the statute.
704 Dougherty v. Randall, 3 Mich. 581 (1855); Caruthers v. Humphrey, 12 Mich. 270 (1864); See Gorham v. Arnold, 22 Mich. 247 at
250 (1871). Accord as to chattel mortgage: Randall v. Higbee, 37 Mich.
40 (1877). But as to the alienability of the interest of a chattel
mortgagor, see note 455 supra.
1os Bowen v. Lansing, 129 Mich. 117, 88 N.W. 384 (1901).
70 6 Belding v. Meloche, II3 Mich. 223, 71 N.W. 592 (1897); Smith
v. Sherman, 265 Mich. 590, 251 N.W. 920 (1933); see Lendzion v.
Senstock, 300 Mich. 346, 1 N.W. (2d) 567 (1942). Cf. Batty v. Snook,
19 Mich. 231 (1858).
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the mortgage and the land contract, it is common in
Michigan to effect credit sales of land by means of executory land contracts instead of by conveyance to the vendee with purchase money mortgage back to the vendor.
There is no doubt that the interest of the vendee under
such a contract is alienable by assignment, subcontract,
or conveyance in the absence of valid restraints on
alienation imposed in the contract. 707 The extent to
which such restraints are effective is not so clear.
Waiver of provisions in land contracts which required
assignments by the vendee to be made in a particular
manner or only with the consent of the vendor has been
found in a number of cases, without definite decision as
to the validity of the provisions. 708
Welling v. Strickland 709 was a suit by the original
vendee for specific performance of a land contract. The
contract provided that the vendee should not assign the
contract or sublet the farm or any part thereof without
the written consent of the vendor, and that any breach
would work an immediate forfeiture. The vendee sublet
most of the farm without permission and defaulted in
payments. The vendor took possession and notified the
vendee that the contract was forfeited. Specific performance was denied, the opinion suggesting that the
subletting alone was enough to work a forfeiture.
101 Brin v. Michalski, 188 Mich. 400, 154 N.W. 110 (1915); Range v.
Davison, 242 Mich. 73, 218 N.W. 789 (1928). See: Wing v. McDowell,
Walk. Ch. 175 (Mich. 1843) (mortgage).
708 Peters v. Canfield, 74 Mich. 498, 42 N.W. 125 (1889); 'Maday v.
Roth, 160 Mich. 289, 125 N.W. 13 (1910); Henze v. Saunders, 215
Mich. 646, 184 N.W. 443 (1921); Distasio v. Gervasio, 234 Mich. 482,
208 N.W. 440 (1926); Mueller v. Bankers Trust Co. of Muskegon,
262 Mich. 53, 247 N.W. 103 (1933); Whitley v. Tessman, 324 Mich. 215,
36 N.W. (2d) 724 (1949). Cf. Rathbun v. Herche, 323 Mich. 160, 35
N.W. (2d) 230 (1948).
1o9 161 Mich. 235, 126 N.W. 471 (1910).
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Rodenhouse v. De Golia 710 was a suit to rescind an
assignment of a land contract. In 1908 Langereis sold
on land contract to Thomas. In August, 1913, Thomas
sold to Vreeland by a subcontract providing that the
vendee might not assign, transfer, lease, or sublet without the consent of the subvendor and for forfeiture on
breach. Thomas later assigned the subvendor's interest
under the subcontract to Langereis, the original vendor.
In 1915 Vreeland assigned the subvendee's interest under
the subcontract to De Golia, and the latter assigned it
to Rodenhouse. These assignments were made without
the consent of Langereis, and he refused to recognize
them. Rodenhouse then sued De Golia to rescind the
assignment to him. A decree granting rescission was
affirmed.
Cutler v. Lovinger 711 was a suit for specific performance of a subcontract for sale of land. Milligan sold
the land to the defendants by a contract providing that
they could not assign their interest without the consent
of the vendor. The defendants, without Milligan's consent, contracted to assign their interest to the plaintiff.
The defendants refused to perform on the ground Milligan would not consent. Milligan testified that he was
willing to convey to the defendants upon payment of
the balance due him. A decree for the plaintiff was
affirmed, the court saying that the defendants could bind
themselves by a contract to assign their interest even if
an assignment would not be effective against Milligan.
This seems obvious. One who owns no interest in land
at all may bind himself by a contract to convey it. The
decision demonstrates that a provision against assignment in a land contract will not be enforced as a prohibino 198 Mich. 402, 164 N.W. 488 (1917).
m 212 Mich. 272, 180 N.W. 462 (1920).
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tion on alienation in the sense that an attempt by the
vendee to alienate imposes no obligation upon him whatever.
Hull v. Hostettler 712 was a suit for specific performance of a contract for exchange of lands. The defendants
were to assign their interest as vendees under a land contract which contained a covenant against assignment
without the consent of the vendor but no provision for
forfeiture on breach. The defendants executed such an
assignment but refused to complete the rest of the exchange. Their vendors intervened to assert a forfeiture
of the contract for assignment without consent. A decree granting specific performance was affirmed, the
court holding that such a provision against assignment
does not prevent assignment and does not give a right
of forfeiture on breach in the absence of specific provision therefor. The court implied that the vendors'
remedy, if any, was by action for breach of covenant.
This is a clear decision that a provision against assignment in a land contract will not be enforced as a prohibition on alienation. If valid at all, it can only be as a
penalty restraint.
Porter v. Barrett 713 was a summary proceeding for possession of land. The plaintiffs sold land to Parent by a
contract which provided, "This land is sold upon express
condition that the ... same shall never be sold or rented
to a colored person." Parent assigned to Barrett with
the consent of the vendors. Barrett, by separate executory contract, sold the land to Robinson, a colored person. The plaintiffs asserted a forfeiture for breach of
the condition. A judgment for the defendants on pro712
713

158.

224 Mich. 365, 194 N.W. 996 (1923).
233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925). Also discussed above at note

EQUITABLE INTERESTS

255

cedural grounds was affirmed on the ground the condition was void as an illegal restraint on alienation of an
estate in fee simple.
William F. Nance Realty Co. v. Wood-Wardowski
Co.m was a suit to set aside foreclosure of a land contract and for specific performance. The defendants solcl
land to Nance by a contract which provided,
"no assignment or conveyance by the purchaser shall
create any liability whatsoever against the seller until
a duplicate thereof duly witnessed and acknowledged,
together with the residence address of such assignee,
shall be delivered to the seller and receipt thereof indorsed hereon."
Nance quit-claimed his interest to the plaintiff corporation, of which he was president, without compliance
with the quoted provision. There having been default
in payments, the defendant instituted summary proceedings against Nance and secured a judgment of restitution. The amounts due were not paid within the
grace period allowed by the statute authorizing such proceedings. ns A decree dismissing the bill was affirmed.
The decision does not enforce a forfeiture for violation
of the provision against assignment; it merely holds that
the plaintiff was not entitled to equitable relief from
forfeiture for default in payments.
Sloman v. Cutler 716 was an action of assumpsit for
payments due under a land contract. The plaintiffs,
114

242 Mich. 110, 218 N.W. 680 (1928).

m Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 30, §25, as amended by Act 243, P.A. 1917;

Comp. Laws (1915) §13253; amended, Act 373, P.A. 1927; Comp. Laws
(1929) §14988; amended, Act 122, P.A. 1933; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.1999;
Comp. Laws (1948) §630.25. The grace period was 30 days when this
case was decided. It was increased to 90 days by the 1933 amendment.
na 258 Mich. 372, 242 N.W. 735 (1932). Accord: Zeidler v. Burlingame, 260 Mich. 596, 245 N.W. 527 (1932); Windmill Point Land
Co. v. Jackson, 269 Mich. 50, 256 N.W. 619 (1934).
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husband and wife, sold land of the husband by a contract providing that the vendee might not assign without the consent of the vendors and for forfeiture on
breach. The vendee assigned his interest to the defendant who, in consideration of the plaintiff husband's
consent to the assignment, assumed performance of the
vendee's obligations. The defendant contended that the
provision against assignment was a void restraint on
alienation, and, therefore, that the consent to assignment was not consideration for his undertaking. A judgment for the defendant was reversed, the court holding
that such a restraint on assignment is valid while the
contract remains executory as a protection to the vendor's security interest.
Jankowski v. Jankowski 111 was a suit to restrain summary proceedings for possession of land. The defendants
sold land to the plaintiffs Jankowski by a contract which
provided that the vendees should not assign or convey
their interest or any part thereof without the consent
of the vendors and for forfeiture on breach. The plaintiffs Jankowski, without the consent of the vendors, sold
their interest by subcontract to the plaintiffs De Courval and later assigned the head contract to the De Courvals. The vendors declared a forfeiture for breach of
the nonassignment clause and commenced the summary
proceedings in question. A decree granting specific performance to the plaintiffs De Courval was affirmed. The
court repeated the statement made in the opinion in
Sloman v. Cutler that restrictions on assignment in a
land contract are valid while the contract remains executory, "for the reason that the seller has a right to
see that the property is kept in the hands of a responm 311 Mich. 340, 18 N.W. (2d) 848 (1945).
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sible person," 718 hut held that equitable relief from forfeiture under the facts of the case was appropriate.
The opinion in Sloman v. Cutler is the most extended
discussion which the Michigan Supreme Court has made
of the validity of provisions in land contracts restraining
assignment. It was based on an amicus curiae brief prepared by Professor Edwin C. Goddard of the University
of Michigan Law School, who later published his view
that such provisions are valid. 719 His argument is by
analogy to the lease for years, pointing out that the land
contract vendor has an interest similar to that of the
lessor in preventing waste. Professor Goddard was careful to observe, however, that "most cases hold that when
the assignee tenders to the vendor full performance of
the contract the vendor can no longer object," 720 which
points to the fact that the vendee under a long-term
executory land contract, like the mortgagor under the
English decisions, has two distinct interests. One interest is purely legal. It includes his right at common law
to have possession pending full payment, which is merely a legal estate for years, and his right to sue the vendor
at law for damages for breach of contract. This legal
interest may properly be made subject to strict forfeiture
on alienation. The other interest, the right to specific
performance in equity of the vendor's covenant to convey in fee upon full payment, is an equitable fee simple,
!d. at 344.
"Non-Assignment Provisions in Land Contracts," 31 MICH. L.
R.Ev. 1-15 (1932). See Grismore, "Effect of a Restriction on Assignment
in a Contract," 31 MICH. L. REv. 299 at 316-319 (1933). Cf. Cornelius,
LAw oF LAND CoNTRACTS §§172, 173 (1922). Mr. Cornelius expresses
understanding of the harshness and inequity of strict enforcement of
such provisions. It is not solely a problem of logic but of the lives and
life savings of people of modest means.
12o 31 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1 at 13 (1932).
11s

719
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alienation of which should not be subject to restraint by
any condition or penalty whatever. 721
An example will demonstrate the inequity of permitting forfeiture of the equitable fee. A professional man
purchases a home on executory land contract for a total
price of $20,000, payable in instalments. When he has
paid $19,000, his health fails and he is unable to pay the
balance. He assigns his interest to another who immediately tenders payment of the full balance. To allow
the vendor to forfeit the contract, take back the house,
and keep the $19,000, would be grossly unfair. If he
has such rights he is likely to exact a heavy pecuniary
mulct for his consent to assignment; in effect, to get a
larger price than that for which he agreed to sell. It
was to prevent just such exactions that the statute Quia
Emptores T errarum 722 was enacted.
The decision in Jankowski v. Jankowski indicates that
the Michigan Supreme Court appreciates the problem
and has not forgotten its great decision in Mandlebaum
v. McDonell. 723 Nevertheless, the field of equitable relief against forfeiture of land contracts will require much
extension and development before the land contract
purchaser attains the degree of protection against oppression which courts of equity have afforded the mortgagor since the seventeenth century.
This is substantially the position taken by the
§416 and comment e.
m 18 Edw. I, stat. 1 (1290); notes 6, 104 supra.
12a 29 Mich. 78 (1874), note 1lJ8 supra.
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PART TWO
THE COMMON-LAW RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES

CHAPTER
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Source, Nature and Local Reception
A. THE ENGLISH BACKGROUND

VERY mature system of law which recognizes private property and permits its alienation has to
contend with the man of property who seeks to
found and endow a family by tying up his wealth so
that his descendants will enjoy it in perpetuity without
being able to dissipate it. If he is permitted to do so,
the property involved is perpetually withdrawn from
commerce and thus is unavailable for purchase by persons who could make better use of it than the descendants of the founder. Those descendants cannot mortgage or sell the property to meet urgent current needs
and may be unable to use the property to their own
best advantage because they cannot finance improvements by mortgage or by sale of a part. They are discouraged from making even those improvements which
they can finance by their inability to sell or control
more than a life interest in the property. 1 Moreover,
the general existence of such perpetuities tends towat:d
the concentration of the bulk of the community's wealth
in a few families who constitute a hereditary aristocracy
of wealth without obligation, and frequently without the
motive or ability, to use it productively, with the consequent reduction of the rest of the population to a

E

1 Scrutton, LAND IN FETTERS, (1886) is an eloquent exposition of the
evils of such fetters. See also PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Div. IV, Part I,
Introductory Note (1944).
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state of poverty and dependence. These disadvantages
have led most systems of law to place some limitations
on the creation of "perpetuities" or upon the duration
of the restraints on alienation which they involve. 2
Part One of this work describes the attempts of English landowners to create perpetuities by two methods,
the entail and the direct restraint ori alienation. After
1613 the entail could not be used to create a perpetuity
because any tenant in tail could convey a fee simple by
suffering a common recovery, and his power to do so
could not be restricted by any prohibition, condition,
or limitation. 3 A perpetual prohibition on alienation of
a fee simple would tend to create a perpetuity worse than
an unbarrable entail because no tenant could convey
even an estate for his own life. As has been seen, such
prohibitions were void after the enactment of the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum. 4 The common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities, which is the subject of Part Two,
was developed by the English courts to restrict the creation of perpetuities by a third method, the remote future
interest.
2 Butler's Note 77, V (7) to I Coke, INSTITUTES, 13th ed., 19la (1787);
Strickland v. Strickland, [1908] A.C. 551. In English legal usage, the
term "perpetuity" originally meant an unbarrable entail. The meaning was later extended to include the perpetual freehold, as to which
see note 13, infra. In modern legal writing the term usually refers to
a future interest the vesting of which is postponed to some remote
time. Sweet, "Perpetuities," 15 L.Q.R. 71-85 (1899). The word has
sometimes been used to describe a perpetual estate conveyed to an
ecclesiastical corporation and a perpetually indestructible trust. All
of these uses of the word involve situations in which the title to
property is tied up in such a manner as to impede alienation for an
extended period.
a Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, Mich., pl. 25 (1472), Part One,
note 67 supra; Partington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 7? Eng. Rep. 976
(1613), Part One, note 76 supra.
4 Statute of Westminster III, 18 Edw. I, stat. I
(1290); Chapter 3
supra.
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The sole freehold future estate known to the common
law was the remainder. 5 A remainder could be created
only incident to the conveyance to a definite living person of a present possessory estate for life or in tail and
so as to become possessory immediately upon the expiration of the preceding "particular" estate. Andrew Baker
could not convey land to John Stiles effective after ten
years or upon the death of Andrew.6 He could convey
land to James Thorpe for life or in tail, remainder to
John Stiles. A remainder could not be limited upon a
fee simple. Andrew Baker could not convey to James
Thorpe and his heirs, remainder to John Stiles and his
heirs. 7 A remainder could not be so limited as to cut off a
5 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §918 (1915). The common law recognized another type of freehold estate which was expectant as to possession, the reversion. Part One, note 356 supra. The
reversion was looked upon, however, not as a future estate but as the
unconveyed residue of a present estate. I Coke, INSTITUTES 22b (1628);
3 Sheppard, ABRIDGMENT 220 (1675). As tenure existed between the
reversioner and the tenant of the particular estate, a reversion was a
present seigniory. Note, R.S.Y.B. 22 Edw. I, p. 641 (1294); 2 Coke,
INsTITUTES 504 (1641). In any event a reversion cannot offend the
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities because it is always deemed
vested, even though expectant upon a particular estate in tail, for life
or for years on special limitation. 2 Cruise, REAL PROPERTY, 1st Am.
ed., 457 (1808); Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§113-113b,
205, 283 (1915); 1 Simes, LAW OF FuTURE INTERESTS, §47 (1936);
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §370, Comment e. (1944). It will be recalled
that the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum forbade the retention of a
reversion on a conveyance in fee simple. 2 Cruise Id. 455; Part One,
note 354 supra.
6 Hogg v. Cross, Cro. Eliz. 254, 78 Eng. Rep. 510 (1591); Barwick's
Case, 5 Co. Rep. 93b, 77 Eng. Rep. 199 (1598).
7 Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's Case, Dyer 33a, 73 Eng. Rep. 73
(1536); 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 18a (1628); 2 Sheppard, ABRIDGMENT 43,
3 id. 221, 226 (1675). See: Anonymous, Dyer 3b at 4a, 73 Eng. Rep. 8
at 9 (1527); Willion v. Berkley, I Plowden 223 at 248, 75 Eng. Rep.
339 at 379 (1559); Wellock and Hammon's Case, 2 Leon. 114, 74 Eng.
Rep. 403-404 (1589); Edward Seymour's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 95b at 97b,
77 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1612); Pills v. Brown, Palm. 131 at 138, 81 Eng.
Rep. 1012 at 1016 (1620); Pell and Browne's Case, 2 Roll. Rep. 216 at
220, 81 Eng. Rep. 760 at 763 (1620). But see: Gardner v. Sheldon,
Vaughan 259 at 269, 124 Eng. Rep. 1064 at 1069 (1670). A remainder
on a fee simple would not necessarily cut off the preceding estate prior
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preceding estate prior to its normal expiration. Andrew
Baker could not convey land to Lucy Baker for life but
if Lucy remarry, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs. 8
The mediaeval law would not permit a "gap in seisin"
during which there would be no possessory freehold
tenant responsible for the feudal duties owed by the
land to its overlord. Hence a remainder could not be
so limited as to take effect in possession at some time
subsequent to the expiration of the preceding estate.
Andrew Baker could not convey to James Thorpe for
life, remainder two years after the death of James to
John Stiles and his heirs.9
By 1550 it was settled that a remainder could be contingent, that is, subject to a condition precedent which
might not occur at or before the expiration of the preceding particular estate?0 Because of the rule against
to its normal expiration because the fee simple might be on special
limitation (e.g. to John Stiles and his heirs so long as London Bridge
shall stand), and even a fee simple absolute may expire upon extinction of heirs, in which case there is an escheat.
s Corbet's Case, I Co. Rep. 83b at 86b, 76 Eng. Rep. 187 at 195
(1600); 3 Sheppard, ABRIDGMENT 223 (I675). See Coithirst v. Bejushin,
I Plowden 2Ia at 25a, 75 Eng. Rep. 33 at 39 (I550). This is a corollary of the rule that only the grantor or his heirs may take advantage
of a condition subsequent. I Coke, INsTITUTES 2l4a (I628); Sheppard,
ToucHSTONE OF CoMMON AssuRANCES I49 (I648). But a remainder
may follow a particular estate on special limitation (e.g. to Lucy
Baker during widowhood, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs). 1
Coke, INSTITUTES 214b (1628).
s See Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 120a at I30a, 76 Eng. Rep. 270
at 296 (I595); Archer's Case, I Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng. Rep. 146 at
I5I-I57 (1597); Boraston's Case, 3 Co. Rep. I9a at 2Ia, 76 Eng. Rep.
668 at 674 (I587). This rule led the courts to decide that where land
was limited to a man for life, remainder to his son, a posthumous son
could not take because of the gap in seisin between his father's death
and his birth. The House of Lords held, however, that a posthumous
son could take in remainder under a will. [Reeve v. Long, I Salk. 227,
91 Eng. Rep. 202 (1694)] and Stat. IO & 11 Gul. III, c. 16 (I699) provided that he could do so under an inter vivos conveyance.
10 Colthirst v. Bejushin, I Plow. Comm. 21, 75 Eng. Rep. 33 (1550). A
contingent remainder required a preceding freehold estate to support
it; an estate for years would not do. Butler v. Bray, 2 Dyer 189b,
73 Eng. Rep. 4I8 (1560); Goodright v. Cornish, I Salk. 226, 91 Eng.
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gaps in seisin, however, such a remainder could never
take effect unless the condition precedent actually did
occur at or before the termination of the preceding
estate. For example, a remainder to a person not in
being was subject to the condition precedent of the remainderman coming into being and could not take
effect if he failed to do so at or before the expiration of
the preceding estate. If Andrew Baker conveyed to
James Thorpe for life, remainder to the eldest son of
John Stiles, and James died before John had a son, the
contingent remainder could never become effective, even
though John later did have a son.u Moreover, this rule
operated to destroy a contingent remainder if the preceding particular estate was extinguished or prematurely
terminated before the remainder vested, that is, the
condition precedent occurred. This happened if the
tenant of the particular estate, whether for life or in
tail, suffered a common recovery in fee simple, and in
several other situations.12 If· Andrew Baker conveyed
to John Stiles for life or in tail, remainder to the eldest
son of John, John could destroy the contingent reRep. 200 (1694). A vested remainder on a term of years (e.g. Andrew
Baker to James Thorpe for ten years, remainder to John Stiles and
his heirs) was valid not as a remainder but as a present estate subject
to a eossessory term. Boraston's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 19a, 76 Eng. Rep.
668 (1587).
11 Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng. Rep. 146 (1597).
12 Idem.; Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 102, 79 Eng. Rep. 691 (1628);
Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Wms. Saund. 380, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (1671);
Pigott, CoMMON REcoVERIES, 2d ed., 125 (1770); 1 Fearne, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS, 5th ed., •465-469 (1795). Any act by which the
life tenant's estate was destroyed or turned into a mere right of action
had this effect. There was destruction by forfeiture if the life tenant
was convicted of treason or felony or made a feoffment or levied a fine
in fee, and destruction by merger if he acquired the reversion or remainder following the contingent remainder. The life tenant's estate
was turned into a mere right of action if he was disseized and the disseisor died.
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mainder by suffering a common recovery before he had
a son.
Before the destructibility of contingent remainders was
settled, attempts were made to create perpetuities by
means of the "perpetual freehold" or endless series of life
estates. Andrew Baker might convey land to John Stiles
for life, remainder to the eldest son of John for life, remainder to the eldest son of John's eldest son for life and
so on, ad infinitum. If such attempts had succeeded in
their purpose, the alienability of the fee simple would
have been restrained forever; none of the successive
tenants for life could have conveyed more than his life
estate. They did not succeed. The courts held not
merely that such contingent remainders were destructible but that those after the first were void ab initio;
that a remainder could not be limited to the unborn
child of an unborn life remainderman. 18 The rule so
established, sometimes called the Old Rule Against Perpetuities, meant practically that remainders following
life estates in family settlements must become possessory
within lives in being plus a period of gestation.
1s Haddon's Case, cited in Perrot's Case, Moore 368 at 372, 72 Eng
Rep. 634 at 637 (1594); Whitby v. Mitchell, L.R. 44 Ch. Div. 85
(1890); 1 Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 251, 565 (Butler's
Note) (1844). See Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 120a at 138a, 76 Eng.
Rep. 270 at 320 (1595); Sir Hugh Cholmley's Case, 2 Co. Rep. 50a
at 51b, 76 Eng. Rep. 527 at 530 (1597); Duke of Marlborough v. Earl
Godolphin, 1 Eden 404 at 415, 28 Eng. Rep. 741 at 745 (1759). But
see: Manning and Andrews Case, 1 Leon. 256, 74 Eng. Rep. 234
(1576). The rule was applied to an equitable contingent remainder
in In re Nash [1910] 1 Ch. 1. This rule, known variously as the Old
Rule Against Perpetuities, the Rule Against Double Possibilities, and
the Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, has been a subject of controversy between legal scholars, who disagree as to whether it was superseded by
the modern Rule Against Perpetuities. 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE
INTERESTS. §486 (1936); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities V,"
25 IowA L. REv. 1, 16-22 (1939). In any event it has been abolished
by statute in England [15 Geo. V, c. 20, §161 (1925)] and has not
been applied in this country.
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In the latter half of the seventeenth century, conveyancers perfected a device, called the strict settlement,
which proved effective in preventing the destruction of
contingent remainders. 14 When his daughter Lucy married John Stiles, Andrew Baker might convey land to
nominees to the use of John and Lucy for 99 years if
either should so long live, remainder to the use of trustees for the lives of John and Lucy upon trust to preserve contingent remainders, remainder to the use of
the unborn children of the marriage in tail. The Statute of Uses operated to transform the uses of John,
Lucy, the trustees, and the unborn children into legal
estates, but it did not execute the trust to preserve
contingent remainders because it was a use on a use.
fhe result was that the trustees took a present vested
estate pur autre vie~ subject to the term of years of John
and Lucy, with a legal contingent remainder in tail to
the unborn children.16 As the trustees, not John and
Lucy, held the particular estate, John and Lucy could
14 Sir Orlando Bridgman (chief justice of the Court of Common
Pleas. 1660-1668; lord keeper, 1667-1672) and Sir Geoffrey Palmer have
usually been credited with inventing the strict settlement. 2 Blackstone,
CoMMENTARIEs, Cooley's 2d ed., 172 (1872); 7 Holdsworth, HISTORY
oF ENGLISH LAw 112 (1926); Lord Hardwicke, L.C. in Garthv. Cotton,
3 Atk. 752 at 753-755, 26 Eng. Rep. 1231 at 1232-1233 (1753). One of
Bridgman's early forms of strict settlement is reprinted in App. 3 to
Holdsworth, op. cit., at 547-559. Sir Frederick Pollock has pointed out,
however, that the essentials of the device were in use a century before
Bridgman. THE LAND LAws, 3rd ed., 224 (1896).
1s Another form of strict settlement, which was more questionable,
was a conveyance to the use of John for life, remainder to the use of
trustees to preserve contingent remainders for the life of John, remainder to the use of John's unborn children. Logically the remainder
to the trustees in this case would seem to be contingent and so destructible. Nevertheless it was held to be vested and indestructible as
in the type of settlement described in the text. Duncomb v. Duncomb,
3 Lev. 437, 83 Eng. Rep. 770 (1697); see Parkhurst v. Smith ex dem.
Dormer, 6 Brown 351, 2 Eng. Rep. 1127 (1740). A third form of strict
settlement, which is clearly valid and more likely to be found in the
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not destroy the contingent remainder. 16 Although the
trustees, as tenants of tl;le particular estate, had legal
power to destroy the contingent remainder, anyone who
took title from them with knowledge of the trust or
without paying a valuable consideration would be compelled in equity to recreate the contingent remainder. 17
If the trustees conveyed to a bona fide purchaser for
value, they could be compelled in equity to buy land
of equal value and convey it to the wronged contingent
remaindermen. 18 Moreover, none of the contingent remaindermen could dock the entail during the lifetime
of either of his parents or during his own minority because a common recovery could be suffered by a tenant
in tail only after he was of age 19 and with the cooperation
of the tenant of the possessory freehold; 20 in this case the
trustees. Andrew Baker's strict settlement could not be
destroyed until John and Lucy were dead and their child
who took the first remainder in tail was twenty-one years
old. If the remainder in tail under a strict settlement
was to a posthumous child, the settlement might be indestructible for lives in being plus a minority and a
period of gestation. 21 This was the most durable "perpeUnited States than the other two, is a conveyance to the use of
trustees for the life of John upon trust for John and to preserve contingent remainders, remainder· to the use of John's unborn children.
See Moody v. Walters, 16 Ves. Jr. 283, 33 Eng. Rep. 992 (I809).
1s Penhay v. Hurrell, 2 Vern. 370, 23 Eng. Rep. 834 (1702); Parkhurst v. Smith ex dem. Dormer, 6 Brown 351, 2 Eng. Rep. 1127
(1740); Garth v. Cotton, 3 Atk. 752, 26 Eng. Rep. 123I (I753).
11 Pye v. Gorge, I P. Wms. 128, 24 Eng. Rep. 323 (1710), aff'd
sub nom. Gorges v. Pye, 7 Brown 221, 3 Eng. Rep. I44 (I712); see
Else v. Osborn, I P. Wms. 387, 24 Eng. Rep. 437 (I717).
1s Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 678, 24 Eng. Rep. 913 (1732); see
Tipping v. Piggot, I Eq. Cas. Abr. 385, 21 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1711).
19 Pigott, CoMMON REcoVERIES, 2d ed., 60 (1770).
20 Parkhurst v. Smith ex dem. Dormer, 6 Brown 35I, 2 Eng. Rep.
1127 (1740); Pigott, CoMMON REcovERIES, 2d ed., 28, 41 (I770).
21 Digby, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 5th ed., 365
(1897). See Reeve v. Long, I Salk. 227, 91 Eng. Rep. 202 (I694);
Stat. IO & 11 Gul. III, c. 16 (1699).
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tuity" which could be created by means of the contingent
remainder.
For centuries the ingenuity of English conveyancers
was devoted to attempts to establish perpetuities by
creating indestructible future interests in remote unborn
generations. Some of these failed. Because a tenant for
years could not suffer a common recovery, an entail of
a term would be unbarrable. It was held that a term
of years could not be entailed and that an attempt to
entail one gave the whole term to the first taker. 22 Future interests created by way of use executed by the
Statute of Uses or devise under the Statute of Wills, if
so limited as to become possessory upon the expiration
of a preceding estate of freehold, were held to be contingent remainders, destructible as such.28 When the
fee simple was conveyed to trustees upon trust for an
equitable tenant in tail, the cestui que trust in tail could
bar the entail and destroy future interests limited to follow, or in defeasance of, the estate tail by suffering a
common recovery.24
Some of the conveyancers' attempts to create indestructible future interests in unborn generations succeeded. Although in strict common-law theory there is
no such thing as a remainder in personal property, it
22 Tatton v. Mollineaux, Moore K.B. 809, 72 Eng. Rep. 920 (1610);
Lovies's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 78a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1043 (1613); Sanders v.
Cornish, Cro. Car. 230, 79 Eng. Rep. 801 (1631); Grig v. Hopkins, 1
Sid. 37, 82 Eng. Rep. 955 (1661).
2s Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 120a, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 (1595);
Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng. Rep. 146 (1597); Smith v.
Belay, Cro. Eliz. 630, 78 Eng. Rep. 870 (1597); Purefoy v. Rogers, 2
Wms. Saund. 380, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (1671).
24 North v. Way, 1 Vern. 13, 23 Eng. Rep. 270, sub nom. North
v. Williams, 2 Ch. Ca. 63, 78, 22 Eng. Rep. 848, 855 (1681); Brydges
v. Brydges, 3 Ves. Jr. 120, 30 Eng. Rep. 926 (1796). Similarly a cestui
que trust in tail could bar his issue by levying a fine as fully as if he
had the legal estate. Basket v. Pierce, 1 Vern. 226, 23 Eng. Rep. 431
(1683).
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was possible by will to limit chattels real or personal to
one person for life, with future interests following which
could not be destroyed by the first taker. If Andrew
Baker devised a term of 500 years to John Stiles for life
and then to the eldest son of John, John could not destroy the executory interest of the unborn son. 25 Future interests created by way of use executed by the
Statute of Uses or devise under the Statute of Wills
which could not have taken effect as remainders because
they followed a fee simple, cut off a preceding estate
prior to its normal expiration, or created a gap in seisin
were held valid and, if not preceded by an estate tail,
indestructible by holders of prior interests. If Andrew
Baker conveyed or devised land "to James Thorpe and
his heirs but if James die in the lifetime of John Stiles
then to John and his heirs," James could not destroy
the executory interest of John. 26 Equitable future interests subject to a trust, whether or not they could take
effect as remainders, and whether in land or personalty,
were indestructible by holders of prior equitable interests not in tail; if Andrew Baker conveyed land to trustees upon trust for John Stiles for life and then for the
eldest son of John in tail, John could not destroy the
equitable contingent remainder of his unborn son. 27
The decisions that executory interests and equitable
25 Matthew Manning's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 94b, 77 Eng. Rep. 618
(1609).
26 Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620); Pigott,
CoMMON REcovERIES, 2d ed., 127, 134 (1770).
21 Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 581, 26 Eng. Rep. 365 (1738); Attorney-General ex rei. University of Cambridge v. Lady Downing,
Wilm. 1, 97 Eng. Rep. 1 (1767); Astley v. Micklethwait, L.R. 15 Ch. D.
59 (1880). See: Cole v. Moore, Moore K.B. 806, 72 Eng. Rep. 917
(1607); Symance v. Tattam, 1 Atk. 613, 26 Eng. Rep. 385 (1737). As
has been seen, however, an equitable tenant in tail could bar equitable
remainders following the estate tail, whether vested or contingent, by
suffering a common recovery. Note 24 supra.
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future interests were indestructible would have made
possible the perpetual tying up of land in a family had
not the English courts, in a long series of cases which
was not complete until the nineteenth century, created
the modern common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. 28
The Rule in its developed form, unlike the old restrictions on contingent remainders, did not limit the time
when future interests must become possessory.211 It was
phrased rather in terms of remoteness of vesting. Every
indestructible future interest must be so limited that it
must necessarily vest, if at all, within lives in being
plus one or more actual periods of gestation, plus an
actual minority or twenty-one years in gross. Any future
interest not so limited was void. Andrew Baker could
convey or devise land to John Stiles for life, remainder
to the eldest son of John in fee simple, but if such eldest
son died during his minority then to the eldest son of
John's eldest son in fee simple. This would be valid
even though both the eldest son of John (who took a
contingent remainder) and his eldest son (who took a
shifting executory interest) were posthumous. Andrew
Baker could convey or devise land to John Stiles for life,
then to Lucy Baker for 21 years, then to the oldest living
descendant of John in being at the expiration of the 21
years. The Rule permitted some perpetuities which
2s For detailed historical studies of the development of the modern
Rule Against Perpetuities see Challis, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed.,
180-200, 205-217 (1911); Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., c.
5 (1915); 7 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 215-228 (1926);
Simes, LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS, §§477-489 (1936). PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Div. IV, Part I, Introductory Note and §374, Comment a
(1944) contain a shorter account of the development.
29 E.g. if Andrew Baker conveys to Lucy Baker in fee simple but,
if Lucy die unmarried, to James Thorpe in fee tail, remainder to
John Stiles in fee simple, the limitation to John Stiles does not
violate the Rule because it must vest, if at all, on the death of Lucy.
although it may not become possessory for centuries. Gray, RuLE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §206 (1915).
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were indestructible for slightly longer than the strict
settlement. Its detailed application will be considered
in subsequent chapters.
B. MICHIGAN's RECEPTION OF THE RULE

The common law of England was received as the law
of Michigan in the last decade of the eighteenth century.80 By this time the modern Rule Against Perpetuities had become part of the English common law, its
general nature was well understood, and most of its applications were either settled or forseeable. There is no
doubt that, in receiving the common law, Michigan received the Rule Against Perpetuities.
By the end of the seventeenth century it had been
settled that a future interest which must necessarily vest
within lives in being plus an actual minority plus one
or more actual periods of gestation did not offend the
rule. 31 It had also been settled that a future interest
which must necessarily vest within lives in being plus
one year in gross did not violate the Rule. 32 When English law came to Michigan, the only question relative to
the permissible period of postponement of vesting under
the Rule Against Perpetuities which was still undecided
was that of the maximum allowable number of years in
gross. Before that numerous dicta had suggested that
30 Either by Stat. 32 Geo. III
(Upper Canada), c. 1, §3 (1792),
Part One, note 33 supra, or by the Law of the Northwest Territory of
July 14, 1795, Laws of the Territory of the United States North-West
of the Ohio, 175, 176 (1796), Part One, note 34 supra. Stout v. Keyes,
2 Doug. 184 (Mich. 1845); Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18 (1860);
Reynolds v. McMullan, 55 Mich. 568, 22 N.W. 41 (1885), Part One,
note 41 supra.
:n Taylor v. Biddall, 2 Mod. 289, 86 Eng. Rep. 1078 (1678); Reeve
v. Long, 1 Salk. 227, 91 Eng. Rep. 202 (1694).
32 Loyd v. Carew, Prec. Ch. 72, 24 Eng. Rep. 35 (1697); Marks v.
Marks, 10 Mod. 419, 88 Eng. Rep. 789 (1718).

SOURCE, NATURE AND LOCAL RECEPTION

271

this was twenty-one years. 33 Sir William Blackstone in
his Commentaries) published in 1766 and vastly influential in America, adopted the same view, 34 and this was
established as the law of England by a decision in 1833. 35
Such a decision was predictable when Michigan adopted
the common law, and the rule it announced may be
considered as part of that law. 116
As has been seen, the modern common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities was developed to prevent the creation of perpetuities by means of executory interests and
equitable contingent remainders, both of which. future
interests were indestructible by the tenant in possession.
When Michigan received the common law, the English
courts had not yet decided that the Rule applied to
legal contingent remainders in land, 37 but it was evi33 Massingberd v. Ash, 2 Ch. Rep. 275 at 282-283, 21 Eng. Rep. 677
at 679 (1685); Goodtitle ex dem. Gurnall v. Wood, Willes 211 at
213, 125 Eng. Rep. 1136 at 1137 (1740); Duke of Marlborough v. Earl
Godolphin, I Eden 404 at 418, 28 Eng. Rep. 741 at 746 (1759); Goodman v. Goodright ex dem. Williams, 2 Burr. 873 at 879, 97 Eng. Rep.
608 at 611 (1759); Buckworth v. Thirkell, 3 B.&P. 652, note, 127 Eng.
Rep. 351 at 353 (1785); Jee v. Audley, I Cox 324 at 325, 29 Eng.
Rep. 1186 at 1187 (1787).
34 2 Blackstone, CoMMENTARIEs, 1st ed., 174 (1766). As to the influence of Blackstone in this country, see Cahill, JuDICIAL LEGISLATION
9 (1952).
35 Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833).
ae PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Div. IV, Part I, Introductory Note, p.
1441 (1944).
a1 It had long been assumed that equitable contingent remainders,
because they were indestructible, were subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities, and this was decided in Abbiss v. Burney, 17 Ch. D. 211
(1881). English writers differed as to whether legal contingent remainders were properly subject to the Rule. Challis, LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 197-200, 213-217 (1911); Gray, RuLE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§284-298 (1915); . 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTs, §505 (1936). That they are subject to the rule was indicated by several judicial dicta [Cattlin v. Brown, 11 Ha. 372 at 374,
68 Eng. Rep. 1319 at 1320 (1853); Re Frost, 43 Ch. D. 246 at 254
(1889)] and definitely decided in Re Ashforth, [1905] I Ch. 535.
Accord: Whitby v. Von Luedecke, [1906] 1 Ch. 783. Stat. 15 Geo. V, c.
20, §1 and First Schedule, Part I (1925) transformed all contingent
remainders into equitable estates, so the question can no longer arise
in England.
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dent that the policy underlying the Rule extended to
contingent remainders which are indestructible. Michigan statutes have made legal contingent remainders indestructible by the tenant in possession since 1838. 38
St. Amour v. Rivard 311 was a suit to construe the will
of a testator who died in 1841. As interpreted by the
Supreme Court, the will purported to devise life estates
in land to nine persons with contingent remainders for
life to the children of the first tenants, remainders for
life to the children of the children, and so on forever.
This, then, was an attempt to create a "perpetual freehold" or endless series of life estates in successive generations. As has been seen, the English courts thwarted
such attempts in the sixteenth century by devising the
so-called Old Rule Against Perpetuities, the rule that
a contingent remainder could not be limited to the child
of an unborn life remainderman.40 The Michigan Court,
after carefully distinguishing between contingent remainders and executory interests, tracing the development in England of the modern common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities through 1833 and noting that it
was developed primarily to restrict executory interests,
held the devises void in toto for violation of the modern
common-law Rule. This decision appears to stand for
four important propositions: (l) Michigan received the
ss Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 258, §4; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §32; Comp. Laws
(1857) §2616; Comp. Laws (1871) §4099; Comp. Laws (1897) §8814;
How. Stat., §5548; Comp. Laws (1915) §11550; Comp. Laws (1929)
§12952; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.32; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.32. Case
v. Green, 78 Mich. 540, 44 N.W. 578 (1889); Jeffers v. Sydnam, 129
Mich. 440, 89 N.W. 42 (1902). Chene v. Bank of Michigan, Walk. Ch.
511 (Mich. 1844) may amount to a decision that a contingent remainder created in 1806 was destructible by the tenant in possession.
aD 2 Mich. 294 (1852). The language of the will is quoted and
another aspect of the case discussed in Part One supra at notes
258-259.
4o Part Two, note 13 supra.
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modern Rule Against Perpetuities as part of the common law of England; (2) The Rule Against Perpetuities
was received in the completely developed form which
it attained in England in 1833, not in the rudimentary
form of some date prior to its complete evolution; 41
(3) The modern Rule Against Perpetuities applies to
legal contingent remainders; 42 and (4) The so-called
Old Rule Against Perpetuities, that a contingent remainder could not be limited to the child of an unborn
life remainderman, was never received as law in Michigan.43
The Michigan Revised Statutes of 1846/' which became effective March 1, 1847, contained a chapter (62)
on estates in land taken from the New York Revised
Statutes of 1829.45 This chapter contained a number
of provisions designed to prevent the creation of undesirable perpetuities by means of future freehold and
leasehold interests in land. 46 The meaning and application of these provisions will be discussed in detail in Part
Three of this work. For present purposes it is sufficient
to note that the most important of them provided, in
41 Accord: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, Div. IV, Part I, Introductory
Note, p. 1441 (1944).
42 Accord as to indestructible contingent remainders: PRoPERTY
RESTATEMENT, §370, Comment b (1944); 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE
INTERESTS, §505 (1936). Legal contingent remainders in Michigan land
have been indestructible since 1838. Part Two, note 38 supra.
43 Accord: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §370, Comment q. (1944); 2
Simes, LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS, §487 (1936).
4 ' As to the drafting of which see Part One at note 582 supra.
Chapter 62 differs in several important respects from the equivalent
New York provisions.
45 As to the drafting of which see Part One at note 575 supra.
4s Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23; Comp.
Laws (1857) §§2598-2604, 2607; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4081-4087, 4090;
Comp.. Laws (1897) §§8796-8802, 8805; How. Stat. §§5530-5536, 5539;
Comp. Laws (1915) §§11532-11538, 11541; Comp. Laws (1929) §§1293412940, 12943; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.14-26.20, 26.23; Comp. Laws
(1948) §§554.14-554.20, 554.23. Repealed by Act 38, P.A. 1949, §2;
Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52.
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effect, that every future estate should be void in its
creation which should suspend the absolute power of
alienation for a longer period than during the continuance of two lives in being at the creation of the
estate.47 This statutory provision differed substantially
in phraseology, theory, and application from the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. The common-law
Rule is phrased in terms of remoteness of vesting; it has
no application to vested interests and does not prohibit
suspension of the absolute power of alienation as such.
The statutory provision, on the other hand, did not in
terms prohibit remoteness of vesting.
It is evident that a limitation of a future interest might
violate the statutory provision although it would not violate the common-law Rule. 48 Conversely, although the
47 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§14, 15, 16, note 46 supra. These sections
read as follows:
"Sec. 14. Every future estate shall be void in its creation, which
shall suspend the absolute power of alienation for a longer period
than is prescribed in this chapter: Such power of alienation is suspended, when there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute fee
in possession can be conveyed.
"Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended
by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than
during the continuance of two lives in being at the creation of the
estate, except in the single case mentioned in the next section.
"Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior
remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the persons to whom
the first remainder is limited shall die under the age of twenty-one
years, or upon any other contingency by which the estate of such
persons may be determined before they attain their full age."
•s Not only because the permissible period under the statute is
shorter, but because some limitations which do not suspend vesting
do suspend the absolute power of alienation. E.g. if Andrew Baker
declared himself trustee of Blackacre to receive the rents and profits
and apply them to the use of James Thorpe for life, then to the use
of Lucy Baker for life, then to the use of John Stiles for life, then to
the use of the children of John Stiles in fee, no part of the disposition
would offend the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities because the
three equitable life estates are presently vested, and the equitable
contingent remainder to the children of John would necessarily vest,
if at all, on the death of John, a life in being. The interests of both
John and his children would, however, suspend the absolute power of
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proposition is not so evident, a limitation which would
violate the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities might
not offend against the statute. If Andrew Baker conveyed land "to James Thorpe and his heirs so long as
the Penobscot Building shall stand and then to John
Stiles and his heirs," the executory interest of John
Stiles would violate the common-law Rule because it
might not vest within lives in being and 21 years, but
it is arguable that it would not suspend the absolute
power of alienation at all because James and John together might at any time convey an indefeasible estate
in fee simple absolute. 49 Chapter 62 of the Revised
Statutes of 1846 did not expressly abolish the commonlaw Rule Against Perpetuities, but it has been settled
that its provisions superseded the common-law Rule as
alienation for longer than two lives in being because, under New York
and Michigan law, neither the trustee nor the cestui of a trust for
receipt of the rents and profits of land can alienate his interest. Part
One supra, notes 592, 593.
49 See: Walker v. Marcellus and Otisco Lake Ry. Co., 226 N.Y. 347,
123 N.E. 736 (1919). At common law every unvested future interest
suspended the absolute power of alienation because unvested future
interests were inalienable. Part One, note 359 supra. As unvested legal
future interests have been alienable in Michigan since 1838 (Part
One, note 371 supra), they do not suspend the absolute power of
alienation unless limited to unborn or unascertained persons. Torpy
v. Betts, 123 Mich. 239, 81 N.W. 1094 (1900); Russell v. Musson, 240
Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927); Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich.
531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926). See: Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids, 123
Mich. 281 at 283-4, 82 N.W. 56 (1900); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker,
226 Mich. 72 at 77, 196 N.W. 976 (1924); Gardner v. City National
Bank &: Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270 at 287, 255 N.W. 587 (1934);
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, c. B, 1[53. But see: Toms v. Williams, 41
Mich. 552 at 562, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456,
73 N.W. 548 (1898). The limitation described in the text would,
however, violate another provision of the New York Revised Statutes
of 1829 (Part II, c. I, Tit. II, Art I, §24) that "a fee may be limited
on a fee, upon a contingency, which, if it should occur, must happen
within the period prescribed in this Article." This provision which,
like the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, prohibits remoteness
of vesting, was not adopted in Michigan.
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to transactions regulated by the statutes, so that only the
statutory provisions need be satisfied. 50
The New York Revised Statutes of 1829 extended the
statutory provisions against perpetuities to all forms of
property, real and personal. 51 Chapter 62 of the Michigan Revised Statutes of 1846 applied only to interests
in land, including freehold interests and chattels real.
In consequence, after March 1, 1847, the validity of
limitations of future interests in land was governed, so
far as perpetuity problems were concerned, solely by
the provisions of Chapter 62 whereas limitations of future interests in chattels personal and choses in action
were, and still are, subject to the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities. 52 When a single limitation of a
future interest embraced both land and other property,
regardless of the relative amounts of each, the limitation
5o Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926); Rodey
v. Stotz, 280 Mich. 90, 273 N.W. 404 (1937). But see: Michigan Trust
Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72 at 76-77, 196 N.W. 976 (1924). Accord:
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., c. B, 1J3. This problem cannot arise in
New York because the courts there, in view of the statutory provision
quoted in the preceding note, which was not adopted in Michigan,
have held that the statutes prohibit suspension of vesting as well as
suspension of the absolute power of alienation. Matter of Wilcox,
194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.E. 497 (1909); Walker v. Marcellus and Otisco
Lake Ry. Co., 226 N.Y. 347, 123 N.E. 736 (1919); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., c. A, 1111. Hence any limitation which would offend the
common-law Rule would also violate the New York statutes. Powell
and Whiteside, THE STATUTES OF THE STATE oF NEw YoRK CoNCERNING
PERPETUITIES AND RELATED MATTERS 73-75 [New York Legislative
Document (1936) No. 65 (H)].
51. Part II, c. 4, Tit. IV, §§1, 2. There were some slight differences
between the treatment of interests in land and that of other property.
52 Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 (1879); Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich.
533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885); Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419
(1888); Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649 (1889); Michigan
Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924); Windiate v.
Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926); Rodey v. Stotz, 280
Mich. 90, 273 N.W. 404 (1937); Floyd v. Smith, 303 Mich. 137, 5
N.W. (2d) 695 (1942). Accord: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., c. B,
1!5, 50. Cf. Ledyard's Appeal, 51 Mich. 623, 17 N.W. 208 (1883);
Hopkins v. Crossley, 132 Mich. 612, 96 N.W. 499 (1903); Moore v.
O'Leary, 180 Mich. 261, 146 N.W. 661 (1914).
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failed unless it conformed to both the statutory provisions and the common-law Rule.68
Because the Michigan statutes make both the estate of
the trustee and the interest of the cestui que trust under
a trust for the receipt of the rents and profits of land
inalienable, 54 every future interest under such a trust
suspends the absolute power of alienation.55 In 1877
the Michigan Supreme Court suggested that a trust, as
such, did not suspend the absolute power of alienation
if, by its terms, the trustee had discretionary power to
sell the land constituting the corpus. 56 This suggestion
5 8 State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898); Grand
Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922);
Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W.
587 (1934); In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657
(1938) (land valued at $800; personalty at $56,054); De Buck v. Bousson, 295 Mich. 164, 294 N.W. 135 (1940); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT,
App., c. B, 1152. See: Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355 at 370, 380, 36
N.W. 419 (1888); Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575 at 598,
2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942). Cf. Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 562,
2 N.W. 814 (1879); Scheibner v. Scheibner, 199 Mich. 630, 165 N.W.
660 (1917); Rodey v. Stotz, 280 Mich. 90 at 99, 273 N.W. 404 (1937).
54 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§19, 21; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2649,
2651; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4132, 4134; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8847,
8849; How. Stat., §§5581, 5583; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11583, 11585;
Comp. Laws (1929) §§12985, 12987; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.69, 26.71;
Comp. Laws (1948) §§555.19, 555.21; quoted in the text, Part One,
supra at note 580.
ss Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); Foster v.
Stevens, 146 Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906); Otis v. Arntz, 198
Mich. 196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917); Scheibner v. Scheibner, 199 Mich.
630, 165 N.W. 660 (1917); Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220
Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922); Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258
Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932); Gardner v. City National Bank &
Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934); In re Richards'
Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938), Chapter 20, Section C,
infra. Cf. Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich.
730, 3 N.W. 207 (1879). A present interest under such a trust also
suspends the absolute power of alienation, but that is irrelevant to the
question under discussion because the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities relates only to future interests.
56 Thatcher v. Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Andrew's Church of Ann
Arbor, 37 Mich. 264 (1877). See: Methodist Episcopal Church of
Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730 at 740, 3 N.W. 207 (1879); Wilson v.
Odell, 58 Mieh. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885); Fitzgerald v. City of Big
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was questioned eleven years later 57 and overruled in 1901
by a decision that a mere power of sale for reinvestment
does not prevent a trust of land from suspending the absolute power of alienation. 58 It was settled by a number
of decisions, however, that if the will or other instrument of trust directed the trustee to sell land constituting the corpus of the trust and reinvest in other types
of property, the doctrine of equitable conversion applied and the trust would be treated as one of chattels
personal, unaffected by the provisions of Chapter 62 of
the Revised Statutes of 1846. 59 It follows that the validity
of future interests under such a trust would be governed
by the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.60
Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT,
App., c. B, ~56, note 222. It does not follow that the validity of future
interests under such a trust would be governed by the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities. The Thatcher case involved the validity
of a vested legal remainder in fee simple following a trust which was
to last for two lives and the time necessary to pay the second life
cestui's expenses of last illness and burial. Records and Briefs, June
Term 1877, No. 36.
57 Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355 at 386, 36 N.W. 419 (1888).
58 Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. 1100 (1901). Accord:
Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250
(1922); Allen v. Merrill, 223 Mich. 467, 194 N.W. 131 (1923); Gardner
v. City National Bank 8c Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587
(1934); In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938);
PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., c. B, ~56; Chapter 20, Section B (3),
infra.
s9 Penny v. Croul, 76 ¥ich. 471, 43 N.W. 649 (1889); Ford v. Ford,
80 Mich. 42, 44 N.W. 1057 (1890) (direction to convert Michigan land
into Missouri land exempted trust from the statutes); Michigan Trust
Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924) (devise to A for
life, remainder to B as trustee to convert into money worked an
equitable conversion on the death of A); Gettins v. Grand Rapids
Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930): Van Tyne v. Pratt, 291
Mich. 626, 289 N.W. 275 (1939); Floyd v. Smith, 303 Mich. 137, 5
N.W. (2d) 695 (1942); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., c. B, ~51; Chapter
20, Section B (3), infra. See: Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355 at 380, 36
N.W. 419 (1888); Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575 at 599,
2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942). Cf. Joseph v. Shaw, 48 Mich. 355, 12 N.W.
486 (1882).
eo Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924);
Floyd v. Smith, 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942).
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Act No. 38 of the Public Acts of 1949 repealed the
provisions of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846
relating to perpetuities and suspension of the absolute
power of alienation and declared:
"The common law rule known as the rule against
perpetuities now in force in this state as to personal
property shall hereafter be applicable to real property
and estates and other interests therein, whether freehold
or non-freehold, legal or equitable, by way of trust or
otherwise, thereby making uniform the rule as to perpetuities applicable to real and personal property." 61
This legislation makes it clear that limitations of future interests in conveyances or wills becoming effective
on or after September 23, 1949, are subject to one, and
only one, rule against perpetuities, the modern commonlaw Rule Against Perpetuities developed by the English
courts between 1609 and 1833 and already in force in
Michigan as to all limitations made prior to March 1,
1847. The statute also makes it clear that Michigan
decisions relative to the application of the Rule Against
Perpetuities to dispositions of interests in property other
than land made between 1847 and 1949 are precedents
for its application to limitations of interests in land made
since 1949.
61. Sec. 1; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (1); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.51.
Sec. 2 [Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52]
repealed Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§14-20 and 23, Part Two, note 46 supra.
Sec. 3 [Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (3); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.53]
provides: "This act applies only to wills with respect to which the
testator dies after the effective date of this act and to deeds and other
instruments executed after the effective date of this act." The act
became effective September 23, 1949.

CHAPTER
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The Period of the Rule
A. COMMENCEMENT OF THE PERIOD

HE RULE Against Perpetuities was developed to
restrict the creation of remote future interests
which were not destructible by the holder of the
present interest. The Rule makes void any limitation
of a future interest unless, at the moment when the interest becomes indestructible, it is certain that it must vest,
if at all, within the period of the Rule.il 2 That period is,
speaking generally, lives in being and twenty-one years.
Ordinarily a future interest is indestructible from the
time of its creation. Consequently the period of the Rule
is normally computed from the time when the instrument
creating the interest becomes effective. In the case of
a deed, this is the time of delivery; in the case of a will,
the death of the testator. 68 If John Stiles transfers prop-

T

&2 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §214 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §370,
Comment k. (1944). The meaning of the requirement of certainty of
vesting will be discussed in the next chapter.
&s Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIEs, 3rd ed., §231 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §494 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §374,
Comment b. (1944); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72,
196 N.W. 976 (1924); Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co.,
267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934). A deed delivered in escrow
does not operate as a conveyance until the occurrence of the condition of the escrow, but when that condition occurs its effectiveness
dates back, for some purposes, to the time of the delivery in escrow.
Sheppard, ToucHSTONE OF CoMMON AssURANCES 58-59 (1648). See:
Butler and Baker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 25a at 35b, 76 Eng. Rep. 684
at 707 (1591). Cf. Avery v. Consumers Power Co., 265 Mich. 696 at
700, 253 N.W. 189 (1934). The Restatement of Property takes no
position as to the time from which the permissible period under the
Rule Against Perpetuities is to be computed in the case of a deed
delivered in escrow. §374, Comment b, Caveat (1944).
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erty by deed to James Thorpe upon trust to pay the
income to John for life, then to pay the income to John's
youngest son for life, and then to transfer the property
to the youngest grandson of John, the equitable contingent remainder of the grandson is void under the rule.
John's youngest grandchild cannot be ascertained until
the death of the last of John's children which, since John
may have children after the delivery of the deed to James
Thorpe, may not occur within lives in being and twentyone years. 64 The same limitation would, however, be
valid in a will, because all of John's children must necessarily come into being before the death of John, and
the youngest of their children will certainly be ascertainable and in being before the death of the last of
John's children.65
Future interests limited to follow, or in defeasance
of, an estate tail are destructible by the tenant in tail.66
Because of this, the English courts held that contingent
remainders on estates tail and executory interests limited
in defeasance of estates tail need not comply with the
Rule Against Perpetuities.67 Andrew Baker could convey land to James Thorpe and the heirs of his body, remainder to the youngest descendant of John Stiles in
being at the death of the last descendant of James. Likewise, Andrew Baker could convey land to James Thorpe
2 Simes, LAW oF FUTURE INTERESTS, §494 (1936).
See: Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885).
66 Capel's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 61b, 76 Eng. Rep. 134 (1593); Benson
v. Hodson, 1 Mod. 108, 86 Eng. Rep. 768 (1674).
67 Nicholls v. Sheffield, 2 Bro. C. C. 215, 20 Eng. Rep. 121 (1787):
Carr v. Earl of Erroll, 6 East 58, 102 Eng. Rep. 1209 (1805); Harrison
v. Round, 2 De G., M. & G. 190, 42 Eng. Rep. 844 (1852); Portman
v. Viscount Portman, [1922] 2 A. C. 473 (H.L.); Gray, RuLE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§446-449 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw oF FUTURE
INTERESTS, §517 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §373, Comment b.
(1944). It should. be remembered that estates for years and other
personalty could not be entailed.
64

65
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and the heirs of his body, but if any tenant in tail fail
to bear the name and arms of the grantor, then to John
Stiles and his heirs. Michigan abolished estates tail in
1821,68 but the principle that destructible future interests are not restricted by the Rule Against Perpetuities,
although established by cases involving estates tail, is
not limited to them.
It is clear from the cases involving estates tail that, if
a future interest will be destructible at all times until it
vests, the Rule Against Perpetuities has no application
to it.69 It would seem, moreover, that if a future interest
is so limited as to be destructible for a time and then
indestructible for a time before it vests, the Rule does
apply to it, but the period of the Rule does not commence until the interest becomes indestructible. 70 In
jurisdictions where estates tail are permitted, an interest
which follows an interest limited on or in defeasance of
an estate tail would fall into this category. Andrew
Baker might convey land to James Thorpe and the heirs
of his body, remainder to Lucy Baker and her heirs, but
if Lucy dies unmarried, to the youngest descendant of
John Stiles in being at the expiration of the estate tail.
In such a case the final executory interest would be de68 Act. Mar. 2, 1821, 1 Terr. Laws 815, Part One, note 82 supra;
superseded by Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 258; superseded by Rev. Stat. 1846,
c. 62, §§3, 4; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2587, 2588; Comp. Laws (1871)
§§4070, 4071; Comp. Laws (1897) "§§8785, 8786; How Stat., §§5519,
5520; Comp. Laws
(1915) §§11521, 11522; Comp. Laws
(1929) §§12923, 12924; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.3, 26.4; Comp. Laws
(1948) §§554.3, 554.4; Part One, note 84 supra.
69 Part Two, note 67 supra.
7 0PRoPERTY RESTATEMENT, §373. (1944); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS, §§516, 517 (1936). Contra: Gray, RuLE AGAINST PER·
PETUITIES, 3rd ed., §446 (1915). Professor Gray appears to have thought
that if, in the absence of destructibility, the future interest would be
void under the Rule, destructibility would not save it unless it was
certain to vest at or before the termination of the period of destructibility. No Michigan authority on the point has been found.
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structible during the continuance of the estate tail but
indestructible thereafter during the life of Lucy. In all
jurisdictions, including Michigan, a future interest may
be destructible because of the existence of an unlimited
power of appointment or of revocation. 71 Andrew Baker
might transfer property by deed to John Stiles for life,
remainder to the youngest son of John Stiles for life,
remainder as John may by will or deed appoint and, in
default of appointment, to the youngest grandson of
John. John Stiles might transfer property by deed to
James Thorpe upon trust to pay the income to John
for life, then to pay the income to the youngest son of
John for life, then to transfer the property to the youngest grandson of John, reserving to the settlor an unlimited power to revoke the trust. 72 In each of these
examples, in the absence of the power, the period of the
Rule Against Perpetuities would commence with the
delivery of the deed and the ultimate remainder to the
youngest grandson of John Stiles would, accordingly, be
void. In each example, however, the presence of the
power enables John Stiles to destroy the ultimate remainder during his lifetime. This being so, it would
seem that the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities
n A power unlimited as to objects is ordinarily referred to as a
general power. However, as the Michigan statutes confine the term
"general power" over land to powers to appoint the full fee, it is
best to avoid use of the term "general power" in Michigan when considering the question under discussion. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §6;
Comp. Laws (1857) §2663; Comp. Laws (1871) §4146; Comp. Laws
(1897) §8861; How. Stat., §5595; Comp. Laws (1915) §11597; Comp.
Laws (1929) §13000; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.96; Comp. Laws (1948)
§556.6.
12 A similar type of destructibility would exist if John Stiles insured his life and designated James Thorpe as beneficiary of the
policy, upon the trusts described in the text, reserving power to
change the designation of beneficiary. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §373,
Comment e. (1944); Smith, PERSONAL LIFE INsuRANcE TRUSTS, §34.2
(1950).
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should be calculated from the death of John Stiles, in
which case the ultimate remainder to the youngest grandson of John would be valid. 78
It would seem that a future interest is destructible
for purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities only while
some living person has unlimited and unconditional
power to vest it in himself for his own exclusive benefit. 74 In jurisdictions where estates tail still exist with
the incidents they had in seventeenth-century England, a
tenant in tail has such power over the future interests
limited to follow, or in defeasance of, the estate tail.
The holder of such an unlimited power of appointment
or of revocation as those involved in the examples in
the preceding paragraph does also. But a future interest
is not destructible for the purpose under discussion
merely because some living person may defeat it by
the exercise of a power of appointment if the power may
be exercised only by will, 75 if it may be exercised only
1a PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §373, Comment c. (1944); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §516 (1936). Another possible situation is
that of a future interest which is so limited as to be indestructible for
a period, then destructible for a period, then indestructible again
for a period before it vests. Andrew Baker might transfer property
by deed to John Stiles for life, remainder to the youngest son of John
Stiles for life, remainder as the youngest son of John may, by deed
or will becoming effective within twenty years after the death of
John, appoint and, in default of appointment, to the youngest grandchild of John. In such a case the Restatement takes the position that
the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities is to be computed from
the end of the period of destructibility, i.e., twenty years after the
death of John or upon the earlier death of John's youngest son. §373,
Comment d. (1944).
74 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §373, Comment d.
(1944). Professor
Simes thinks that it is sufficient if a group of cotenants have jointly,
as co-owners, such a power, 2 LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §515 (1936).
75 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §373, Comment d. (1944).
Cf. 2 Simes,
LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS, §§516, 538 (1936); 3 Walsh, CoMMENTARIES
oN THE LAw oF REAL PRoPERTY, §340 (1947). But Rev. Stat. 1846,
c. 64, §12, Comp. Laws (1857) §2669, Comp. Laws (1871) §4152, Comp.
Laws (1897) §8867, How. Stat., §5601, Comp. Laws (1915) §11603,
Comp. Laws (1929) §13006, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.102, Comp. Laws
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upon performance of a condition precedent, such as the
payment of money, 76 or if the exercise of the power is
restricted to objects other than the holder of the power. 77
If Andrew Baker transfers property to John Stiles for
life, remainder to the youngest son of John for life, remainder as John may by will appoint and, in default
of appointment, to the youngest grandson of John, the
ultimate remainder is void under the Rule Against
Perpetuities. If Andrew Baker transfers property to
John Stiles for life, remainder to the youngest son of
John for life, remainder as John may by will or deed
appoint after paying $1,000 to St. Paul's Cathedral and,
in default of appointment, to the youngest grandson of
John, the ultimate remainder is likewise void. The same
is true if Andrew Baker transfers property to John Stiles
for life, remainder to the youngest son of John for life,
remainder to such descendant of John as John may
appoint and, in default of appointment, to the youngest
grandson of John.
A future interest is not destructible for this purpose
(1948) §556.12, provides: "When a general and beneficial power to
devise the inheritance, shall be given to a tenant for life or years, such
tenant shall be deemed to possess an absolute power of disposition,
within the meaning, and subject to the provisions of the last three
preceding sections." It would seem that future interests subject to
such a power are destructible for purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities. See Part Two, notes 293, 304, 305, 321 infra.
76 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §373, Comment e. (1944); 2 Simes, LAw
oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §518 (1936). An option to purchase would be
such a power. In Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196
N.W. 976 (1924) a testatrix devised land to her husband until his
death or remarriage, "with right to spend the income and so much
of the principal as he might desire for his support and comfort, and
with power to sell and give conveyance," remainder to a trustee to
convert into personalty and hold on trust for successive beneficiaries.
The Court held that the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities commenced at the death of the testatrix rather than at the death of the
husband.
11 PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, §373, Comment d. (1944); 2 Simes, LAW
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §516 (1936).
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merely because its owner is in being and ascertained and
so can release or convey it. If Andrew Baker conveys
land "to James Thorpe and his heirs so long as the
Penobscot Building shall stand and then to John Stiles
and his heirs," the executory interest of John Stiles is
void under the Rule although John could at any time
release it to James Thorpe or unite with James to convey an absolute fee simple. 78 Neither is a future interest
destructible for this purpose merely because some living
person has power to sell the property involved free of
the future interest if the proceeds of the sale will be
subject to the future interest. A trustee can defeat future interests in the trust property by selling it wrongfully to a bona fide purchaser or by selling it rightfully
for reinvestment purposes under a power conferred by
the trust instrument or an order of a court of equity,
but he cannot do so for his own exclusive benefit because the proceeds of such a sale are subject to the future
interest in trust/ 9 Statutes of many jurisdictions, including Michigan, so authorize sale of property in which
future interests exist, free of such interests, on petition
1s Grey v. Montagu, 2 Eden 205, 28 Eng. Rep. 876 (1764); affd.,
3 Brown 314, 1 Eng. Rep. 1341 (H.L.1770); In re Johnson's Trusts, L.R.
2 Eq. 716 (1866); In re Hargreaves, 43 Ch. Div. 401 (C.A. 1890);
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §373, Comment e. (1944); 2 Simes, LAW OF
FuTuRE INTERESTS, §514 (1936); 3 Walsh, CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAw
OF REAL PROPERTY, §§336 '(1947). Contra: Avern v. Lloyd, L.R. 5 Eq.
383 (1868) (overruled by In re Hargreaves, supra).
79 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §518 (1936); Michigan Trust
Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924); Gettins v. Grand
Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930); Gardner v.
City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270; 255 N.W. 587 (1934).
so Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 19, §§62 to 70; Comp. Laws (1915) §§12716
to 12724; Comp. Laws (1929) §§14404 to 14412; Mich. Stat. Ann.,
§§27.1188 to 27.1196; Comp. Laws (1948) §§619.62 to 619.70. This is
a reenactment of Act 233, P.A. 1887, as amended, Comp. Laws (1897)
§§9234 to 9242. See: PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, §124, Comment i.; §179,
note (1936); Garrison v. Hecker, 128 Mich. 539, 87 N.W. 642 (1901);
Young v. Young, 255 Mich. 173, 237 N.W. 535, 77 A.L.R. 963 (1931).

THE PERIOD OF THE RULE

287

of the owner of the present interest and judicial order.
But such statutes provide that the proceeds of the sale
shall be subject to the future interests, so the owner of
the present interest does not have unlimited and unconditional power to destroy the future interest for his
own exclusive benefit. 81
The application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to
future interests which are subject to destruction by the
exercise of a power of appointment has been touched
upon. The Rule also applies· to powers of appointment
themselves and to future interests created by their exercise. In the application of the Rule to future interests
created by the exercise of a power of appointment, the
period of the Rule is in some cases computed from the
effective date of the instrument creating the power and
in others from the effective date of the instrument exercising the power. 82 The commencement of the period
of the Rule Against Perpetuities in cases involving future
interests created by the exercise of a power of appointment will be discussed in a later chapter in connection
with the application of the Rule to such powers themselves.83
B.

COMPUTATION OF THE PERIOD

In St. Amour v. Rivard 84 the Supreme Court of Michigan held that an attempt to create a "perpetual free81 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §519 (1936). Cf. Michigan
Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924).
82 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §§390-392 (1944); Gray, RuLE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§514, 524 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS, §§534-539 (1936); 3 Walsh, CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY, §§340, 349 (1947). See: Gardner v. City National
Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270 at 285, 255 N.W. 587 (1934).
ss Chapter 13, Section C, infra.
84 2 Mich. 294 (1852), discussed above at Part One, notes 258-259
and Part Two, note 39. Cf. Brush v. Beecher, llO Mich. 597, 68 N.W.
420, 64 Am. St. Rep. 373 (1896), indicating that an endless series of
five-year terms, each limited on a condition precedent, would be void.
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hold" or endless series of life estates in successive generations was void because it violated the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities. With respect to the period of the
Rule, the Court said:
"At first it was held that the contingency upon which
the estate was to vest must happen within the compass of
a life or lives in being, or a reasonable number of years;
afterwards it was further extended to a child en ventre sa
mere, at the time of the death of the father; subsequently
it was extended to twenty-one years after the death of a
person in being. * * * The period of limitation as now
recognized is that laid down. by Lord Kenyon, in Long
v. Blackall,85 7 T.R., 102, and is stated in these words: 'It
is an established rule that an executory devise is good if
it must necessarily happen within a life or lives in being,
and twenty-one years and the fraction of another year,
allowing for the time of gestation.' In an opinion distinguished for its learning and careful research, delivered
by the Judges of England upon questions submitted to
them by the House of Lords, in 1833, it was considered
that twenty-one years was the limit, and that the period
of gestation was to be allowed in those cases only in
which gestation existed. Cadell v. Palmer}ro 10 Bing.,
140." 87

Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co. 88 was a
suit to construe a will which created two trusts. The income from each trust was to be paid to a named daughter
of the testator for life. On the death of each life beneficiary, the corpus of the trust was to be divided into
equal parts, one for each of her children. Each child was
ss 101 Eng. Rep. 875 at 877 (1797).
sG 131 Eng. Rep. 859, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833).
s1 2 Mich. 294 at 297.
88 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934). As the testator died in
1931 and the trusts included both land and other property, compliance
with both the statute prohibiting the suspension of the absolute power
of alienation and the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities was
required. Part Two, note 53 supra.
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to receive the income from his part until twenty-five,
then half the corpus, the income from the other half until
thirty, and then the balance of the corpus. If any child
died under thirty leaving issue, his share was to pass to
his issue, subject to trust during minority. If any child
died under thirty without surviving issue, his share was
to pass to the trusts for the surviving children of the life
beneficiary or, if there were none, to the trust for the
other daughter of the testator. As the testator's daughters
might have children after his death and the takers of the
ultimate remainders could not be ascertained until the
youngest of their children reached the age of thirty, the
vesting of these remainders might not occur for lives in
being (those of the two daughters) and thirty years. The
Court accordingly held that they violated the commonlaw Rule Against Perpetuities, quoting the following
from Halsbury's Laws of England as to the period of the
Rule:
" 'The rule stated more fully is as follows:
" 'First, subject to the exceptions hereafter mentioned
every future estate or interest in any kind of property,
the rights in which are governed by the law of England,
must be such that, at the time when the instrument creating it comes into operation, it can be predicated that, if
the estate or interest vests at all, it must necessarily vest
not later than at the end of a certain period.
" 'Secondly, this period is the life of a person or the
survivor of any number of persons in being at the time of
creation of such future estate or interest, and ascertained
for that purpose by the instrument creating the same, and
21 years to be computed from the dropping of such life;
but if no such person or persons are ascertained by the
instrument, the period is 21 years computed from the
time of creation of the future estate or interest.
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" 'In the following paragraphs this period is called
"the perpetuity period.
" 'Thirdly, a child who is en ventre sa mere at the time
of creation of an estate or interest, and is afterwards born
alive, is deemed to be a person in being for the purposes
both of the vesting of the estate or interest in him, and
of being a life chosen to form the perpetuity period. The
perpetuity period may, therefore, be apparently extended
by a period or periods for gestation, but only in those
cases where gestation actually exists. This branch of the
rule is applied whether it is for the advantage of the
unborn child or not. * * *
" 'Fifthly, any estate or interest which does not necessarily satisfy the above rule is void from its creation, and
events, subsequent to the date of the instrument which,
or subsequent to the death of the testator whose 'Will,
created the estate or interest, which in fact make the
vesting take place within the perpetuity period, have no
effect so as to make the estate or interest valid.' " 89
As the passage quoted by our Supreme Court from
Halsbury's Laws of England indicates, the measuring
lives in being must be those of persons "ascertained for
that purpose by the instrument creating" the future interest. This does not mean either that the persons whose
lives are to be used as a measure must be named in the
instrument or that the instrument must manifest an
intention that the lives of particular persons should be
used for that purpose; it means only that it must appear
from the instrument that the future interest thereby
limited must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years after
ascertainable lives.90 Thus if John Stiles devises property
to James Thorpe and his heirs "until my youngest grand89 267 Mich. 270 at 284-285, quoting from 22 Ha1sbury, LAws OF
ENGLAND, §641, p. 302 (1912).
9o PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §374, Comment j. (1944); 2 Simes, LAw
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §491 (1936).
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son reaches twenty-one and then to such grandson and his
heirs," the measuring lives are those of John's children,
although they are not mentioned in the instrument and
John may never have heard of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Even if the grantor or testator expressly manifests
an intention to suspend vesting for a period in excess of
that permitted by the Rule, a future interest is valid if
it must vest within the permissible period. If John Stiles
devises property to James Thorpe upon trust to pay the
income to John's children during their lives, then to pay
the income to John's grandchildren until the youngest
reaches twenty-five, then to transfer the property to the
youngest grandson, "it being my intention to suspend
the vesting of the ultimate remainder until twenty-five
years after the death of the survivor of my children," the
ultimate remainder will be valid if all of John's children
predecease him because, in that event, the measuring
lives in being will be those of John's grandchildren. 91
The measuring lives in being must be those of human
beings; lives of animals, regardless of their life expectancies/2 or of corporations 93 will not do. Although the
measuring lives are usually those of persons who take
something under the instrument creating the future interest or their ancestors, and all of the reported Michigan
cases involve measurement by the lives of such persons,
91. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §374, Comment k. (1944); Gray, RuLE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §231 (1915).
92 In re Estate of Kelly, [1932] I.R. 255; Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§228a, 906 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §491 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §374, Comment h.
(1944). See: Matter of Howells, 145 Misc. 557, 260 N.Y. Supp. 598
(1932); Clark, "Unenforcible Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 10 MICH L. REv. 31 at 40 (1911). Cf. In re Dean, 41 Ch. D.
552 (1889).
93 Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT,
§374, Comment h. (1944); 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §491
(1936).
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the instrument may by apt language designate as measuring lives those of persons who take nothing under it
and are not related to persons who do. 94 John Stiles may
devise property to James Thorpe and his heirs "until
the death of the survivor of the present members of the
Supreme Court of Michigan and then to my youngest
male descendant living at the time of such death." Although there is no definite limit to the number of measuring lives in being which is permissible, they must be
the live:s of persons who are not so numerous or so situated that evidence of their deaths is likely to be unreasonably difficult to obtain. 95 John Stiles may devise property
94 In re Villar, [1928] Ch. 471, aff'd., [1929] 1 Ch. 243 (C.A.);
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §374, Comment l. (1944); Gray, RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §216 (1915); 2 Simes, tAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS, §491 (1936).
95 Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030
(H.L. 1805). In his opinion in this case, the Lord Chancellor (Lord
Eldon) made the classic statement of the rule: "The language of all
the cases is, that property may be so limited as to make it unalienable
during any number of lives, not exceeding that, to which testimony
can be applied, to determine, when the survivor of them drops." 11
Ves. Jr. at 146, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1043. Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUI·
TIES, 3rd ed., §216 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §491
(I936). In Cadell v. Palmer, I CI. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (I833),
twenty-eight lives, and in Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 32I (1908), fortyodd lives, were held not too numerous, but in In re Moore, [I901]
I Ch. 936, measurement by the lives of "all persons who shall be
living at my death" was held to be too indefinite. In re Villar,
[I928] Ch. 471, affd., [I929] I Ch. 243 (C.A.), involved measurement by the lives of the descendants of Queen Victoria living
in 1926, of whom there were some 120. It was held valid. Accord: In re
Khoo Cheng Teow, [1932.] Straits Settlements L.R. 226; In re Leverhulme, [1943] 2 All Eng. L.R. 274, 169 L.T. 294. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §374, Comment l. (1944) takes the position that the lives of
the descendants of Queen Victoria living in 1941 would be too numerous. Cf. In re Leverhulme, [1943] 2 All Eng. L.R. 274 at 280-281,
169 L.T. 294 at 298. As the Restatement points out, the obscurity of
the persons whose lives are involved has a bearing on the difficulty
of proving their deaths. It is interesting to note that the future
interests involved in Cadell v. Palmer, supra, created by the will of
a testator who died in 1818, did not vest until I918. [1928] Ch. 478,
note. In Hay v. Hay, 3I7 Mich. 370, 26 N.W. (2d) 908 (I947), personalty was bequeathed to a trustee to pay certain annuities and
accumulate the rest of the income "for 2I years after the death of
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to James Thorpe and his heirs "until the death of the
survivor of my fourteen law partners and then to my
youngest male descendant living at the time of such
death." But the executory interest of John's youngest
living male descendant would be void if he is to be ascertained on the death of the survivor of "the persons
listed in the Lansing City Directory on January I, 1954"
or "those persons who crossed the Ambassador Bridge
from Detroit to Canada on July 4, 1954," because these
groups are too large and, in the case of the last example,
too difficult to identify, to make proof of the deaths included reasonably convenient.
The Rule Against Perpetuities permits suspension of
vesting until the expiration of a life or lives in being. In
Palms v. Palms 96 property was bequeathed to trustees to
pay half the income to the testator's son and half to his
daughter for life. On the death of either, half the principal was to be paid to the children of the deceased child,
if any. If the child who first died had no surviving issue,
the entire income was to be paid to the surviving child
for life and, on his death, the principal was to go to his
children. As all interests would necessarily vest on the
my last surviving grandchild that shall be living at the time of my
death," then to distribute the accumulated fund to the testator's
heirs to be determined at that time. There were seven grandchildren
living when the testator died. The bequest was treated as valid.
1!6 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419
(1888). This case involved a disposition which included both land and personalty and so was subject
to the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. Part Two, note 53
supra. In Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976
(1924), a silver tea set was bequeathed to the testatrix's husband for
life. The will further provided, "The Baker silver tea set shall go· to
my son Stuart for his use only for his life, at his death it is to go to
his child or children, if any, if none, to his brother Looe, if living,
if not to his child or children, if any, and if none, to the said Marie
Grampp." If Marie and her children were dead on the death of
Stuart, the set was to go to two other named persons. These provisions were held valid because vesting was not postponed beyond the
lives of the husband and Stuart.
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death of the surviving child, it was held that the limitations did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. In
McLain v. Howald 97 a bequest to grandchildren of the
testator to be ascertained on the death or remarriage of
his wife was held valid. In Floyd v. Smith 98 property was
bequeathed to a trustee to pay the income to four named
children of the testator's sister and their issue until the
death of the survivor of the four, and then to transfer the
principal to the issue of the four living at the time of
such death. A codicil transferred the interest of one of
the four to his children. The Court held that the codicil
was not intended to change the measuring lives, which
were those of the four children of the sister and that, as
the interests would all vest on the death of the survivor
of these four, they were valid under the Rule.
The Rule Against Perpetuities permits suspension of
vesting for part or parts of a life or lives in being at the
commencement of the period. Thus in Walton v. Torrey 99 a devise to descendants of the testator to be ascertained when the youngest of his children reached twentyone was treated as valid. So, likewise, in In re Dingler's
97 120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W. 182, 77 Am. St. Rep. 597 (1899). In
Cheever v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 45 Mich. 6, 7 N.W. 186 (1880),
a bequest to a daughter for life, remainder to her children and grandchildren, was treated as valid, it being construed to be to children
and grandchildren in being at the death of the daughter.
98 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942). Both land and personalty
were involved but, as the will contained a mandatory direction for
conversion of land into personalty, the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities was alone applicable. Part Two, notes 59, 60 supra.
99 Harr. Ch. 259 (Mich. circa 1840). The limitation was of land, but,
as the testator died in 1825, its validity was governed by the commonlaw Rule Against Perpetuities. Similarly, in Toms v. Williams, 41
Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879) the vesting of property bequeathed by
a will was validly suspended until "the expiration of the minority of
the youngest of the said children of my deceased brother, Gen. Thomas
Williams." There were three such children, one of whom was of age
when the testatrix died.
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Estate 100 a bequest to descendants of the testatrix to be
ascertained when two granddaughters, who were named
in the will and alive when it took effect, reached the age
of thirty, was held good. The Rule also permits suspension of vesting for lives in being at the commencement
of the period plus part or parts of a life or lives not then
in being which cannot exceed twenty-one years. Thus
in Wilson v. Odell~ 101 a bequest to grandchildren of the
testator to be determined after the death of the survivor
of his children and on the majority of his youngest grandchild was held valid under the Rule.
The Rule Against Perpetuities does not permit suspension of vesting for lives in being plus part or parts of
a life or lives not in being which may exceed twenty-one
years. This is one of the commonest types of violation
of the Rule. In Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker~ u 2 testatrix
devised land to her husband until death or remarriage,
then to a trustee to sell the land and hold the proceeds
in trust to pay half the income to a son, Stuart, for life.
The will, as construed by the Court, gave the remainder
in half the corpus, after the death of Stuart, to those
daughters of Stuart who reached twenty-five and those
sons of Stuart who reached thirty. It was held that this
1oo 319 Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947). The disposition was
in a residuary clause which included both land and personalty and
so was subject to the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. Part
Two, note 53 supra. In Post v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 255 Mich.
436, 238 N.W. 206 (1931), a bequest of personalty to issue of a daughter to be determined when the youngest issue of the daughter in being
at the death of the testatrix reached twenty-five was treated as valid.
101 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885).
102 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924). This was a devise of land,
but the will contained a mandatory direction to convert into money
upon the death or remarriage of the testatrix's husband. It was held
that this direction worked an equitable conversion to personalty,
effective upon the death of the husband, so that the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities governed the validity of the subsequent
limitations. See Part Two, notes 59, 60 supra.
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disposition violated the Rule because Stuart might have
children who would not reach the stipulated ages within
twenty-one years after his death. In Gettins v. Grand
Rapids Trust Co.,103 property was bequeathed to a trustee to pay the income to the testatrix's daughter Belle for
life and thereafter to her children, and to transfer a share
in the corpus to each child of Belle on reaching twentyfive, with limitations over in the event of any child dying
under twenty-five. The limitations over on death under
twenty-five were held void because they might postpone
vesting until more than twenty-one years after Belle's
death. Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co./ 0 '
which has already been discussed, involved the same type
of violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
As the English authorities quoted by our Supreme
Court indicate/05 the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities may include any period or periods of gestation
involved in the situation to which the limitation applies.
That is, a child en ventre sa mere who is subsequently
born alive is treated as a life in being under the Rule,
1oa 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930). The will contained a mandatory direction to convert land into personalty. The same result
was reached on similar facts in Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich.
588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932). Because the trust there included both land
and personalty and there was no direction to convert, the Court based
its decision on the statute forbidding suspension of the absolute power
of alienation, saying that it was unnecessary to consider the application
of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.
104 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934), discussed above at Part Two,
note 88. This aspect of the Rule has been modified in England by
Stat. 15 Geo. V, c. 20, §163 (1925), which provides that any gift
contingent upon a beneficiary or class of beneficiaries attaining or not
attaining an age over twenty-one, and for that reason too remote,
is to take effect by substituting twenty-one for the age stated.
W5 St. Amour v. Rivard, 2. Mich. 294 at 297 (1852), quoting from
Long v. Blackall, 7 T.R. 102, 101 Eng. Rep. 875 at 877 (1797),
quoted in the text at Part Two, note 87 supra; Gardner v. City
National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270 at 284, 255 N.W. 587
(1934), quoting from 22 Halsbury, LAws OF ENGLAND, §601 p. 302
(1912), quoted in the text at Part Two, note 89 supra.
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both for the purpose of receiving interests limited to it
and for that of serving as a measuring life in being as
to interests limited to others. In Chambers v. Shaw/06 a
testator devised his estate to his wife for life with a
provision that if a posthumous child should be born it
would take half the estate, to commence in possession
when it reached twenty-one, and that the wife would
take the other half if she lived until the child was
twenty-one, otherwise the child would take the whole.
The testator died in September, 1860, a son was born
in December, 1860, the son died in April, 1862, and the
wife died in September, 1862. The Court held that the
wife took the entire estate as sole heir of her son, saying
that the first interest to the posthumous son vested on
the testator's death. This case illustrates both the purposes mentioned. The posthumous son was treated as
a life in being for the purpose of the vesting of the half
given him unconditionally and as a measuring life for
the purpose of the vesting of the other half. It is permissible under the Rule to suspend vesting for any num·
ber of periods of gestation actually involved in addition
to lives in being and twenty-one years. It is possible to
have as many as three such periods. 107 John Stiles might
1o6 52 Mich. 18, 17 N.W. 223 (1883). The will contained a mandatory direction to convert the land into personalty so the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities applied. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§30, 31;
Comp. Laws (1857) §§2614, 2615; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4097, 4098;
Comp Laws (1897) §§8812, 8813; How. Stat., §§5546, 5547; Comp.
Laws (1915) §§11548, 11549; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12950, 12951;
Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.30, 26.31; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.30, 554.31,
provide: "When a future estate shall be limited to heirs, or issue, or
children, posthumous children shall be entitled to take, in the same
manner as if born before the death of their parents.
"A future estate depending on the contingency of the death of any
person without heirs or issue, or children, shall be defeated by the
birth of a posthumous child of such person, capable of taking by
descent."
101 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §222 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAw oF FuTuRE INTEREsTs, §492 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §374,
Comment p. (1944).
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devise property to James Thorpe and his heirs "until
my youngest grandchild is of age and then to my youngest descendant in being." If John has a posthumous
child which has a posthumous son who is the father
of a child en ventre sa mere when he comes of age, the
unborn child could take the executory interest limited
to the youngest descendant of John in being. Periods of
gestation are allowed under the Rule Against Perpetuities only if gestation in fact exists; it is not permissible
to suspend vesting for lives in being plus twenty-one
years and nine months in gross. 108 If John Stiles devises
property to James Thorpe and his heirs "until twentyone years and nine months after the death of my youngest child and then to my youngest descendant in being,"
the executory limitation is void although it must necessarily vest within a period which might well be shorter
than that involved in the preceding illustration.
As the passage quoted by our Supreme Court from
Halsbury's Laws of England 109 indicates, the period of
the Rule Against Perpetuities is the life of a person or
the survivor of a group of persons in being and ascertained for that purpose by the instrument creating the
future interest in question and twenty-one years, but if
no such person or persons are ascertained by the instrument, the period is twenty-one years. Whether the
term of years follpws lives in being or is itself the sole
measure of the period, it may be in terms of a minority or minorities, as was the case in Wilson• v.
1os Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833), cited
with approval in St. Amour v. Rivard, 2 Mich. 294 at 297 (1852).
See: Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270 at 284,
255 N.W. 587 (1934) and authorities cited in the preceding note.
1o9 Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270 at
284, 255 N.W. 587 (1934), quoting from 22 Halsbury, LAws OF ENGLAND, §601, p. 302 (1912), quoted in the text at Part Two, note 89
supra.
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110

Odell, or a gross period of twenty-one years or less
unrelated to minorities. 111 Toms v. Williams 112 was a
suit to construe the will of a testatrix who died in 1876
owning the reversion under a forty-year lease given in
1854 which required the lessor, at the expiration of the
term in 1894, to pay for the lessee's improvements (a
building costing some $50,000) or renew the lease for
another forty years. The will gave the entire estate, including personalty, to trustees who were to accumulate
$5,000 per year of the income, use it to pay for the
lessee's improvements in 1894, and then to transfer the
corpus of the trust to three named persons "or the survivor of them, and to their heirs and assigns forever, as
tenants in common." The Court held that the provision
for accumulation for eighteen years did not exceed the
period of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities,
which the Court said was "any number of lives in being
and twenty-one years, and of course for twenty-one years
as a distinct period, independent of lives." 113 In Markham v. Hufford, 114 testatrix bequeathed $500 to the petitioner "to be paid to him at the expiration of two
years from the date of my demise: Provided that he shall
be deemed a reformed man, in the judgment of the
executors of this will," otherwise to the Women's Chris58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885), Part Two, note 101 supra.
Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833), cited
with approval in St. Amour v. Rivard, 2 Mich. 294 at 297 (1852) and
Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 571, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); Gray,
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §223 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw OF
FUTURE INTERESTS, §493 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §374, Com.
ment m. (1944).
.
112 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879). The surplus income above
$5,000 per annum was to be accumulated until the expiration of the
minority of the youngest of the three named persons and then paid
over to them or the survivor of them. One of them was of age when
the testatrix died.
m 41 Mich. 552 at 571.
n4 123 Mich. 505, 82 N.W. 222, 48 L.R.A. 580 (1900).
110

111
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tian Temperance Union. It was held that this was a
condition precedent which suspended vesting for only
two years in gross and so was valid. In re De Rancourt's
Estate 115 involved a bequest to a trustee to pay the
income to the testator's heirs for fifteen years and then
to transfer the corpus to the heirs of the testator determined according to the statute then in force. It was
treated as valid.
It will be recalled that if lives in being are to be used
as all or part of the measure of the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, they must be the lives of persons
ascertained for that purpose by the instrument creating
the future interest; courts will not select lives not designated by the instrument or connected with its limitations. As to the twenty-one year period, the Rule is
not quite so strict. Thus if Andrew Baker devises property to James Thorpe and his heirs "for the lives of
James and all of his descendants living at the time of
my death and for such period thereafter as the law permits suspension of vesting and then to the youngest living descendant of John Stiles" the words "such period
thereafter as the law permits" are construed to mean
twenty-one years, and the future interest of the youngest descendant of John Stiles is, accordingly, valid. 116
11s 279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891, 110 A.L.R. 1346 (1937).
Both
land and personalty were involved. In Otis v. Arntz, 198 Mich. 196,
164 N.W. 498 (1917), land and personalty were devised to descendants
of the testator to be ascertained twenty-five years after his death. The
disposition was held void as violating the statute prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation. Of course, it also violated
the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.
us Pownall v. Graham, 33 Beav. 242, 55 Eng. Rep. 360 (1863);
Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUI·
TIES, 3rd ed., §§219, 219b (1915); 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS,
§495 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §370, Comment n. and Illustration 4 (1944). In West Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Matlock, 212 S.W.
937 (Tex. Com. App. 1919), "a reasonable time" was construed to
mean twenty-one years.
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The computation of the permissible period under the
Rule Against Perpetuities may involve one, two, or all
of the three elements, lives in being, periods of gestation, and twenty-one years. When more than one of
these elements is involved in a situation, a period of
gestation may precede or follow either or both of the
others. Thus, as has been seen, if John Stiles devises
property to James Thorpe and his heirs "until my
youngest grandchild is of age and then to my youngest
descendant in being at that time," a period of gestation
may precede the measuring life in being of John's child,
a second period of gestation may follow the life and precede the minority of the grandchild, and a third period
of gestation may follow that minority. The element of
twenty-one years, however, although it may follow lives
in being, may not precede them, because the only permissible lives in being are lives in being at the commencement of the period of the Rule. 111 If John Stiles
devises property to James Thorpe and his heirs "until
the death of all of my descendants living twenty-one
years after my death and then to my youngest descendant
living at that time," the executory interest is void. John
may have descendants in being twenty-one years after
his death who were not in being when he died.
Even though an instrument in terms suspends the
vesting of a future interest until the happening of an
event which may not occur within the period of the
Rule, the interest is not void if it could not vest beyond
the period, because the duration of the estate out of
which it is created is limited. If Andrew Baker, ownirig
an estate in Blackacre for the lives of Thomas Kempe,
Roger White and Edward Willis, conveys his estate "to
111 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §374,
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §493 (1936).

Comment e. (1944); 2 Simes,

LAw

302

PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS

James Thorpe and his heirs so long as the Penobscot
Building shall stand and then to John Stiles and his
heirs," the executory interest of John Stiles is valid because it cannot vest after the death of the survivor of
Thomas Kempe, Roger White, and Edward Willis. 118
This is probably an exception to the rule that the measuring lives must be ascertained by the instrument creating the future interest.
If an instrument postpones the vesting of a future
interest until the happening of both of two conditions,
one of which must occur within the period of the Rule
and the other of which may not so occur, the future
interest is void. If John Stiles devises property to James
Thorpe and his heirs "for thirty years and until my
children are all dead and then to my youngest descendant living at that time," the future interest is invalid.119 If, on the other hand, the instrument postpones
vesting only until the happening of that one of two
alternative conditions which first occurs, the fact that
one of the conditions might not be performed within
the period of the Rule will not invalidate the future
interest. In re Lamb's Estate 120 involved a will which
left the estate to nine brothers and sisters of the textatrix
and provided:
"But in case of the death of any of the above-named
legatees previous to the probating or execution of this,
11s Low v. Burron, 3 P. Wms. 262, 24 Eng. Rep. 1055 (1734); Gray,
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§225, 226 (1915); PROPERTY
REsTATEMENT, §370, Comment k. (1944). If the estate conveyed is one
for the lives of ascertained living persons, it cannot violate the Rule
because it cannot vest after the death of the survivor of those persons.
119 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §374, Comment g. and Illustration 7
(1944).
120 122 Mich. 239, 80 N.W. 1081 (1899). Both land and personalty
were involved. Cf. Calkins v. Smith, 41 Mich. 409, 1 N.W. 1048
(1879); Skinner v. Taft, 140 Mich. 282, 103 N.W. 702 (1905).
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my last will and testament, then I desire, will and bequeath that the share of such deceased brother or sister
shall revert to, and become the property of, the children
of said deceased legatee; but, if said deceased legatee
has no children living at the time of my decease, then
the said deceased legatee's share of the property bequeathed to him or her by the terms of this will shall
revert to, and become a part of, the general fund to be
divided among the surviving legatees named in this will."
One of the brothers assigned his interest under the
will and died before the estate of the testatrix was ready
for distribution. The Court held that "execution"
meant distribution and that the children of the brother,
not his assignee, were entitled to the share which would
have been his. This was a sound result because, although distribution might not occur within the period
of the Rule, 121 the gift over would necessarily vest, if at
all, on the death of the survivor of the brothers and
sisters.
2 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); PROPERTY RE§374, Comment f. (1944). But see: Brandenburgh v. Thorndike, 139 Mass. 102, 28 N.E. 575 (1885); Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn.
299, 27 Atl. 585 (1893).
121

STATEMENT,

CHAPTER

11

The Requirement ofCertaintyofVesting
A. CERTAINTY

O SATISFY the Rule Against Perpetuities, a future interest must be so limited that at the commencement of the period of the Rule, 122 it is certain that the interest must vest, if at all, within the period.
This does not mean that the interest must be certain to
vest; if it did a future interest could not be limited to an
unborn person. What it does mean is that there must be
certainty that the interest cannot vest at some time beyond the period of the Rule. 128 If Andrew Baker conveys property to John Stiles, who has no children, for
life, remainder to the eldest son of John, the contingent
remainder may never vest because John may not have a
son. But the remainder will either vest or fail at the
death of John, so it is valid under the Rule. 124

T

The time when the certainty must exist is that of the
commencement of the period of the Rule. Events which
occur before the commencement of the period are considered in determining the validity of a limitation.125 If
As to which see Chapter 10, §A, supra.
Challis, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 180 (1911); Simes,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 370 (1951).
124 See, e.g., Stevens v. Wildey, 281 Mich. 377, 275 N.W. 179 (1937).
12s Vanderp1ank v. King, 3 Hare 1 at 17, 67 Eng. Rep. 273 at
279-280 (1843); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §231
(1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §494 (1936); PROPERTY
REsTATEMENT, §370, Comment m., §374, Comment k. (1944). In
Mullreed v. Clark, llO Mich. 229 at 233, 68 N.W. 138 (1896) the
Court quoted the cited section of Gray with approval and applied the
rule stated to a disposition governed by the statute prohibiting sus
pension of the absolute power of alienation.
1.22

12a
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John Stiles devises property to James Thorpe on trust
to pay the income to John's children for life, then to
their children until the youngest reaches twenty-five,
and then to transfer the principal to John's grandchildren living at that time, the disposition of the principal
is invalid if John has children living at the time of his
death. 1 z6 If, however, John's children predecease him,
that fact is considered in applying the rule and the limitation of the principal is good. Events which occur after
the commencement of the period of the Rule are rrot
considered in determining the validity of a limitation. 121
In Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker,tzs textatrix devised land
to her husband until death or remarriage, then to a
trustee to sell the land and hold the proceeds in trust
to pay half the income to a son, Stuart, for life. The will,
as construed by the Court, gave the remainder in half
the corpus, after the death of Stuart, to those daughters
of Stuart who reached twenty-five and those sons of
Stuart who reached thirty, but if none did so to testatrix's son Looe and his children. Testatrix died in 1913,
1zs Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976
(1924); Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W.
703 (1930); Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich.
270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934), discussed above at Part Two, notes 88,
102-104.
121 Viscount Dungannon v. Smith, 12 Cl. & F. 546, 8 Eng. Rep.
1523 (1846); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); PROPERTY
REsTATEMENT, §370, Comment k. (1944). Contra: Story v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934); PENNA.
STAT. ANN., Tit. 20, §301.4 (1950). Merchants National Bank v. Curtis,
98 N.H. 225, 97 A. (2d) 207 (1953); Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 184 A (1954).
There is an exception in the case of future interests created by the exercise of powers of appointment. Chapter 13, Section C, infra. The rqle
stated in the text has been criticized. Sweet, "The Monstrous Regiment
of the Rule Against Perpetuities," 18 JuRID. REv. 132 at 157-158 (1906);
Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective," 65 HARv. L. REv. 721 at 728-730
(1952); Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67
HARV. L. REV. 1349 (1954). See: Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The 'Wait and See' Doctrine," 52 MICH. L. REv.
179 (1953).
12s 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924).
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and Stuart died in 1915 without issue. The court held
the disposition of the corpus void because, at the time of
the testatrix's death, it was possible that Stuart might
have children, saying:
"The court must be able to say, to avoid the rule, that
to a certainty the estate will vest within 21 years after
the death of Stuart and Looe, and this vesting must be
found to have been discernible at the date of the death
of the testatrix. At that time Stuart and Looe were both
living but had no children. Certainty as to time the
estate will vest must be apparent unaided by events subsubsequent to the date the will became operative." 129
The certainty of vesting required by the Rule Against
Perpetuities is absolute certainty; a high degree of probability is not enough. If, at the commencement of the
period, any combination of future events which would
postpone vesting beyond the period is possible, the future interest is void, although the actual occurrence of
that combination of events is highly unlikely. 130 If John
Stiles devises property "to my brother Henry for life,
remainder to my brother Henry's widow for life, remainder to the oldest male descendant of my brother
Henry living at the death of his widow" the ultimate
remainder is void even though, when John dies, his
brother Henry is eighty and has a wife the same age. 181
129 226 Mich. 72 at 77. Cf. Dean v. Mumford, 102 Mich. 510, 61
N.W. 7 (1894), holding that the fact that testator's widow elected to
take against the will could not be considered in determining the
validity of a disposition under the statute forbidding suspension of
the absolute power of alienation.
180 Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §214 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §370,
Comment k. (1944). ·
m Hodson v. Ball, 14 Sim. 558, 60 Eng. Rep. 474 (1845); Gray,
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §214 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §370, Comment k. (1944). In Dean v. Mumford, 102 Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7
(1894), land was devised upon trust for two sons, their wives and
children, for the lives of the sons and their wives, then to the children
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Henry's present wife may die and he may marry a woman
who was not in being at the death of John. In that event
vesting would be postponed until the end of a life not
in being at the commencement of the period. It is unlikely that Henry will marry a woman more than eighty
years younger than himself, but he may possibly do so.
Provisions in wills postponing distribution until some
administrative step, such as probating the will, paying
debts, completion of administration, winding up of a
business or sale of property, is taken are frequent causes
of difficulty. Whenever possible, such provisions are construed to postpone only enjoyment, not vesting. 132 In
Skinner v. Taft, 133 a direction in a will that the executors
transfer property to four named persons and their heirs
and assigns, "after the payment of my just debts and
funeral expenses" and upon the termination of a trust
which was to terminate "five years from the date of the
probating of my will in the County of which I may die
and their heirs and assigns. The trust was held invalid for violation
of the statute prohibiting suspension· of the absolute power of alienation, but the Court thought that the reference to the sons' wives was
to wives living at the testator's death. So construed, the trust would
not violate the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. Conover v.
Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900), involved a conveyance
of land upon trust for William for life, then for his wife and children
for her life, remainder to the children. The Court held that, under
the language of the deed in question, "children" meant those children
living at the death of William so that their interests vested indefeasibly at his death. With this construction, the remainder would not
have violated the common-law Rule. Another provision of the instrument limited interests to persons to be determined on the death
of William's wife if he had no children. If the word "wife" included
anyone whom William might marry after the date of the conveyance,
these provisions would have violated the common-law Rule.
132 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §374, Comment f. (1944). See: Fitzgerald v. City of Big
Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900) (payment of debts and
other legacies); McGraw v. McGraw; 176 Fed. 312 (6th Cir. 1910) (payment of debts). Cf. De Buck v. Bousson, 295 Mich. 164, 294 N.W. 135
(1940).
133 140 Mich. 282, 103 N.W. 702 (1905). Cf. In re Mallory's Estate,
127 Mich. 119, 86 N.W. 541, 89 N.W. 348 (1901).
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a resident," was treated as valid, presumably on the
theory that the interests vested at the death of the testaor and only enjoyment was postponed. If such a provision does postpone vesting until the taking of some
administrative action, such as probating the will, which
may not occur within twenty-one years, the interests so
postponed are void, even though that action would
normally be completed well within the permissible
period. 134 Thus in Battelle v. Parks/ 85 it was suggested
that land could not be devised beneficially to the administrator of the testator's estate, because it is uncertain when
an administrator will be appointed. It should be recalled,
however, that if vesting is postponed only until the happening of that one of two alternative conditions which
1s4 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTuRE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); Note, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 814 (1939); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §374, Comment f. (1944).
But see: Brandenburgh v. Thorndike, 139 Mass. 102, 28 N.E. 575
(1885); Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 Atl. 585 (1893). In re
Wood, [1894] 3 Ch. 381 (C.A.), involved a bequest to issue of the
testator living when his gravel pits should be exhausted. Although
the pits would have been exhausted in four years after the testator's
death if worked at the usual rate and they were in fact exhausted in
six years, the bequest was held void because the pits might not have
been exhausted within twenty-one years. In re Bewick, [1911] 1 Ch.
116, involved a devise to trustees to pay off a £1000 mortgage from
income and then to convey to the testator's issue living when the
mortgage was paid. Although the normal income was sufficient to
pay off the mortgage in five years, the interest of the issue was held
void because the income might possibly decrease, thus preventing
paying off the mortgage within twenty-one years. The rule that postponement of vesting until probate or administration violates the Rule
Against Perpetuities is criticized in Leach and Tudor, "The Common
Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.23
(1952).
1s5 2 Mich. 531 (1853). The case involved the statute prohibiting
suspension of the absolute power of alienation, which allowed no
period in gross, but the problem can arise under the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities. Cf. Thatcher v. Wardens &: Vestrymen of
St. Andrew's Church of Ann Arbor, 37 Mich. 264 (1877), where the
Court assumed that a direction to pay the expenses of the last illness
and funeral of a life cestui could suspend the absolute power of
alienation. The facts are not stated in the official report but are set
out in Records &: Briefs, June Term, 1877, # 36.
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first occurs, the fact that one of the conditions might
not be performed within the period of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, will not invalidate the interest in question.
In re Lamb's Estate 136 involved a will which left the
estate to nine brothers and sisters of the testatrix and
provided that if any legatee should die before the estate
was ready for distribution his share should pass to his
children. The shifting executory interests were properly
treated as valid because they would necessarily vest, if
at all, on the deaths of the legatees. Similarly, in Schiffer
v. Brenton,131 a provision in a will that if any legatee contested it his interest would shift to the other legatees was
held valid. A contest by a named legatee would necessarily be commenced during his lifetime.
For the purpose of determining certainty of vesting
under the Rule Against Perpetuities, every human being
is treated as being capable of having children, regardless
of age or physical condition. 138 This is a conclusive presumption of law which cannot be rebutted by evidence
that the person is incapable of having children.189 If
1SG122 Mich. 239, 80 N.W. 1081 (1899), Part Two, note 120 supra.
137 247 Mich. 512, 226 N.W. 253 (1929).
Cf. Fitzgerald v. City
of Big Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900), where a gift to
named legatees in the event the city refused to accept a bequest for
library purposes was treated as valid. This was much more questionable than the provisions in Schiffer v. Brenton as the life of the city
could not be a measuring life under the Rule. In Moss v. Axford,
246 Mich. 288, 224 N.W. 425 (1929), a bequest of the residue to the
executor, "with the instructions to pay the same to the person who
has given me the best care in my declining years and who in his
opinion is the most worthy of my said property," was held valid.
If the discretionary power to select the legatee was confined to the
named executor, the legacy would necessarily vest, if at all, during
the life of the executor.
138 Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787); Gray,
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §215 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS, §497 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §377 (1944);
Annotations, 67 A.L.R. 539 (1929); 146 A.L.R. 794 (1943). Contra:
Exham v. Beamish [1939] I.R. 336.
ta9 Although irrebuttable for purposes of determining the validity
of future interests under the Rule Against Perpetuities, there is
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John Stiles devises property to "my mother for life, remainder to her children for their lives, remainder to her
youngest grandchild living at the death of the survivor
of her children," the ultimate remainder is void even if
John's mother is ninety-eight years old at the time of
his death. 140 An English court has even suggested that a
child is conclusively presumed to be capable of having
children before reaching the age of five years. 141 Unless
the word "children" as used in the limitation includes
adopted children, 142 the conclusive presumption of law
that all persons are capable of having children throughout their lives sometimes requires the treatment as possible that which is factually impossible. For this reason
the presumption has,been criticized.148 It does have the
virtue of increasing the certainty of the law of property
English and some American authority for permitting the presumption of possibility of issue to be rebutted in suits to terminate trusts
where the only non-consenting beneficiaries are the unborn children
of a person who, because of age, disease, or surgery is in fact incapable
of having children. Leng v. Hodges, Jacobs 585, 37 Eng. Rep. 971
(1822); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., 191n (1915); TRUSTS
RESTATEMENT, §340, Comment e. (1935); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
§274 (1940).
uo Ward v. Van der Loeff, [1924] A.C. 653. In this country, if the
context permits, the word "children" in such a limitation [i.e., to
the children of a person whom the testator knows to be beyond the
age of child-bearing] tends to be construed to mean children living
at the time of the testator's death. Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 131
Atl. 188 (1925); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Marble, 316 Mass. 294,
55 N.E. (2d) 446 (1944); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §377, Comment c.
(1944). Such a construction would make the limitation valid.
141 Re Gaite's Will Trusts, [1949] 1 All E.R. 459 at 460. The disposition in question was held valid, however, on the ground that, because English law does not permit a child under five to marry, such
a child could not have legitimate issue.
1 42 A limitation to the children of a named person ordinarily does
not include adopted children except where an intent to include them
is found from additional language or circumstances. Russell v. Musson, 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
§287 (1940). Some modern adoption statutes may alter this rule.
E.g., REv. STAT. Mo. (1949) §453.090.
143 E.g., Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective," 65 HARV. L. REv. 721
at 731-734 (1952).
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by making it possible to ascertain the validity of limitations of future interests without awaiting the settlement
by litigation of doubtful questions of fact. 144 At any
rate, Michigan follows the presumption. In Gettins v.
Grana Rapids Trust Co.,145 property was bequeathed to
a trustee to pay the income to the testatrix's daughter
Belle for life, and then to her children and to transfer
a share in the corpus to each child of Belle on reaching
twenty-five, with limitations over in the event of any
child dying under twenty-five. Although Belle was fiftytwo and childless, the provisions as to the limitations
over were held void because they might postpone vesting until more than twenty-one years after her death,
the Court saying that Belle must be considered as capable of having issue as long as she lived.
B. THE CONCEPT OF VESTING IN ENGLISH LAW

As has been seen, at the time of its reception in this
country, English law permitted the creation in persons
other than the grantor or testator of three types of future interests 146 in property, remainders, 147 interessia
2 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §497 (1936).
249 Mich. 238, 288 N.W. 703 (1930). The case involved a devise
of land with a mandatory direction to convert to personalty so the
common-law Rule applied Accord under the statute prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation: Rozell v. Rozell, 217
Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922) (man aged 44). See: Van Gallow v.
Brandt, 168 Mich. 642 at 647, 134 N.W. 1018 (1912) (woman aged
68; suggestion that it would make no difference if she were 100).
.146 Professor Simes defines a future interest as "an interest in land
or other things in which the privilege of possession or of enjoyment
is future and not present." 1 LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §1 (1936).
For more extended discussions of the rules of vesting in Anglo-American law see Simes, ld., §§64-158; Fearne, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS,
lOth ed. (1844); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§99-ll8,
970-974 (1915); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§157, 158 and comments
(1936); 2 Powell, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §§275-279 (1950); Simes,
"Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §§4.334.36, 4.53-4.58 (1952).
147 Part One, notes 351, 352, 358, 359, 363; Part Two, notes 5-21
supra.
144
145
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termini, 148 and executory interests. 149 At common law
a remainder is a future freehold estate in land so limited
as to become possessory immediately upon the termination of a preceding estate for life or in tail created by
the same conveyance or will. 150 A remainder is contin148 Part One, notes 355, 359, 363, supra. An interesse termini is a
legal estate for years in land, limited to an ascertained living person,
to commence on a fixed future date. If Andrew Baker on January
1, 1954, leases land to John Stiles for a term of forty years, to commence July 1, 1990, the interest of John is an interesse termini. Such
an interest is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. Mann,
Crossman & Paulin, Ltd. v. Registrar of Land Registry, [1918]
1 Ch. 202; Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§117, 320n
(1915). See: Smith v. Day, 2 M. & W. 684, 150 Eng. Rep. 931 (1837);
Gillard v. Cheshire Lines Committee, 32 W.R. 943 (C.A. 1884); Redington v. Browne, 32 L.R. (Ir.) 347 at 356 (1893); Knight v. City of
London Brewery Co., (1912] 1 K.B. 10; Challis, LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 472-473 (1911). At common law, prior to the
statutes of Uses and Wills, an estate for years could not be limited to
commence on the happening of an event uncertain to occur. Green
v. Edwards, Cro. Eliz. 216, 78 Eng. Rep. 472 (1591). Hence, a limitation of a term of years or an interest therein to an unborn or un·
ascertained person or contingent upon an uncertain event is not an
interesse termini but an executory interest, to which the Rule Against
Perpetuities does apply. Redington v. Browne, 32 L.R. (Ir.) 347
(1893); Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §320n. (1915); 2
Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §498 (1936).
1 49 Part One, notes 355, 359, 363; Part Two, notes 23, 25, 26, supra.
1 5o Part Two, supra, at notes 6-21. Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS,
lOth ed., 3-4 [Butler's Note (c)] (1844); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PER·
PETUITIES, 3rd ed., §8 (1915); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §156 (1936);
Simes, "Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY,
§4.25 (1952). A freehold estate limited unconditionally to an ascertained living person, to follow an estate for years, whenever and however the estate for years terminates, although frequently referred to as
a remainder, is technic;tlly a present estate subject to a term. If
Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe for forty years, remainder
to John Stiles and his heirs, John takes a present estate in fee simple
which is vested and not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Boraston's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 19a, 76 Eng. Rep. 668 (1587); Smith ex
dem. Dormer v. Packhurst, 3 Atk. 135, 26 Eng. Rep. 881 (1742);
DeGrey v. Richardson, 3 Atk. 469, 26 Eng. Rep. 1069 (1747); Smith,
EXECUTORY INTERESTS, ed. 1844, §§253, 760; Challis, LAW OF REAL
PRoPERTY, 3rd ed., 80, 99 (1911); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES,
3rd ed., §§8, 970n (1915); 1 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §62
(1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §156, Comment e. (1936). This is
true even though the estate for years is subject to a special limitation.
If Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe for forty years if the
Penobscot Building so long stands, remainder to John Stiles and his
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gent (not vested) if it is subject to a condition precedent
which may not occur at or before the expiration of the
preceding particular estate. 151 If Andrew Baker conveys
land to James Thorpe for life, remainder to John Stiles
if John marries Lucy Baker, the remainder is contingent
until John marries Lucy. A remainder is vested if it is
not subject to any condition precedent except the termination of the preceding estate.152 This being so, a reheirs, John takes a present estate in fee simple which is, of course,
vested. If, however, a freehold estate is limited to cut off or follow a
term of years only if an uncertain event occurs, it is an executory
interest. If Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe for forty
years but, if the Penobscot Building falls at or before the expiration
of the term, to John Stiles and his heirs, the interest limited to John
is an executory future interest which is void because it may not vest
within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Gore v. Gore, 2 P.
Wms. 28, 24 Eng. Rep. 629 (1722); Smith, EXECUTORY INTERESTS, ed.
1844, §§121-124; Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§58, 59
(1915); 1 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §§62, 155 (1936); PROPERTY
RESTATEMENT, §156, Comment e. (1936); Simes, "Types of Future
Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§4.31, 4.55 (1952). See:
Green v. Edwards, Cro. Eliz. 216, 150 Eng. Rep. 472 (1591).
tst Beverley v. Beverley, 2 Vern. 131, 23 Eng. Rep. 692 (1690);
Festing v. Allen, 12 Mees. & W. 279, 152 Eng. Rep. 1204 (1843);
Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 5-9 and Butler's Note (g)
(1844); Digby, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 5th ed., 266
(1897); Challis, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 75, 128 (1911); Gray,
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§9, 101 (1915); 1 Simes, LAw OF
FuTuRE INTERESTS, §§68, 69 (1936); Simes, "Types of Future Interests,"
1 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §4.36 (1952). See: Smith ex dem.
Dormer v. Packhurst, 3 Atk. 135 at 139, 26 Eng. Rep. 881 at 883 (H.L.
1742). So a remainder is contingent even though limited on a condition which must occur, such as the death of a person or the coming
of a fixed future date, if the condition is not certain to occur at or
before the termination of the preceding estate, whenever and however
that termination may occur. If Andrew Baker conveys land to James
Thorpe for life, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs if Lucy Baker
dies, the remainder is contingent. Lucy must necessarily die, but she
may not die at or before the termination of the life estate. Colthirst
v. Bejushin, 1 Plow. Comm. 21, 75 Eng. Rep. 33 (1550); Beverley v.
Beverley, supra.
1s2 Webb v. Hearing, Cro. Jac. 415, 79 Eng. Rep. 355 (1616); Luxford v. Cheeke, 3 Lev. 125, 83 Eng. Rep. 611 (1683); Digby, HISTORY
OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 5th ed., 265 (1897); Challis, LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 146 (1911); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES,
3rd ed., §970 (1915); 1 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §67 (1936).
This is so only if the remainder, throughout its continuance, will take
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mainder may be vested although it is not presently possessory and may never become so. 153 If Andrew Baker
conveys land to Roger White for life, remainder to Lucy
Baker for life, remainder to James Thorpe in tail, remainder to John Stilesin fee simple, all three remainders
are vested because none is subject to any condition
precedent except the termination of the preceding estate
or estates. This is so as to Lucy Baker's life estate although it will never become possessory unless she survives James Thorpe. 154 As the Rule Against Perpetuities
prohibits only remoteness of vesting, not remoteness of
possession, the remainder to John Stiles is valid under
the Rule although it will not become possessory until
the last lineal descendant of James Thorpe dies, which
effect on the termination of the preceding estate, whenever and however such termination occurs. If the remainder is conditional upon the
preceding estate terminating in a particular manner, it is contingent.
If Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe for life, remainder to
John Stiles and his heirs, the remainder is vested. If Andrew Baker
conveys land to James Thorpe for life, remainder if, but only if,
the life estate terminates by the death of James, to John Stiles and
his heirs, the remainder is contingent because the life estate may
terminate in some other manner than the death of James, as by forfeature or surrender. Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 5 and
Butler's Note (d) (1844).
1sa Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 216 (1844); Digby,
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 5th ed., 265 (1897); Challis,
LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 74, 127, 146 (1911); Gray, RuLE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §102 (1915); Simes, "Types of Future
Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §4.35 (1952). See: Smith
ex dem. Dormer v. Packhurst, 3 Atk. 135 at 138, 26 Eng. Rep. 881 at
883 (H.L. 1742).
1~>4 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUmES, 3rd ed., §102 (1915); 1 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§69, 72 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
§157, Comment f., Special Note, Comment p., Ill. 11 (1936); 2 Powell,
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §274 (1950); Simes, "Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §4.35 (1952). See: Webb v. Hearing, Cro. Jac. 415, 79 Eng. Rep. 355 (1616); Boreton v. Nicholls,
Cro. Car. 363, 79 Eng. Rep. 917 (1634); Badger v. Lloyd, 1 Salk. 232,
91 Eng. Rep. 206 (1696); Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 268 at 287-288
(1866). Lucy's life estate would be vested even if Roger's preceding
life estate were on special limitation, e.g., "to Roger White for life
if he shall so long remain in the Ready Reserve, remainder to Lucy
Baker for life."
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may occur at a time beyond the period of the Rule. 155
Similarly, if Andrew Baker conveys land to Lucy Baker,
now unmarried and childless, for life, remainder to the
eldest child of Lucy for life, remainder to John Stiles in
fee simple, the estate of John Stiles is both vested and
valid although it may not become possessory until the
end of a life not now in being and follows in time a
remainder which is contingent.156
At common law a remainder limited to a person not
in being or not presently ascertainable is contingent because it is subject to the condition precedent of the remainderman coming into being or becoming ascertainable.157 If Andrew Baker conveys land to Lucy Baker,
now unmarried and childless, for life, remainder to the
eldest child of Lucy, the remainder is contingent. So,
where the Rule in Shelley's Case has been abolished, if
155 Webb v. Hearing, Cro. Jac. 415, 79 Eng. Rep. 355 (1616); Udal
v. Udal, Aleyn 81, 82 Eng. Rep. 926 (1648); Fearne, CoNTINGENT
REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 223 (1844); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES,
3rd ed., §111 (1915); 1 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§69, 72
(1936); Simes, "Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, §4.35 (1952). See: Badger v. Lloyd, 1 Salk. 232, 91 Eng.
Rep. 206 (1696). John's remainder in fee simple would be vested
even if James' preceding estate tail were on special limitation, e.g.,
"to James Thorpe and the heirs of his body so long as they bear
the name and arms of Baker, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs."
.t5s Udal v. Udal, Aleyn 81, 82 Eng. Rep. 926 (1648); Fearne,
CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 223 (1844); 1 Simes, LAw OF
FUTURE INTERESTS, §§69, 73 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §157,
Comment f. (1936); Simes, "Types of Future Interests,'' 1 AMERICAN
LAW oF PROPERTY, §4.33 (1952). See: Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §117a (1915). Cf. the rule stated in Part Two, note
161 infra, that every interest subsequent to an executory interest is
itself executory.
mKent v. Harpool, 1 Vent. 306, 86 Eng. Rep. 197 (1678); Fearne,
CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth Ed., 9 (1844); Challis, LAw oF REAL
PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 131 (1911}; Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd
ed., §9 (1915); 1 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§69, 82 (1936);
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §157, Comments u., v. (1936); §370, Comment i. (1944); 2 Powell, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §278 (1950). See:
Smith ex dem. Dormer v. Packhurst, 3 Atk. 135 at 139, 26 Eng. Rep.
881 at 883 (H.L. 1742).
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Andrew Baker conveys land to Lucy Baker for life, remainder to the heirs of Lucy in fee simple, the remainder is contingent until the death of Lucy because
her heirs will not be ascertainable until then. 158 Similarly, if Andrew Baker conveys land to John Stiles, who
now has ten children, for life, remainder to that child
of John's who takes the most care of John in his last
illness, the remainder is contingent until the death of
John because the remainderman cannot be ascertained
until then. 159
A remainder may be vested although it is subject to
being defeated by the exercise of a power of appointment
or by the operation of a condition subsequent, a special
limitation, or an executory limitation.160 If Andrew
Baker conveys land to Lucy Baker for life, remainder
15s Challoner and Bowyer's Case, 2 Leon. 70, 74 Eng. Ree. 366
(1587); Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng. Rep. 146 (1597);
Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 9 (1844); Challis, LAw OF
REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 75, 131 (1911); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PER·
PETUITIES, 3rd ed., §109 (1915); 1 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS,
§§69, 83 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §157, Comment u., Ill. 26
(1936); Simes, "Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY, §§4.2, 4.25 (1952). See: Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4
H.L.C. 1 at 81, 10 Eng. Rep. 359 at 392 (1853). However, a remainder
to the "heirs" of a living person is vested if the word "heirs" is not
used in its technical sense but as a designation of presently ascertainable existing persons, such as presently living children or the persons
who would be heirs if the ancestor died presently. Darbison ex dem.
Long v. Beaumont, 1 P. Wms. 229, 24 Eng. Rep. 366 (1713), aff'd.,
3 Brown 60, 1 Eng. Rep, 1177 (1714); Goodright ex dem. Brooking
v. White, 2 Wm. Bl. 1010, 96 Eng. Rep. 593 (1775).
159 Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 102, 79 Eng. Rep. 691 (1628); Quarm
v. Quarm, [1892] I Q.B. 184 (C.A.); Challis, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY,
3rd ed., 131 (1911); 1 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §82 (1936).
1so Cunningham v. Moody, 1 Ves. Sen. 174, 27 Eng. Rep. 965
(1748); Doe ex dem. Willis v. Martin, 4 T.R. 39, 100 Eng. Rep. 882
(1790); Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 226-227 (1844);
Challis, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 75 (1911); Gray, RuLE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§102, 103, 112 (1915); 1 Simes, LAw
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§57, 69, (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §157,
Comments p., q., r., s. (1936); 2 Powell, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §277
(1950). Simes, "Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY, §4.35 (1952).
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as Lucy may by will appoint and, in default of appointment, to John Stiles in fee subject to the condition that
John and his heirs care for Lucy's grave forever, the remainder of John Stiles is vested. If Andrew Baker conveys land to Lucy Baker for life, remainder to John
Stiles and his heirs so long as they care for Lucy's grave,
the remainder is vested. If Andrew Baker conveys land
to Lucy Baker for life, remainder to John Stiles and his
heirs, but if Lucy's grave is neglected within twenty
years after her death, then to James Thorpe and his
heirs, the remainder to John Stiles is vested.
Under the common-law system, every future interest
limited to someone other than the grantor or testator
which is not a remainder or an interesse termini is an executory interest. 161 The term includes springing freehold
interests in land, 162 shifting freehold interests which cut
161 Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 381-386 and Butler's
Notes (a) and (b), 401 and Butler's Note (e) (1844); Challis, LAw oF
REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 76, 168-171 (1911); 1 Simes, LAw oF FUTURE
INTERESTs, §149 (1936); Simes, "Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERI·
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §4.53 (1952). Cf. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
§§156, Comment e., 158 (1936). The Restatement classifies interessia
termini as executory interests and future interests in chattels real and
personal, and following chattels real, which would be remainders if
they were freehold estates in land expectant upon freehold estates in
land, as remainders. The Restatement classification reflects fairly widespread American usage.
A limitation subsequent to an executory interest is an executory
interest, although it is a freehold estate in land so limited as to
become possessory upon the termination of a preceding freehold
estate. If Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe and his heirs
but, if Lucy Baker die in the lifetime of James, to Roger White for
life, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs, the interest of John is
executory. Fearne, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS, 10th ed., 503 (1844);
Challis, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 124 (1911). But see Part
Two, note 168 infra. A freehold interest which follows an estate for
years is either a present estate or an executory interest. Part Two,
note 150 supra.
162 Clerc's Case, 6 Co. Rep. I7b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (1599); Davies v.
Speed, 2 Salk. 675, 91 Eng. Rep. 574 (1692); Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 399 (1844); 2 Powell, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY,
§279 (1950); Simes, "Types of Future Interests," I AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY, §4.56 (1952). See: Badger v. Lloyd, 1 Salk. 232 at 233, 91
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off a prior estate for life163 or in tail, 164 freehold interests
which follow or cut off a prior estate in fee simple,165
Eng. Rep. 206 (1696). If Andrew Baker conveys or devises land to
John Stiles and his heirs "to commence in possession ten years after
my death," the interest of John is a springing executory interest.
1sa For example, if Andrew Baker conveys land to Lucy Baker for
life but, if Lucy remarry, to John Stiles for the life of Lucy, the
interest of John is a shifting executory interest. Brent's Case, 2 Leon.
14, 74 Eng. Rep. 319 (1575); Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth
ed., 400 (1844). See: Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H.L.C. 1 at 186,
10 Eng. Rep. 359 at 433 (1853). This must be distinguished from an
interest following a life estate on special limitation, which is a re·
mainder, not an executory interest. If Andrew Baker conveys land
to Lucy Baker until her death or remarriage and, in the event of such
remarriage, to John Stiles for the life of Lucy, John takes a contingent remainder. Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 10
[Butler's Note (h)], 13, (1844); 2 Powell, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY,
§279 (1950); 1 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §154 (1936). See:
Beverley v. Beverley, 2 Vern. 131, 23 Eng. Rep. 692 (1690); Egerton
v. Earl Brownlow, supra.
164 For example, if Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe
and the heirs of his body, but if the tenant in tail fail to bear the
name and arms of Baker, to John Stiles and the heirs of his body.
If, however, an estate tail is on special limitation, an estate limited to
take effect upon the operation of the special limitation is a remainder,
not an executory interest. If Andrew Baker conveys land to James
Thorpe and the heirs of his body so long as they bear the name and
arms of Baker and, on their ceasing to do so, to John Stiles and the
heirs of his body, John takes a contingent remainder. Arton v. Hare,
Popham 97, 79 Eng. Rep. 1207 (1594); Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, 10th ed., 5, 13 (1844); 1 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS,
§154 (1936).
1s5 Hinde and Lyons Case, 3 Leon. 64, 74 Eng. Rep. 543 (1577);
Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620). As there
cannot be a remainder on a fee simple (Part Two, note 7 supra), a
future interest limited on a fee simple is always an executory interest
whether or not the fee is on special limitation, that is, whether the
future interest is limited to follow or to cut off the preceding fee.
If Andrew Baker conveys fand to James Thorpe and his heirs so long
as they shall bear the name and arms of Baker and then to John
Stiles and his heirs (special limitation), or to James Thorpe and his
heirs, but if they shall cease to bear the name and arms of Baker to
John Stiles and his heirs (conditional limitation), the interest of
John Stiles is, in either case, an executory interest (which, of course,
violates the Rule Against Perpetuities and so is void). Fearne, CoN·
TINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 12 (1844); Challis, LAw OF REAL
PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 173 (1911); 1 Simes, LAw oF FUTuRE INTERESTS,
§154 (1936); 2 Powell, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §279 (1950); Simes,
"Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§4.25,
4.27, 4.55 (1952). See: Willion v. Berkley, 1 Plowd. Conun. 223 at
235, 239, 248, 75 Eng. Rep. 339 at 358, 365, 379 (1562); Earl of
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all future interests in estates for years except the interesse
termini/66 and all future interests in chattels personal
except, possibly, an interest limited to follow a life estate
which modern authorities treat as, or analogous to, a remainder.m In strict common-law theory, an executory
interest, unlike a remainder, never vests until it becomes
possessory. 168 Thus if Andrew Baker conveys to John
Stafford v. Buckley, 2 Ves. Sen. 170, 28 Eng. Rep. 111 (1750). But
see Part Two, note 168 infra. Compare the different rule as to future
interests limited on life estates and fees tail mentioned in the two
preceding notes.
.1ss Manning's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 94b, 77 Eng. Rep. 618 (1609);
Lampet's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (1612); Cotton v.
Heath, 1 Eq. Cas. Ahr. 191, pl. 2, 21 Eng. Rep. 981 (1638); Fearne,
CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 4 [Butler's Note (c) 2.] (1844);
Smith, EXECUTORY INTERESTs, ed. 1844, §756a. Cf. Gray, RuLE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §117b, App. F. (1915); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT,
§156, Comment e. (1936); 2 Powell, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, §§273,
279 (1950). The Restatement treats some interests in estates for years
as remainders. Part Two, note 161 supra. Professor Powell follows
the terminology of the Restatement but recognizes that the rule
stated in the text was that of the English law. As to the interesse
termini, see Part Two, note 148 supra. A freehold estate which follows
an estate for years is either a present estate or an executory interest.
Part Two, note 150 supra.
167 Hoare v. Parker, 2 T.R. 376, 100 Eng. Rep. 202 (1788); Re
Tritton, 61 L.T.R. 301 (Q.B. 1889); Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS,
lOth ed., 4 (Butler's Note (c) 2.) (1844); Part One, notes 409-422
supra. Cf. Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §117a, App. F
(1915); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §156, Comment e. (1936); Powell,
LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, §§273, 279. In Evans v. Walker, [1876] 3
Ch. Div. 211, there was a bequest of chattels personal to Maria Evans
for life, then to her children for their lives, then to Edwin, Sally,
and Eliza Walker. The interest of the Walkers was treated as a
vested remainder and held valid. If an executory interest, it would
have violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. Most modern American
authority follows the view of this case.
1ss Preston, TREATISE oN EsTATES, 2d ed., 66, 75 (1820); Fearne,
CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 1 [Butler's Note (a)] (1844);
Smith, ExECUTORY INTERESTS, ed. 1844, §301; Gray, RuLE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §114 (1915); Simes, "Types of Future Interests,"
1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §4.2 (1952); Leach and Tudor, "The
Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 Id., §24.20. See: Gore v.
Gore, 2 P. Wms. 28, 24 Eng. Rep. 629 (1722). Cf. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §158, Comment b. (1936), §370, Comment o. (1944); Gray, Id.,
§§117, 117a. This does not mean that an executory interest was always
contingent. Such an interest limited to take effect on an event bound
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Stiles an estate in fee simple in land to commence in
possession upon the death of Andrew, the estate does
not, in theory, vest until Andrew dies. Similarly, if Andrew Baker conveys to John Stiles an estate in fee simple
in land to commence in possession ten years after the
date of the deed, the estate does not vest until the expiration of the ten years.169 Logical application of this doctrine would mean that if Andrew Baker conveys to John
Stiles an estate in fee simple in land to commence in
possession twenty-two years after the date of the deed,
the conveyance would be void under the Rule Against
Perpetuities because the estate cannot vest within the
period of the Rule. Such a result would be absurd, because a conveyance by Andrew Baker to James Thorpe
for twenty-two years, remainder to John Stiles in fee,
is unquestionably valid.170 Modem authorities take the
to occur was not contingent. An executory interest of a non-possessory
character, such as a beneficial interest under a trust or a profit or
easement, would, of course, vest when it becomes presently beneficial.
Professor Gray suggested that a future interest in chattels personal,
to take effect upon the termination of a prior interest for years,
whenever and however the prior interest terminates, and a future
interest in chattels personal which would be a vested remainder on a
life estate if the property were land, are vested. However that may
be, it is settled tliat a future interest in land which would be a remainder but for the fact that the preceding estate is an executory
interest may vest when the preceding interest vests. If Andrew Baker
conveys land to James Thorpe and his heirs but, if James die without
issue living at the time of his death, to Roger White for life, remainder
to John Stiles and his heirs, the interest of John, although originally
executory, becomes a vested remainder when James dies without surviving issue. Lewis Bowles's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 79b, 77 Eng. Rep.
1252 (1615); Challis, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 124 (1911);
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §114n.4. (1915); 1 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §152 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §156,
Comment c., (1936), §370, Comment o. (1944).
169 Clere's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (1599); Davies
v. Speed, 2 Salk. 675, 91 Eng. Rep. 574 (1692). Professor Simes thinks
that such a conveyance can sometimes be construed to create a life
estate followed by a remainder. I LAw oF FUTURE INTERESTS, §150
(1936).
110 Part Two, note 150 supra. Professor Simes thinks that such a
conveyance can sometimes be construed to create a present estate in
fee simple subject to a term. 1 LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §150 (1936).
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view that an executory interest limited to an ascertained
living person and certain to become possessory on a fixed
future date does not violate the Rule. 171
With this exception, every executory interest which is
not certain to become possessory, if at all, within the
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, is void. 172 Thus
an executory interest limited to a person who may not
be ascertainable within the period of the Rule is invalid.
If Andrew Baker bequeaths jewels to John Stiles for life,
then to John's widow for life, then to the eldest son of
John living at the death of such widow, the interest of
the eldest son is void because.he may not be ascertainable
until the death of a person not presently in being. 173
Similarly, if Andrew Baker, owning an estate for five
hundred years in land, bequeaths it to John Stiles for
171 Challis, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 472-473
(1911); 2
Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §498 (1936); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, §370, Comment h. (1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common
Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY,
§24.20 (1952). See: Gore v. Gore, 2 P. Wms. 28, 24 Eng. Rep. 629
(1722); Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 1 (1844). But cf.
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§114, 20ln.2 (1915).
Compare the rule as to interessia termini, which are of the same
essential nature as springing executory interests. Part Two, note
148 supra. An executory interest violates the Rule even though
limited unconditionally to an ascertained living person on a fixed
future day, if ascertainment of the exact interest in or part of the
property so limited is postponed for longer than the period of the
Rule. Curtis v. Lukin, 5 Beav. 147, 49 Eng. Rep. 533 (1842).
112 Part Two, note 134 supra. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §370, Comment o., Ill. 5 (1944). An executory interest of a non-possessory
character, such as a beneficial interest under a trust or a profit or
easement, would, of course, vest when it becomes presently beneficial.
11a Hodson v. Ball, 14 Sim. 558, 60 Eng. Rep. 474 (1845); Gray,
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIEs, 3rd ed., §214 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw OF
FUTURE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §370, Comment k. (1944); Part Two, note 131 supra. In Re Hill, [1902] 1 Ch.
807 (C.A.), an attempt to create a perpetual succession of life interests in jewels was held invalid. Compare Part Two, note 13 supra.
In both the example put in the text and in Re Hill, the interests
created would have been contingent remainders if the property
involved had been land instead of jewels. Even so, they would have
been void because no future interest can vest until the taker is ascertainable. Part Two, note 157 supra.

322

PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS

life, then to his eldest son for life, then to the eldest son
of such eldest son, the last disposition is void if John has
no son when Andrew dies, because the taker may not
be ascertainable within lives in being and twenty-one
years. 174 Even though the taker of an executory interest
is in being and ascertained, it is invalid if so limited as
to become possessory upon the happening of an event
which may not occur and which may occur at a time
beyond the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Thus if Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe
in fee simple, "but if the descendants of James become
extinct, then to John Stiles and his heirs," the shifting
executory interest limited to John is void because it
might become possessory at some time beyond the period
of the Rule. 175 Similarly, if Andrew Baker conveys land
174 Somerville v. Lethbridge, 6 T.R. 213, 101 Eng. Rep. 517 (1795);
Beard v. Westcott, 5 B.&Ald. 801, 106 Eng. Rep. 1383 (1822); Beard
v. Westcott, Turn. & R. 25, 37 Eng. Rep. 1002 (1822). A freehold remainder limited in the same way would also be void.
u5 Davies v. Speed, 2 Salk. 675, 91 Eng. Rep. 574 (1692); Digby,
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 5th ed., 365-366 (1897);
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PFRPETUmEs, 3rd ed., §177 (1915). See: Badger
v. Lloyd, I Salk. 232 at 233, 91 Eng. Rep. 206 (1696). That is, an
executory interest limited to commence on indefinite failure of issue
is void under the Rule although, as has been seen (Part Two, note
155 supra) a remainder on an estate tail, which is really conditional
upon indefinite failure of issue, is vested and valid. In England, until
the rule was changed by statute [1 Viet., c. 26, §29, (1837)] there was
a constructional presumption that, when property was transferred "to
James Thorpe and his heirs but, if James die without issue, to John
Stiles and his heirs," the phrase "die without issue" meant indefinite
failure of issue, that is "if the descendants of James ever become
extinct." If the property involved was land, such a transfer was construed to create an estate tail in James with a remainder in fee simple
in John which was vested and valid. Soulle v. Gerrard, Cro. Eliz. 525,
78 Eng. Rep. 773 (1595); Tuttesham v. Roberts, Cro. Jac. 22, 79 Eng.
Rep. 18 (1603); Browne v. Jerves, Cro. Jac. 290, 79 Eng. Ree. 249
(1610); Chadock v. Cowley, Cro. Jac. 695, 79 Eng. Rep. 604 (1624);
Doe ex·dem. Jones v. Owens, 1 Barn. & Ad. 318, 109 Eng. Rep. 805
(1830). See: Machell v. Weeding, 8 Sim. 4, 59 Eng. Rep. 2 (1836).
If the property involved consisted of chattels real or personal, the
interest of John was an executory interest which was void under the
Rule Against Perpetuities. Green v. Rod, Fitz-G. 68, 94 Eng. Rep.
656 (1732); Beauclerk v. Dormer, 2 Atk. 308, 26 Eng. Rep. 588 (1742).
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to James Thorpe and his heirs so long as the Penobscot
Building stands and then to John Stiles and his heirs,
the shifting executory interest of John is invalid because
it is not certain that the Penobscot Building will fall
within lives in being and twenty-one years. 176
C. VESTING UNDER MICHIGAN LAW

Chapter 62 of the Michigan Revised Statutes of
1846,177 which was adopted, with some modifications,
from the New York Revised Statutes of 1829,m made
extensive changes in the terminology and some changes
in the nature and characteristics of future interests in
land. The statutes denominate every interest which is
expectant as to possession, created in a person other than
17'6 Part Two, note 49 supra. Yet, where estates tail are permitted,
a conveyance to James Thorpe and the heirs of his body so long as
Westminster Hall stands, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs, would
give John a valid vested remainder. Part Two, note 155 supra.
111 Comp. Laws (1857); §2585 et seq.; Comp. Laws (1871) §4068 et
seq.; Comp. Laws (1897) §8783 et seq.; How. Stat., §5517 et seq.; Comp.
Laws (1915) §11519 et seq.; Comp. Laws (1929) §12921 et seq.; Mich.
Stat. Ann., §26.1 et seq.; Comp. Laws (1948) c. 554.
178 Part Two, Chapter I, Title 2, Art. 1. As to the drafting of the
New York Revised Statutes and their partial adoption in Michigan,
see Part One, supra, at notes 575, 582. The Michigan chapter has
two sections which were not in the New York article, §45, which
provides that the presumption created by §44, that a conveyance to
two or more persons creates a tenancy in common, does not apply to
mortgages or conveyances to husband and wife, and §46, re1atmg to
nominal conditions, which is quoted in Part One, supra, at note 143.
Section 24 of the New York article provided: "Subject to the rules
established in the preceding sections of this Article, a freehold estate
as well as a chattel real, may be created, to commence at a future
day; an estate for life may be created, in a term of years, and a remainder limited thereon; a remainder of a freehold or chattel real,
either contingent or vested, may be created expectant on the determination of a term of years; and a fee may be limited on a fee, upon
a contingency, which, if it should occur, must happen within the
period prescribed in this Article." Section 24 of the Michigan chapter
omitted the italicized portion of the New York section. The significance of this omission has been suggested in Part Two, note 49 supra,
and will be discussed more fully in Part Three, infra.
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the grantor or testator, a future estate179 and classify
some future estates as remainders but give no special
name to those which are not remainders. The Statutes
classify as remainders not only those freehold future
interests which would have been remainders under English law but also future estates of freehold or for years
so limited as to cut off a prior freehold estate, to cut
off or follow an estate in fee simple, or to cut off or
follow an estate for years.180 Thus those interests which
179 "Sec. 7.
Estates, as respects the time of their enjoyment, are
divided into estates in possession, and estates in expectancy.
"Sec. 8. An estate in possession, is where the owner has an im·
mediate right to the possession of the land; an estate in expectancy is
where the right to the possession is postponed to a future period.
"Sec. 9. Estates in expectancy are divided into,
"1. Estates commencing at a future day, denominated future
estates: and,
"2. Reversions.
"Sec. 10. A future estate, is an estate limited to commence in possession at a future day, either without the intervention of a precedent
estate, or on the determination, by lapse of time or otherwise, of a
precedent estate, created at the same time."
The Revisers' notes make it clear that the object of these provisions
was to abolish the technical differences between remainders and
executory interests. 3 N.Y. Rev. Stat., 2 ed., 570-571 (1836).
tso "Sec. 11.
When a future estate is dependent upon a precedent
estate, it may be termed a remainder, and may be created and transferred by that name.
"Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior
remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the persons to whom
the first remainder is limited shall die under the age of twenty-one
years, or upon any other contingency by which the estate of such
persons may be determined before they attain their full age.
"Sec. 20. A contingent remainder shall not be created on a term
for years, unless the nature of the contingency upon which it is limited
be such that the remainder must vest in interest, during the continuance of not more than two lives in being at the creation of such
remainder, or upon the termination thereof.
"Sec. 21. No estate for life shall be limited as a remainder on a
term of years, except to a person in being at the creation of such estate.
"Sec. 23. All the provisions in this chapter contained relative to
future estates, shall be construed to apply to limitations of chattels
real, as well as of freehold estates, so that the absolute ownership of a
term of years, shall not be suspended for a longer period than the
absolute power of alienation can be suspended, in respect to a fee.
"Sec. 27. A remainder may be limited on a contmgency, which,
in case it should happen, will operate to abridge or determine the
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in England would have been remainders, shifting executory interests and present freeholds subject to a term are
remainders here. One type of estate which would have
been a springing executory interest in England, the freehold estate limited to cut off or follow a term of years
only if an uncertain event occurs, is also a remainder
under the Michigan statutes. Interests which in England would have been interessia ·termini or springing
executory interests of other types are simply future
estates, without specific name, in Michigan.
The statutes convert all estates tail into estates in
fee simple 181 and provide that a remainder in fee limited
on an estate tail shall take effect if, but only if, the first
tenant in tail dies without issue living at the time of his
precedent estate; and every such remainder shall be construed a
conditional limitation, and shall have the same effect as such a
limitation would have by law."
See also §24; quoted in Part Two, note 178 supra} and In re
Coots' Estate, 253 Mich. 208 at 214, 234 N.W. 141 (1931). §§16, 20
and 23 were repealed by Act 38, P.A. 1949, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2),
Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52, but the repeal would not seem to alter
the meaning of the term "remainder." For the much narrower meaning of the term "remainder" at common law see Part Two, supra} at
notes 6-21, 148, 150.
1s1 §3, quoted in the text at Part One, note 84 supra. Under the
Rule in Shelley's Case [Wolfe v. Shelley, 1 Co. Rep. 93b, 76 Eng.
Rep. 206 (1579-81)], a conveyance "to John Stiles for life, remainder
to his heirs," creates a fee simple in John and a conveyance "to John
Stiles for life, remainder to the heirs of his body," creates a fee tail
in John. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §28, abolishes that rule by rroviding,
"When a remainder shall be limited to the heirs, or heirs o the body
of a person to whom a life estate in the same premises shall be given,
the persons who, on the termination of the life estate, shall be the
heirs, or heirs of the body of such tenant for life, shall be entitled
to take as purchasers, by virtue of the remainder so limited to them."
The effect of §§3 and 28 combined is that a conveyance "to John
Stiles for life, remainder to the heirs of his body," creates a life estate
in Tohn with contingent remainder in fee simple to the heirs of his
body. Thompson v. Thompson, 330 Mich. 1, 46 N.W. (2d) 437
(1951), Part One, note 89 supra. As a remainder to the heirs of a
living person is contingent (Part Two, note 158 supra), the abolition
of the Rule in Shelley's Case has the effect of making some dispositions
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities which would not have done so
at common law.
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death.
Whereas in English law the rules as to vesting
of remainders and executory interests were different in
several respects, our statutes provide a uniform rule as
to the vesting of all future estates in land:
"Sec. 13. Future estates are either vested or contingent:
"They are vested when there is a person in being
who would have an immediate right to possession of
the lands, upon the ceasing of the intermediate or precedent estate:
"They are contingent whilst the person to whom or
the event upon which they are limited to take effect remains uncertain.''
Because the common-law recognition of remainders
was restricted to freehold interests in land, it seemed, at
the time when English law was received in this country,
that all future interests in chattels real and personal,
except interessia termini, were executory interests and
so could not vest before they became possessory. 188 Chap182 §4, quoted in the text at Part One, note 84 supra. Sec. 22 provides: "When a remainder shall be limited to take effect on the
death of any person without heirs, or heirs of his body, or without
issue, the word 'heirs' or 'issue', shall be construed to mean heirs
or issue living at the death of the person named as ancestor." Compare the different construction of such provisions in the older English
decisions. Part Two, note 175 supra. By eliminating the "indefinite
failure of issue" construction, Section 22 saves many future estates
which would otherwise violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Revisers' Note, 3 N.Y. Rev. Stat., 2d ed., 568 (1836). It was applied in
Goodell v. Hibbard, 32 Mich. 47 (1875); Mullreed v. Clark, 110 Mich.
229, 68 N.W. 138, 989 (1896). In St. Amour v. Rivard, 2 Mich. 294
(1852), a will which became effective before the Revised Statutes of
1846 came into force devised life estates to named persons and successive estates for life to their descendants "as long as any posterity
will exist, and in case of extinction to the next heirs." The ultimate
remainder was held void under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.
183 Part One, notes 403-422, Part Two, notes 166, 167, supra. However, modern English and American law tends to treat future interests
in chattels personal, limited to follow life interests, as remainders, at
least for purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Evans v. Walker,
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ter 62 of the Michigan Revised Statutes of 1846 makes
possible remainders in chattels real and applies the same
rules of vesting to future estates in chattels real as to
future freehold estates. The chapter did not apply to
chattels personal, but the Michigan Supreme Court has
shown a tendency to recognize future interests in chattels personal, including remainders, which correspond to
those permitted in land. Many of the vesting cases discussed in this section involved future interests in chattels personal and some involved mixed dispositions of
land and chattels. In all of them the Court applied the
same rules of vesting to future interests in chattels personal as to future interests in land, and in several instances it has expressly stated that the rules of vesting
are the same as to both. 184 What the statutes have done
for future interests in chattels real, case law has done
[1876] 3 Ch. Div. 211; Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUlTIES, 3rd ed.,
§§841, 851 (1915); Part One, notes 429, 430, supra.
m Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 556, 2 N.W. 814 (1879);
In re Coots' Estate, 253 Mich. 208 at 214, 234 N.W. 141 (1931). Cf.
Wessborg v. Merrill, 195 Mich. 556 at 568-569, 162 N.W. 102 (1917).
The Rule Against Perpetuities did not apply to dispositions of
Michigan land between 1847 and 1949 (Part Two, note 50 supra), but
decisions establishing the rules of vesting of interests in land made
during this period, although not involving application of the Rule,
should be considered authoritative as to the problem of vesting for
purposes of the Rule. The Michigan vesting cases are discussed in
detail in Brake, "The 'Vested vs. Contingent' Approach to Future
Interests: A Critical Analysis of the Michigan Cases," 9 UNIV. OF
DETROIT L.J. 61, 121, 179 (1946). The original title of Chapter 62 of
the Revised Statutes of 1846 (Part Two, note 177 supra) was, "Of
the Nature and Qualities of Estates in Real Property, and the Alienation Thereof." It was the first chapter in Title XIV, which was
headed, "Of Real Property, and of the Nature, Qualities and Alienation of Estates Therein." Act 227, P.A. 1949, amended the title of
Chapter 62 to read, "Of the nature and qualities of estates in real
and personal property, and the alienation thereof." It could be argued
that this amendment extended Section 13 and other provisions of the
chapter to chattels personal. However, Act 227 did not amend the
heading of Title XIV or remove the limiting word "lands" from Sections 1, 8, 13, 36, 44, and 46. The lorimary purpose of Act 227 was
to extend Sections 37, 38, 39 and
, relating to accumulations, to
personal property. Part Two, note 501 infra. It is doubtful that it
changed the scope of other sections of Chapter 62.
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for chattels personal. We have one system of future
interests in all types of property with uniform rules of
vesting for all.
Section 13 is a paraphrase of Sir William Blackstone's
explanation of the distinction between vested and contingent remainders. 185 Although neither complete nor
accurate for that purpose, the section was probably intended to adopt the English rules governing the vesting
of remainders and apply them to all future estates. In
at least one situation, however, the section, when read
with other provisions of Chapter 62, appears to change
the rules governing the vesting of remainders. At common law a remainder failed if it was not ready to take
effect when the preceding estate terminated. 186 Hence
a remainder limited to commence on an event which
might not occur at or before the termination of the preceding estate was contingent even though the event was
one certain to occur, such as the coming of a fixed date
or the death of a living person. 187 If Andrew Baker conveys lands to James Thorpe for life, remainder to John
Stiles and his heirs if Lucy Baker dies either before or
after James, the remainder is contingent at common
law. Lucy will certainly die but not necessarily before
James' life estate terminates. Our statutes provide that
a remainder does not fail merely because it is not ready
185 "For remainders are either vested or contingent.
Vested remainders (or remainders executed, whereby a present interest passes
to the party, though to be enjoyed in futuro) are where the estate
is invariably fixed, to remain in a determinate person, after the particular estate is spent. . . . Contingent or executory remainders
(whereby no present interest passes) are where the estate in remainder
is limited to take effect, either to a dubious and uncertain person,
or upon a dubious and uncertain eventj so that the particular estate
may chance to be determined, and the remainder never take effect."
2 CoMMENTARIES *168-169 (1765), citing Boraston's Case, 3 Co. Rep.
16a, 20a, 76 Eng. Rep. 664, 670 (1587).
1ss Part Two, notes 11, 12, supra.
187 Part Two, note 151 supra.
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to take effect when the preceding estate terminates, 188
hence the remainder of John is certain to take effect
upon an event certain to occur. If James should die
before Lucy, the right to possession for the life of Lucy
would revert to Andrew. If the reversionary estate of
Andrew is an "intermediate or precedent estate" within
the meaning of the second clause of Section 13, John's
interest comes within the statutory definition of a vested
future estate. If the phrase "intermediate or precedent
estate" in the second clause does not include reversionary
estates, John's interest does not come within either the
second or third clause. The first clause provides that
future estates are either vested or contingent. John's
interest is not contingent under either the common-law
definition of contingency or that provided by the third
clause of Section 13 because there is no uncertainty as
to the person who takes or the event upon which the
interest takes effect, so his interest is probably a vested
future estate in Michigan. 189
1ss "Sec. 32. No expectant estate can be defeated or barred by
any alienation or other act of the owner of the intermediate or precedent estate, nor by any destruction of such precedent estate by disseizin,
forfeiture, surrender, merger or otherwise.
"Sec. 33. The last preceding section shall not be construed to pre·
vent an expectant estate from being defeated in any manner, or by
any act or means which the party creating such estate shall, in the
creation thereof, have provided or authorized; nor shall an expectant
estate thus liable to be defeated, be on that ground adjudged void in its
creation.
"Sec. 34. No remainder, valid in its creation, shall be defeated
by the determination of the precedent estate, before the happening
of the contingency on which the remainder is limited to take effect;
but should such contingency afterwards happen, the remainder shall
take effect in the same manner, and to the same extent, as if the
precedent estate had continued to the same period."
189 Walsh, FUTURE EsTATES IN NEW YoRK, §7
(1931). This conclusion seems inescapable in view of the language of Section 29:
"When a remainder on an estate for life, or for years, shall not be
limited on a contingency, defeating or avoiding such precedent estate,
it shall be construed as intended to take effect only on the death of the
first taker, or the expiration, by lapse of time, of such term of years."
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It will be recalled that, under English law, a remainder
may be vested although it is not presently possessory,
even when it may never become possessory/90 but an
executory interest does not vest until it becomes possessory.191 It is clear that in Michigan a remainder may
vest before it becomes possessory/92 even when it may
never become possessory. Thus if Andrew Baker conveys land to Roger White for life, remainder to John
Stiles for life, John's remainder is vested although it
will not become possessory if he does not survive
Roger. 193 As Section 13 adopts one standard of vesting
for all future estates, the standard applicable to remainders in English law, it would seem that a future
estate may be vested in Michigan before it becomes possessory even though it would have been an executory
interest in England. The language of the second clause
of Section 13 makes this clear as to those types of remainders which would have been shifting executory
interests under English law. As to those future interests
which would have been springing executory interests, a
problem like that discussed in the preceding paragraph
arises. If the phrase "intermediate or precedent estate"
Under the common-law rules, this section would make every remainder
limited on an indefeasible estate for life or years contingent because
it would not be ready to take effect whenever and however the preceding estate terminated. It is apparent that the statutes change the
common-law rules of vesting in this respect.
190 Part Two, notes 153-155, supra.
1s1 Part Two, notes 168, 169, supra. But such an interest may not be
contingent.
m Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 (1874); Hovey v. Nellis,
98 Mich. 374, 57 N.W. 255 (1894); Downing v. Birney, 117 Mich.
675, 76 N.W. 125 (1898); Rodey v. Stotz, 280 Mich. 90, 273 N.W.
404 (1937). See: Walton v. Torrey, Harr. Ch. 259 (Mich. circa
1840); Chambers v. Shaw, 52 Mich. 18, 17 N.W. 223 (1883); Hull v.
Osborn, 151 Mich. 8, 113 N.W. 784 (1908); Wessborg v. Merrill, 195
Mich. 556, 162 N.W. 102 (1917); In re De Bancourt's Estate, 279
Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891 (1937).
193 Case v. Green, 78 Mich. 540, 44 N.W. 578
(1889); Downing
v. Birney, 117 Mich. 675, 76 N.W. 125 (1898).
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in the second clause includes the retained interest of a
grantor who has conveyed a future estate of the springing use type, then such a future estate is within the
statutory definition of a vested interest if limited to commence upon an event certain to occur. If the phrase does
not include such retained interests, such a future estate
does not come within either the second or third clause
but, since it is not contingent, must be vested under the
language of the first clause. In any event, the Michigan
Supreme Court has held that a future estate of the
springing executory interest type, limited to commence
upon the death of a living person, is vested. Thus in
Mcintyre v. Mcintyre's Estate,194 involving a conveyance
of an estate to commence on the death of the grantors,
the Court said,
"Two provisions of the deed were relied on to sustain
proponent's contention that the terms of the deed were
not sufficient to create a vested interest in a grantee:
(a) 'It is understood that this deed is made for the purpose of creating a future estate;' (b) 'and the full title
and enjoyment * * * shall only become operative upon
1 94 156 Mich. 240 at 241-242, 120 N.W. 587
(1909). The real
problem involved in the case was not vesting but whether the instrument was a will or a present conveyance of a future estate. If, as
the Court held, it was a present conveyance of a future estate, that
estate would have been a springing executory interest under English
law. Part Two, notes 6, 150, 162, 169, supra. In Engel v. Ladewig,
153 Mich. 8, 116 N.W. 550 (1908), a husband and wife joined in a
deed conveying land owned by the husband in fee simple to their
son in fee simple, subject to certain charges and reserving to the
grantors "all right, title and control so long as we or either of us
shall live." The Court treated the interest of the son, which would
have been a springing executory interest in England, exactly as if it
were a vested remainder. See: Hitchcock v. Simpkins, 99 Mich. 198,
58 N.W. 47 (1894); Taylor v. Richards, 153 Mich. 667, 117 N.W.
208 (1908); Watkins v. Minor, 214 Mich. 308, 183 N.W. 186 (1921);
Benton Harbor Federation of Women's Clubs v. Nelson, 301 Mich.
465, 3 N.W. (2d) 844 (1942); Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §24, quoted in
Part Two, note 178 supra; Revisers' note, 3 N.Y. Rev. Stat., 2d ed.,
570-571 (1836).
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the death of the survivor of the grantors hereof, and at
that time, and not before, the said grantee shall enjoy
the full title and control hereof.' Our statute * * *
defines 'a future estate' as 'an estate limited to commence
in possession at a future day,' etc., and by [Section 13]
they are said ·to be either vested or contingent. There
is no contingency mentioned in this deed. The grantee's
right to possession was inevitable on the happening of
events which were inevitable. He had, therefore, a
vested interest."
If a future estate of the springing executory interest
type, limited to commence unconditionally on the death
of a living person, is vested, it would seem that such an
estate limited to commence unconditionally on a fixed
future date is likewise vested. In other words, mere postponement of enjoyment to a future time does not make
a future estate contingent and so, under Section 13, does
not keep it from being vested, although it would have
been an executory interest in England. If Andrew Baker
conveys to John Stiles an estate in fee simple in land to
commence in possession twenty-two years after the date
of the deed, John probably takes a vested estate which
does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.195
Under English law, the fact that an interest prior in
time is on special limitation does not make a future
interest contingent, provided it is limited to take effect
whenever and however the prior interest terminates. If
Andrew Baker devises land to Lucy Baker until her
death or remarriage, remainder to John Stiles and his
heirs, John takes a vested remainder at common law. 196
If Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe for
195 In Hibler v. Hibler, 104 Mich. 274, 62 N.W. 361 (1895), there
was a bequest to be paid a year after the death of the testator's widow.
It was treated as vested. Walsh, FuTURE EsTATES IN NEw YoRK, §7
(1931). Cf. Part Two, note 171 supra.
196 Part Two, note 154 supra.
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forty years if the Penobscot Building so long stands, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs, John takes a present
vested estate in fee simple at common law. 197 The Michigan statutes make the interest of John in the second
example a future estate instead of a present interest,
and Section 13 provides that future estates are contingent "whilst - - - the event upon which they are limited
to take effect remains uncertain." It is arguable that the
section makes the interests of John in these examples
contingent and, hence, that that in the second example
is void because the event may remain uncertain for more
than twenty-one years. However, the "event" in each of
these examples is not a condition precedent to John's
taking an interest but only one which, if it occurs, will
terminate the preceding estate and so make his interest
possessory sooner. At any rate, the Michigan Supreme
Court has held that a remainder of the type described
in the first example is vested, 198 so it would probably
hold that one of the type described in the second example is vested and valid.
(1) Contingency as to Person or Event

Under English law a future interest limited to persons not in being or not presently ascertainable or upon
a condition precedent not certain to occur is contingent.199 Hence a remainder limited to the heirs of a
living person is contingent because they cannot be ascertained until the death of the ancestor. 200 Dicta in New
197 Part Two,

note 150 supra.
Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 (1874); Rood v. Hovey,
50 Mich. 395, 15 N.W. 525 (1883). See: Ryder v. Flanders, 30 Mich.
336 (1874); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W.
976 (1924).
199 Part Two, notes 151, 159, 173, 175, 176, supra.
2.;o Part Two, note 158 supra.
198
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York cases decided in 1835 and 1840 suggested that the
second clause of Section 13 may have made a radical
change in the rules of vesting by providing that a remainder is vested if there is a person in being who
would be entitled to take if the preceding estate terminated now. 201 In Moore v. LittelJ202 decided in 1869,
land had been conveyed to John Jackson "for and during
his natural life, and after his death to his heirs and their
assigns forever." Although unnecessary to the decision/ 03
the opinion of Judge Woodruff, in which a majority of
the Court of Appeals concurred, stated that the remainder vested presently in the living children of John
as his heirs apparent and contained the following dicta:
"If there 'is a person in being who would have an
immediate right to the possession of the lands upon the
ceasing of the precedent estate, then that remainder is
vested' within the terms of the statute. It is not 'a person
who now has a present fixed right of future possession
or enjoyment', but a person who would have an immediate right if the precedent estate were now to cease. I
read this language according to its ordinary and natural
signification, and if you can point to a human being and
201 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 at 301-302 (1835); Moore v.
Lyons, 25 Wend. 119 at 144 (1840). In the latter case Chancellor
Walworth qualified this startling proposition by a suggestion that it
was true only if the preceding estate would be terminated by an event
certain to occur. See also Lawrence v. Bayard, 7 Paige 70 at 75 (N.Y.
1838).
202 41 N.Y. 66 (1869). It is evident from his opinion (pp. 71-75)
that Judge Woodruff misunderstood the common-law rules of vesting.
He seems to have thought that such a remainder was contingent at
common law only because of the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders. The context indicates that Judge Woodruff did
not consider the remainder indefeasibly vested; it would open to
admit after-born children and be defeated, as to any child, if he
predeceased his father.
2oa The only question involved was whether children of John could
alienate their interests before their father's death. Six of the seven
judges agreed that the remainder was alienable even if contingent
in view of Section 35 (Part One, note 371 supra.)
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say as to him, 'that man or that woman, by virtue of a
grant of a remainder, would have an immediate right
to the possession of certain lands if the precedent estate
of another therein should now cease', then the statute
says, he or she has a vested remainder.--"That definition [the third clauseJ is to be construed
in connection with the other [the second clause]; if there
is no person who would have an immediate right of
possession upon the ceasing of the intermediate or precedent estate, i.e.} if no person can be found of whom this
can now be avowed, either because if that precedent
estate should now cease, it would be uncertain who was
entitled, or whether the event upon which it was limited
would happen, then the remainder is contingent." 204
If pushed to their logical conclusion these dicta would
seem to mean that if Andrew Baker conveyed land to
James Thorpe and his heirs "until his last descendant
dies" or "until the Penobscot Building falls," then to
John Stiles and his heirs, the interest of John Stiles
would be vested. The Revisers' Notes make it clear that
this was not intended. 205 Even if confined to the facts of
Moore v. LittelJ a remainder to the heirs of a life tenant,
the dicta are unsound. They engraft onto the second
clause of Section 13 the words "if the precedent estate
should now cease." When read in the light of the common law, that clause means that a remainder is vested
if an ascertained living person would take on the termination of the preceding estate whenever it terminates.
Moreover, it seems evident that the second clause is
qualified by the third rather than qualifying it. When
the three clauses are read together, the result is a short
statement of the common-law rules of vesting of re2o4
2o5

41 N.Y. 66 at 76, 79.
3 N.Y. Rev. Stat., 2d ed., 568-569 (1836).
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mainders. 206 However that may be, the dicta in Moore
v. Littel have caused much confusion in New York and
other states which have adopted the New York statutes. 207
In the New York version of Section 13, the clauses
are separated by periods. 008 In the Michigan version
they are separated by colons. 209 Judge Sanford M. Green,
who drafted the Michigan Revised Statutes of 1846, had
been a New York lawyer 210 and must have been familiar
with the doubt in New York as to the meaning of Section 13. It may be that he introduced this change in
punctuation deliberately to make it clear that the second
clause was qualified by the third. In any event, the
confusion in the New York cases necessitates a careful
examination of the Michigan cases which involve the
problem in Moore v. Littel.
As to the specific problem involved in Moore v. Littel,
the Michigan Supreme Court has shown a disposition
to construe the word "heirs" in a conveyance of a remainder to the heirs of a living person as meaning "children" or "issue." 211 If the word is construed t:p mean
oos Chaplin, SusPENSION oF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed.,
§§571-582 (1928); Walsh, FuTURE EsTATES IN NEW YoRK, §8 (1931).
As Mr. Chaplin points out, the Revisers' Notes expressly state that a
remainder to the issue of a life tenant living at his death is contingent. 3 N.Y. Rev. Stat., 2d ed., 573 (1836). See Part Two, note 185
supra.
201 Id.; Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §107 (1915); I
Simes, LAW oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §§83-92 (1936).
2os1 N.Y. Rev. Stat., 2d ed., 718 (1836).
2o9 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §13, Part Two, note 184 supra. In Comp.
Laws (1857) §2597, Comp. Laws (1871) §4080, Comp. Laws (1897)
§8795 and Comp. Laws (1915) §11531, there is a colon after the first
clause and a semicolon after the second. In How. Stat., §§5529, there
are semicolons after both. In Comp. Laws (1929) §12933, Mich. Stats.
Ann., §26.13, and Comp. Laws (1948), §554.13, there is a colon after
the first clause and a period after the second. The punctuation of the
original Revised Statutes of 1846 should prevail.
210 Part One, note 582 supra.
211 See v. Derr, 57 Mich. 369, 24 N.W. 108 (1885); Porter v. Osmun,
135 Mich. 361, 97 N.W. 756 (1904); Fullager v. Stockdale, 138 Mich.
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"children," the remainder vests in the living children
of the named ancestor, subject to open to admit after
born children. 212 When, however, the word "heirs" in
a conveyance of a remainder to the heirs of a living
person is construed in its technical sense, that is, as
meaning the persons who would inherit the lands of the
ancestor on his death intestate, Michigan rejects the view
of Judge Woodruff in Moore v. Littel and follows the
common-law rule that a remainder to the heirs of a living person is contingent until his death. In re Churchill's Estate 2.13 involved a devise to a trustee for the life
of the testator's daughter, remainder, if the daughter
should die leaving issue, to such issue, and, if she should
die without issue, remainder, as to eight-tenths, to named
persons. The will provided, "This leaves an undivided
two-tenths part of the remainder of my estate, to be
disposed of under the laws of the State of Michigan."
The Court held that the two-tenths remained contingent
until the death of the daughter without issue and then
vested in the heirs of the testator, determined as of the
death of the daughter. Thompson v. Thompson 214 involved a conveyance to a son, "For and during his natural lifetime and after his decease, to the heirs of his
body." The trial court, evidently following the dicta in
Moore v. Littel, held that the son took a life estate with
363, 101 N.W. 576 (1904). In all these cases the life tenant, to whose
"heirs" the remainder was limited, had living children at the date of
the conveyance. Cf. Goodell v. Hibbard, 32 Mich. 47 (1875).
212
See v. Derr, 57 Mich. 369, 24 N.W. 108 (1885). But see:
Fullager v. Stockdale, 138 Mich. 363 (1904). This was the commonlaw view. Part Two, note 158 supra.
213 230 Mich. 148, 203 N.W. 118 (1925).
See: Lewis v. Nelson,
4 Mich. 630 (1857).
214 330 Mich. 1, 46 N.W. (2d) 437 (1951); Part One, note 89, Part
Two, note 181, supra. Cf. Wilson v. Terry, 130 Mich. 73, 89 N.W.
566 (1902). In Menard v. Campbell, 180 Mich. 583, 147 N.W. 556
(1914), land was devised to a son for life, remainder to his heirs.
It was held that the son's widow took a share as a statutory heir.
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a vested remainder to the heirs of his body in being at
the date of the deed, subject to open to admit after-born
heirs. The Supreme Court modified the decree to hold
that the son took a life estate with a remainder to the
heirs of his body in being at his death. The opinion
clearly adopts the technical common-law meaning of
"heirs" and appears to accept the common-law view that
a remainder limited to the heirs of a living person is
contingent.
The dicta in Moore v. Littel 215 go far beyond the
specific problem involved in that case by stating that a
remainder is vested if there is a person in being who
would take it if the preceding estate terminated now.
In Mcinerny v. Haase 216 the Michigan Supreme Court
showed some inclination to adopt this view. In that
case, land was devised to the testator's wife for life, "and
upon her death I bequeath to my daughter Hannah and
finally, upon Hannah's death, to my granddaughter,
Mary Jane Mcinerny, should she survive her mother
Hannah. And in case the said Mary Jane dies before
her mother, Hannah, then it is my will that the aforesaid property be equally divided among the surviving
children of my daughter Hannah." The Court said
that the question of whether the will violated the statute prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of
alienation,
"depends upon whether the estate in remainder was
vested or contingent. Our statute (section 8795, 3 Comp.
Laws) defines such estates:
" 'Future estates are either vested or contingent: They
are vested when there is a person in being who would
have an immediate right to the possession of the lands,
Part Two, notes 202-204, supra.
163 Mich. 364, 128 N.W. 215 (1910). Accord: Ensign v. Dunn,
181 Mich. 456, 148 N.W. 343 (1914).
215
216
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upon the ceasing of the intermediate or precedent estate.
They are contingent whilst the person to whom or the
event upon which they are limited to take effect, remains uncertain.' 217
"We find in the instant case, under this definition,
that at the creation of this estate this granddaughter was
such person then in being who would have such immediate right to possession. The conclusion is unavoidable that this was a vested remainder. See opinion, authorities, and notes on the distinction between vested
and contingent remainders. Kountz's Estate, 213 Pa. 390
(62 Atl. 1103, 3 L.R.A. [N.S.J 639, 5 Am. & Eng. Ann.
Cas. 427." 218
The report of the cited Pennsylvania case is preceded
by a headnote reading:
"A vested remainder is an estate to take effect after
another estate, for years, for life, or in tail, which is so
limited that if the particular estate were to expire or end
in any way at the present time, some certain person
would become thereupon entitled to the immediate enjoyment.'' 219
211 The punctuation does not agree with Comp. Laws (1897) §8795,
in which the second clause is followed by a semicolon. Part Two,
note 209 supra.
21s 163 Mich. 364 at 368. The question involved was whether these
dispositions, plus a provision requiring the then holder of the land
to pay $5 to testator's son if he returned from the Army, suspended
the absolute power of alienation for more than two lives. It is
difficult to see why the court thought the vested or contingent character of Mary Jane's remainder was material. It would either vest
subject to the $5 charge or fail on the deaths of her grandmother and
mother. In Rood v. Hovey, 50 Mich. 395, 15 N.W. 525 (1883) there
was a devise to testator's wife for life or widowhood, remainder "to
my children now living, or who may be at the time of her decease or
marriage." It was held that the remainder vested indefeasibly in the
children living at the testator's death. This is probably just an
illustration of the tendency to construe ambiguous or inconsistent
language in favor of early vesting. Cf. Lewis v. Nelson, 4 Mich. 630
(1857), holding that a remainder to the surviving children of the
grantors created by a deed executed before the effective date of the
Revised Statutes of 1846 conveyed no interest to their living children,
present or future.
219 Emphasis supplied.
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This headnote appears to express the view of Judge
Woodruff in Moore v. Littel, but the Pennsylvania opinion quotes from numerous English authorities and clearly asserts the common-law view in the following passage:
"But, in any event, the remainder in the grandchildren could only be deemed vested in case they had the
right to immediate possession whenever and however the
preceding estate determined." 220
This being so, it would seem that the opinion in McInerny v. Haase does not really adopt the theory of the
dicta in Moore v. Littel. It should probably be classified as an illustration of the judicial tendency to construe as a condition subsequent language which on its
face imposes a condition precedent. However that may
be, the other Michigan cases involving the question
clearly reject the Moore v. Littel view and adopt the
common-law rules of vesting of remainders. Fitzhugh v.
Townsend 221 involved a devise to a trustee for the life
of testatrix's granddaughter,
"and if, at her decease, she leave lawful issue surviving her, I devise and bequeath the whole of my said
residuary estate to such issue.
"In the event of the death of my granddaughter,
Elizabeth Fitzhugh Birney, without lawful issue surviving her, - - - I further will and direct that all the rest,
residue, and remainder - - - be equally divided among
all my brothers and sisters, and the children of such of
them as shall be no longer living, - - -."
Elizabeth died without ever having had issue. A
z2o 213 Pa. 390 at 396, 62 Atl. 1103 (1906). Emphasis supplied.
The case held that an interest limited to grandchildren to be ascertained ten years after the testatrix's youngest grandchild came of age
was contingent and violated the Rule Against Perpetuities.
zz1 59 Mich. 427, 27 N.W. 561 (1886).

CERTAINTY OF VESTING

341

brother of the testatrix, Samuel, predeceased the testatrix, survived by a son, William, who survived the testatrix but died in the lifetime of Elizabeth, without issue,
devising his estate to Townsend. The interest of William
would not be vested under the English concept of vesting because it would be contingent on an event uncertain to occur, the death of Elizabeth without issue. Counsel for Townsend contended that a share vested in William at the death of the testatrix because, if the life interest of Elizabeth had then terminated, William would
have taken a share, citing Moore v. Littel and other
New York cases following the dicta of Judge Woodruff
in support of this contention. 222 The Court affirmed a
decree of Circuit Judge Sanford M. Green ruling that
Townsend took nothing and held that William's remainder was contingent until the death of Elizabeth. As
the same result could have been reached by holding
that the interest of William vested at the death of the
testatrix, subject to being divested if he predeceased
Elizabeth, the Court's care in holding that William's
remainder was contingent must be interpreted as a
categorical rejection of the dicta in Moore v. Littel and
a deliberate adherence to the common-law rules governing the vesting of remainders.
Hadley v. Henderson 223 involved a will which devised
the residue to Charles C. Owen and provided, "If in
222 Briefs and Records, January Term, 1886, Defendant Townsend's
Brief, pp. 11-15. His counsel was Charles I. Walker, Professor of
Law in the University of Michigan. The Briefs and Records contain
no opinion by Judge Green and the Bay County Clerk, who searched
his records at the author's request, could find none.
22a 214 Mich. 157, 183 N.W. 75 (1921). Accord: Stevens v. Wildey,
281 Mich. 377, 275 N.W. 179 (1937). Cf. In re Churchill's Estate,
230 Mich. 148, 203 N.W. 118 (1925); Part Two, note 213 supra;
Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703
(1930), Part Two, notes 103, 145, supra; In re Dingler's Estate, 319
Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947).
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case Charles C. Owen dies without issue, it is my will
that the above property be disposed of" to three named
persons and a society. The Court, relying on Fitzhugh v.
Townsend and stressing the third clause of Section 13,
held the remainder contingent. In Michigan Trust Co.
v. Baker/24 property was bequeathed to testatrix's husband until death or remarriage, remainder to a trustee
for the life of her son Stuart and "If my said son shall
have lawful child or children of his body who shall survive him, his share of my estate shall go to such child or
children, girls at age of 25 years and boys at 30 years and
not before." The will limited other remainders in the
event that Stuart died without issue. Stuart died two
years after the testatrix, without ever having had issue.
The Court held all the remainders subsequent to the
trust contingent and void under the Rule Against Perpetuities. In Lambertson v. Case/ 25 land was devised to
testator's wife "as long as she lives, and when she gets
through with it it shall go to Norma Lambertson if she
is living, if not to J. V. Lambertson." It was held that
the remainder of Norma was contingent. In re Coots'
Estate 226 involved a devise of land and other property
to a trustee for the lives of the testator's widow and son,
then to the son's children, or their heirs by right of representation, and in case the son should die without leaving
issue or lineal heirs, then to six named nephews and
nieces. The remainder to the nephews and nieces was
held to be contingent. In Floyd v. Smith 2·21 there was a
bequest to a trustee for the lives of four named persons,
224226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924), Part Two, notes 102, 128,
supra. Accord: Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267
Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934), Part Two, notes 88, 104, supra.
225 245 Mich. 208, 222 N.W. 182 (1928).
2zs 253 Mich. 208, 234 N.W. 141
(1931), cert. den., Delbridge v.
Oldfield, 284 U.S. 665 (1931).
221 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942), Part Two, note 98 supra.
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then to the issue of the life beneficiaries living ·at the
death of the survivor. It was held that the remainder
vested on the death of the survivor of the life beneficiaries.
This review of the cases would seem to make it abundantly clear that Michigan does not accept the view
advanced by Judge Woodruff in Moore v. Littel that a
remainder is vested if there is a person in being who
would take if the preceding estate terminated now. In
Michigan a remainder is not vested unless the event
upon which it is to become possessory is certain to occur
and there are ascertained persons in being who, throughout the continuance of the remainder, will take whenever that event occurs. In the language of Section 13,
a future estate is contingent whilst the person to whom
or the event upon which it is limited to take effect remains uncertain.
(2) What Language Creates Contingency
As has been seen, a future interest may be vested although possession or enjoyment is postponed until a
future time/28 although it may never become possessory
because it may terminate before prior interests, 229 and
although it is subject to defeasance by the exercise of
a power of appointment or by the operation of a condition subsequent, a special limitation, or an executory
limitation. 230 If Andrew Baker devises land to James
Thorpe for life, remainder to Lucy Baker for life, but
22s Part Two, notes 153, 155, 195, supra. Otherwise there could be
no such thing as a vested future interest. By definition a future estate
is one "where the right to the possession is postponed to a future
period." Part Two, note 179 supra.
229 Part Two, notes 154, 193, supra.
200 Part Two, note 160 supra. Cf. Plant v. Weeks, 39 Mich. 117
(1878).
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if Lucy remarry, to John Stiles for the life of Lucy, the
remainder of Lucy is vested although it will not become
possessory in any event until the termination of James's
life estate, it will never become possessory if Lucy dies
before James and, even after it becomes possessory, it
will be defeated if Lucy remarries. On the other hand,
if Andrew Baker devises land to James Thorpe for life,
remainder, if Lucy is unmarried at the death of James,
to Lucy Baker for life, Lucy's remainder is contingent.
When a future interest is limited to an ascertained living person it is contingent only if subject to a condition
precedent of an uncertain event. In Michigan State
Bank v. Hastings, 231 land and other property were conveyed to the State, "upon and subject to the express
condition that the State of Michigan shall indemnify and
save harmless" the grantors against a certain mortgage.
In holding that this was a condition subsequent, the
Court remarked,
"The right to annex a condition to a conveyance, results from the power of alienation; and this power of
alienation is an incident to the right of property. If
then, that condition be precedent, and the act upon
which the estate depends be not performed, the estate
does not vest; but if the condition be subsequent, the
estate does vest, and will continue to vest until defeated
by a failure on the part of the grantee to perform the
condition annexed to the estate; or, in other words, until
there is a breach of the condition." 232

It should be noted that a future interest may be vested
subject to defeasance although the event causing de231 1 Dougl. 225
(Mich. 1844). Blanchard v. Detroit, Lansing &
Lake Michigan R.R. Co., 31 Mich. 43 (1875), is a similar case. There
a conveyance was made "upon the express condition" that the grantee
build a depot on the land and stop a train there daily. This was held
to be a condition subsequent.
2s2 1 Dougl. 225 at 252.
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feasance may or will occur before the future interest
becomes possessory. For example, if Andrew Baker devises land to Lucy Baker for life, remainder as she may
by will appoint, and in default of appointment to John
Stiles and his heirs, the remainder of John Stiles is
vested subject to defeasance. 233 In McCarty v. Fish/ 34
property was devised to testatrix's husband for life, with
power to use so much of the principal as might be necessary in defraying his necessary expenses, remainder to
others. It was held that the remainder vested at the
death of the testatrix, subject to being defeated by the
exercise of the power.
Whether particular language of a conveyance or will
mentioning an uncertain event imposes a condition
precedent or merely postpones enjoyment, limits the
duration of the interest, or subjects it to defeasance is
usually a problem of construction. The Michigan
Supreme Court has frequently expressed a strong constructional preference for that construction which will
make the future interest vest at the earliest possible
time. 235 An interest which is vested or will certainly vest
during the period of the Rule does not, of course, violate
the Rule Against Perpetuities.
2&3 Part Two, note 160 supra. It is also possible to have a remainder
vested subject to a charge. Smith v. Jackman, 115 Mich. 192, 73 N.W.
228 (1897); Engel v. Ladewig, 153 Mich. 8, 116 N.W. 550 (1908).
234 87 Mich. 48, 49 N.W. 513 (1891).
2as Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 565, 2 N.W. 814 (1879);
Rood v. Hovey, 50 Mich. 395 at 399-400, 15 N.W. 525 (1883); Union
Mutual Association v. Montgomery, 70 Mich. 587 at 595, 38 N.W.
588 (1888); Hovey v. Nellis, 98 Mich. 374 at 378, 57 N.W. 255 (1894);
Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642 at 648-649, 134 N.W. 1018
(1912); Ensign v. Dunn, 181 Mich. 456 at 462, 148 N.W. 343 (1914);
In re Churchill's Estate, 230 Mich. 148 at 155, 157, 203 N.W. liS
(1925); Lambertson v. Case, 245 Mich. 208 at 210, 222 N.W. 182
(1928); In re East's Estate, 325 Mich. 352 at 360, 38 N.W. (2d) 889
(1949); In re Ecclestone's Estate, 339 Mich. 15 at 20, 62 N.W. (2d) 606
(1954). This is a rule of construction generally accepted in AngloAmerican law. 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §348 (1936).
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The uncertain events which most commonly cause
difficulty are reaching a certain age, and death before
another. Other uncertain events occasionally appear in
the cases. As has been seen, provisions in wills postponing distribution until some administrative step, such
as probating the will, paying debts, completion of administration, winding up of a business, or sale of property, is taken, are construed, whenever possible, to postpone only enjoyment, not vesting. 236 In Skinner v.
Taft/ 81 a direction in a will that the executors transfer
property to four named persons and their heirs and assigns, "after the payment of my just debts and funeral
expenses" and upon the termination of a trust which
was to terminate "five years from the date of the probating of my will in the County of which I may die a resident," was treated as valid, presumably on the theory
that only enjoyment, not vesting, was postponed. In
Ostrander v. Muskegon Finance Co./ 38 the testator devised his estate to his wife, "Provided, she remains my
widow." It was held that the widow took a present fee
simple, subject to defeasance upon her remarriage.
Where it is clear that no interest was intended to pass
unless and until an uncertain event should occur, the
interest is contingent. Conant v. Stone 239 involved a
will which provided, "My said son to have the use and
income from said estate so long as Lizzie Rice, his present
wife, remains as his legal wife, but in case of her death
or in case of a legal separation and divorce from my said
Part Two, note 132 supra.
140 Mich. 282, 103 N.W. 702 (1905), Part Two, note 133 supra.
Accord: Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56
(1900) (payment of debts and other legacies); McGraw v. McGraw,
176 Fed. 312 (6th Cir. 1910) (payment of debts). Cf. De Buck v.
Bousson, 295 Mich. 164, 294 N.W. 135 (1940).
za8 230 Mich. 310, 202 N.W. 951 (1925).
239 176 Mich. 654, 143 N.W. 39 (1913), Part One, note 191 supra.
23s

237
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son, I then give, devise and bequeath to my said son
and to his heirs and assigns forever, said above mentioned interest in my estate." The devise of the fee was
held contingent. Similarly, in Dusbiber v. Melville/ 40
a will provided, "Now, my will is, that in case she shall
be compelled to live apart from her said husband, Frederick Melville, and shall have to support herself, that I
give, devise and bequeath to her, the said Florence A.
Melville, the sum of two thousand dollars, to be paid to
her by my executor, out of my estate, as soon as my
executor shall be convinced that it is impossible for the
said Florence A. Melville to live with her husband ... "
This language was held to impose a condition precedent. In Markham v. Hufjord/ 41 a bequest "to be paid
to him at the expiration of two years from the date of
my demise: provided that he shall be deemed a reformed
man, in the judgment of the executors of this will,"
was correctly held to be contingent.
A provision postponing enjoyment until a legatee or
devisee reaches a certain age may be construed as a condition precedent which suspends vesting until the legatee
reaches that age or the bequest may be found to vest
indefeasibly, subject only to postponement of enjoyment, or to vest, subject to defeasance if the legatee dies
before reaching the stipulated age. 243 If the legatee is
in being and ascertained and entitled to the income until
receipt of the principal, the gift is usually found to be
240

178. Mich. 601, 146 N.W. 208 (1914), Part One, note 191 supra.

Cf. Conrad v. Long, 33 Mich. 78 (1875), where a remainder was
devised, "upon this condition: if at any time subsequent she should
conclude not to live with her present husband - - - -." This was held
to be a condition subsequent.
241. 123 Mich. 505, 82 N.W. 222 (1900), Part Two, note 113 supra.
243 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §350 (1936).
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vested. 244 In Hull v. Osborn/ 45 the residue of an estate
was devised and bequeathed to two named grandchildren "on the terms and conditions herein contained and
payable at the times and in the manner hereinafter set
forth." Ten thousand dollars was to be paid to each of
the persons "when she shall arrive at" the ages of twentyone, twenty-five, thirty, thirty-five and forty years "and
the remainder of the one-half of the residue hereby devised and bequeathed to the said Blanche Wyckoff Hull
shall be paid to her when she shall arrive at the age of
forty-five years." After like provision for the other
legatee, the will provided that if either legatee should die
without living issue before reaching forty-five, the unpaid portion of her share should be paid to the survivor
"at the time and in the manner it would have been paid
to such deceased grandchild had she lived." If both died
under forty-five without living issue, there was a gift
over to brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces then living. It was held that the interest of the two grandchildren in the principal vested at once, subject to postponement of enjoyment and to defeasance upon death
244 !d., §§351, 355, 356; PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§256-259 (1940).
See Wessborg v. Merrill, 195 Mich. 556 at 569, 162 N.W. 102 (1917).
In Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 565, 2 N.W. 814 (1879), Chief
Justice Campbell said, "While there has been some variance among
the authorities concerning the legal distinctions between vested and
contingent estates, they chiefly agree first in favoring the vesting of
interests, and second in treating future interests as vested when there
is any present interest in the income of the property."
245 151 Mich. 8, 113 N.W. 784 (1908). See: Le Baron v. Shepherd,
21 Mich. 263 (1870); Knorr v. Millard, 52 Mich. 542, 18 N.W. 349
(1884); Knorr v. Millard, 57 Mich. 265, 23 N.W. 807 (1885); In re
Dingler's Estate, 319 Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947). Cf. Bennett
v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889), Part One, note 6ll
supra, where property was to be transferred to a daughter when she
reached thirty-five, but if she died before that to her issue or, if none,
to another. The daughter was entitled to part of the income pending
the transfer. It was held that her interest was indefeasibly vested.
This result is, of course, unsound.
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under forty-five. In Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust
Co./46 there was a bequest to a trustee to pay the income
to testatrix's daughter Belle for life and upon her death
to pay portions of the principal to children of Belle who
were then twenty-five and the issue of children who predeceased Belle,
"And any remaining portions, my trustee shall keep
each as a special trust fund, for one each of her children
surviving and being less than 25 years of age, and it shall
pay to each such child the net income arising from his
or her special fund, and upon a child reaching the age
of 25 years, it shall pay, deliver and convey to said child
his or her special trust fund; and in the event of the
death of such child before the same shall reach the age
of 25 years, my trustee shall pay, deliver and convey his
or her special fund to my said daughter's children surviving, except this, that if any child has died with issue
then surviving, said issue shall take the share the deceased child would receive if living - - -."
The Court held that the interests of the children of
Belle were vested subject to defeasance on death under
twenty-five. The provision for defeasance violated the
Rule Against Perpetuities, but the interest of the children did not.
In Hunter v. Hunter/ 47 a will directed the executors
to apply the income to the support of the testatrix's three
2462.49 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930); Part Two, notes 103, 145,
supra. Gardner v: City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270,
255 N.W. 687 (1934), Part Two, note 88 supra, involved a similar
disposition. As the trust included land, it violated the statute prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation. Part One,
note 593, Part Two, note 53 supra. The Court did not clearly decide
whether the interest of children, who were to receive income until
they reached thirty and then the principal, was contingent or vested
subject to defeasance but used language suggesting that their interest
would violate the Rule Against Perpetuities unless indefeasibly vested.
267 Mich .. 270 at 291-292. This is clearly unsound. A future interest
vested subject to defeasance does not violate the Rule, although the
provision for defeasance may. Cf. Part Two, note 280, infra.
247 160 Mich. 218, 125 N.W. 71 (1910).
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children until distribution, to distribute a third of the
principal to each child on reaching thirty or, in the discretion of the executors, at any time after reaching
twenty-one, and, in case any child die, to distribute its
share to its issue or, if none, to the survivor. Two children died without issue before reaching twenty-one;
the third died at twenty-seven, leaving issue, before distribution had been made. It was held that the estate of
the surviving child took nothing; that his interest was
either contingent upon surviving until distribution or
vested subject to defeasance on death before reaching
thirty.
If a will manifests no intention to give any interest
to a legatee unless he reaches a certain age, his interest·
is, of course, contingent until he reaches that age. In
Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker} 248 there was a bequest to
a trustee to pay the income from half to testatrix's son
Stuart for life, then, "If my said son shall have lawful
child or children of his body who shall survive him, his
share of my estate shall go to such child or children, girls
at age of 25 years and boys at 30 years and not before."
It was held that the interests of the children would not
vest until they reached the stated ages.
Alleged conditions of survival give rise to three types
of problems: (1) whether the future interest in question
is subject to such a condition; (2) who must be survived;
and (3) whether the condition is precedent or subsequent; that is, whether the interest is contingent or
vested subject to defeasance. If the future interest is a life
estate following a prior life estate, it will never become
possessory unless the remainderman survives the life ten2 4 8 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924), Part Two, notes 102, 224,
supra. Cf. Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760.
(1932); Part Two, note 103 supra.
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ant. If Andrew Baker devises land to James Thorpe for
life, remainder to Lucy Baker for life, Lucy's interest, although vested, will not become possessory unless she
survives James. If, however, the future interest is a
fee simple or an absolute interest in personalty, the failure of the remainderman to survive the preceding estates
does not affect his interest unless it is subject to a condition of survival. If Andrew Baker devises land to Lucy
Baker for life, remainder to John Stiles in fee simple,
John's remainder is not affected by his death before
Lucy. It passes to his heirs, devisees, or assigns as if
he owned a present estate in fee simple. 250
When a present interest is devised to the surviving
members of a group of persons, "surviving" normally
means surviving the testator, because language in a will
is ordinarily construed to speak from the death of the
testator. 251 Hence if Andrew Baker devises land "to the
surviving children of my deceased daughter Lucy," those
children of Lucy who are living when Andrew dies will
take. When, however, a future interest is devised to the
surviving members of a group, the normal meaning
would ordinarily seem to be "surviving the preceding
estates." Thus if Andrew Baker devises land to Lucy
Baker for life, remainder to her surviving children, he
probably means those who survive Lucy. Most courts
adopt this construction unless the context suggests a different meaning. 252 Michigan, however, appears to fol250 Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); Curtis v.
Fowler, 66 Mich. 696, 33 N.W. 804 (1887); Hovey v. Nellis, 98 Mich.
374, 57 N.W. 255 (1894); Hibler v. Hibler, 104 Mich. 274, 62 N.W.
361 (1895); Lariverre v. Rains, 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583 (1897);
Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900); Holmes v.
Holmes, 215 Mich. 112, 183 N.W. 784 (1921); In re Hurd's Estate,
303 Mich. 504, 6 N.W. (2d) 758 (1942). But see: Hunter v. Hunter,
Part Two, note 24 7 supra.
2p Eberts v. Eberts, 42 Mich. 404, 4 N.W. 172 (1880).
2s2 2 Simes, LAW oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §349 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §251 (1940).
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low a minority rule that, even in this situation, "surviving" presumptively means "surviving the testator."
In Toms v. Williams/ 58 land and other property were
devised to a trustee to hold for eighteen years and
then to transfer them to four named persons "or the
survivor of them, and to their heirs and assigns forever, as tenants in common." It was held that the
word "survivor" related to surviving the testator so that
the interests vested indefeasibly on the death of the
testator. Rood v. Hovey 254 involved a will by which a
testator devised his estate to his wife for life or widowhood, remainder to "my children now living, or who
may be at the time of her decease or marriage." Two
sons who survived the testator predeceased his widow.
It was held that their interests vested indefeasibly on
the death of the testator. In Porter v. Porter/ 55 a testator
devised his estate to his wife for life and "on the decease
of my wife,--- I desire my property to be divided equally between my surviving children". One son survived
the testator but predeceased his widow. It was held that
an interest vested indefeasibly in this son upon his
father's death and was not defeated by his failure to
survive the life tenant.
The rule that "surviving" means "surviving the testator" being only a rule of construction, it ought to be
2sa 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); Part Two, notes ll2, 244,
supra. The four named persons were entitled to part of the income
during part of the eighteen years.
254 50 Mich. 395, 15 N.W. 525 (1883), Part Two, notes 198, 218, supra.
L'Etourneau v. Henquenet, 89 Mich. 428, 50 N.W. 1077 (1891) is
substantially contra. There land was devised to the widow for life,
remainder to three named children with a provision that "whereas
one or more of my said children may not survive me or my said
wife" in such case the remainder to the survivors. The remainder
was held vested subject to defeasance by failure to survive the willow.
255 50 Mich. 456, 15 N.W. 550 (1883). Accord: In re Patterson's
Estate, 227 Mich. 486, 198 N.W. 958 (1924).
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overcome by a clear expression of contrary intention. In
Mullreed v. Clark/ 56 where a remainder was devised to
the testator's son James "and, if James should die without heirs, then" to testator's daughters, the trial court
held that "die without heirs" meant die without heirs
before the testator, so that James took an indefeasibly
vested estate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
"die without heirs" referred to the time of James's death.
Lambertson v. Case 257 involved a devise of land to testator's wife "as long as she lives, and when she gets through
with it it shall go to Norma Lambertson if she is living,
if not to J. V. Lambertson." Norma survived the testator but predeceased the life tenant. The court rejected
a contention that "if she is living" referred to the time
of the testator's death and held that Norma's remainder
was contingent upon her surviving the life tenant and
never vested. In one case, however, the Michigan Supreme Court has applied the rule as if it were a rule of
law, defeating intent, rather than a rule of construction
designed to ascertain intent. In Sturgis v. Sturgis, 258
a testator devised land to his son David "for and during
his natural life and to descend to his male children, if
any shall survive him, if not, then to his female children,
and should none of his children survive him" to other
grandchildren of the testator. At the death of the testator, David had two sons, Frank and James. Frank predeceased David, leaving issue. It was held that the in256110 Mich. 229, 68 N.W. 138, 989 (1896), Part Two, notes 125,
183, supra.
257 245 Mich. 208, 222 N.W. 182 (1928), Part Two, note 225 supra.
In re Blodgett's Estate, 197 Mich. 455, 163 N.W. 907 (1917) involved
a bequest to a wife for life, remainder to five children "or to such of
them as shall be living at the time of my death in case I shall survive
my wife, or at the time of my wife's death, in case she should survive
me." It was held that the remainder was subject to a condition of
surviving the wife.
258 242 Mich. 52, 217 N.W. 771 (1928). Emphasis supplied.
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terests of Frank and James vested indefeasibly at the
death of the testator.
When a condition of survival is found to exist, the
Michigan Supreme Court has shown a strong preference for a construction which would make the future
interest affected by it vested subject to defeasance rather
than contingent. 259
When a remainder is vested, it is clear in Michigan as
elsewhere that it is not subject to any condition of survivorship unless such a condition is imposed expressly or
by implication by the terms of the limitation.260 As to
contingent remainders, however, Michigan developed a
peculiar doctrine, markedly inconsistent with the usual
constructional preferences for early vesting and early
indefeasibility, that every contingent remainder was subject to a condition of surviving the life tenant unless a
contrary intention was expressly manifested. In Fitzhugh
v. Townsend/ 61 property was devised to a trustee for the
life of a granddaughter, with remainder to the surviving issue of the granddaughter. In the event of the granddaughter's death without surviving issue, the property
was to be divided among testatrix's brothers and sisters,
"and the children of such of them as shall be no longer
living." A brother of the testatrix who had died before
259 L'Etourneau v. Henquenet, 89 Mich. 428, 50 N.W. 1007 (1891),
Part Two, note 254 supra; Mcinerny v. Haase, 163 Mich. 364, 128
N.W. 215 (1910), Part Two, note 216 supra; Van Gallow v. Brandt,
168 Mich. 642, 134 N.W. 1018 (1912). See: Penny v. Mayer, 279
Mich. 400, 272 N.W. 721 (1937). Accord: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT,
§253 (1940). But see: Hadley v. Henderson, 214. Mich. 157, 183
N.W. 75 (1921), Part Two, note 262 infra; Lambertson v. Case, 245
Mich. 208, 222 N.W. 182 (1928), Part Two, notes 225, 257, supra;
In re Coots' Estate, 253 Mich. 208, 234 N.W. 141 (1931), Part Two,
note 263 infra; Stevens v. Wildey, 281 Mich. 377, 275 N.W. 179
(1937), Part Two, note 266 infra; Horton v. Moore, 110 F. (2d) 189
(6th Cir. 1940), Part One, note 372 supra.
260 Part Two, note 250 supra.
2a1. 59 Mich. 427, 27 N.W. 561 (1886), Part Two, note 221 supra.

CERTAINTY OF VESTING

355

rhe will was made left a son, William, who survived the
testatrix but predeceased the life beneficiary. It was
held that William's interest was contingent both upon
the death of the life beneficiary without issue and upon
his surviving her, so that his estate took nothing. In
Hadley v. Henderson/ 62 there was a bequest to testator's
son Charles, but in case Charles should die without issue, $3,000 to a daughter Mary, $2,000 to a sister Susan,
$1,000 to a niece Alice, and the residue to a missionary
society. Susan predeceased the testator, survived by issue. Mary and Alice survived the testator ·but predeceased Charles. These three had no issue. It was held
that the contingent legacies of Mary and Alice "lapsed"
upon their death before Charles. In re Coots' Estate 263
is the most notorious of this strange line of cases. There,
land was devised to a trustee for the life of the survivor
of the testator's widow and son, remainder to the son's
children and their heirs, but if the son should die without issue, to six named nephews and nieces of the testator. Three of these nephews and nieces survived the
testator but predeceased his son, who died without issue.
The Court rejected the cogent argument that our statutes make contingent future estates descendible and devisable/64 which they cannot be if all are subject to a
condition of survivorship until vesting, and held that
the devises to the nephews and nieces were subject to a
condition precedent of surviving the widow and son.
262 214 Mich. 157, 183 N.W. 75 (1921), Part Two, note 223 supra.
Contra: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §261 (1940). See: Casner and Westfall, "Construction Problems," 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.25
(1952).
2ss 253 Mich. 208, 234 N.W. 141
(1931), cert. den., Delbridge v.
Oldfield, 284 U.S. 665 (1931), Part Two, note 226 supra. Contra:
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §261 (1940).
264 Part One, note 371 supra.
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After this decision the Legislature enacted a statute providing:
"In all cases where the owner of an expectant estate,
right or interest in real or personal property, shall die
prior to the termination of the precedent or intermediate estate, if the contingency arises by which such
owner would have been entitled to an estate in possession if living, his heirs at law if he died intestate, or his
devisees or grantees and assigns if he shall have devised
or conveyed such right or interest, shall be entitled to
the same estate in possession." us

Stevens v. Wildey u 6 involved a will which became
effective before the statute. By it, land was devised to
Richard Odell for life, remainder to his children, but if
he died without issue to Isaac Odell. Isaac survived the
testator but predeceased Richard, who died without issue. It was held that Isaac's remainder "lapsed." The
Court said, however, that the rule in the Coots' case
was changed by the statute as to dispositions becoming
effective after the statute. It would seem, therefore, that
the strange rule in In re Coots' Estate is no longer the
law of Michigan.
Professor Gray and many of the courts which have
passed upon the question have taken the position that a
limitation should be construed as if the Rule Against
265 Act 211, P.A. 1931; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.47; Comp. Laws (1948)
§554.101; Part One, note 372 supra.
266 281 Mich. 377, 275 N.W. 179 (1937); Part Two, notes 124, 223,
supra. See: American Brass Co. v. Hauser, 284 Mich. 194 at 200,
278 N.W. 816, 115 A.L.R. 1464 (1938); Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300
Mich. 575 at 606, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942). In In re East's Estate,
325 Mich. 352, 38 N.W. (2d) 889 (1949), a remainder was limited
by a will admitted to probate in 1905, to Percey C. Hunt in fee,
"further, in case he dies without leaving direct heirs then said estate
to be divided equally between my brothers and sisters." It was
decided that the condition (dying without direct heirs) had not occurred, but the opinion suggests that the contingent future estate of
the brothers and sisters was subject to a condition of surviving Percey.
325 Mich. 352 at 359, 363.
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Perpetuities did not exist, and then the Rule should be
applied to it, as so construed "remorselessly." American
courts, however, are tending to adopt the view that when
the limitation is capable of two possible constructions,
one of which would violate the Rule and the other of
which would not, the latter should be adopted. 267 The
Michigan Supreme Court has not clearly accepted either
view, but it has indicated that it will not distort the language of a limitation in order to achieve a construction
which would make it valid. 268
267Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §629 (1915), but
compare §633: "When the expression which a testator uses is really
ambiguous, and is fairly capable of two constructions, one of which
would produce a legal result, and the other a result that would be
bad for remoteness, it is a fair presumption that the testator meant to
create a legal rather than an illegal interest." Taking the two sections
together, Professor Gray may only have meant that the language
should not be distorted in order to achieve a construction which would
make the limitation valid. See 2 Simes, LAW oF FUTuRE INTERESTS,
§550 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §375 (1944); Leach and Tudor,
"The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY §§22.44-22.46 (1952). The Restatement adopts and Leach and
Tudor prefer the view that the effect of the Rule should have a bearing
on construction. The classic statement of the view that it should not is
that of Baron Parke in Viscount Dungannon v. Smith, 12 Cl. & F. 546 at
599, 8 Eng. Rep .. 1523 at 1545 (1846). One of the best known statements of the other view is that of Lumpkin, J., in Forman v. Troup,
30 Ga. 496 at 499 (1860).
268 Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922). The
limitation was to a son for life, remainder to his children for their
lives, remainder to the children's heirs. The question was whether
the class "children" closed at the testatrix's death or at her son's
death. See Part Two, note 276 infra. But in Dean v. Mumford, 102
Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 (1894) the court held that a testamentary trust
for testator's sons, their wives and children, included only wives whom
they had at the testator's death, although one of the sons was then
unmarried. The opinion indicates that this construction was adopted
because any other would make the limitation invalid.

CHAPTER
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Class Gifts
CLASS gift is a limitation of a property interest
to a group of persons intended to take as an
entity or unit rather than as specific individuals.
When a limitation is to persons specified by their individual names, the grantor or testator may be assumed to
have thought of them as separate individuals rather than
as an entity, unit, or group. Hence, in the construction
of limitations, there is a presumption that a limitation to
named individuals is not a class gift. 269 Being only a rule
of construction, this presumption is overcome by a contrary manifestation of intention. 270 When a limitation

A

269 Hatt v. Green, 180 Mich. 883, 147 N.W. 598 (1914) (to her
children, i.e., George, Ellen, Milo, Merwin, Walter, Alfred, Sarah,
Wade, and Governor); In re Coots' Estate, 258 Mich. 208, 284 N.W.
141 (1981), cert. den., Delbridge v. Oldfield, 284 U.S. 665 (1981)
(residue to be divided equally among seven named nephews and
nieces); Cattell v. Evans, 301 Mich. 708, 4 N.W. (2d) 67 (1942)
(residue to seven named persons, each to take an equal undivided oneseventh share). PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §280 (1940); Casner, "Class
Gifts," 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§22.5-22.8 (1952).
210 Eyer
v. Beck, 70 Mich. 179, 38 N.W. 20 (1888) (my
heirs, to wit: John Beck, the children of Christian Beck, Jr., deceased, Elizabeth Eicher, Gottsieb Beck, Peter Beck, Magdalena Eyer);
Lariverre v. Rains, 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 588 (1897) (remainder
"to her said grandchildren, Joseph and Peter Lariverre, children of
the said Joseph, her son, or to his heirs; it being expressly understood
that, if her said son Joseph shall have more children at the time of
his death, they shall share and share alike the said property"); In re
Ives' Estate, 182 Mich. 699, 148 N.W. 727 (1914) (residue to sister
Hattie and brothers Wesley and Dwight, to each an undivided onethird); In re Hunter's Estate, 212 Mich. 880, 180 N.W. 864 (1920)
(residue to my two sisters, viz: Catherine and Ella, share and share
alike); Rodey v. Stotz, 280 Mich. 90, 278 N.W. 404 (1987) (to the
following named children of my said nephew, Fred, to wit: Edmund,
Mildred, Wilmot and Helma, share and share alike); American Brass
Co. v. Hauser, 284 Mich. 194, 278 N.W. 816, 115 A.L.R. 1464 (1938)
(to my children. This will is made by me having in mind my
children, Frank, Otto, Albert and Charles); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
§281 (1940).
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is to persons described only by a group designation, such
as "children," "grandchildren," "brothers," "nephews,"
"cousins," "issue," "heirs," or "next of kin," the grantor
or testator may be assumed to have thought of them as
an entity or unit rather than as separate individuals.
Hence, in the construction of limitations, there is a presumption that a limitation to persons described only by
a group designation is a class gift. 271 Being only a rule of
construction, this presumption is overcome by a contrary
manifestation of intention. 272
211 See v. Derr, 57 Mich. 369, 24 N.W. 108 (1885) (conveyance of
remainder to heirs of a living person created a class gift to his
children); Hovey v. Nellis, 98 Mich. 374, 57 N.W. 255 (1894) (to the
children of my said son); McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W.
182 (1899) (to my daughter Mary Ann, I give to each of her children
one hundred dollars); Porter v. Osmun, 135 Mich. 361, 97 N.W. 756,
98 N.W. 859 (1904) (conveyance of remainder to heirs of a living
person created a class gift to his children); Sturgis v. Sturgis, 242
Mich. 52, 217 N.W. 771 (1928) (remainder to the male children of
a son); In re Ecclestone's Estate, 339 Mich. 15 at 24, 62 N.W. (2d) 606
(1954). See: In re Churchill's Estate, 230 Mich. 148, 203 N.W. ll8
(1925). PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §279 (1940); Casner, "Class Gifts," 5
AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §§22.9-22.11 (1952). Class gifts were
involved in the following cases:
Bailey v. Bailey, 25 Mich. 185 (1872) (my lawful heirs); Plant v.
Weeks, 39 Mich. 117 (1878) (children of my deceased sister Mary);
Hascall v. Cox, 49 Mich. 435, 13 N.W. 807 (1882) (my legal heirs);
Morrison v. Estate of Sessions, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N.W. 249 (1888) (my
lawful heirs); Clark v. Mack, 161 Mich. 545, 126 N.W. 632 (1910)
(nearest of kin); Menard v. Campbell, 180 Mich. 583, 147 N.W. 556
(1914) (at his decease to his heirs surviving); Morse v. Lowe, 182
Mich. 607, 148 N.W. 970 (1914) (his next of kin, by blood relationship); Brooks v. Parks, 189 Mich. 490, 155 N.W. 573 (1915) (after
her decease to her heirs); In re Shumway's Estate, 194 Mich. 245, 160
N.W. 595 (1916) (after her decease to my legal heirs); Russell v.
Musson, 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927) (surviving children of
life tenant); Hay v. Hay, 317 Mich. 370, 26 N.W. (2d) 908 (1947)
(remainder to my legal heirs); In re East's Estate, 325 Mich. 352, 38
N.W. (2d) 889 (1949) (remainder in case he dies without leaving
direct heirs to my brothers and sisters). In LaMere v. Jackson, 288
Mich. 99, 284 N.W. 659 (1939), a class gift was held void for uncertainty as to the composition of the class. Other Michigan cases involving class gifts are cited in Part Two, notes 270 supra, 273-276,
279, 282, 284, 286, infra.
212 Strong v. Smith, 84 Mich. 567, 48 N.W. 183 (1891) (to my own
brothers and sisters and to the brothers and sisters of my said wife);
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As in the case of limitations to individuals, when a
future estate is limited to a class, the death of a member
of the class before his interest becomes possessory does
not defeat it unless it is subject to a condition of survival, express or implied. If Andrew Baker devises land
to John Stiles for life, remainder to John's children in
fee, and John has three children when Andrew dies, these
children take a vested remainder. If one dies before
John, his interest passes to his heirs, devisees, or assigns.273 If, however, a class gift is subject to a condition
of survival, the effect of nonsurvival is different from that
when the gift is to individuals, in that the share of the
member of the class who fails to survive ordinarily
passes to the surviving members of the class. If Andrew
Baker devises land to John Stiles for life, remainder to
those children of John who survive him, John has three
Downing v. Birney, 117 Mich. 675, 76 N.W. 125 (1898) (conveyance
of remainder to the children of her body begotten); Fullager v. Stockdale, 138 Mich. 363, 101 N.W. 576 (1904) (conveyance to heirs of a
living person vested indefeasible interests in her present living
children); Wessborg v. Merrill, 195 Mich. 556, 162 N.W. 102 (1917)
(bequest to my wife and five children). With the last case compare
In re Holtforth's Estate, 298 Mich. 708, 299 N.W. 776 (1941) where a
devise "to the seven children of my brother, - - and the survivor of
them" was assumed to create a class gift.
21s De Visme v. Mello, 1 Bro. C.C. 537, 28 Eng. Rep. 1285 (1782)
(personalty); Rood v. Hovey, 50 Mich. 395, 15 N.W. 525 (1883), Part
Two, note 254 supra; Porter v. Porter, 50 Mich. 456, 15 N.W. 550
(1883), Part Two, note 255 supra; Hovey v. Nellis, 98 Mich. 374, 57
N.W. 255 (1894), Part Two, note 250 supra; Conover v. Hewitt, 125
Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900); Porter v. Osmun, 135 Mich. 361, 97
N.W. 756, 98 N.W. 859 (1904); In re Patterson's Estate, 227 Mich.
486, 198 N.W. 958 (1924), Part Two, note 255 supra; Sturgis v. Sturgis,
242 Mich. 52, 217 N.W. 771 (1928), Part Two, note 258 supra; Rodey
v. Stotz, 280 Mich. 90, 273 N.W. 404 (1937). See Lariverre v. Rains,
112 Mich. 276 at 281, 70 N.W. 583 (1897). 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE
INTERESTS, §390 (1936); Casner and Westfall, "Construction Problems,"
5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §21.11 (1952). Cf. Fitzhugh v. Townsend, 59 Mich. 427, 27 N.W. 561 (1886), Part Two, notes 221, 261,
supra. The class designation itself, e.g., "heirs," "next of kin," may
imply a condition of survival. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §249, Comments e, f. (1940).
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children when Andrew dies, and one of these dies before
John, the entire remainder passes to the surviving two
in the absence of other provisions in Andrew's will. 274
A class gift differs from a limitation to individuals in
that a class may open to admit new members after the
effective date of the instrument containing the limitation.
If Andrew Baker devises land to John Stiles for life, remainder to John's sons Henry and William in fee, a third
son of John, born after the death of Andrew, will not take
under the devise. If however, Andrew Baker devises
land to John Stiles for life, remainder to the children of
John, not only John's children in being at the death of
Andrew but those born thereafter will share the remainder.275 A well-settled rule of construction, known
as the "Rule of Convenience," prescribes that, in the absence of a manifestation of some other intention, a class
closes when any member of it is entitled to possession of
a share in the property. This means that the class will
z14 Eberts v. Eberts, 42 Mich. 404, 4 N.W. 172 (1880); Fitzhugh v.
Townsend, 59 Mich. 427, 27 N.W. 561 (1886), Part Two, notes 221,
261, supra; In re Blodgett's Estate, 197 Mich. 455, 163 N.W. 907
(1917), Part Two, note 257 supra; American Brass Co. v. Hauser, 284
Mich. 194, 278 N.W. 816, 115 A.L.R. 1464 (1938). See In re Coots'
Estate, 253 Mich. 208 at 212, 234 N.W. 141 (1931); Cattell v. Evans,
301 Mich. 708, 4 N.W. (2d) 67 (1942). PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §251,
Ill. 1; c. 22, Introductory Note; §296, Comment c. and Ills. 1, 6
(1940); Casner and Westfall, "Construction Problems," 5 AMERICAN
LAW oF PROPERTY, §21.12 (1952). If a limitation to individuals is
subject to a condition of survivorship, the survivors take the shares of
those who fail to survive only if the limitation creates a joint tenancy
or contains express provisions therefor, as was the case in L'Etourneau
v. Henquenet, 89 Mich. 428, 50 N.W. 1077 (1891), Part Two, note
254 supra.
z1s Cheever v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 45 Mich. 6, 7 N.W. 186
(1880); See v. Derr, 57 Mich. 369, 24 N.W. 108 (1885); Hovey v.
Nellis, 98 Mich. 374, 57 N.W. 255 (1894); Lariverre v. Rains, 112
Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583 (1897); McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79
N.W. 182 (1899); Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922).
Cf. Knorr v. Millard, 57 Mich. 265, 23 N.W. 807 (1885) (bequest,
without precedent interest, to children of a living person, to be paid
to them on coming of age). PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, C. 22, JntrodUC·
tory Note §279, Ill 2. (1940).
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not open to admit persons who come into being after
this time. If Andrew Baker devises land to Lucy Baker
for life, remainder to the children of John Stiles, children of John who are in being when Andrew dies or
who come into being before Lucy dies constitute the
class; children of John who come into being after the
death of Lucy are not entitled to shares. 276 Similarly, if
Andrew Baker bequeaths property to the children of
John Stiles who attain the age of twenty-one, children
of John who come into being after a child of John has
attained that age do not take. 271
The Rule of Convenience has an important exception.
If there is no member of the designated class in being at
the time when, under the terms of the limitation, the
interest of the class or some of its members would otherwise become possessory, the class does not close so long
as it is possible for persons included within the class description to come into being. If Andrew Baker devises
land to Lucy Baker for life, remainder to the children
of John Stiles, and John has no children when Lucy
276 Baldwin v. Karver, 1 Cowp. 309, 98 Eng. Rep. 1102
(1775);
Cheever v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 45 Mich. 6, 7 N.W. 186 (1880)
(devise to daughter for life, remainder to her children and grandchildren); McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W. 182 (1899)
(bequest to widow for life, remainder to children of daughter Mary
Ann; child of Mary Ann en ventre sa mere when the widow died entitled to share); Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922).
PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, §295 (1940); 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §378 (1936); Casner, "Class Gifts," 5 AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY, §§22.40-22.46 (1952). Being only a rule of construction, the
Rule of Convenience does not apply if a contrary intent is manifested. Thus in Lariverre v. Rains, 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583
(1897), Part Two, note 270 supra, the Court recognized that the
language used expressly included members of the class who came into
being after the remainder limited to it became posssesory. This language is quoted in the text, Part One, note 264 supra.
211 Andrews v. Partington, 3 Bro. C.C. 401, 29 Eng. Rep. 610
(1791 ); Hoste v. Pratt, 3 Ves. Jr. 730, 30 Eng. Rep. 1243 (1798); Gray,
RULE AGAINST PFRPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §379 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS, §382 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §295 (1940);
Casner, "Class Gifts," 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §22.44 (1952).
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dies, all children of John, whenever born, will take.
The first child of John will take the whole remainder
subject to open, that is, to partial defeasance in favor
of children of John born later. 278
Chapters 9, 10, and 11 have made it evident that if the
interest of any member of a class may possibly vest at a
time beyond the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, that interest is void, and, hence, if the interests of all
members of the class may possibly vest at a time beyond
the period of the Rule, the entire class gift is void. This
is well settled in Michigan. 279 The English cases and all
American decisions involving the question go beyond
this by holding that, for purposes of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, a class gift stands or falls as a unit. If the
interest of any member of the class may possibly vest at
any time beyond the period of the Rule, the entire class
gift is void, even though the interests of some members
are presently vested or will certainly vest within the
period.280 If Andrew Baker bequeaths property to James
218 Hutcheson v. Jones, 2 Madd. 124, 56 Eng. Rep. 281
(1817).
See: Wyndham v. Wyndham, 3 Bro. C.C. 58, 29 Eng. Rep. 407 (1790);
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §295 (b), Ill. 2 and Comment o (1940); 2
Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §378 (1936); Casner, "Class Gifts,"
5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§22.42, 22.43 (1952).
279 St. Amour v. Rivard, 2 Mich. 294 (1852), Part Two, notes 39,
84, supra; Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W.
976 (1924), Part Two, notes 102, 128, supra; Gettins v. Grand Rapids
Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930), Part Two, note 145
supra; Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270,
255 N.W. 587 (1934), Part Two, note 88 supra.
2so Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox. 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787); Routledge
v. Dorril, 2 Ves. Jr. 357, 30 Eng. Rep. 671 (1794); Leake v. Robinson,
2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (1817); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PER·
PETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§373-376 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS,
§§527, 528 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§371, 383, 384 (1944);
Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PRoPERTY, §24.26 (1952); Leach, "The Rule Against
Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes," 51 HARV. L. REv. 1329-1353 (1938).
In Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922), land was
devised to testator's son for life, remainder to the children of the son
for their lives. When the testator died the son had five children. A
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Thorpe upon trust to pay the income to John Stiles for
life and then to transfer the principal to those children
of John who reach the age of twenty-five, the entire class
gift to the children of John is void, even if John has two
children who are twenty-five and three under twentyfive when Andrew dies. 281 Considered alone, the interests
of the two children who are already twenty-five would
vest at once upon the death of Andrew, and those of the
three under twenty-five would certainly vest or fail
within their own lives, but John may have more children.
born within four years of his death, who would reach
twenty-five more than twenty-one years after John's
death. The Rule of Convenience does not save such a
gift because, under it, the class would not close against
persons not in being until John's death.
The unit or "all or nothing" rule, that a class gift is
void in toto if the interest of any possible member of the
class violates the Rule Against Perpetuities, has two exceptions. First, when a fixed sum is given to each member of the class, the gifts to those members whose interests will certainly vest within the period of the Rule are
valid even though the interests of other members violate the Rule and so are void. 282 If Andrew Baker bestatute then in force forbade the limitation of successive estates for
life to persons not in being (Chapter 19, infra). It was held that
the entire limitation to the children of the son failed because the
class would not close until the death of the son and so might include
persons not in being at the death of the testator. And see Part Three,
notes 78, 79, 81, infra.
281 Vawdry v. Geddes, I Russ. & M. 203, 39 Eng. Rep. 78 (1830).
2 8 2 Storrs v. Benbow, 3 DeG. M. & G. 390, 43 Eng. Rep. 153 (1853);
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §389 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §528 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §385
(1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PRoPERTY, §24.28 (1952). This type of
gift was involved in McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W.
182 (1899), Part Two note 271 supra, and In re East's Estate, 325
Mich. 352, 38 N.W. (2d) 889 (1949), but in those cases no interest
could possibly vest beyond the period of the Rule, the gift being to
persons to be ascertained at the death of a life tenant.
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queaths property to James Thorpe upon trust to pay
the income to John Stiles for life, and then to transfer
$1,000 of the principal to each of those children of John
who reach twenty-five, the interests of those children of
John who are in being when Andrew dies are valid. The
second exception is related to the first. When a class
gift is made to a class consisting of several separated subclasses, the gifts to some subclasses may be valid although
others fail. If Andrew Baker bequeaths property to James
Thorpe upon trust to pay the income to John Stiles for
life, then to pay the income to John's children for their
lives and upon the death of any child of John to pay the
principal upon which that child was receiving income to
the issue of that child, the limitations to such issue are
valid as to the issue of any child of John who was in
being when Andrew died, although void as to issue of
any child of John who came into being after Andrew's
death. 283
The interrelations between the Rule of Convenience
and its exception and the unit or "all or nothing" rule
and its two exceptions are perhaps best illustrated by a
series of examples. If Andrew Baker bequeaths property
to John Stiles for life and then to the grandchildren of
John, the class gift is valid if John has a grandchild living when Andrew dies. 284 That grandchild takes a vested
2ss Griffith v. Pownall, 13 Sim. 393, 60 Eng. Rep. 152 (1843); Gray,
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §391 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS, §528 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §389 (1944);
Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.29 (1952).
284 In Cheever v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 45 Mich. 6, 7 N.W.
186 (1880), there was a bequest to testator's daughter Escalala for
life, then to her children and grandchildren in equal shares. Escalala
had children but no grandchildren when the testator died. The
remainder to the class was correctly treated as valid. The living
children took vested interests which would entitle them or their
estates to possession of shares on their mother's death. This, under
the Rule of Convenience, would close the class to afterborn grand-
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interest which will entitle him or his estate to possession
of a share when John dies. Under the Rule of Convenience, the class will close on the death of John and, therefore, all its members will be ascertained and their interests vested at the end of a life in being. If, on the other
hand, John has no grandchild when Andrew dies, the
class gift is void. 285 John's grandchildren may be born
after his death to children of John not in being when
Andrew died. The Rule of Convenience is not certain
to close the class at John's death because he may have
no grandchildren at that time. Since it is possible that
the interests of all of the members of the class may vest
too remotely, they would all be void even if there were
no unit or "all or nothing" rule.
If Andrew Baker bequeaths property "to my brothers
and sisters for life, remainder to their children," the
remainder is valid whether or not Andrew's parents are
alive and whether or not there are children of his
brothers and sisters in being at the time of his death. 286
The brothers and sisters in being at his death will be
entitled to possession at that time; therefore the Rule
children at the death of Escalala. As the Court held, grandchildren who
came into being after the death of Escalala (the only ones whose interests might violate the Rule Against Perpetuities) would be excluded
by the Rule of Convenience.
285 Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.25, Case 37 (1952). If
there is no precedent estate, that is, if Andrew Baker bequeaths
property "to the grandchildren of John Stiles," the result is the same
as in the case of the postponed gifts described in the text. If John
has grandchildren living when Andrew dies, they are entitled to immediate possession. Hence the Rule of Convenience closes the class
at once and the gift is valid. If John has no grandchildren in being
when Andrew dies, the class gift is void. John's only grandchildren
may be children of his as yet unborn children, born after his death.
2s6 As to the validity of a bequest "to James Thorpe upon trust to
pay the income semi-annually to my brothers and sisters for their lives
and on the death of the survivor to transfer the corpus to their children in equal shares," see Casner, "Class Gifts," 5 AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY, §22.46 (1952).
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of Convenience closes the class "brothers and· sisters"
to afterborn children of his parents. The children of the
brothers and sisters must necessarily be born or conceived within their parents' lifetimes. If, on the other
hand, Andrew Baker bequeaths property "to my
brothers and sisters for life, remainder to my nephews
and nieces in equal shares," the remainder is void unless
Andrew's parents predecease him or he has a nephew or
niece in being at the time of his death. His only nephews
and nieces might be the children of brothers and sisters
born after his death and might not come into being until
after the deaths of those brothers and sisters who were
alive when Andrew died. Here again, the gift would be
void even if there were no unit or "all or nothing rule.'·
If, in the last example, Andrew's parents predeceased
him, the remainder will be valid because no more
brothers and sisters can be born. Hence, all of Andrew's nieces and nephews must necessarily come into
existence within lives in being. If there is a nephew
or niece in being when Andrew dies, the remainder will
also be valid. The class "brothers and sisters" will close
under the Rule of Convenience on the death of Andrew.
The nephew or niece in being when Andrew dies will
take a vested right to possession of a share on the death
of the living brothers and sisters. Hence, the class
"nieces and nephews" will close at the end of a life in
being.
If Andrew Baker bequeaths property to John Stiles
for life and then to such of John's children as reach the
age of twenty-five, and John has no children when Andrew dies, the remainder is void because all of John's
children who reach twenty-five may be born within four
years of John's death and so their interests would not
vest until more than twenty-one years after a life in be-
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ing. 287 As has been seen, such a gift is also void in toto
under the unit or "all or nothing" rule, even though
John has children who have reached twenty-five when
Andrew dies. 288 The class will not close until John's
death; children born within four years of his death will
be included in it and, because reaching twentyfive is a condition precedent to their interests, those interests may not vest until more than twenty-one years
after the death of John and those of his children who
are living when Andrew dies. On the other hand, if
Andrew Baker bequeaths property to John Stiles for life
and then to John's children "but if any child of John
dies before reaching twenty-five, his share shall pass to
his issue," the class gift to the children is valid whether
or not John has children when Andrew dies. Here the
provisions as to age is not a condition precedent but
one for defeasance. All of John's children must necessarily come into being during his lifetime, and their
interests will vest as soon as they do, subject to defeasance on death before twenty-five. 289 The provisions for
defeasance are valid as to the shares of children of John
287 Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976
(1924), Part Two, notes 102, 128, supra; Gettins v. Grand Rapids
Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930), Part Two, note 145
supra; Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270,
255 N.W. 587 (1934), Part Two, note 88 supra. Cf. Burke v. Central
Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932).
2ss Part Two, note 281 supra. In this situation, if there is no precedent estate, that is, if Andrew Baker bequeaths property "to such of
the children of John Stiles as reach the age of twenty-five years," the
gift is valid if John has children who have reached twenty-five when
Andrew dies. These children will be entitled to immediate possession of shares. Hence the class will close at once under the Rule of
Convenience and afterborn children of John will take no interest.
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §379 (1915).
289 Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §372
(1915); PROP·
ERTY RESTATEMENT, §384, Jll. 2 (1944).
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m being when Andrew dies but void as to the other
shares. 290
If Andrew Baker bequeaths property to John Stiles for
life, remainder to the grandchildren of John, payable at
their respective ages of twenty-five, the class gift is valid
if John has a grandchild who has reached the age of four
when Andrew dies. 291 The age provision is neither a
condition precedent nor a provision for defeasance.
Hence the grandchild who is four or his estate will certainly be entitled to possession of a share when twentyfive years after his birth have elapsed and John has died.
This must happen within a life in being and twenty-one
years, and, when it does, the class will close and all members of it, the grandchildren of John who come into being before the class closes, will have vested interests.
2oo Part Two, note 283 supra; PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §384, Ill. 2
(1944).
291 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §639aa. (1915); Leach
and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities,'' 6 AMERI·
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.25, Case 40. (1952).
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Powers of Appointment
F ANDREW BAKER devises land to John Stiles for
life, remainder to such children of John as John
may appoint and, in default of appointment, to Lucy
Baker in fee simple, Andrew is the donor of a power of
appointment, John is the donee of the power, John's
children are the objects of the power, and Lucy is the
taker in default. When a power of appointment is
created, problems as to validity under the Rule Against
Perpetuities may arise as to (1) the power itself, (2) interests appointed under the power, and (3) the limitation
in default of appointment. As the validity of limitations
in default of appointment has been considered before,
it may be best to treat this problem first.

I

A. INTERESTS LIMITED IN DEFAULT OF APPOINTMENT

A limitation in default of appointment may be vested,
subject to defeasance by the exercise of the power. 292
The limitation to Lucy Baker in the example given in
the preceding paragraph is of this type. A future interest which is vested subject to defeasance does not offend
the Rule Against Perpetuities. But a limitation in default of appointment may be contingent. Such a limitation violates the Rule unless it is certain to vest, if at all,
within the period of the Rule. If the power of appointment is limited as to objects or restricted to exercise by
will, so that the donee cannot appoint to himself for his
292 McCarty v. Fish, 87 Mich. 48, 49 N.W. 513 (1891), Part Two
notes 160, 234 supra.
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own exclusive benefit, the period of the Rule Against
Perpetuities is computed, so far as the validity of the
limitation in default of appointment is concerned, from
the time when the instrument creating the power became effective. 293 If Andrew Baker bequeaths property
to John Stiles, who has no children, for life, remainder
to such children of John as John may appoint and, in
default of appointment, to those children of John who
reach the age of twenty-five years, the period of the Rule
is computed from the death of Andrew. At that time it
293 Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924);
Part Two, notes 75-77 supra. Although agreeing that, in this situation,
the period of the Rule commences upon the effective date of the instrument creating the power, Professor Leach thinks that facts occurring between that date and the time when the power expires may be
considered in determining the validity of the limitation in default of
appointment. Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against
Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.36 (1952). Compare
Part Two, notes 127, 128, supra. He cited no authority for this view
and conceded that there was none at the time he wrote, but the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts later adopted his view. Sears
v. Coolidge 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E. (2d) 563 (1952), noted, 33 BosTON
UNIV. L. REv. 119 (1953), 66 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1953). Michigan
Trust Co. v. Baker, supra, is opposed to the Leach view. There the
limitations were (l) to testatrix's husband for life, with power to consume so much of the principal as he might desire for his support and
comfort, (2) to a trustee to pay the income to testatrix's son Stuart
for life, (3) to the daughters of Stuart who reach twenty-five and the
sons who reach thirty, (4) in default of such children of Stuart, to
other persons. Stuart predeceased the husband, leaving no issue, so if
facts occurring before the expiration of the husband's power had been
considered, the subsequent limitations would have been valid. They
were held void.
It should be recalled that when a future interest is destructible by
someone for his own benefit, the period of the Rule does not commence until the destructibility ceases. Part Two, note 70 supra. This
doctrine applies to limitations in default of appointment and so qualifies the statement in the text in situations where such limitations are
destructible by virtue of some other power than that in default of
which they are limited. Moreover, Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §12, Part
Two, note 304 infra, provides that when a tenant for life has an unlimited power to dispose of the fee by will, he shall be deemed to
possess an absolute power of disposition. The effect of the statute
would seem to defer the commencement of the period of the Rule, as
to interests limited in default of appointment, to the death of the
donee. Compare Part Two, notes 297, 321, infra.
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is not certain that any of John's children will reach the
age of twenty-five within twenty-one years after John's
death. Hence the limitation in default of appointment
is void. That is, the existence of such a limited power
of appointment has no bearing on the validity of interests limited in default of its exercise. If, on the other
hand, the power is unlimited as to objects and purpose
and presently exercisable by deed, so that the donee of
the power could at any time appoint to himself for his
own exclusive benefit, the period of the Rule Against
Perpetuities is computed from the time when the power
ceases to be exercisable. 294 If Andrew Baker bequeaths
property to John Stiles, who has no children, for life,
remainder to such person or persons as John may by deed
or will appoint and, in default of appointment, to those
children of John who reach the age of twenty-five years,
the period of the Rule is computed from the death of
John because John could appoint to himself for his
own exclusive benefit. At that time all of John's children are in being and all will reach twenty-five or die
within their own lives. Hence the limitation in default
of appointment is valid. That is, the existence of an
unlimited power to destroy a future interest for the sole
benefit of the holder of the power postpones the commencement of the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
B. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT THEMSELVES

A power of appointment itself, whether limited or unlimited, violates the Rule Against Perpetuities unless it
294 Part Two, notes 69-73 supra. Although such a gift in default of
appointment does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, there is a
line of Michigan cases (certainly unsound and probably overruled)
holding that when a life tenant is given unlimited power to dispose
of the fee by deed, a limitation in default of appointment is void for
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is certain to be exercisable, if at all, within the period of
the Rule, computed from the effective date of the instrument creating the power. 295 If Andrew Baker devises
land to John Stiles, who has no children, for life, remainder to James Thorpe in fee, subject to a power in
the first son of John who reaches twenty-five to appoint
the fee by deed or will to any person or persons, the
power is void. It is not certain that a son of John will
reach twenty-five and so be able to exercise the power
within the period of the Rule. However, even though
a power is limited to take effect on a contingency which
may not occur within the period of the Rule, if the
donee of the power is an ascertained, living human being,
the power is valid because it will be exercisable, if at all,
within the lifetime of the donee. 296 If Andrew Baker
repugnancy. Part Two, notes 182, 183, supra. If the power permits
disposition by deed or will, there should be no possible basis for the
application of this repugnancy doctrine.
29o Wollaston v. King, L.R. & Eq. 165 (1868); Re Hargreaves, 43 Ch.
D. 401 (C.A. 1890); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §475
(1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §535 (1936); PROPERTY
REsTATEMENT, §390 (1) (1944). The Rule Against Perpetuities regulates only interests in property. Strictly speaking, a power of appointment is not an interest in property. Simes, "The Devolution of Title
to Appointed Property," 33 ILL. L. REv. 480 at 488-490 (1928);
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §390, Comment b, (1944). Accordingly, instead of saying that a power violates the Rule, it might be technically
more accurate to say that, because any exercise of it would violate
the Rule, the power is incapable of effective exercise. Foulke, "Powers
and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 16 CoL. L. REv. 537 at 539-540
(1916); Bettner, "The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Powers
of Appointment," 27 VA. L. REv. 149 at 151 (1940). The end result
is the same, and the courts tend to use the language of the text.
296 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §476 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §535 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §390,
Comment c. (1944). See: Re Hargreaves, 43 Ch. D. 401 at 405 (C.A.
1890). There is some doubt as to the soundness of this proposition
in Michigan when the objects of the power are limited to persons
other than the donee of the power because our statutes provide that
when the disposition which a power authorizes is limited to be made
to any particular person or class of persons, other than the donee of
the power, the court of chancery shall exercise the power after the
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devises land to John Stiles, who has no children, for life,
remainder to James Thorpe in fee, subject to a power
in John to appoint the fee by deed or will to any person
or persons when and if John has a son who reaches
twenty-five, the power is valid. It cannot be exercised
unless John has a son who reaches twenty-five during
the lifetime of John and so must be exercisable, if at all,
within a life in being.
A power of appointment which is limited as to objects
or exercisable only by will, so that the donee cannot appoint to himself for his own exclusive benefit, violates
the Rule Against Perpetuities if it could possibly be exercised at a time beyond the period of the Rule, computed from the effective date of the instrument creating
the power. 297 If Andrew Baker bequeaths property to
John Stiles, who has no son, for life, remainder to such
death of the donee unless the exercise of the power is made expressly
to depend on the will of the donee. Rev. Stat. 1846 c. 64, §§23, 24,
28; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2680, 2681, 2685; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4163,
4164, 4168; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8878, 8879, 8883; How. Stat., §§5612,
5613, 5617; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11614, 11615, 11619; Comp. Laws
(1929) §§13017, 13018, 13022; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.113, 26.114,
26.118; Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.23, 556.24, 556.28. If Andrew Baker
devises land to John Stiles, who has no children, for life, remainder
to James Thorpe in fee, subject to a power in John to appoint the fee
to such of his issue as he may select when and if John has a son who
reaches twenty-five, it might be argued that the statute permits the
power to become exercisable more than twenty-one years after the
death of John and so that it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities.
See: Matter of Christie, 133 N.Y. 473, 31 N.E. 515 (1892); Battelle v.
Parks, 2 Mich. 531 (1853); American Brass Co. v. Hauser, 284 Mich.
194, 278 N.W. 816, 115 A.L.R. 1464 (1938).
297 Webb v. Sadler, L.R. 14 Eq. 533 (1872), L.R. 8 Ch. App. 419
(1873); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, §§474, 477 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §536 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §390
(2) (1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against
Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §24.32 (1952). But Rev.
Stat. 1846, c. 64, §12, Part Two, note 304 infra, provides that when a
tenant for life has an unlimited power to dispose of the fee by will,
he shall be deemed to possess an absolute power of disposition. The
effect of the statute would seem to be that such a power will be treated
as if the donee could appoint to himself for his own exclusive benefit.
Compare Part Two, notes 293 supra, 321 infra.
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female issue of John as John's eldest son may appoint, the
power will certainly be exercisable, if at all, within a life
in being and twenty-one years and so does not offend
the rule stated in the preceding paragraph, but, since
it may possibly be exercised more than twenty-one years
after the death of John, it is void under the rule just
stated. This means, in effect, that an unborn person
cannot be the donee of a power which is limited or testamentary unless the exercise of the power is restricted
by other terms of the instrument to a period measured
by lives in being and twenty-one years. As a power of appointment limited to a living person cannot be exercised
after his death, such a power does not violate the rule
even though it is subject to a condition precedent which
may never occur. 298 A power of appointment which is unlimited as to objects and exercisable by deed, so that the
donee can appoint to himself for his own exclusive benefit, does not offend the Rule Against Perpetuities merely
because it could possibly be exercised at a time beyond
the period of the Rule, so long as it will certainly be
exercisable, if at all, within the period.299 If Andrew
Baker bequeaths property to John Stiles, who has no son,
for life, remainder to such persons as John's eldest son
298 But see Part Two, note 296 supra. A power of appointment which
is not limited in duration to the life of the donee is bad unless its
execution is restricted to the period of the Rule. Thus if Andrew
Baker devises land to John Stiles and his heirs, subject to a power in
Lucy Baker and her heirs to appoint the fee to any issue of the testator, the power is void. See Gray, id., §475. It is not necessary to the
validity of a power, however, that the donee have any other interest
in the property. Ostrander v. Muskegon Finance Co., 230 Mich. 310,
202 N.W. 951 (1925).
299 Bray v. Hammersley, 3 Sim. 513, 57 Eng. Rep. 1090
(1830),
sub nom. Bray v. Bree, 2 Cl. 8c F. 453, 6 Eng. Rep. 1225 (1834); Gray,
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §477 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw oF
FUTURE INTERESTS, §536 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §390, Com·
ment a. (1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against
Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.31 (1952).
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may appoint, the power is valid even though, by its
terms, the son may possibly exercise it more than twentyone years after John's death.
If a power of appointment does not offend the rules
stated in the preceding two paragraphs, it is not made
invalid by the fact that, within its terms, an appointment
could be made which would violate the Rule Against
Perpetuities. aoo If Andrew Baker bequeaths property to
John Stiles for life and then to such issue of John as
John may appoint, John might appoint to "my oldest
male descendant living ninety years after the Penobscot
Building falls." As will be seen, such an appointment
would be void. But if John appoints to "my children
in equal shares,'' the appointment is valid.
C. INTERESTS APPOINTED UNDER POWERS

Under general Anglo-American law, if a power of appointment is unlimited as to objects and exercisable by
deed, so that the donee can appoint to himself for his
own exclusive benefit, the period of the Rule Against
Perpetuities is computed, for the purpose of determining
the validity of interests appointed under the power, from
the effective date of the appointment rather than that of
the instrument creating the power. 301 If Andrew Baker
soo Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. Jr. 357, 30 Eng. Rep. 671 (1794);
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§473, 510 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §537 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §392,
Comment c. (1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule
Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.32 (1952).
See: Moss v. Axford, 246 Mich. 288, 224 N.W. 425 (1929); Part Two,
note 295 supra.
so1 Bray v. Hammersley, 3 Sim. 513, 57 Eng. Rep. 1090 (1830), sub
nom. Bray v. Bree, 2 CI. & F. 453, 6 Eng. Rep. 1225 (1834); Gray, RuLE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §524 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS, §537 (1936); Annotation, 1 A.L.R. 374 (1919), 101 A.L.R.
1282 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §391 (1944); Leach and Tudor,
"The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
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bequeaths property to John Stiles, who has neither children nor grandchildren, for life, remainder to such persons as John may by deed or will appoint, and John
appoints by will to "my children for life, remainder to
my grandchildren," the appointment is valid although
all of John's children were born after Andrew's death and
all of his grandchildren are born after his own death.
In other words, a power of appointment under which the
donee can at any time appoint to himself is the equivalent of absolute ownership for purposes of the Rule
Against Perpetuities. An appointment under such a
power is treated as if it were a limitation by the donee
of his own property.
The applicability of the rule stated in the preceding
paragraph to appointments of Michigan land is rendered somewhat doubtful by two sections of our statutes:
"Sec. 55. The period during which the absolute
right of alienation may be suspended by any instrument
in execution of a power, shall be computed from the time
of the creation of the power, and not from the date of
such instrument.
"Sec. 56. No estate or interest can be given or
limited to any person, by an instrument in execution of
a power, which such person would not have been capable
of taking, under the instrument by which the power
was granted." 302
PRoPERTY, §24.33 (1952). See: Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust
Co., 267 Mich. 270 at 285, 255 N.W. 287 (1934), quoting a passage
from Halsbury's LAws oF ENGLAND which reflects the rule stated in the
text.
so2 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §§55, 56; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2712,
2713; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4195, 4196; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8910,
8911; How. Stat., §§5644, 5645; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11646, 11647;
Comp. Laws (1929) §§13049, 13050; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.145, 26.146;
Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.55, 556.56. These provisions do not appear
to have been construed by the Michigan Supreme Court. Other provisions of the statutes on powers were construed in Bates v. Leonard,
99 Mich. 296, 58 N.W. 311 (1894), to reach the same result which
would have obtained at common law.
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These statutory provisions were taken from the New
York Revised Statutes of 1829. 303 The New York Court
of Appeals has indicated that these two sections are
modified by other sections of the statutes which, as in
force in Michigan, provide:
"Sec. 9. When an absolute power of disposition, not
accompanied by any trust, shall be given to the owner of
a particular estate, for life or years, such estate shall be
changed into a fee, absolute in respect to the rights of
creditors and purchasers, but subject to any future
estates limited thereon, in case the power should not be
executed, or the lands should not be sold for the satisfaction of debts.
"Sec. 10. When a like power of disposition shall be
given to any person to whom no particular estate is
limited, such person shall also take a fee, subject to any
future estates that may be limited thereon, but absolute
in respect to creditors and purchasers.
"Sec. 11. In all cases where such power of disposition
is given, and no remainder is limited on the estates of
the grantee of the power, such grantee shall be entitled
to an absolute fee.
"Sec. 12 .. When a general and beneficial power to
devise the inheritance, shall be given to a tenant for life
or for years, such tenant shall be deemed to possess an
absolute power of disposition, within the meaning, and
subject to the provisions of the three last preceding sections.
"Sec. 13. Every power of disposition shall be deemed
absolute, by means of which the grantee is enabled, in
3o3 Part Two, c. I, Art. Third, §§128, 129. Because of the doubt as
to its meaning raised in Dempsey v. Tylee, S Duer (10 N.Y. Super.)
7S (1854), Part Two, note SIO infra, Section 129 was amended by
Laws 1909, c.52, to read: "An estate or interest can not be given or
limited to any person, by an instrument in execution of a power, unless
it would have been valid, if given or limited at the time of the
creation of the power.'' The sections are now Real Property Law,
§§178, 179.
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his lifetime, to dispose of the entire fee for his own
benefit." 304
In the view of the New York Court, if the donee of
a power has an absolute power of disposition of the
entire fee within the meaning of Sections 9-13, Sections
55 and 56 have no application, and the validity of appointments made by him is determined as if he were in
fact an absolute owner disposing of his own property. If
the donee does not have an absolute power of disposition
of the entire fee within the meaning of Sections 9-13,
Sections 55 and 56 do apply and the validity of appointments is judged from the time of the creation of the
power. 305 If the donee of the power has unlimited ca004 Rev. Stat. 1846, c 64, §§9 to 13; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2666 to
2670; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4149 to 4153; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8864
to 8868; How. Stat., §§5598 to 5602; Comp. Laws (1915) §§1160011604; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13003 to 13007; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.9926.103; Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.9-556.13. N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, Part
II, Art. Third, §§81-85 were identical, except as to section numbers.
N.Y. Real Property Law, §§149 to 153, as presently in force, are
virtually identical. These sections operated to eliminate the strange
fiction of powers appendant, under which one person might have
both the whole fee and a power to appoint the fee which would enable
him to defeat dower and creditors. See: Simes, "The Devolution of
Title to Appointed Property," 22 ILL. L. REv. 480 at 493-497 (1928).
The following section provides: "Sec. 14. When the grantor in any
conveyance shall reserve to himself, for his own benefit an absolute
power of revocation, such grantor shall still be deemed the absolute
owner of the estate conveyed, so far as the rights of creditors and
purchasers are concerned." Such a power of revocation is not a power
of appointment but, as it makes powers of appointment created by the
conveyance, appointments under them, and limitations in default of
appointment, destructible, it postpones the commencement of the
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, as to these interests, until
its expiration. Part Two, notes 70, 293, supra, 322 infra. Bettner,
"The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Powers of Appointment,"
27 VA. L. REv. 149 at 167-171 (1940).
Although these statutes purport to apply only to land, there is a
tendency to extend them, by analogy, to personalty. Townsend v.
Gordon, 308 Mich. 438, 14 N.W. (2d) 57 (1944); In re Pilsbury's
Will, 50 Misc. 367, 113 App. Div. 893, 99 N.Y. Supp. 62, affd., 186
N.Y. 545, 79 N.E. 1114 (1906).
sos Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 85 N.E. 59

(1908; Bettner, "The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Powers

of Appointment,'' 27 VA. L. REv. 149 at 167-171 (1940).
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pacity to convey the en•tire fee to anyone, including himself, the New York view coincides with the common-law
rule. If, however, the donee's unlimited power of disposition is limited to a future estate, it does not come
within Sections 9-13, so Sections 55 and 56 apply. If
Andrew Baker devises land to James Thorpe upon trust
to pay the rents and profits to John Stiles for life, remainder as John Stiles may by deed or will appoint, John
cannot dispose of the entire fee because, under New York
and Michigan law, his equitable life interest as beneficiary of the trust is inalienable. 806 Hence, even though
his power to dispose of the remainder is unlimited and
presently exercisable by deed, the validity of any appointment which he makes will be judged, under the
New York view, from the death of Andrew. 807
The reference in Section 55 to the "period during
which the absolute right of alienation may be suspended"
is to the provisions of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 which prohibited suspension of the absolute power of alienation for more than two lives. 308
Those provisions were repealed in 1949,809 so Section
55 no longer has any meaning in Michigan. It thus becomes important to know whether Section 56 is a mere
adjunct or addendum to Section 55 which has ceased to
have meaning or whether it is a provision of independent
significance which invalidates any appointment made
under a power unless the power is an absolute power of
disposition of the entire fee within the meaning of Sections 9-13 or the donor of the power.could have consos Part One, notes 581, 583, 621, 625, supra. 'See: Hunt v. Hunt,
124 Mich. 502, 83 N.W. 371 (1900); In re Peck. Estates, 320 Mich.
692, 32 N.W. (2d) 14 (1948); Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N.Y. 522 (1881).
307 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 85 N.E. 59
(1908).
ws Part Two, note 47 supra.
309 Part Two, note 61 supra.
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veyed or devised directly to the appointee by the instrument creating the power. That question was raised
in Dempsey v. Tylee,S'-0 a New York case decided in 1854,
where the problem involved was whether a married
woman could create a power to appoint to her husband
although she could not, in the then existing state of the
law, convey directly to him. If Section 56 is read literally and is independent of Section 55, she could not do
so. The majority of the court took this view, but Justice
Duer, who had been one of the draftsmen of the New
York Revised Statutes, filed an opinion in which he said:
"From the construction, however, which my brother
has given to § 129 [Michigan §56], in the article "Of
Powers", it seems proper that I should now say, that I
entirely dissent. As I construe that section, it only means
that no person shall take an estate under a power that,
if limited to him by the instrument creating the power,
would have involved an undue suspense of the power of
alienation; in other words, where its direct limitation
would have been void, as too remote. Section 129 merely
declares the legal consequence of the rule which § 128
[Michigan § 55] establishes, and is to be construed, precisely as if the word 'hence' had connected the sections,
by following the.first, and preceding the second and both
the sections are expressed very nearly in the words in
which the rule and its consequence will be found to be
stated by the most approved text writers on this abstruse
branch of the law, Fearne, Sugden, and Cruise. As I
construe the section, therefore, it refers only to the nature of the estate granted, and not at all to any personal
incapacity of the grantee, other than that which the rule,
declared in § 128, necessarily creates, although it cannot
be denied that the words of the section are quite susceptible of the interpretation that my brother Bosworth has
given to them." 811
3 Duer (10 N.Y. Super.) 73 (1854).
3 Duer (10 N.Y. Super.) 73 at 101-102. See Part Two, note 303
supra.
31o
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To return to the example given in the first paragraph
of this section: 312 If Andrew Baker devises property to
John Stiles, who has neither children nor grandchildren,
for life, remainder to such persons as John may by deed
or will appoint, it is clear that John has an absolute
power of disposition of the entire fee under Sections 9
and 13. Accordingly, under the New York view, which
Michigan is likely to follow, Sections 55 and 56
have no application, 313 from which it follows that the
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities does not commence until. John exercises the power. Hence, if he
appoints by will to "my children for life, remainder to
my grandchildren," the appointment is valid, as at common law. If, on the other hand, Andrew Baker devises
property to James Thorpe upon trust to pay the income to John Stiles, who has no children or grandchildren, for life, remainder to such persons as John may
by deed or will appoint, John does not have an absolute
power of disposition of the entire fee under Sections 9
and 13. Under the New York view, Sections 55 and 56
apply. 314 Section 55 no longer has meaning in Michigan,
but, if our courts should follow the majority view in
Dempsey v. Tylee 315 that Section 56 has independent
and literal significance, it would seem that John could
not appoint to "my children, remainder to my grandchildren," because Andrew Baker could not have made
a devise directly to John's grandchildren. In this situation, then, our law would differ from the common law
as to the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities
to appointments made under unlimited powers to apIn the text immediately following Part Two, note 301 supra.
Part Two, note 305 supra.
314 Part Two, note 307 supra.
315 Part Two, note 310 supra.
312
313
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point by deed or will. If our courts should accept the
Duer view in Dempsey v. Tylee 316 that Section 56 has
no independent significance and relates only to the statutes prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of
alienation, now repealed in Michigan, then that section
no longer has meaning here and the common law applies.
In view of the doubt which exists, Sections 55 and 56
should be repealed or modified so as to make clear this
phase of the law.
The New York and Michigan statutes governing
powers of appointment purport to apply only to interests
in land. The courts of both states have tended to extend
them, by analogy, to powers of appointment of chattels
personal. 317 If Section 56 should be deemed to have independent and literal significance, the distinction would,
of course, become important because, if it does not apply
to dispositions of chattels personal, they are governed
by the common law.
The older English cases and the great weight of American authority hold that, when a power of appointment
is restricted to exercise by will, the period of the. Rule
Against Perpetuities is computed, as to interests appointed, from the creation of the power rather than the
time of its exercise, even though the objects of the power
are unlimited, so that the donee could appoint to his
own estate. 318 The more recent English decisions and
Part. Two, note 311 supra.
In re Pilsbury's Will, 50 Misc. 367, 113 App. Div. 893, 99 N.Y.
Supp. 62, aff'd., 186 N.Y. 545, 79 N.E. 1114 (1906); Townsend v. Gordon, 308 Mich. 438, 14 N.W. (2d) 57 (1944).
318 Wollaston v. King, L.R. 8 Eq. 165 (1868); In re Powell's Trusts,
39 L.J. Ch. 188 (1869); Morgan v. Gronow, L.R. 16 Eq. 1 (1873); Gray,
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§526-526c, 948-969 (1915); 2
Simes, LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS, §538 (1936); Annotation, 1 A.L.R.
374 (1919), 101 A.L.R. 1282 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §392
(1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.34 (1952).
3HI
317
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one in Wisconsin hold that, even though a power is
restricted to exercise by will, if it is unlimited as to objects, the period of the Rule does not commence until
the power is exercised. 3111 Section 12 of Chapter 64 of the
Revised Statutes of 1846 320 provides that, if a tenant for
life has unlimited power to devise the fee, he shall be
deemed to possess an absolute power of disposition. It
would seem that the effect of this statutory provision is
that, in Michigan, even though the power as to the remainder is limited to exercise by will, if the donee is
enabled to dispose of the entire fee, including his own
life estate, for his own benefit, the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities does not commence until the power
is exercised, that is, from the death of the life tenant. 321
If a testamentary power is unlimited as to objects but
the donee cannot dispose of the entire fee, the same
doubtful situation described in the preceding paragraph
exists.
319 Rous v. Jackson, 29 Ch. D. 521 (1885); Miller v. Douglass, 192
Wis. 486, 213 N.W. 320 (1927).
32'0 Part Two, note 304 supra. But there must be power to dispose of
the entire fee. A life cestui of a trust with unlimited power to appoint
the remainder cannot dispose of the entire fee if, because of spendthrift provisions as to personalty or the statutory restraint on alienation
as to land, he cannot transfer his own life interest. Hunt v. Hunt,
124 Mich. 502, 83 N.W. 371 (1900); In re Peck Estates, 320 Mich.
692, 32 N.W. (2d) 14 (1948); Dana v. Murray, 122 N.Y. 604, 26 N.E.
21 (1890).
an Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 85 N.E. 59
(1908); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §391, Comment h., App. Ch. A. par.
36 (1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §24.34 (1952). In re Kilpatrick's Estate, 318 Mich. 445, 28 N.W. (2d) 286 (1947) involved a
bequest to a trustee to pay the income to testator's wife for life and
to transfer to her any part of the principal which she might request,
remainder as the wife might appoint by will. No perpetuities problem
was involved. As the wife had an immediate right to demand the
whole principal, it would seem that the period of the Rule Against
Perpetuities should be computed from the time she made an appointment rather than from her husband's death under both the commonlaw and statutory rules.
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It is well settled everywhere that when a power of
appointment is limited as to objects, so that the donee
cannot appoint to himself or his estate, the period of
the Rule Against Perpetuities is computed from the effective date of the instrument creating the power. 322 If
Andrew Baker bequeaths property to John Stiles for life,
remainder to such issue of John as John may appoint,
the period of the Rule commences at the death of Andrew. It will be recalled that events which occur after
the commencement of the period ordinarily cannot be
considered in determining whether interests are certain
to vest within the period. 323 When the period commences
at the creation of a power of appointment, however, facts
which occur between the creation and exercise of the
power may be so considered. 824 If Andrew Baker bequeaths property to John Stiles, who has no issue, for
life, remainder to such of John's issue as John may by
will appoint and John appoints by will to "my son
Henry for life, remainder to his children," the appointment to the children of Henry is invalid if Henry is
s22 Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. Jr. 357, 30 Eng. Rep. 671
(1794);
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§473, 514 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW oF FuTURE IN'r}:RESTS, §537 (1936); Annotation, 1 A.L.R. 374
(1919), 101 A.L.R. 1282 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §392 (1944);
Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities,"
6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.34 (1952). It should be borne in
mind, however, that if the power itself and interests created by appointment under it are destructible by virtue of some other power,
the period of the Rule does not commence until the destructibility
ceases. Part Two note 70 supra. See: Foulke, "Powers and the Rule
Against Perpetuities," 16 CoL. L. REv. 537 at 541 (1916).
s2s Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924);
Part Two, notes 127-129, supra.
a24 Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. Jr. 357, 30 Eng. Rep. 671
(1794);
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§515, 516 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §537; PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §392 (1944);
Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.35 (1952); Simes, "The Devolution
of Title to Appointed Property," 22 ILL. L. REv. 480 at 502 (1928).
Cf. Part Three, note 152 infra.
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alive when John dies, because the class may include
children born more than twenty-one years after the
death of John, the only measuring life designated in Andrew's will. If, however, Henry predeceased John, the
appointment to his children is valid. The fact of Henry's
death may be considered, and it makes it certain that
all of Henry's children came into being during the life
of John. 825
The repeal in 1949 of the statutes prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation for more
than two lives 8211 creates a difficult question as to powers
of appointment created by instruments which became
effective before the repeal but exercised after the repeal.
Is the validity of an appointment made after the repeal
under a power created before governed by the repealed
statutes? Such authority as there is indicates that it is
if the power is limited as to objects. 827 Probably it is not
if the power is an absolute power of disposition of the
entire fee within the meaning of Sections 9-13!28
325 Rev. Stat. 1846, c.64, §56, Part Two, note 302 supra, should not
affect the result in such a situation. Andrew could have bequeathed
directly to "the children of any son of John Stiles who may predecease
Johu" because such children would necessarily come into being during the life of John.
32~ Part Two, notes 46, 61, supra.
s21 Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 70 Ad. 33 (1908); Simes, "The
Devolution of Title to Appointed Property," 22 ILL. L. REv. 480 at 515
(1928). But see: Re Leigh's Marriage Settlement, [1952] 2 All Eng.
L.R. 57.
328 Part Two, note 304 supra.

CHAPTER

14

Interests to Which the Rule Applies
PEAKING generally, as Chapters 9, 11, and 12
have indicated, the requirement of certainty of
vesting within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities applies to all future interests in property
limited to persons other than the transferor, whether
in land or in chattels, whether legal or equitable, and
whether, under English law, they would have been remainders, executory interests, powers of appointment,
or interests created by the exercise of a power of appointment.329 There remain for consideration (1) interests retained by or created in the transferor under the
terms of the instrument of transfer, (2) interests created
in others which are not strictly property rights but derive from the law of contract, and (3) interests which
are excepted from the operation of the Rule.

S

a29 This statement should be read with the qualification that certain administrative powers which do not have the characteristics of a
power of appointment are not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.
A power of appointment is dispositive in character. Its exercise cuts
off an interest of a taker in default and creates one in the appointee.
PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, §318, Comment g. (1940). Trustees' powers
to sell, lease, mortgage, invest, and appoint successor trustees during
the term of the trust are not dispositive in character and are not subject to the Rule. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §382 (1944); Leach and
Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN
LAW oF PROPERTY, §24.63 (1952). The same is true as to a mortgagee's power of sale. Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed.,
§562-571 (1915). Howe':er, powers of a trustee which are dispositive
in character, such as a discretionary power to allocate income between
life beneficiaries or to apply principal to the use of a life beneficiary,
are subject to the Rule. Leach and Tudor, id., §24.32. Cf. Chapter 20,
Section B (1), infra.
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A. INTERESTS OF A TRANSFEROR

When an owner of property transfers an interest in
it which is less than his whole interest and less than a
fee simple, or the equivalent in personalty, his retained
interest is a reversion. If Andrew Baker, owning land
in fee simple, conveys it to John Stiles for life, in tail,
or for forty years, Andrew retains a reversion expectant
upon the termination of John's estate. 330 When an
owner in fee simple transfers an estate for life followed
by a contingent remainder, he retains a reversion. Thus
if Andrew Baker conveys land to John Stiles, who has
no son, for life, remainder to the eldest son of John and
his heirs, Andrew retains a reversion in fee simple which
will become possessory on the death of John if John
never has a son. 331 Although, as in the last example, a
reversion may be subject to defeasance, all reversions
330 1 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§42-49 (1936); PROPERTY
REsTATEMENT, §154 (1936). Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §12, Comp. Laws
(1857) §2596; Comp. Laws (1871) §4079; Comp. Laws (1897) §8794;
How. Stat., §5528; Comp. Laws (1915) §11530; Comp. Laws (1929)
§12932; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.12; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.12, provides: "A reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor or
his heirs, or in the heirs of a testator, commencing in possession on
the determination of a particular estate granted or devised."
There cannot be a reversion expectant upon an estate tail in Michigan because our statutes convert estates tail into estates in fee simple.
Part One. note 84 supra. There is no such thing as a reversion expectant upon a fee simple. A reversionary interest expectant upon a fee
simple is a possibility of reverter. Part Two, note 335 infra. In strict
common-law theory, a reversion expectant upon an estate for years
is a present rather than a future estate, since the lessor retains seisin.
Cf. Part Two, note 150 supra. Our statutes appear to define such a
reversion as a future estate. Part Two note 179 supra. Nevertheless,
Chief Justice Campbell referred to such a reversion as a "present
estate in possession" in Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 572, 2 N.W.
814 (1879).
331 Egerton v. Massey, 3 C.B. n.s. 338, 140 Eng. Rep. 771
(1857);
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §ll3a (1915); 1 Simes, LAW
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §45 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §154, Ill. 6
(1936). A conveyance of the springing use type, e.g., Andrew Baker to
John Stiles and his heirs when and if John marries Lucy Baker, leaves
a present estate in the transferor. Simes, id., §43.
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are deemed to be vested, 332 and they are not subject to
the Rule Against Perpetuities. 333 If Andrew Baker bequeaths land to John Stiles for a thousand years "but
if John's descendants ever become extinct, then the
estate bequeathed to him shall terminate," the heirs of
Andrew have a valid reversion which will become possessory on the extinction of John's descendants or the
expiration of a thousand years, whichever first occurs. 334
When an owner in fee simple transfers an estate in fee
simple on special limitation, his retained interest is a
possibility of reverter. 335 If John Stiles conveys land to
the Detroit, Lansing, and Northern Railroad Company
"so long as used for railroad purposes," John has a possibility of reverter which will become possessory when
use for railroad purposes ceases. There is disagreement
among the authorities as to whether such an interest is
vested or contingent. 336 A recent English decision holds
3sz Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §113 (1915); 1 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §47 (1936).
333 Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §283 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§504, 508 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT
§372 (1944).
ss4See: Gore v. Gore, 2 P. Wms. 28, 24 Eng. Rep. 629 (1722); Wood
v. Drew, 33 Beav. 610, 55 Eng. Rep. 505 (1864); Toms v. Williams,
41 Mich. 552 at 572, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); Negaunee Iron Co. v. Iron
Cliffs Co., 134 Mich. 264, 96 N.W. 468 (1901), Part One, note 323 supra
(reversion expectant upon 99-year lease on special limitation); Great
Lakes Realty & Building Co. v. Turner, 190 Mich. 582, 157 N.W. 57
(1916), Part One, note 331 supra (reversion expectant upon 99-year
lease subject to condition subsequent); C.J. Netting Co. v. Sillman,
226 Mich. 307, 197 N.W. 545 (1924), Part One, note 334 supra (reversion expectant upon 50-year lease subject to condition subsequent);
Smith v. Applebaum, 241 Mich. 493, 217 N.W. 401 (1928), Part One,
note 320 supra (reversion expectant upon 99-year lease subject to condition subsequent); Webb v. Knauss, 253 Mich. 197, 234 N.W. 154
(1931), Part One, note 339 supra (same as preceding); Gray, RuLE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §209 (1915). Cf. Part Two, notes 150,
330, supra.
335 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §154, Comment c. (1936); 1 Simes, LAW
oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §§177-187 (1936); Part One, note 354 supra.
336 Gray, RuLE A~AINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §113, n.3
(1915)
(vested); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §154 (3) and Comment e. (1936)
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that it is contingent, subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities and, consequently, void, if the event which will
terminate the estate conveyed may not occur within the
period of the Rule. 837 All American authority is to the
effect that possibilities of reverter are not subject to the
Rule. 338 Several Michigan decisions assume the validity
of possibilities of reverter, 889 but they relate to conveyances which became effective between 1847 and 1949,
when the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities was not
in force as to Michigan land. 840
When an owner in fee simple transfers an estate in
fee simple on condition subsequent, his retained interest
is a right of entry. 341 If John Stiles conveys land to the
Detroit, Lansing, and Northern Railroad Company "but
if the said land shall cease to be used for railroad purposes
the grantor or his heirs may enter and terminate the
(not vested); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §507 (1936) (essentially contingent).
B37 Hopper v. Corporation of Liverpool, 88 Sol. J. 213 (1944), noted,
62 L. QuAR. REv. 222 (1946). But see: In re Chardon, [1928] 1 Ch.
464; Cheshire, MoDERN LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed., 520 (1949).
ass Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§41, 312 (1915);
2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §507 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §372 and Comment a. (1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PRoPERTY,
§24.62 (1952). .
aa9 School District No. 5 of Delhi v. Everett, 52 Mich. 314, 17 N.W.
926 (1883); Lemmen v. Allendale Grange No. 421, 201 Mich. 179,
166 N.W. 1003 (1918); Fractional School District No. 9 v. Beardslee,
248 Mich. 112, 226 N.W. 867 (1929); Thomas v. Jewell, 300 Mich.
556, 2 N.W. (2d) 501 (1942); Part One, note 377 supra. Language
in Thayer v. McGee, 20 Mich. 195 at 211 (1870) might be thought
to recognize the validity of a possibility of reverter under a conveyance executed before 1847.
B4o Part Two, note 50 supra.
B41 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §12 (1915); 1 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §159 (1936). PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §24,
Comment b. (1936) denominates such an interest a "power of termination." This term is not a happy one because the old law made a
sharp distinction between a condition subsequent, which was permissible in a common-law conveyance, and a power of revocation,
which could be used only in a conveyance operating under the Statute
of Uses. 1 Coke, INSTITUTES, 237a (1628).
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estate hereby granted," John has a right of entry which
will entitle him or his heirs to take possession when use
for railroad purposes ceases. Such rights of entry are
contingent, 342 and recent English cases indicate that they
are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities and so void
if the event which will entitle the transferor to enter is
not certain to occur within the period of the Rule. 343
The American decisions are to the effect that rights of
entry on breach of condition subsequent are not subject
to the Rule. 544 No Michigan reported decision discusses
the applicability of the Rule Against Perpetuities to
rights of entry. Their validity has been assumed in cases
involving conveyances executed both before 345 and
after 346 1847, and they have been enforced in a few in342 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §304 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW oF FuTURE INTERESTs, §506 (1936).
343 In re Trustees of Hollis' Hospital, [1899] 2 Ch. 540; In re Da
Costa, [1912] 1 Ch. 337; Re Peel's Release, [1921] 2 Ch. 218. See:
In re Macleay, L.R. 20 Eq. 186 at 190 (1875); Dunn v. Flood, 25 Ch.
D. 629 at 633 (1882), aff'd., 2~ Ch. D. 586 at 592 (1885). Stat. 15 Geo.
V, c. 20 §4 (3) (1925) expressly subjects rights of entry to the Rule.
344 Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIEs, 3rd ed., §304 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §506 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §372
(1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.62 (1952).
345 Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, 1 Dougl. 225 (Mich. 1844);
Michigan State Bank v. Hammond, 1 Doug!. 527 (Mich. 1845); People
v. Beaubien, 2 Doug!. 256 (Mich. 1846); Campau v. Chene, 1 Mich.
400 (1850); City of Detroit v. Detroit & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 23 Mich.
173 (1871); Hatch v. Village of St. Joseph, 68 Mich. 220, 36 N.W.
36 (1888); County of Oakland v. Mack, 243 Mich. 279, 220 N.W.
801 (1928). The rights of entry, involved in these cases and those
cited in the two following notes were on breach of conditions subsequent, which might not occur within the period of the Rule annexed
to conveyances in fee simple. A right of entry on breach of a condition
subsequent in a conveyance of a term of years (lease) is an incident
of the reversion, which is vested. Part One, notes 360, 375, Part Two,
notes 330, 334, supra.
346 Blanchard v. Detroit, Lansing & Lake Michigan R.R. Co., 31
Mich. 42 (1875); Barrie v. Smith, 47 Mich. 130, 10 N.W. 168 (1881),
Part One, note 142 supra; Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Tremper, 75 Mich.
36, 42 N.W. 532 (1889); Jenks v. Pawlowski, 98 Mich. llO, 56 N.W.
1105 (1893); Leggett v. City of Detroit, 137 Mich. 247, 100 N.W. 566
(1904); Adams v. First Baptist Church of St. Charles, 148 Mich. 140,
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stances where the conveyances were executed after
1847. 347
The American exemption of possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry on breach of condition subsequent
from the operation of the Rule Against Perpetuities is
a strange anomaly. If Andrew Baker conveys land to
James Thorpe and his heirs so long as the Penobscot
Building shall stand and then to John Stiles and his
heirs, the interest of John is void under the Rule. But
if Andrew Baker conveys to John Stiles and his heirs and
John conveys to James Thorpe and his heirs so long as
the Penobscot Building shall stand, John retains a possibility of reverter which the American decisions treat
as valid and which may become possessory after centuries. Why the law should forbid one and permit the
other is difficult to see. Indeed, the possibility of re111 N.W. 757 (1907); Puffer v. Clark, 202 Mich. 169, 168 N.W. 471
(1918); Halpin v. Rural Agricultural School District No. 9, 224 Mich.
308, 194 N.W. 1005 (1923); Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206
N.W. 532, 42 A.L.R. 1267 (1925), Part One, note 158 supra; Epworth
Assembly v. Ludington & Northern Ry., 236 Mich. 565, 211 N.W. 99
(1926); Trustees of the M.J. Clark Memorial Home v. Jewell, 240
Mich. 250, 215 N.W. 378 (1927); Weber v. Ford Motor Co., 245 Mich.
213, 222 N.W. 198 (1928); Village of Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres,
254 Mich. 58, 235 N.W. 829 (1931); Bruce v. Henry Ford Hospital,
254 Mich. 394, 236 N.W. 813 (1931); Quinn v. Pere Marquette Ry.
Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931); Rhines v. Consumers' Power
Co., 259 Mich. 236, 242 N.W. 898 (1932); Briggs v. City of Grand
Rapids, 261 Mich. 11, 245 N.W. 555 (1932); Avery v. Consumers'
Power Co., 265 Mich. 696, 253 N.W. 189 (1934); Ford v. City of
Detroit, 273 Mich. 449, 263 N.W. 425 (1935); Dolby v. State Highway
Commissioner, 283 Mich. 609, 278 N.W. 694 (1938); Juif v. State
Highway Commissioner, 287 Mich. 35, 282 N.W. 892 (1938); Central
Land Co. v. City of Grand Rapids, 302 Mich. 105, 4 N.W. (2d) 485
(1942); Livonia Township School District v. Wilson, 339 Mich. 454,
sub nom. Wayne County v. Wilson, 64 N.W. (2d) 563 (1954).
347 Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314, 22 N.W. 816 (1885); Watrous v.
Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 24 N.W. 104 (1885); Hickox v. Chicago & Canada
Southern Ry. Co., 78 Mich. 615, 44 N.W. 143 (1889); Reilly v. Otto,
108 Mich. 330, 66 N.W. 228 (1896); Estes v. Muskegon County Agricultural & Driving Park Association, 181 Mich. 71, 147 N.W. 553
(1914); Hawkins v. Dillman, 268 Mich. 483, 256 N.W. 492 (1934).
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verter is the more serious indirect restraint on alienation
of the two where, as in Michigan, it is probably inalienable 348 and so must descend to the heirs of the transferor. Under our system of descent, the heirs of a
grantor are likely to be very numerous and very scattered a hundred years after his death. Unless all of them
can be found and persuaded to release, the owner of the
fee subject to defeasance cannot afford to erect expensive
improvements on the land and cannot sell it for an adequate price because the title he has may be cut off at
any moment by an event beyond his control. The only
possible explanation of this anomalous rule is the historical one that the Rule Against Perpetuities was developed to restrict interests created by virtue of the Statutes of Uses and Wills and that possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry were interests known to the common
law before the enactment of these statutes. 849 This argument has not deterred our courts from applying the Rule
to contingent remainders, which were also known to the
common law. 350 The Michigan Supreme Court has never
enforced a possibility of reverter or a right of entry defeating a fee arising from a conveyance which became
3 48 Part One, note 377 supra. Rights of entry on breach of conditions subsequent in conveyances of estates in fee executed before
1931 are also inalienable. Part One, note 374 supra.
3 4 9 Part Two, notes 338, 344, supra. Professor Leach is wont to cite
as a horrible example of the tendency ot remote possibilities of reverter and rights of entry to prevent the development and use of land,
a tract in Boston which was conveyed long ago on condition that no
building over thirteen feet high ever be erected on it. The probable
motive of the grantor was a desire to preserve a view of his cattle
grazing in the vicinity. The tract is now in a closely built-up section
of the city but the owners dare not erect an appropriate building
on it. They cannot secure releases from the heirs of the grantor because these cannot be found. Hence no one can use the land effectively,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed.) 50, note 25
(1940); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.62 (1952).
35o Part Two, notes 37, 39, 42, supra.
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effective at a time when the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities applied to Michgan land. It is, therefore,
free to follow the English decisions holding that these
interests are subject to the Rule, 351 and it ought to do so.
A fee simple subject to an easement, a profit a prendre,
or a use restriction is a present estate which is vested and
not subj.:!ct to the Rule Against Perpetuities. If John
Stiles, owning land in fee simple, grants to James Thorpe
and his heirs a right to take oil and gas from his land
so long as they can be extracted, John retains a present
possessory fee simple which does not violate the Rule
although it will become more enjoyable at some remote
future time when the oil and gas operations cease. 352 In
England it is not possible to create a legal easement
which entitles the holder to exclusive possession of the
servient land, a right to exclusive possession being
deemed a possessory estate. 353 Several Michigan cases,
Part Two, notes 337, 343, supra.
This was assumed in McClanahan Oil Co. v. Perkins, 303 Mich.
448, 6 N.W. (2d) 742 (1942), which involved such a grant.
353 Anonymous, Y.B. 4 Edw. IV, Pasch., pl. 9 (1464); Rex. v. Bell,
7 T.R. 598, 101 Eng. Rep. 1152 (1798) (exclusive use of way); Rex
v. Bath, 14 East 609, 104 Eng. Rep. 736 (1811); Rex v. Rochdale Waterworks, 1 M.&S. 634, 105 Eng. Rep. 237 (1813); Rex
v. Birmingham Gas-Light & Coke Co., l B.&C. 506, 107 Eng. Rep.
187 (1823); Rex v. Brighton Gas Light & Coke Co., 5 B.&C. 466, 108
Eng. Rep. 173 (1826); Rex v. Chelsea Water Works, 5 B.&Ad. 156,
110 Eng. Rep. 750 (1833); Regina v. East London Waterworks, 18
Q.B. 705, 118 Eng. Rep. 266 (1852); Electric Telegraph Co. v. Overseers of Salford, 11 Ex. 181, 156 Eng. Rep. 795 (1855); Taylor v.
Corporation of St. Helens, 6 Ch. D. 264 (C.A. 1877) (exclusive use
of an artificial watercourse); Lancashire & Cheshire Telephone Exchange Co. v. Manchester, 14 Q.B.D. 267 (C.A. 1884); Reilly v. Booth,
44 Ch. D. 12 (C.A. 1889) (exclusive use of a passage); Bevan v. London Portland Cement Co., Ltd., 67 L.T. 615 (1892); Metropolitan
Ry. Co. v. Fowler, (1893] A.C. 416 (exclusive use of tunnel); Assessment Committee of Holywell Union v. Halkyn District Mines Drainage Co., (1895] A.C. 117 (H.L. 1894) (this and the other cases not
specially noted involved public utility pipe or pole lines); Sweet,
"The 'Easement' of Tunnelling," 32 L.Q.R. 74 at 79 (1916). Accord:
Dyce v. Hay, 1 Macqueen 305 (H.L., Scotland, 1852). See: Potter v.
North, 1 Lev. 268, 83 Eng. Rep. 400 (1669).
351

352
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however, have treated conveyances of rights of exclusive
possession and control, particularly to railroad companies, as grants of easements. 354 If John Stiles grants to
the Detroit, Lansing, and Northern Railroad Company
"an easement of right of way, with the right to exclusive
possession, control and enjoyment, so long as used for
railroad purposes," the railroad takes, under English
law, a possessory fee simple on special limitation, and
John's retained interest is a possibility of reverter.
Under Michigan law it would seem that the railroad
takes only an easement and John retains the present fee
simple subject to the easement, not a mere possibility of
reverter. 355 Yet his right to possession is contingent upon
a remote future event.
ss4 Jones v. Van Bochove, 103 Mich. 98, 61 N.W. 342 (1894); Matthews v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 110 Mich. 170,
67 N.W. 1111 (1896): Mahar v. Grand Rapids Terminal R. Co., 174
Mich. 138, 140 N.W. 535 (1913); Engleman v. City of Kalamazoo,
229 Mich. 603, 201 N.W. 880 (1925) (exclusive right to use a stairway);
McClintic-Marshall Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 254 Mich. 305, 236 N.W.
792 (1931) (exclusive right to construct and use a tunnel); Michigan
Central R.R. Co. v. Garfield Petroleum Corp., 292 Mich. 373, 290
N.W. 833 (1940): Gardens of Rest, Inc. v. Upper Michigan Power
& Light Co., 322 Mich. 153, 33 N.W. (2d) 741 (1948) (exclusive right
to maintain a power line; the other cases involve railroad rights of
way). See: Annotation, "Deed to Railroad Company as Conveying
Fee or Easement," 132 A.L.R. 142 (1941). But in Croucher v. Wooster,
271 Mich. 337, 260 N.W. 739 (1935), a grant of the use of land for
residence purposes forever was held to convey a possessory estate in
fee simple.
a5s Mahar v. Grand Rapids Terminal R. Co., 174 Mich. 138, 140
N.W. 535 (1913). See: Wanzer v. Blanchard, 3 Mich. 11 (1853);
Thayer v. McGee, 20 Mich. 195 (1870). In reality our Supreme Court
has created a new fiction, analogous to the English fiction that an
owner in fee simple subject to an outstanding long-term lease has a
present possessory estate. Part Two, note 330 supra. Such a development is remarkable in view of the evident intention of our statutes
to abolish the English fiction and to make every estate "where the
right to the possession is postponed to a future period" an estate in
expectancy. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §8, Comp. Laws (1857) §2592,
Comp. Laws (1871) §4075; Comp. Laws (1897) §8790; How. Stat.,
§5524; Comp. Laws (1915) §11526; Comp. Laws (1929) §12928; Mich.
Stat. Ann., §26.8; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.8. See Part Two, notes
179, 330, supra.
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The American exemption of possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry on breach of condition subsequent
from the Rule Against Perpetuities does not appear to
extend to any other type of contingent future interest
in property retained by or created in a transferor under
the terms of the instrument of transfer. Thus it would
seem that a reserved power of revocation 356 or power of
appointment 357 and the possibility of being an appointee
under a power of appointment 358 created by the instrument are subject to the Rule to the same extent that
interests limited to persons other than the transferor are
so subject. So is a reserved option to repurchase which
would be specifically enforcible if valid. 859
356 Foulke, "Powers and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 16 CoL. L.
REv. 627 at 644 (1916). A power of revocation exercisable only by
the transferor personally would not violate the Rule because it could
not be exercised beyond a life in being. See Part Two, note 296 supra.
But a power of revocation reserved to the transferor and his heirs,
exercisable only upon a remote condition precedent would, it is believed, offend the Rule. It is noteworthy that the only future interests
retained by or created in a transferor which the American decisions
exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities are those which were recognized at common law before the enactment of the Statutes of Uses and
Wills. Powers were a creation of equity and acquired recognition at
common law only by virtue of these statutes. An option is an interest
in property only by virtue of the equitable doctrine of specific performance of contracts.
357 A power of appointment exercisable only by the transferor personally would not offend the Rule because it could not be exercised
beyond a life in being. Part Two, notes 296, 298, supra. But a power
of appointment reserved to the transferor and his heirs, exercisable
only upon a remote condition precedent, would seem to violate the
Rule. For example, if Andrew Baker conveys land to John Stiles and
his heirs "but if the descendants of John ever become extinct, to such
person as the grantor or his heirs may appoint."
358 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §372, Comment a.
(1944). For example, if John Stiles conveys land "to such persons as Andrew Baker
may appoint and until and in default of appointment to James
Thorpe and his heirs" and Andrew Baker appoints "to John Stiles
and his heirs if the descendants of James Thorpe ever become extinct."
359 London & South Western Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562
(1882); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §394 (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The
Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW oF PROP·
ERTY, §24.56 (1952).
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B. CONTRACTS) OPTIONS) AND MORTGAGES

The Rule Against Perpetuities is a part of the law of
property. It has no application to contracts which do
not create interests in property. 3 If the Iosco Life In6{)

An option to repurchase stock in a closed corporation, probably
limited in duration to the life of the transferor-optionee, was enforced
in Halsey v. Boomer, 236 Mich. 328, 210 N.W. 209, 48 A.L.R. 622
(1926). The validity of an option to repurchase land, given in 1838
for a term of fifteen years, was assumed in Swetland v. Swetland, 3
Mich. 482 (1855). As the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities did
not apply to limitations of interests in land made between March 1,
1847, and September 22, 1949 [Part Two, note 50 supra], decisions
relative to the validity of options to repurchase given during that
period are not precedents as to the application of the Rule. In a
number of cases options to repurchase land given during that period,
limited in duration to twenty-one years or less, were enforced or assumed to be valid. Cornell v. Hall, 22 Mich. 377 (1871); Daniels v.
Johnson, 24 Mich. 430 (1872); Stahl v. Dehn, 72 Mich. 645, 40 N.W.
922 (1888); Reed v. Bond, 96 Mich. 134, 55 N.W. 619 (1893); Abbott v. Gruner, 121 Mich .. 140, 79 N.W. 1065 (1899); Blumberg v.
Beekman, 121 Mich. 647, 80 N.W. 710 (1899); City Lumber Co. v.
Hollands, 181 Mich. 531, 148 N.W. 361 (1914); Gogarn v. Connors,
188 Mich. 161, 153 N.W. 1068 (1915); McFadden v. Huron Valley
Building and Savings Association, 255 Mich. 659, 239 N.W. 322 (1931);
Beecher v. Morse, 286 Mich. 513, 282 N.W. 226 (1938). As such
options could not have been exercised beyond the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, they would not have violated the Rule if it had
been in force. In Livonia Township School District v. Wilson, 339
Mich. 454, sub nom. Wayne County v. Wilson, 64 N.W. (2d) 563 (1954),
a reserved option in a 1944 deed to repurchase for $80 if, within 25
years, the land should not be used for school purposes, was treated as
valid. The validity of a perpetual pre-emptive option to repurchase land was assumed in Stony Pointe Peninsula Association v.
Broderick, 321 Mich. 124, 32 N.W. (2d) 363 (1948), Part One, note
233 supra, and there is dictum to the effect that an option of this
type would be valid in Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314 at 317, 22 N.W.
816 (1885), Part One, note 230 supra. Such an option reserved in a
conveyance executed since September 23, 1949, should be deemed void
both as . a direct restraint on alienation and as violating the Rule
Against Perpetuities.
sso Walsh v. Secretary of State for India, 10 H.L.C. 367, 11 Eng.
Rep. 1068 (1863); Witham v. Vane, (H.L. 1883), reported in Challis,
LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 440 (1911). Gray, RuLE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §329 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS,
§513 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §401 (1944); Leach & Tudor,
"The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW oF
PROPERTY, §24.58 (1952). Professors Gray and Simes suggest that the
Rul~does apply to a transfer of rights created by contract, such as a
beq~st by the obligee on a remote contingency.
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surance Company, in consideration of being designated
beneficiary under a $100,000 insurance policy on the life
of John Stiles, contracts with John that it will pay $3,000
per annum to the eldest son of John for life, to the eldest son of such eldest son for life, and to the eldest son in
each successive generation forever, in like manner, it
would seem that the contract is valid 361 although such
a perpetual succession of life interests, if limited as interests in property, whether legal or under a trust, would
be void.
An option to purchase property is a contract right
to purchase which is always subject to at least two conditions precedent, notification of election to purchase
and payment of the purchase price. Irrevocable options
to purchase land and unique chattels are specifically enforcible in equity. Consequently such an option, to the
extent that it is valid for that purpose, is a limitation of
a contingent equitable future interest in the property
involved. The decisions in England and this country
are uniform in holding that options, insofar as they are
limitations of contingent future interests in property,
are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. 862 In England an option, in its purely contract aspects, is not subject to the Rule, and therefore, even though it may under
its terms be exercised at some time beyond the period of
the Rule, it may be enforced against the original optionor either by an action for damages for breach or, if
the original optionor still owns the property, by a suit
361 See: Holmes v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 288
N.Y. 106, 41 N.E. (2d) 909 (1942); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §401,
Ill. 2. (1944).
ss2 London&: South Western Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562 (1882);
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §330 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §512 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§393,
394 (1944); Leach &: Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.56 (1952).
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for specific performance.'~ In this country an option
which would otherwise be specifically enforcible and
which, under its terms, might be exercised at a time
beyond the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, is
wholly void and cannot be enforced in any way either
against the original optionor or against a subsequent
purchaser. 864 If Andrew Baker, owning land in fee
simple, contracts with John Stiles to convey it to John,
his heirs or assigns, upon notice and payment of $10,000
at any time within forty years, the contract is void.
An option given to someone who has no other interest
in the land is a very severe indirect restraint on alienation and development. Neither the optionor nor anyone who acquires the land can afford to expend money
on improvements while his title remains subject to defeasance by the exercise of the option. An option given
to a lessee under a long-term lease does not have the
same restraining effect. It increases the value and improves the salability of the lessee's estate and encourages
him to make valuable improvements, since by exercise
of the option he may extend the duration of his possession. In England options in leases, entitling the lessee
to renew, are not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities even though they permit perpetual renewal, &65 but
an option to purchase the fee is subject to the Rule, even
363 Worthing Corporation v. Heather, [1906] 2 Ch. 532 (damages);
Hutton v. Watling, [1948] Ch. 26 (specific performance); Cheshire,
MoDERN LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed., 505 (1949).
364 Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128
N.E. 177 (1919); 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §512 (1936);
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §393, Comment h, §394, Comment e. (1944);
Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.56 (1952); Annotation: 162 A.L.R.
581 (1946). See: Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §330c
(1915); Cf. §330a.
365 Rider v. Ford, [1923] 1 Ch. 541; Cheshire, MoDERN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY, 6th ed., 505 (1949).
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though given to a lessee under a long-term lease" 866 In
this country options given to a lessee, exercisable only
during the term of the lease, whether to renew 3~ 7 or to
purchase the fee, 1168 are exempt from the Rule Against
Perpetuities. If Andrew Baker, owning land in fee
simple, leases it to John Stiles, his executors, administrators, and assigns for 99 years, with options in the lessee
to renew forever on the same terms and to purchase at
any time at a price to be determined by arbitrators at
the time of exercise, both options are valid.
Windiate v. Lorman ss9 was a suit to remove a cloud
from title. In 1910 the plaintiff, John Windiate, executed an instrument providing,
"If I ever desire to sell, or if my heirs or devisees shall
ever desire to sell [certain lands], I will give to Janette
Lorman, her heirs, devisees and assigns the first opportunity to buy the said land at the best price, not to exceed
$1,000, which I can get for it from anyone else - - - and
3 66 Woodall v. Clifton, [1905] 2 Ch. 257; Cheshire, MoDERN LAw oF
REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed., 504 (1949).
3 67 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §230 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §511 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §395
(1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PRoPERTY, §24.57 (1952); Annotations,
3 A.L.R. 498 (1919), 162 A.L.R. 1147 (1946).
368 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §512 (1936); PROPERTY RE·
STATEMENT, §395 (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule
Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.67 (1952);
Annotation: 162 A.L.R. 581 at 599 (1946). But see: Gray, RuLE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §230b (1915).
3~9 236 Mich.
531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926). In Livonia Township
School District v. Wilson, 339 Mich. 454, sub nom. Wayne County v.
Wilson, 64 N.W. (2d) 563 (1954), a provision in a 1944 deed giving the
grantor an option to repurchase for $80 if, within 25 years, the land
should not be used for school purposes, was treated as valid. In Braun v.
Klug, 335 Mich. 691, 57 N.W. (2d) 299 (1953), land was conveyed in fee
simple subject to a covenant against sale to anyone but the grantors or
their heirs. A decree holding the provision void as a direct restraint on
alienation but giving the grantors a pre-emptive option to repurchase,
to which the grantees did not object, was affirmed. As to whether a
pre-emptive option is a direct restraint on alienation see Part One,
at notes 226-231, supra.
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upon payment or tender of such price by her, her heirs
or assigns, to me, my heirs and devisees, that the land
shall be conveyed to her, her heirs or assigns, in fee
. I e---. "
s1mp
The plaintiff, at a time when the land was worth some
$8,000, sought a declaration that this option was void
under the Rule Against Perpetuities. An assignee of
the optionee intervened as party defendant and filed a
cross-bill for specific performance of the option. The
Court affirmed a decree for the intervenor, granting
specific performance of the option, saying that the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities was not in force in
Michigan so far as land was concerned and that the option did not suspend the absolute power of alienation in
violation of the statutes then in force. 370 Subsequently
3 7o Accord as to the latter point: Matter of City of New York, 246
N.Y. 1, 549, 157 N.E. 911, 159 N.E. 646 (1927), cert. den., 276 U.S.
603 (1928); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1!12, Ch. B, 1!53
(1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations,"
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.9 (1952). Both the New York and
Michigan courts were influenced in reaching this conclusion by the
fact that the suspension of the absolute power of alienation statutes
[Part Two, note 47 supra], unlike the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities, allowed no period in gross. Hence, if any option contravened the statutes, an option exercisable for any period, even a
single day, not based on human lives, would be void. There are
numerous decisions enforcing or assuming the validity of options to
purchase land given between March 1, 1847, and September 22, 1949,
when these statutes applied to disposition of land and the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities did not [Part Two, note 50 supra], exercisable for periods in gross of less than twenty-one years. Curran v.
Rogers, 35 Mich. 221 (1876); Wilcox v. Cline, 70 Mich. 517, 38 N.W.
555 (1888); Mier v. Hadden, 148 Mich. 488, Ill N.W. 1040 (1907);
Cameron v. Shumway, 149 Mich. 634, 113 N.W. 287 (1907); Van
Deusen v. Brown, 167 Mich. 49, 132 N.W. 472 (1911); Weadock v.
Champe, 193 Mich. 553, 160 N.W. 564 (1916); George v. Schuman,
202 Mich. 241, 168 N.W. 486 (1918); Wayne Woods Land Co. v.
Beeman, 211 Mich. 360, 178 N.W. 696 (1920); Cooper v. Pierson,
212 Mich. 657, 180 N.W. 351 (1920); Jacob v. Cummings, 213 Mich.
373, 182 N.W. 115 (1921); Olson v. Sash, 217 Mich. 604, 187 N.W.
346 (1922); Jefferson Land Co. v. Kamowski, 233 Mich. 210, 206
N.W. 351 (1925); Ludwig v. Hall, 234 Mich. 478, 208 N.W. 436
(1926); Su1zberger v. Steinhauer, 235 Mich. 253, 209 N.W. 68 (1926);
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John Windiate's widow sued for admeasurement of her
dower in the optioned land, joining as a defendant Frank
Tyack, who claimed to have an interest as a vendee under
a land contract executed by John Windiate in 1920.
Tyack, who was not a party to the earlier case, urged
the invalidity of the 1910 option. The Court reaffirmed
its previous decision that the option was valid, saying,
"Inasmuch as we do not follow the common law on
the subject it will not be necessary for us to take up the
many English and American cases cited to us by counsel
dealing with the common-law rule. - - "In Gray on the Rule Against Perpetuities (3d Ed.),
§329, it is said:
"'The rule against perpetuities concerns rights of
property only, and does not affect the making of contracts
which do not create rights of property.'" 371
Tromley v. Lange, 236 Mich. 240, 210 N.W. 202 (1926); Rashken v.
Smith, 236 Mich. 440, 210 N.W. 485 (1927); Beardslee v. Grindley,
236 Mich. 453, 210 N.W. 486 (1926); Clark v. Muirhead, 245 Mich. 49,
222 N.W. 79 (1928); O'Toole & Nedeau Co. v. Boelkins, 254 Mich.
44, 235 N.W. 820 (1931); Danto v. Kunze, 255 Mich. 135, 237 N.W.
390 (1931); Stevens v. Stott, 270 Mich. 637, 259 N.W. 157 (1935);
Thomas v. Ledger, 274 Mich. 16, 263 N.W. 783 (1936); State v.
Owen, 312 Mich. 73, 19 N.W. (2d) 491 (1945); Bergman v. Dykhouse,
316 Mich. 315, 25 N.W. (2d) 210 (1946); Le Baron Homes, Inc. v.
Pontiac Housing Fund, Inc., 319 Mich. 310, 29 N.W. (2d) 704 (1947);
Deane v. Rex Oil & Gas Co., 325 Mich. 625, 39 N.W. (2d) 204 (1949).
See also cases cited in Part Two, notes 359 supra, 372, 373, infra. In
Digby v. Thorson, 319 Mich. 524, 30 N.W. (2d) 266 (1948) an option
to purchase land, exercisable for two lives in being, was enforced. As
such options could not have been exercised beyond the period of the
common-law Rule Against· Perpetuities, they would not have violated
the Rule if it had been in force. In Caughey v. Ames, 315 Mich. 643,
24 N.W. (2d) 521 (1946) an option to purchase land without a
stated time limitation was construed to be exercisable only for a
reasonable time. As a reasonable time would be less than twenty-one
years, such an option would not have violated the Rule if it had been
in force as to land. In Bohnsack v. Detroit Trust Co., 292 Mich. 167,
290 N.W. 367 (1940), an option to purchase stock in a closed corporation, exercisable during the lives of named persons, was enforced.
This option, as it related to unique chattels personal, was subject to
the Rule Against Perpetuities but did not violate it.
an Windiate v. Leland, 246 Mich. 659 at 663 and 665, 225 N.W. 620
(1929).
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If this language quoted from Professor Gray's treatise
is to be considered dictum that options are not subject
to the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, it should
be read in the light of the following section of that
treatise, which asserts positively that specifically enforcible options are subject to the Rule. Options to purchase land given since September 23, 1949, when the
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities came into force
as to land, should be deemed subject to the Rule here
as elsewhere.
The Michigan Supreme Court has frequently enforced or assumed the validity of options to purchase 872
and to renew a single time 878 in leases for terms of less
872 Gustin v. Union School District of Bay City, 94 Mich. 502, 54
N.W. 156 (1893); Wright v. Kaynor, 150 Mich. 7, 113 N.W. 779
(1907); Mentlikowski v. Wisniewski, 173 Mich. 642, 139 N.W. 874
(1913); Agar v. Streeter, 183 Mich. 600, 150 N.W. 160 (1914); Bushman
v. Faltis, 184 Mich. 172, 150 N.W. 848 (1915) (granting specific performance of a contract to give a 99-year lease containing an option
to purchase exercisable for ten years); Nowicki v. Kopelczak, 195 Mich.
678, 162 N.W. 266 (1917); Polczynski v. Nowicki, 227 Mich. 415, 198
N.W. 976 (1924); Meadow Heights Country Club v. Hinckley, 229
Mich. 291, 201 N.W. 190 (1924); Hake v. Groff, 232 Mich. 233, 205
N.W. 145 (1925); Hafeli Bros. Corp. v. Bon, 273 Mich. 525, 263 N.W.
733 (1935); Nu-Way Service Stations, Inc. v. Vandenberg Oil Co.,
283 Mich. 551, 278 N.W. 683 (1938); Berrien County Fruit Exchange,
Inc. v. Pallas, 314 Mich. 66, 22 N.W. (2d) 74 (1946); Brenner v.
Duncan, 318 Mich. 1, 27 N.W. (2d) 320 (1947); Starr v. Holck, 318
Mich. 452, 28 N.W. (2d) 289 (1947); Mathieu v. Wubbe, 330 Mich.
408, 47 N.W. (2d) 670 (1951); Dyksterhouse v. Ohl, 330 Mich. 599,
48 N.W. (2d) 122 (1951); Rosenthal v. Shapiro, 333 Mich. 302, 52
N.W. (2d) 859 (1952); Holt v. Stoffiet, 334 Mich. 272, 54 N.W. (2d)
593 (1952), 338 Mich. 115, 61 N.W. (2d) 28 (1953).
373 Brown v. Parsons, 22 Mich. 24 (1870); Brand v. Frumveller, 32
Mich. 215 (1875); Pickard v. Kleis, 56 Mich. 604, 23 N.W. 329 (1885);
Starkey v. Horton, 65 Mich. 96, 31 N.W. 626 (1887); Wright v. Kaynor,
150 Mich. 7, 113 N.W. 779 (1907); Chittenden v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 154 Mich. 1, 117 N.W. 548 (1908); Meadow Heights
Country Club v. Hinckley, 229 Mich. 291, 201 N.W. 190 (1924);
Stern Co. v. Friedman, 229 Mich. 623, 201 N.W. 961 (1925); King-Blair
Co. v. Schloss, 253 Mich. 243, 234 N.W. 481 (1931); Maas Bros., Inc.
v. Weitzman, 288 Mich. 625, 286 N.W. 104 (1939); Berrien County
Fruit Exchange, Inc. v. Pallas, 314 Mich. 66, 22 N.W. (2d) 74 (1946);
Mansour v. Hyman Winegarden Realty Corp., 314 Mich. 262, 22 N.W.
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than twenty-one years given between 1847 and 1949,
when the Rule Against Perpetuities was not in force as
to limitations of land. Such options would not, of course,
have violated the Rule even if it had been in force and
if it extended to options in leases.m Stender v. Kerreos 375 was a summary proceeding for possession of land.
Mrs. Cady leased the land to the defendants for three
years from August 1, 1904, by a lease providing,
"And the said parties of the second part at the end of
the said three years may have the privilege of renewing
this lease at the same rental for so long a term as said
parties of the second part may see fit, upon the same
terms and conditions as in this lease contained, with this
exception: That on and after three years from said
August 1, 1904, the said party of the first part shall have
the privilege of entering and occupying said premises
and terminating said lease, in case she wishes to rebuild
upon said premises, upon giving said parties of the
second part sixty (60) days' notice in writing of such
intention; - - -."
The plaintiff purchased the reversion from Mrs. Cady,
and on May 29, 1907, served the defendants with a notice
(2d) 366 (1946); Laevin v. St. Vincent de Paul Society of Grand
Rapids, 323 Mich. 607, 36 N.W. (2d) 163 (1949); Mathieu v. Wubbe,
330 Mich. 408, 47 N.W. (2d) 670 (1951); Gurunian v. Grossman, 331
Mich. 412, 49 N.W. (2d) 354 (1951); Rosenthal v. Shapiro, 333 Mich.
302, 52 N.W. (2d) 859 (1952).
374 But they would have violated the statutes prohibiting suspension
of the absolute power of alienation for more than two lives if options
were deemed to suspend the absolute power of alienation because the
statutes permitted no period in gross. Part Two, note 370 supra.
Moreover, in Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879), it
was assumed that a provision in a forty-year lease that the lessor would
either pay for the tenant's improvements or grant a renewal lease for
forty years at the end of the term was valid.
375 156 Mich. 499, 121 N.W. 258 (1909). Grenier v. Cota, 92 Mich.
23, 52 N.W. 77 (1892), involved a lease for seven months with "first
privilege to keep said building for a longer term." The Court, having
determined that the lessees had estopped themselves to exercise the
option for renewal, found it unnecessary to consider the validity or
effect of the quoted language.
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to quit on August 1, 1907, which did not state that the
plaintiff intended to rebuild. On July 27, 1907, the defendants notified the plaintiff that they elected to renew
the lease for fifty years from August I, 1907. A judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. All members of the
Court agreed that the option to renew the lease for an
indefinite term was valid and that it could not be cut off
unless the reversioner actually intended to rebuild. The
majority deemed the notice to quit a sufficient manifestation of such an intention. Three justices dissented on
the ground that it was not. The dissenting opinion, in
the course of an argument that the option to renew was
valid, stated,

"If they had nominated a term, the length of which,
if originally agreed upon, would have violated the rule
against perpetuities, a different question would be presented. They did no such thing. It will not be presumed
that it was the intention of either party that a perpetuity
was to be created, nor should the contract receive the
construction that under its terms one might be
created." 376
The meaning of this passage escapes the present writer.
Gould v. Harley 377 was a suit to construe a lease. On
156 Mich. 499 at 508.
215 Mich. 234, 183 N.W. 705 (1921). Brush v. Beecher, llO
Mich. 597, 68 N.W. 420 (1896), involved leases for terms of five
years providing that, at the expiration of the term, the lessor might
elect to purchase buildings erected by the lessee and that, if he did
not so elect, the lease would be extended for five years, with like provision for election and extension at the expiration of each extension.
After the lessee's death the lessor attempted to treat the leases as
being perpetually renewable. It was held that as they only purported to bind the parties, their executors, administrators and assigns,
not their heirs, the renewal provisions were limited to the joint lives
of the parties. The opinion suggested that if the provisions called for
perpetual renewal at the option of the lessor, they would probably
be void as against public policy because of their tendency to restrict
alienation and development. This public policy must be something
other than the statutes prohibiting suspension of the absolute power
376
377
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January 12, 1898, land was leased to the defendants for
a term of ten years, "with the privilege of renewing said
lease at the pleasure of said second parties." The defendants elected to renew for ten years in 1908 and notified
the lessor in 1918 of their intention to renew for an
additional ten years, which renewal the reversioner resisted. The trial court entered a decree for the defendants, holding that they had a perpetual option to renew
the lease every ten years forever. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that, as a matter of construction, the
option was limited to a single ten-year renewal. The
opinion states that provisions for perpetual renewal are
not favored and will not be found unless the language
is clear and a provision that the renewal lease shall contain the same terms as the original does not include the
renewal provision. These decisions are not authority as
to the validity of options for perpetual renewal under
the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, but there is
no reason to believe that the Court will deviate from
its constructional preference against such options in
cases governed by the Rule. That this is so is indicated
by the recent case of Rex Oil & Gas Companry v. Busk,818
where an option to purchase oil extracted from designated land, created by a contract of December 9, 1949,
which expressed no time limit, was construed to be operative only for a reasonable time, not perpetually. The
Court did not discuss the validity under the Rule
of alienation and the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, because
all that could be renewed against the lessee's objection would be his
obligation to pay rent, and a contingent obligation to pay money is
not subject to either the statutes or the common-law Rule.
a1s 335 Mich. 368, 56 N.W. (2d) 221 (1953). As this option was not
contained in a lease it should have been deemed, if perpetual, to
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Part Two, note 364 supra.
Accord, as to the proposition that options without time limits will
be construed to be limited to a reasonable time: Caughey v. Ames,
315 Mich. 643, 24 N.W. (2d) 521 (1946), Part Two, note 370 supra.
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Against Perpetuities of an option which is perpetual.
The common-law mortgage took the form of a conveyance by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, in fee or of some
lesser estate, upon condition that if the mortgagor should
repay the mortgage debt by the due date, he or his heirs
might re-enter and terminate the estate of the mortgagee.879 As has been seen, by the seventeenth century,
the mortgagor, in addition to a right of entry, also had
an equity of redemption entitling him to revest title in
himself by payment of the debt after the due date. 380 Although these are really contingent future interests, they
have never been deemed subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities. 381 Under Michigan law the mortgagor retains a present possessory estate and the mortgagee
acquires a lien, 882 which is really a beneficial power of
appointment exercisable on a future contingency. For
the purpose at hand, the relations between the vendor
and the vendee under an executory contract for the sale
of land are essentially the same. The vendee has a present equitable fee simple and the vendor a nominal legal
title which is really only a power of revocation exercisable on a future contingency. 383 So, under our law, the
interests of the mortgagee and the land contract vendor
are really contingent future estates. Nevertheless, it
would seem that they are not subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities. 884 That is to say, mortgages and executory
Littleton, TENURES, Sec. 332 (1481 ); Part One, note 667 supra.
Part One, notes 678-688, supra.
as1 Knightsbridge Estates Trust, Ltd. v. Byrne, [1940] A.C. 613;
Cheshire, MoDERN LAW oF REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed., 505 (1949). See:
Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, §§562-571 (1915).
382 Part One, note 704 supra.
38a Part One, notes 693-696, 705, supra.
384 See: Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§562-571; Leach
& Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN
LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.63 (1952). A mortgagee's rights may be barred
by the statute of limitations, which begins to run at the time of default.
379
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land contracts may be made to run longer than twentyone years.
The Restatement of Property takes the position that
a limitation made by a corporation of its own unissued
stock or securities is exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities. sss
Albright v. Cobb, 34 Mich. 316 (1876). Although mortgages and land
contracts themselves are exempt from the Rule, transfers of interests
thereunder are not. Thus a mortgagee could not devise his interest to
"my oldest descendant living when the Penobscot Building falls.''
ss5 S. 400 (1944). See: 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §513
(1936). This would include long term options given as security and
options to repurchase stock designed to keep the organization "closed".
The Michigan Supreme Court has shown some favor to the latter type
of arrangement, although it has not been confronted with one which
might violate the Rule. Halsey v. Boomer, 236 Mich. 328, 210 N.W.
209, 48 A.L.R. 622 (1926); Bohnsack v. Detroit Trust Co., 292 Mich.
167, 290 N.W. 367 (1940); Barnes Co., Inc. v. Folsinski, 337 Mich.
370, 60 N.W. (2d) 302 (1953), Part One, note 522 supra.
Limitations to charities are partially exempt from the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities. Chapter 15 infra.

CHAPTER

15

Trusts and Charities
A. REMOTENESS OF VESTING

T WILL be recalled that the indestructibility of
equitable contingent remainders was one of the reasons for the development of the Rule Against Perpetuities.386 The interests of private beneficiaries of
trusts and the interests of private persons following trusts
are subject to the Rule to the same extent as any other
future interests. 887 One aspect of this is the familiar rule
of the law of trusts that a trust beneficiary must be certain to be ascertainable within the period of the Rule. 388
There are two principal methods of devoting property
to charity. One is by transferring it to a charitable corporation for all or some of the purposes permitted by
the corporate charter. A transfer of property to a perpetual charitable corporation, as mediaeval lawyers well

I

ass Part Two, notes 27, 28, 37, supra.
as1 Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885); Palms v.
Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker,
226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924); Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust
Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930); Gardner v. City National
Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934); Floyd v. Smith,
303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942); In re Dingler's Estate, 319
Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES,
3rd ed., §§323-326 (1915); TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §§62, Comment k,
65, Comment b. (1925); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §62.10 (1939); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §370, Comment p. (1944). Act. 193, P.A. 1947, §1,
amended, Act 61, P.A. 1951, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.82 (1), Comp.
Laws (1948) §555.301, provides that trusts created by an employer for
his employees as part of a stock bonus plan, pension plan, disability
or death benefit plan, or profit-sharing plan, "shall not be deemed to
be invalid as violating the so-called rule against perpetuities, any other
existing law against perpetuities or any law restricting or limiting the
duration of trusts."
ass TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §112 (1935).
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knew, creates a perpetuity. Hence such transfers have
been restricted in England and some American states by
what are known as mortmain statutes, and the permissible transferees have been limited by statutes restricting
the creation, powers, and purposes of charitable corporations. 889 In the absence of applicable statutory restrictions, the only perpetuity problem involved in a transfer
of property to a charitable corporation is whether the
interest of the corporation is certain to vest within the
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. If the prior
interests are non-charitable, a limitation of property to
a charitable corporation is subject to the Rule to the
same extent as a like limitation to a private person. 390 If
Andrew Baker devises land to John Stiles in fee simple
"but if John's descendants ever become extinct, to the
Baker Home for the Aged Poor, Inc.," the shifting executory interest limited to the Home is void under the Rule.
Under the English and most American decisions, however, if the prior interests are charitable, such a shifting
interest to a charity is excepted from the Rule Against
Perpetuities. 891 If Andrew Baker devises land to the So3 Scott, LAw oF TRusTs, §§362.1-362.4 (1939).
Attorney-General v. Gill, 2 P. Wms. 369, 24 Eng. Rep. 770 (1726);
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §594 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §543 (1936); TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, §401,
Comment i. (1935); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §396 (1944); Leach &
Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN
LAw oF PROPERTY, §24.38 (1952). The same is true if there is no preceding interest, i.e., if a springing executory interest is limited by a
private person to a charitable corporation.
391 Christ's Hospital v. Grainger, 16 Sim. 83, 30 Eng. Rep. 804
(1847); affd., 1 Mac. & G. 460, 41 Eng. Rep. 1343 (1848); Gray, RuLE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§597-603d (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS, §542 (1936); TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §401, Comment
f. (1935); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §397 (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The
Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PRoPERTY, §24.40 (1952). The same is true if there is no preceding interest
and the transferor is itself a charity, i.e., if a springing executory
interest is limited by a charitable corporation to another charitable
corporation.
389
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ciety for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc., "so
long as it maintains at least forty free drinking fountains
for horses in the City of Boston and when and if it shall
cease to do so to the Baker Home for the Aged Poor,
Inc.," the shifting executory interest limited to the Home
is, under these decisions, valid, although it is not certain to vest within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The other principal method of devoting property to
charity is by the creation of a trust. This, too, has been
restricted by statutes of various types. 392 In the absence
of applicable statutory restrictions, several perpetuities
problems arise incident to the creation of a charitable
trust because determination of the validity of a trust
under the Rule Against Perpetuities involves not only
the vesting of the legal estate of the trustee but also that
of the equitable interests of the beneficiaries. The problem of the legal estate of the trustee is and is treated the
same as that of a limitation to a charitable corporation.
If the prior interests are non-charitable, a limitation to a
trustee for charitable purposes must be certain to vest,
if at all, within the period of the Rule. 393 If Andrew
Baker devises land to John Stiles in fee simple "but if
John's descendants ever become extinct to James Thorpe
and his heirs upon trust to erect and maintain forever a
free home for the aged poor," the shifting executory
interest limited to James is void under the Rule. Under
the English and most American decisions, however, if
the prior interests are charitable, such a shifting interest
to a charitable trust is excepted from the Rule Against
Perpetuities. 894 If Andrew Baker devises land to the
Part Two, note 389 supra.
Part Two, note 390 supra.
394 Part Two, note 391 supra. The problem here involved can arise
in several situations. (1) Limitation to one charitable corporation,
~92
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Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc.,
"so long as it maintains at least forty free drinking fountains for horses in the City of Boston and when and if
it shall cease to do so to James Thorpe and his heirs
upon trust to erect and maintain forever a free home for
the aged poor," the shifting executory interest limited
to James is, under these decisions, valid, although it is
not certain to vest within the period of the Rule Against
Perpetuities. The interests of the beneficiaries of a
charitable trust are, under the English and most American decisions, excepted from the Rule Against Perpetuities.395 Thus a trust to erect and maintain forever a
free home for the aged poor is valid, although many of
the aged poor who will become beneficiaries will not be
ascertainable, and their interests will not vest, for centuries.
Michigan has always recognized the validity of limitations of vested interests in property to charitable corporations. Thus a bequest to an incorporated missionary society,396 church, 897 college, 898 school board, 399 or city 400
then to another; (2) limitation to a trustee for charity, then to a
charitable corporation; (3) limitation to a charitable corporation, then
to a trustee for charity; (4) limitation to a trustee for one charity, then
to another trustee for another charity; (5) limitation to a trustee to
hold forever, first for one charity, then for another; (6) limitation
by a charitable corporation to another charitable corporation without
a preceding interest; (7) limitation by a charitable corporation to a
trustee for charity without a preceding interest. In all these situations
it would seem that the interest of the second charity is exempt from
the Rule. That is, a particular charitable purpose is treated as an
entity for the purpose at hand.
395 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, §§112, Comment h., 364, 365 (1935).
It is sometimes said that the beneficiaries of a charitable trust have
no property interest at all and hence there is no equitable interest
which could vest at a time beyond the period of the Rule. Gray, RuLE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §590 (1915); 3 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS,
§364 (1939).
396 American Baptist Missionary Union v. Peck, lO Mich. 341 (1862);
Cook v. Universalist General Convention, 138 Mich. 157, 101 N.W.
217 (1904); Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155 Mich. 126, 118 N.W. 938 (1908).
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for all or some of its corporate purposes has always been
good. As an unincorporated society cannot hold title to
land, a devise to an unincorporated charitable organization is bad, but a direct bequest of personalty to such an
organization is good. m As the reported cases involved
limitations which were not contingent, we lack authority
Cf. Wheelock v. American Tract Society, 109 Mich. 141, 66 N.W. 955
(1896); Sprague v. Trustees of Protestant Episcopal Church, 186 Mich.
554, 152 N.W. 996 (1915).
397 Otis v. Arntz, 198 Mich. 196, 162 N.W. 498 (1917); Puffer v. Clark,
202 Mich. 169, 168 N.W. 471 (1918); Trustees of the M.J. Clark
Memorial Home v. Jewell, 240 Mich. 250, 215 N.W. 378 (1927). See:
Estate of Ticknor, 13 Mich. 44 (1864).
398 Allison v. Smith, 16 Mich. 405 (1868).
399 Maynard v. Woodard, 36 Mich. 423 (1877). (Bequest of residue
to district school board to hold forever in trust, to use the annual
interest for a school library with books "suitable for people of all ages
and classes within the said district.") Such a bequest does not create
a true trust. Part One, note 221 supra.
4oo Hatheway v. Sackett, 32 Mich. 97 (1875); Hathaway v. Village
of New Baltimore, 48 Mich. 251, 12 N.W. 186 (1882) (bequest to
village to erect a high school); Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids, 123
Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900) (devise of land and bequest of money
to a city for library); Hosmer v. City of Detroit, 175 Mich. 267, 141
N. W. 657 (1913) (devise of land worth $357,000 and personalty
worth $44,000 to a city to erect a fountain in a public park); Greenman v. Phillips, 241 Mich. 464, 217 N.W. 1 (1928) (devise of residue
to city to provide park; the Court, unnecessarily, relied on charity
statutes cited in Part Two, note 421 infra). Cf. Penny v. Croul, 76
Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649, 5 L.R.A. 858 (1889) (bequest to trustee to
devote the income to maintenance of the library and grounds of the
Detroit Water Works). Act 380, P.A. 1913, Comp. Laws (1915) §3301;
Comp. Laws (1929) §2746; Mich. Stat. Ann., §5.3421; Comp. Laws
(1948) §123.871, provides that grants, devises, and bequests to municipal corporations for public parks, grounds, cemeteries, buildings,
or other public purposes, whether made directly or in trust and
whether made before or after the enactment of the statute, shall not
be invalid for violation of any statute or rule against perpetuities.
401 Estate of Ticknor, 13 Mich. 44 (1864) (bequest to unincorporated
charitable society good). Although an unincorporated association cannot hold legal title to land, it can be the beneficiary of a trust of land,
and there is a strong tendency in modern cases to construe a direct
devise of land to an unincorporated charitable organization as creating
a trust for the organization. In re Schoales, [1930] 2 Ch. 75, noted,
29 MICH. L. REv. 651 (1931); 3 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §397.2 (1939);
TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §397, Comment g. (1935).
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as to the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to
limitations to charitable corporations and societies.
In Smith v. Bonhoof/(}2 it was held that a conveyance
of land made in 1842 to the Roman Catholic bishop of
Detroit, upon trust for an unincorporated congregation,
created a valid perpetual trust. The opinion does not
mention the Rule Against Perpetuities which, of course,
was in force as to limitations of land in 1842.
It will be recalled that Chapter 63 of the Revised Statutes of 1846, which is still in force, limits the purposes
for which trusts of land can be created,403 and that provisions of Chapter 62, which were in force from 1847
to 1949, prohibited suspension of the absolute power of
alienation of land for more than two lives.404 As neither
chapter made provision for charitable trusts, these chapters greatly complicated the problem of the validity of
charitable trusts involving land. Although neither
chapter regulated trusts of chattels personal, the subsequent developments make it desirable to consider the
decisions chronologically rather than according to the
subject matter involved.
In Attorney General v. Soule~405 a provision in a will
directing the executors to set aside $10,000 "for the
establishment of a school at Montrose aforesaid, for the
education of children," was held void as too indefinite to
bind the executors to use for a public charity. In Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark/ 06 a convey2 Mich. 116 (1851).
Part One, notes 583, 586, supra.
404 Part Two, note 47 supra. These provisions were held to limit
the duration of trusts of land. Part One, notes 592, 593, supra.
4os 28 Mich. 153 (1873).
406 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207 (1897). It was assumed in Thatcher
v. Wardens and Vestrymen of St. Andrew's Church of Ann Arbor, 37
Mich. 264 (1877), that a remainder to an incorporated church following a trust which offended by its duration the suspension statutes,
402
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ance to trustees upon trust for use as the site of a church
forever was held void. The Court said that, as Chapters
62 and 63 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 made no provision for charitable trusts of land, they must conform
to the rules for private trusts and were void if they suspended the absolute power of alienation for more than
two lives. In Penny v. Croul,407 a testator devised land
to his wife ·for life, remainder to trustees with directions
to convert it into personalty and devote the income forever to maintaining the library and grounds of the Detroit Water Works. It was held that the direction to convert the land into personalty took the disposition out of
the suspension of the absolute power of alienation statutes and that, as a trust of personalty for the benefit of
a public charitable corporation, it was valid. The Court's
opinion, written by Justice Campbell, cited as authority
cases involving direct bequests to public corporations 408
and stated:
"The rule which prevents personal property from being tied up for more than lives in being, and 21 years
thereafter, is not a universal rule of common law, but
would be void, and held in State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W.
548 (1898) that a remainder to the State which might vest five years
after a life in being was void. In White v. Rice, 112 Mich. 403, 70
N.W. 1024 (1897), a conveyance of land to an incorporated church,
partially upon a potentially perpetual trust for unincorporated religious societies, was held to create a valid trust under a statute enacted after the conveyance involved in Methodist Episcopal Church of
Newark v. Clark was executed. Act 145, P.A. 1855, §21, Comp. Laws
(1857) §2029, Comp. Laws (1871) §3074, How. Stat., §4637, repealed,
Act 209, P.A. 1897. This statute expressly authorized conveyances to
trustees to hold in perpetuity for religious societies.
4o7 76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649, 5 L.R.A. 858 (1889).
In Home
Missionary Society v. Corning, 164 Mich. 395, 129 N.W. 686 (1911),
the validity of a bequest to trustees to pay the income in perpetuity
to the society was assumed.
408 Hatheway v. Sackett, Hathaway v. Village of New Baltimore,
Part Two, note 400 supra; Maynard v. Woodward, Part Two, note
399 supra.
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one worked out by courts of equity, and it never had
any application to charitable or public benefactions.
There has never been any incapacity to keep a fund in
permanence when there is a public corporation to receive and expend the income." 409
The testatrix in Wheelock v. American Tract Society 410 devised her lands to her executors in trust "to
pay the same" to the society and three other charitable
corporations,
"And should my executors think it best to appropriate
a portion of the moneys which may come into their
hands, which shall not be expended and paid as hereinbefore set forth, - - and as to the amount to be paid, or
sums to be distributed, to each, I leave entirely to the
judgment and discretion of my executors to act in this
respect as they shall think right, - - it is my wish and
desire, and they are hereby directed, to pay to such
worthy poor girls, to aid in their education, such sums
as shall not be expended or paid as hereinbefore provided; - - -"
The Court held that the provision for worthy poor
girls was invalid because it was not fully expressed and
clearly defined upon the face of the instrument creating
it, as required by subsection 5, Section 11, Chapter 63,
Revised Statutes of 1846.411 It ruled that the direct
devises to the four charitable corporations also failed
because they were inseparably connected with the void
provision for worthy poor girls. So by the turn of the
century it was clear, from Methodist Episcopal Church
of Newark v. Clark,412 that charitable trusts of land were
subject to the suspension of the absolute power of aliena76 Mich. 471 at 480.
109 Mich. 141, 66 N.W. 955 (1896). Testatrix was domiciled in
Pennsylvania, but the lands were in Michigan.
411 Part One, notes 583, 586, supra.
412 Part Two, note 406 supra.
409
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tion provisions of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes,
and, from Wheelock v. American Tract Society,418 that
they were subject to the provisions of Chapter 63 governing trusts. As to charitable trusts of chattels personal,
Penny v. Croul 414 had indicated their validity when the
beneficiary was a charitable corporation, and Smith v.
Bon hoof 415 might indicate that they were valid when the
beneficiary was an unincorporated charitable society.
Attorney General v. Soule 41 had left doubtful the validity of any other type of charitable trust.
In Hopkins v. Crossley, 411 the Detroit Volunteer Fire
Department, a corporation, dissolved in 1886 and turned
over its personalty to three trustees for the relief of poor
and needy or disabled members of the old Volunteer Department and their families, of poor, needy, or disabled
members of the new paid Fire Department, and of any
other needy and worthy persons, and also for the upkeep of firemen's monuments in cemeteries. The Court,
after saying that, because no land was involved, Chapters 62 and 63 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 had no
application, and that the Rule Against Perpetuities does
not apply to a gift to charity, held the trust void. The
grounds of this decision are not clear, but it does not
seem that the objection to charitable trusts rested on
their being perpetuities. Under the law of trusts, the
beneficiaries of a trust must be definitely ascertainable
persons.418 Charitable trusts are an exception to this
jj

Part Two, note 410 supra.
Part Two, note 407 supra.
415 Part Two, note 402 supra.
416 Part Two, note 405 supra.
417 132 Mich. 612, 96 N.W. 499 (1903). In Hopkins v. Crossley, 138
Mich. 561, 101 N.W. 822 (1904), it was decided that the fund belonged
to the persons who were members of the corporation at its dissolution.
418 TlWSTS RESTATEMENT, §112 (1935).
418
414
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rule.
Hopkins v. Crossley probably amounts to a refusal to accept this exception to the general rule. In
any event, several attempts to create charitable trusts
were held ineffective under its authority.420
Act 122 of the Public Acts of 1907 provided,
"Section 1. No gift, grant, bequest or devise to religious, educational, charitable or benevolent uses which
shall in other respects be valid under the laws of this
State, shall be invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or
uncertainty of the persons designated as the beneficiaries
thereunder in the instrument creating the same, nor by
reason of the same contravening any statute or rule
against perpetuities. - - -" 421
!d., §112, Comment h., §364 (1935).
McPherson v. Byrne, 155 Mich. 338, 118 N.W. 985 (1909) (inter
vivos trust of personalty for charity, "just as you wish."); Stoepe1 v.
Satterthwaite, 162 Mich. 547, 127 N.W. 673 (1910) (bequest to
physician "to be used as he sees best for carrying on the work of
relieving suffering," void where testatrix died before the effective date
of Act 122, P.A. 1907). In Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155 Mich. 126, 118
N.W. 938 (1908), a husband who died in 1896 devised the residue of
his estate, real and personal, to his wife for life, remainder as to twothirds to such charities in the City of Alpena as she should by will
appoint. The wife, who died in 1905, attempted to exercise the power
and also made bequests of her own property to "women.'s work in
foreign fields," "women's work in home lands (not Tank Home),"
and "Protestant Missionary work among poor colored people of the
South." The Court held that the power created by the husband's
will failed because the beneficiaries were not definitely ascertainable,
but, on the basis of extrinsic evidence that the church to which she
belonged had three organizations devoted to the three objects stated,
held that the wife's bequests of her own property were to these
organizations and were valid.
421 Amended by Act 125, P.A. 1911, to include trusts for the maintenance of parts of cemeteries. Repealed and superseded by Act 280,
P.A. 1915, Comp. Laws (1915) §§11099-11101; Comp. Laws (1929)
§§13512-13514; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.1191-26.1193; Comp. Laws (1948)
§§554.351-554.353. Section I of the present statute provides, "No gift,
grant, bequest or devise, whether in trust or otherwise to religious,
educational, charitable or benevolent uses, or for the purpose of providing for the care or maintenance of any part of any cemetery, public
or private, or anything therein contained which shall in other respects
be valid under the laws of this state, shall be invalid by reason of
the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the object of such trust or of the
persons designated as the beneficiaries thereunder in the instrument
419
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Since the enactment of this legislation there is no
doubt that any charitable trust which would be valid
under general Anglo-American law is also valid under
Michigan laW. 422 It has been held to exempt charitable
creating the same, nor by reason of the same contravening any statute
or rule against perpetuties." Act 373, P.A. 1925, Comp. Laws (1929)
§§13516-13517; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.1201-26.1202; Comp. Laws (1948)
§§554.381, 554.382, provides: "Sec. 1. No statutory or common law
rule of this state against perpetuities or restraint of alienation shall
hereafter invalidate any gift, grant, devise or bequest in trust or
otherwise, for public welfare purposes. Sec. 2. Public welfare purposes
are defined to be all lawful purposes beneficial to the public as a
whole." See also Act 380, P.A. 1913, Part Two, note 400 supra.
Trusts created by an employer as part of a stock bonus plan, pension
plan, disability or death benefit plan, or profit sharing plan, are
exempted from the Rule Against Perpetuities by Act 193, P.A. 1947,
as amended by Act 61, P.A. 1951, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.82 (1), Comp.
Laws (1948), §555.301.
422 Loomis v. Mack, 183 Mich. 674, 150 N.W. 370 (1915) (Devise of
land and personalty on trust for dependent children of Oakland
County; decree holding valid affirmed by four to four vote in Supreme
Court. The justices voting for reversal thought Act 122 of 1907 was
unconstitutional because of a defective title. This doubt was eliminated by Act 125 of 1911); In re Brown's Estate, 198 Mich. 544, 165
N.W. 929 (1917), discussed at Part Two, note 428 infra; Peters v.
Fowler, 202 Mich. 695, 168 N.W. 966 (1918), discussed at Part Two,
note 427 infra; Scudder v. Security Trust Co., 238 Mich. 318, 213
N.W. 131 (1927) (devise of residue to trustee to provide for the welfare of elderly persons without means of support by paying income
or principal to organized charities); Wanstead v. Fisher, 278 Mich. 68,
270 N.W. 218 (1936) (devise of land to trustee to provide college
scholarships to needy graduates of Iron River High School); John
Robinson Hospital v. Cross, 279 Mich. 407, 272 N.W. 724 (1937)
(bequest to trustee to maintain room in hospital); Gifford v. First
National Bank of Menominee, 285 Mich. 58, 280 N.W. 108 (1938)
(devise of residue to trustee to pay income to named persons for life,
then to devote to charitable purposes connected with medicine and
public health); Floyd v. Smith, 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942)
(bequest to trustee to construct a hospital in Lapeer); Chicago Bank
of Commerce v. McPherson, 62 Fed. (2d) 393 (6th Cir. 1932) (devise
to trustees for "such charitable, benevolent, educational and public
welfare uses as such trustees shall elect"). In Moore v. O'Leary, 180
Mich. 261, 146 N.W. 661 (1914), a devise of the residue to "Mary E.
Clary, to be disposed of by her as I have heretofore instructed her for
charitable purposes" was held void in spite of the statute. Because
of the Statute of Wills, such a devise does not create an express
charitable trust. There is a conflict of authority in other jurisdictions
as to whether a constructive trust for charity will be imposed in this
situation. 3 Scott, LAw oF TRusTs, §359 (1939). In Scarney v. Clarke,
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trusts of land from the suspension of the absolute power
of alienation provisions of Chapter 62 of the Revised
Statutes of 1846 423 and from the "fully expressed and
clearly defined" provision of Chapter 63. 424 It will be
recalled that, under general Anglo-American law, charities are not wholly exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities in that a contingent limitation to a charity not
preceded by an interest in a charity is subject to the
Rule, 425 although one which follows another charity is
exempt. 426 In Peters v. Fowler, 421 a testator directed his
executors to invest $500 and pay the income to the local
Methodist Episcopal church as long as it conducted at
least twelve services a year, and when it ceased to do so
to pay over the principal to the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church. This was held
valid, as it would be in most jurisdictions. In re Brown's
Estate 428 involved a devise of land and personalty to
corporations to be organized within two years after probate of the will to operate charitable hospitals. This
282 Mich. 56, 275 N.W. 765 (1937), a trust for a clinic operated for
profit was properly held to be non-charitable. Cf. Auditor General
v. R. B. Smith Memorial Hospital Association, 293 Mich. 36, 291 N.W.
213 (1940), where a non-profit hospital was held charitable although
it charged fees.
423 Scudder v. Security Trust Co., Wanstead v. Fisher, cited in preceding note. See Part One, notes 583, 586, Part Two at notes 410,
411, supra.
424 In re Brown's Estate, Part Two, note 422 supra. See Part One,
notes 592, 593, Part Two, at notes 47, 406, supra.
425 Part Two, note 390 supra.
426 Part Two, note 391 supra.
427 202 Mich. 695, 168 N.W. 966 (1918).
428 198 Mich. 544, 165 N.W. 929 (1917). In re DeBancourt's Estate,
279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891, 110 A.L.R. 1346 (1937), involved a bequest to a trustee to pay $10,000 to the Salvation Army in Jackson
"when he is satisfied that the building will be completed and that the
said Salvation Army will be able to finance the same." This was
treated as valid, but it was held that the Salvation Army would forfeit
the bequest if it failed to comply with the condition precedent within
ten years, the period of the statute of limitations on claims against
decedent's estates.
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was held valid although it suspended the absolute power
of alienation for a period which might exceed two lives,
the maximum period permitted by the statute then in
force, and postponed vesting for a period which might
exceed lives in being and twenty-one years, the period
of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. 429 This
decision appears to mean that in Michigan charities are
exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities in all cases,
even when the charitable limitation is contingent and
does not follow another charity.
B. DURATION; RESTRAINTS ON TERMINATION

Generally speaking, the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities prohibits only remoteness of vesting, it does
not restrict the duration of interests in property, legal
or equitable, whether or not they are vested. If Andrew
Baker conveys land to John Stiles and his heirs, John
takes a legal estate in fee simple which may last forever.
If Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe and his
heirs upon trust for John Stiles and his heirs, James takes
a legal estate in fee simple and John an equitable estate
in fee simple. Both of these and the trust itself may
last forever, but no violation of the Rule is involved
because there is no postponement of vesting.430 A trust
does not tie up property or impede alienation undesirably if the interests of the beneficiaries are alienable and
they are entitled to terminate the trust by compelling
the trustee to convey the legal title to them. Hence, in
the absence of statutory restrictions, there is no legal
Part Two, note 134 supra.
Williams v. Teale, 6 Hare 239, 67 Eng. Rep. 1155 (1847); Gray,
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§232-246 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §557
(1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §378
(1944).
429
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limit to the duration of such trusts. 431 As has been seen,
the Michigan statutes prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation, which were in force from 1847
to 1949, were construed to limit the permissible duration of trusts for receipt of the rents and profits of land,
charitable and private, to two lives in being.432 A trust
does tie up property and impede alienation undesirably
if the beneficiaries are unable to compel termination of
the trust, particularly if their interests are inalienable.
Hence rules, collateral to the Rule Against Perpetuities,
have been developed to restrict limitations which tend
to make trusts indestructible for undesirably long
periods. The application of these rules is not identical
as to all types of indestructible trusts, so separate consideration of the types of trusts which may be indestructible
is desirable.
( 1) Charitable Trusts
Under general Anglo-American law, a charitable trust
may be made perpetually indestructible; that is, it may
be so limited that it may last forever and that no one will
be entitled to terminate it. 433 Michigan recognized this
lack of limitation on the duration of indestructible
charitable trusts in Smith v. Bonhoof/34 involving a trust
of land created before the enactment of the suspension
of the absolute power of alienation statutes, and in
431 In re Cassel, [1926] Ch. 358; 1 Scott, LAw OF TRusTs, §62.10
(1939).
432 Part One, note 593, Part Two, note 406 supra. But these statutes
were made inapplicable to charitable trusts by Act 122, P.A. 1907,
Part Two, note 421 supra.
433 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §365; 3 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §365 (1939);
2 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §554 (1936). PROPERTY REsTATE·
MENT, §§378, 381, 398 (1944); Wolfe, "Rules Against Perpetuities and
Gifts to Charity," 17 IND. L.J. 205 (1942).
434 2 Mich. 116 (1851), Part Two, note 402 supra.
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435

Penny v. CroulJ
involving a trust of personalty created
before the charities statute of 1907.436 Although charitable trusts of land were limited in duration to two lives
by the suspension of the absolute power of alienation
statutes, 437 it is clear that there has been no restriction
on the duration of charitable trusts, whether of land or
of personalty and whether or not they are indestructible,
since the legislation of 1907.488

(2) Honorary Trusts
A trust which has no ascertainable human beneficiaries
but which does have a definite non-charitable purpose is
known as an honorary trust. 439 The commonly recognized honorary trusts are those for care of graves, 440 for
support of particular animals, 441 and for the promotion
of non-charitable causes such as sports 442 and political
parties. 443 An honorary trust is not a true trust because
the trustee cannot be compelled to carry it out. If he
refuses to do so, however, he holds upon resulting trust
4ss 76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649, 5 L.R.A. 858 (1889), Part Two, note
407 supra.
436 Act 122, P.A. 1907, Part Two, note 421 supra.
437 Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730,
3 N.W. 207 (1879), Part Two, note 406 supra.
438 Part Two, notes 422-424, 426-428, supra.
489 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, §124, Comment c. (1935); 1 Scott, LAW oF
TRUSTS, §124 (1939).
440 Lloyd v. Lloyd, 21 L.J. Ch. (N.S.) 596 (1852); Mussett v. Bingle,
[1876) W.N. 170; 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §124.2 (1939).
441 Pettingall v. Pettingall, 11 L.J. Ch. 176 (1842) (favorite black
mare); In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552 (1889) (testator's horses and hounds);
In re Kelly, [1932] I.R. 255 (testator's dogs); 1 Scott, LAw OF TRUSTS,
§ 124.3 (1939). A trust for the benefit of animals in general, as for
the prevention of cruelty to them, is charitable. In re Marchant, 54
Sol. J. 425 (1910); TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, §374, Comment c. (1935);
3 Scott, id., §374.2.
44 2 In re Thompson, [1934] 1 Ch. 342 (fox hunting); 1 Scott, LAW
OF TRUSTS, §124.6 (1939).
443 Bonar Law Memorial Trust v. Inland Revenue Commissioners,
49 T.L.R. 220 (1933); 3 Scott, LAw OF TRUSTS, §374.6 (1939).
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for the settlor or the persons who would have been entitled to the property if there were no trust, usually the
heirs or residuary devisees of the settlor. In the absence
of provision for its termination in the trust instrument,
such a trust is indestructible. The beneficiaries cannot
terminate it because there are no ascertainable human
beneficiaries, the settlor or his heirs, etc., cannot compel
termination, and the trustee cannot terminate the trust
for his own benefit. This being so, a rule collateral to
the Rule Against Perpetuities has been developed to the
effect that an indestructible honorary trust is void unless
its duration is certain not to exceed the period of the
Rule. 444 If Andrew Baker bequeaths $10,000 to John
Stiles upon trust to devote the income to the support of
Andrew's horses and dogs so long as they live, the bequest is void, because the trust is not certain to terminate within human lives and twenty-one years. 445
In Lounsbury v. Trustees of Square Lake Burial Association/46 a testator bequeathed $100 to the trustees "as
a perpetual fund to be kept at interest by said trustees
444 Dawson v. Small, L.R. 18 Eq. Il4 (1874); Mussett v. Bingle,
[1876] W.N. 170; Kennedy v. Kennedy, [1914] A.C. 215; In re Kelly,
[1932) I.R. 255; TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §124 (1935); 2 Simes, LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS, §555 (1936); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §124.1 (1939);
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §379 (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common
Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW oF PROPERTY, §24.67
(1952); Smith, "Honorary Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities,"
30 CoL. L. REv. 60 (1930).
445 It is the generally accepted view that animal lives may not be
used to measure the period. In re Estate of Kelly, [1932] I.R. 255;
Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§228a, 906 (1915); 2
Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §491 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
§374, Comment h. (1944). See Matter of Howells, 145 Misc. 557, 260
N.Y. Supp. 598 (1932). But in In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552 (1889), an
honorary trust to last for fifty years if the horses who were its beneficiaries so long lived was held valid. Moreover, in In re Estate of
Kelly, supra, where the trust was to apply £4 annually to the support
of certain dogs, it was held that the annual payments were severable
and the trust good for twenty-one years.
446 170 Mich. 645, 129 N.W. 36 (1912).
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and the interest used to take care of the graves on my lot
in said cemetery," and the residue of his estate to his
wife for life, remainder to the trustees to erect a fence
around the cemetery and a vault in it. The disposition
of the residue was held valid, but the provision for a perpetual trust fund was held void as a perpetuity. Since
1911 the Michigan statutes have expressly permitted perpetual trusts for the care of graves/47 but the Lounsbury
case is still authority for the proposition that Michigan
recognizes honorary trusts and holds those not authorized
by statute invalid if their duration may exceed the
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
(3) Trusts For Unincorporated Societies
An unincorporated association has capacity to be the
beneficiary of a trust. 448 If the purposes of such an association are charitable, there is no limit to the duration
of trusts for it. 449 If the purposes of an unincorporated
association are not charitable, a trust for it is void if, by
its terms, it may continue for a period longer than that
of the Rule Against Perpetuities and will be indestruc447 Act 125, P.A. 1911, Act 280, P.A. 1915, Part Two, note 421,
Act 380, P.A. 1913, Par,t Two, note 400 supra. See: In re More's
Estate, 179 Mich. 237, 146 N.W. 319 (1914), where such a trust was
held valid by virtue of the provisions of a special act incorporating
the cemetery involved.
448 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §119 (1935); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §119
(1939). Such a trust must be distinguished from a trust for the present
or future members of a society as individuals, which is a form of class
gift.
449 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §380 (1944); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS,
§119 (1939); Part Two, note 433 supra; Smith v. Bonhoof, 2 Mich.
116 (1851); Home Missionary Society v. Corning, 164 Mich. 395, 129
N.W. 686 (1911); Peters v. Fowler, 202 Mich. 695, 168 N.W. 966
(1918), Part Two, note 427 supra. Of course this was not true as to
trusts of Michigan land created between 1847 and 1907. Methodist
Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207
(1879), Part Two, note 406 supra.
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tible during that period. 450 It would seem, however, that
a trust for a non-charitable unincorporated association is
valid, even though it may continue for a period longer
than that of the Rule Against Perpetuities, if some person may destroy it for his own benefit or if the current
members of the association may expend the entire principal at any time for the purposes of the association. 451
(4) Indestructible Trusts For Private Persons
In England, if all the beneficiaries of a trust for private persons are in being and ascertained, they are entitled to terminate the trust by compelling the trustee
to convey to them even though such termination will
defeat a material purpose of the trust. 452 The rule that
trusts for private persons were always destructible by the
beneficiaries had, until 1935, a single exception. The
interest of the beneficiary of a trust for the separate use
of a married woman could be made inalienable and she
could be effectively prohibited from terminating the
trust prematurely. 453 Such a restraint on alienation and
4 50 Thomson v. Shakespear, 1 De G.F.&J. 399, 45 Eng. Rep. 413
(1860); Carne v. Long, 2 De. G.F.&.J. 75, 45 Eng. Rep. 550 (1860); 1
Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §119 (1939); 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS,
§485 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §380 (1944); Leach 8c Tudor,
"The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, §24.67 (1952).
451 In re Drummond, [1914] 2 Ch. 90; 1 Scott, LAW oF TRusTs, §119
(1939); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §380 (1944). The Restatement deems
it sufficient if the trustee or some other person has such power to expend the principal, but this has been questioned. Morray, "The Rule
Against Prolonged Indestructibility of Private Trusts," 44 ILL. L. REv.
467 at 484 (1949).
452 Saunders v. Vautier, Cr. 8c Ph. 240, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (1841);
Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §236 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §557 (1936); 3 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §337
(1939).
453 Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483, 35 Eng. Rep. 1025 (1817);
Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 My. 8c Cr. 377, 41 Eng. Rep. 147 (1840); Baggett v. Meux, 1 Ph. 627, 41 Eng. Rep. 771 (1846). The restraints on
alienation and termination were effective, however, only while the
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termination would endure, of course, only for the life
of the married woman concerned. In re Ridley 454 involved a bequest to trustees to pay the income to Mary
Cooper for life and then to hold upon trust for the children of Mary who survived her. The will prohibited
alienation or anticipation of their interests by female
beneficiaries. Mary survived the testator and later died,
survived by two married daughters. The daughters sued
to compel the trustees to terminate the trust by transferring the principal to them. Such transfer was decreed
on the ground that provisions against termination of a
trust which might last longer than the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities are void.
Since 1935 England has not permitted indestructible
trusts for private persons whether or not they are married women; that is, if all the beneficiaries of such a
trust are in being, ascertained and of full age, they may
compel the trustee to terminate the trust by transferring
the principal to them. In this country, however, it is
generally held that the beneficiaries of a trust are not
entitled to compel its termination if such termination
would defeat a material purpose of the trust. 455 This
doctrine is commonly applied in two situations, where
woman was married, ceasing upon her husband's death. Jones v.
Salter, 2 Russ. & M. 208, 39 Eng. Rep. 374 (1815); Barton v. Briscoe,
Jac. 603, 37 Eng. Rep. 978 (1822). The Law Reform (Married
Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 and 26 Geo. V, c. 30, §2, invalidated such restraints in deeds and wills becoming . effective after
the statute. The Married Women (Restraint Upon Anticipation)
Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. VI, C. 78, §1 (1), made such invalidation
retroactive, so that restraints on alienation and termination in trusts
for married women are void, regardless of when the trust instrument
became effective.
4iH 11 Ch. D. 645 (1879). Accord: Whitby v. Mitchell, 42 Ch. D.
494 (1889), aff'd., 44 Ch. D. 85 (C.A. 1890).
4 55 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §121c (1915); TRUSTS
RESTATEMENT, §337 (2) (1935); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS,
§557 (1936); 3 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTs §337 (1939); Part One, note
615 supra.
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the interest of the cestui que trust is inalienable by reason of spendthrift provisions which, as has been seen,
are usually valid in the United States/56 and where, even
though the cestui's interest is alienable, one of the purposes of the trust is to postpone the cestui's enjoyment
of the principal until he reaches a stipulated age. Such
provisions for postponement of enjoyment are ordinarily
valid in this country under what is known as the rule in
Claflin v. Clafiin. 451 There is general agreement that provisions which would make trusts for private persons perpetually indestructible are void 458 and some authority
for the view adopted in In re Ridley,459 that provisions
against termination of trusts which might last longer
than the period of the Rule Aganist Perpetuities. are
void. 460 The rules on this question are as yet somewhat
unsettled. 461
The problem of indestructibility of trusts for private
persons is complicated in Michigan by statutory provisions that a conveyance by a trustee of land in contravention of the trust is absolutely void and that the beneficiary of a trust for receipt of the rents and profits of
lands cannot assign or dispose of his interest. 462 In New
Part One, notes 569-572, supra.
149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889).
458 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, §62, Comment k. (1935); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §381 (1944). The Restatement takes no position as to
the validity of provisions for indestructibility which are not perpetual
but which may last longer than the Rule Against Perpetuities.
459 Part Two, note 454 supra.
4so 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §§553, 557 (1936); I Scott,
LAW OF TRUSTS, §62.10 (1939). Cf. Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES,
3rd ed., §I2li (1915).
461 Brownell, "Duration of Indestructible and Spendthrift Trusts,"
23 CoRN. L.Q. 629 (1938); Morray, "The Rule Against Prolonged Indestructibility of Private Trusts," 44 ILL. L. REv. 467 (1949).
462 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§19, 21, Comp. Laws (1857) §§2649, 2651;
Comp. Laws (1871) §§4132, 4134; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8847, 8849;
How. Stat., §§5581, 5583; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11583, 11585; Comp.
Laws (1929) §§12985, 12987; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.69, 26.71; Comp.
Laws (1948) §§555.19, 555.20; Part One, notes 580, 583, 602, 621, supra.
456
457
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York these provisions are held to prevent premature
termination of trusts even though the beneficiaries are
in being, ascertained, of full age and wish to terminate. 463
As a trust suspends the absolute power of alienation, a
trust of land which might last for more than two lives
in being is void if created between 1847 and 1949, when
the statutes prohibiting such suspensions were in force.m
The repeal of the statutes prohibiting suspension of the
absolute power of alienation 465 leaves us without any
statutory restriction on the duration of trusts. If Michigan should follow the New York view, that the statutory
inalienability of the interests of the trustee and cestui
que trust makes trusts for receipt of the rents and profits
of land indestructible, it would have either to permit
perpetually indestructible trusts or to hold perpetual
trusts of land void; it could not then follow the general
Anglo-American view, that the trusts themselves are
valid but the provisions preventing termination are void,
because the provisions preventing termination would be
statutory.
In Bennett v. Chapin/66 land and other property were
devised to trustees to pay the income to a daughter of
the testatrix until she reached thirty-five and then to
transfer the principal to her. Before she reached that
age the daughter sued to compel termination of the
Part One, note 614 supra.
Part One, note 593 supra.
465 Part Two, note 61 supra.
466 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889). The facts are stated more
fully in Part One, at note 611 supra. See: Fredericks v. Near, 260
Mich. 627 at 631, 245 N.W. 537 (1932), Part One, notes 616, 617,
supra. In Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900),
land was conveyed to a trustee to apply the rents and profits to the
use of William Fitzhugh during his life and after his death to apply
them to the use of his wife and children during the life of the wife,
remainder at her death to the children. After the death of William
his widow released her interest to the other beneficiaries. They sued
to compel termination of the trust and were granted the relief sought.
463

464
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trust. It was held that she was entitled to such termination. This decision appears to be a rejection of both
the New York view that the statutory inalienability of
the interests of the trustee and cestui que trust makes
trusts for receipt of the rents and profits of land indestructible and of the doctrine of Claflin v. Claflin 467 that
the beneficiaries of a trust are not entitled to terminate
it if termination would defeat a material purpose of the
trust. Subsequent Michigan decisions indicate, however,
that a beneficiary of a trust of either land or personalty
is not entitled to compel its termination if the trust instrument contains express spendthrift provisions restraining the alienation of the cestui's interest.468 It would
seem that such spendthrift provisions are invalid in
Michigan if the beneficiary whose alienation is restrained
has more than a life interest in income.469 Reading these
decisions together, it appears that provisions against
termination of a trust are wholly ineffective in Michigan,
whether the subject matter is land or chattels, if the
beneficiary has an equitable fee simple or equivalent
interest. If Andrew Baker devises property to James
Thorpe and his heirs upon trust to pay the income to
John Stiles and his heirs by a will providing, "it is a
material purpose of this trust that no beneficiary thereof
shall have access to the principal or be entitled to terminate the trust," the trust is probably valid but the provision against termination void. If, however, a beneficiary has only a life interest, he cannot compel termination in contravention of express provisions of the trust
Part Two, notes 455, 457, supra.
Rose v. Southern Michigan National Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 238
N.W. 284 (1931); Hay v. Le Bus, 317 Mich. 698, 27 N.W. (2d) 309
(1947), Part One, note 647 supra.
469 In re Ford's Estate, 331 Mich. 220, 49 N.W. (2d) 154 (1951),
Part One, note 650 supra.
467
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instrument, even with the cooperation of the beneficiaries in remainder. If Andrew Baker devises property
to James Thorpe and his heirs upon trust to pay the
income to John Stiles for life and then to transfer the
principal to Roger White, his heirs, and assigns by a will
providing "John Stiles shall not alienate or anticipate his
right to income under this trust," John and Roger probably cannot compel the trustee to transfer the property
to them during John's lifetime.
This raises the problem in In re Ridley. 470 If Andrew
Baker devises property to James Thorpe and his heirs
upon trust to pay the income to John Stiles, who has no
son, for life, then to pay the income to the eldest son of
John for life, then to transfer the principal to Roger
White, his heirs and assigns, by a will providing, "no
life beneficiary under this trust shall alienate or anticipate his interest," is the restraint on termination valid?
If so, it may make the trust indestructible for longer than
lives in being and twenty-one years. In re Ridley and the
best American authorities would hold the restraint mvalid.471 Michigan should do so.
Part Two, note 454 supra.
Part Two, note 459 supra. But see: Blossom v. Anketell, 275 Fed.
947 (E.D. Mich. 1921).
470
471
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Accumulations
A. THE COMMON-LAW RULE AGAINST ACCUMULATIONS

DIRECTION to accumulate is a provision in an
instrument limiting interests in property, usually
by way of trust, that income shall be added to
principal so as to increase the corpus.472 If Andrew Baker
bequeaths property to James Thorpe upon trust to add
the income received during the life of John Stiles to
the principal and, upon the death of John, to pay the
accumulated fund to the children of John who survive
him, an accumulation is directed. A direction to use
income to preserve, as distinguished from increase, the
principal is not a provision for an accumulation. Thus
a provision in a trust instrument that income shall be
used to pay taxes, rent, or repair costs, or to replace such
a wasting asset as a valuable lease or a mine, is not a
direction to accumulate. 473 But a provision for use of income in a manner which will increase the original principal, as by payment of an existing mortgage on the
trust property, paying premiums on an insurance policy
on the life of the settlor which is an asset of the trust,
or treating stock dividends as principal, is a direction to
accumulate, 474 as is a provision that part of the income

A

472 PROPERTY
RESTATEMENT, §439 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory
Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY

§25.109 (1952).
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §439, Comments a., d., j., (1944).
Simes, "Statutory Restrictions on the Accumulation of Income,"
7 UNIV. OF CHICAGO L. REV. 409 at 417 (1940); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
473

474

§439, Comments f., g., h. (1944).
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shall be paid to the beneficiaries and part added to the
principal.
If the completion of an accumulation is a condition
precedent to the interests of its beneficiaries and it may
not be accomplished within the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, those interests are void by virtue
of the normal operation of the Rule as a rule against
remoteness of vesting.m If Andrew Baker bequeaths
$100,000 to James Thorpe upon trust to add income to
principal until the fund reaches $1,000,000 and to pay
the accumulated fund to the issue of John Stiles then
in being, the limitation to the issue of John is void because they may not be ascertainable within lives in being
and twenty-one years. The same would be true if Andrew Baker bequeaths property to James Thorpe upon
trust to add income to principal for fifty years and to
pay the accumulated fund to the issue of John Stiles
then in being.
In England at common law, if the interests of the
beneficiaries were certain to vest within the period of
the Rule Against Perpetuities and the accumulation was
certain to cease at or before the time that such interests
vested, a provision for accumulation was valid. 416 If
John Stiles bequeaths property to James Thorpe upon
trust to add income to principal "during the lives of all
my issue living at the time of my death and for twentyone years thereafter and to pay the accumulated fund
to my issue then living," the provision for accumulation
is valid at common law. Because the English law of
475 Lord Southampton v. Marquis of Hertford, 2 V.&:B. 54, 35 Eng.
Rep. 239 (1813); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§671,
677 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §587 (1936); Leach &
Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, §§24.42, 24.65 (1952).
476 Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030
(1805); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §62.11.
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accumulations became statutory in 1800, there are few
precedents as to the common-law rules, but it would
seem that, so long as the interests of the beneficiaries
were certain to vest within the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities, the fact that a provision for accumulation might operate for longer than that period
did not invalidate it. 477 If Andrew Baker bequeathed
property to James Thorpe upon trust "for the children
of John Stiles, income to be added to principal for thirty
years and the accumulated fund then to be paid to such
children, their executors, administrators and assigns,"
it would seem that the provision for accumulation was
valid. Such a provision did not tie up property for
longer than the period of the Rule because, under English law, the beneficiaries could compel termination of
the trust as soon as they were ascertained and of age,
even though the accumulation was incomplete.478
As has been seen, in this country the beneficiaries of
a trust cannot always compel its termination even though
they are all in being, ascertained, and of full age. 479
Consequently, a provision for accumulation ties up property here although the interests of the beneficiaries are
vested. That being so, the American courts have developed a rule corollary to the Rule Against Perpetuities known as the Common-Law Rule Against Accumulations. Under this rule, whether or not the interests of
the beneficiaries are vested, a provision for accumulation
is wholly void if the accumulation may possibly continue
for longer than the period of the Rule Against Perpe4<77 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §672 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §588 (1936). See: Tregonwell v. Sydenham,
S Dow 194, 3 Eng. Rep. 1035 (H.L. 1815); Wharton v. Masterman,
[1895] A.C. 186.
478 Saunders v. Vautier, Cr. & Ph. 240, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (1841);
Part Two, note 452 supra.
479 Part Two, notes 455, 456, 457, supra.
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tuities. 480 The Common-Law Rule Agai~stAccumula
tions has a partial exception in the case/of charities. If
the interest of a charitable beneficiar:t is vested, a provision for an accumulation in its fayor which may continue longer than the period of tl;ie Rule Against Perpetuities is not void, but a court b£ competent jurisdiction may shorten the period of accumulation.481
B. THE MICHIGAN STATUTES

rJ~-~---

Chapter 62 of the Michigan Revised Statutes of 1846
provided:
"Sec. 37. An accumulation of rents and profits of
real estate, for the benefit of one or more persons, may
be directed by any will or deed suffu:ient to pass real
estate, as follows:
"·
"1. If such accumulation be directed"~ commence
on the creation of the estate out of which the remLaJlJi
profits are to arise, it must be made for the benefit of one
or more minors then in being, and terminate at the
expiration of their minority:
"2. If such accumulation be directed to commence
at any time subsequent to the creation of the estate out
of which the rents and profits are to arise, it shall com·
4so 2 Simes, LAW oF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §589 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §441, (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule
Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW oF PROPERTY, §24.65 (1952).
Professor Simes thinks that this is the same rule as that which restricts
provisions making trusts indestructible. "Statutory Restrictions on the
Accumulation of Income," 7 UNIV. OF CHICAGO L. REv. 409 at 410
(1940).
4S1 St. Paul's Church v. Attorney-General, 164 Mass. 188, 41 N.E.
231 (1895); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §678 (1915); 3
Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §401.9 (1939); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §442
(1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.42 (1952). This seems to
have been the rule in England at one time. Harbin v. Masterman,
L.R. 12 Eq. 559 (1871). Now, however, where a vested interest is
given to a charity, subject to a provision for accumulation, the provision for accumulation is void and the charity takes the principal at
once. Wharton v. Masterman, [1895] A.C. 186.
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mence within the time in this chapter permitted for the
vesting of future estates, and during the minority of the
persons for whose benefit it is directed, and shall terminate at the expiration of such minority.
"Sec. 38. If in either of the cases mentioned in the
last preceding section, the direction for such accumulation shall be for a longer time than during the minority
of the persons intended to be benefited thereby, it shall
be void as to the time beyond such minority; and all
directions for the accumulation of the rents and profits
of real estate, except such as are herein allowed, shall
be void.
"Sec. 39. When such rents and profits are directed
to be accumulated for the benefit of infants entitled to
the expectant estate, and such infants shall be destitute
of other sufficient means of support and education, the
chancellor, upon the application of their guardian, may
direct a suitable sum out of such rents and profits to be
applied to their maintenance and education.
"Sec. 40. When in consequence of a valid limitation
of an expectant estate, there shall be a suspense of the
power of alienation, or of the ownership, during the
continuance of which the rents and profits shall be undisposed of and no valid direction for their accumulation is given, such rents and profits shall belong to the
person presumptively entitled to the next eventual
estate." 482
Chapter 63 of the Michigan Revised Statutes of 1846
provides:
482 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§37 to 40; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2621
to 2624; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4104 to 4107; Comp. Laws (1897)
§§8819-8822; How. Stat., §§5553 to 5556; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11555
to 11558; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12957 to 12960; Mich. Stat. Ann.,
§§26.37 to 26.40; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.37 to 554.40. These provisions were taken from N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit II, art.
First, §§37-40. Sections 37 and 38 were amended in important respects
by Act 227, P.A. 1949, and all four sections were repealed by Acts 6,
7 P.A. 1952. See Part Two, note 501 infra.
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"Sec. 11. Express trusts may be created for any or
either of the following purposes: --"4. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to
accumulate the same for the benefit of any married
woman, or for either of the purposes and within the
limits prescribed in the preceding chapter." 483
In St. Amour v. Rivard,484 a case involving the will of
a testator who died in 1841, the Court stated that,y
common law, a provision for accumulation for ~ortger
than the period of the common-law R_!!Ie/Agafnst Perpetuities would be wholly voic:l~
·
Toms v. Willi~as
~~inVolved the will of a testatrix
ing land which was subject to a
who died in 1876
·forty-year lease, g" en in 1854, which required the lessor
to pay for buildJngs erected by the lessee at the expiration of the term) in 1894 or to grant a renewal lease for
an additional f~rty years. The will devised this and
other land and ~l. lso personal property to trustees ( 1) to
set aside annually until 1894 $5,000 of the income as a
sinking fund to p~y for the buildings, (2) to accumulate
the rest of the inCQme until the expiratiori of the minority of the younge~f John R., ~~(}ni M. and Mary
J. Williams, (3) to pay Qver-·suefi accumulation and
subsequently accruing income to these three persons
after the youngest was of age, (4) to pay for the buildings in 1894, and then to transfer the entire corpus of
the trust to the three persons. John R. Williams came
483 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §11, Comp. Laws (1857) §2641; Comp.
Laws (1871) §4124; Comp. Laws (1897) §8839; How. Stat., §5573;
Comp. Laws (1915) §11575; Comp. Laws (1929) §12977; Mich. Stat.
Ann., §26.61; Comp. Laws (1948) §555.11. This subsection was taken
from N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §55, but
the words "for the benefit of any married woman" were not in the
New York section.
484 2 Mich. 294 at 299-300 (1852), Part Two, note 39 supra. The
case did not involve an accumulation, so the language is dictum.
485 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879).
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of age before the death of the testatrix, Gershom M.
Williams did so in 1878, and Mary J. Williams would
do so in 1881. The Court held that the interests of John
R., Gershom M., and Mary J. Williams vested immediately upon the death of the testatrix and that both provisions for accumulation were valid. The opinion states
that the Michigan accumulation statutes had no application to accumulations of income of personal property,
and that directions for such accumulations limited to
lives in being and twenty-one years are valid. 486 Rejecting New York decisions to the contrary, the Court held
that our statutes permitted an accumulation of the
rents and profits of land for the benefit of any number
of minors until the youngest came of age. 487 Likewise,
rejecting New York decisions to the contrary, the Court
held that our statutes did not invalidate provisions for
accumulations to pay off what amounted to an encumbrance on the trust property.488
In Wilson v. Odell/ 89 a will devised land and personalty to trustees (I) to pay an annuity of $1500 to the
testator's wife for her life, (2) to pay annuities of $600
for or to each of his children while under fourteen and
$1,000 thereafter for life, (3) to continue the children's
annuities to their children until the youngest was of
age, (4) to transfer the corpus to the children's children
after all the children were dead and the youngest of
their children was of age. The Court held that the
limitation of the principal violated the statutes prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation and
486 41 Mich. 552 at 562. Accord: Post v. Grand Rapids Trust Co.,
255 Mich. 436, 238 N.W. 206 (1931), Part Two, note 495 infra.
4 87 41 Mich. 552 at 568-569. See: Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §§25.110,
25.114 (1952).
488 41 Mich. 552 at 575. See: Whiteside, id., §§25.109, 25.114 (1952).
489 58 Mich. 533, 25 N_W, 506 (1885).
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that, as the annuities given to the testator's children
would not consume the en~ire income, the direction as
to them was for an accumulation which, under our
accumulation statutes, could not last beyond the time
, when the youngest of the testator's children came of
*·~T~is decision illustrate!s the fact that, whereas an
accumulation which violates the Common-Law Rule
Against Accumulations is wholly void, an accumulation
for a minor which violates the statutes because it is to
extend beyond minority is void only as to the excess.
Palms v. Palms 490 in;lolved a will which devised land
and othe~ prope:rey-mtrustees to pay the income to the
testator's two children for life and then to transfer the
principal to their children as each came of age. A codicil
directed the trustees to treat royalties under mineral
leases as principal during the minority of testator's
grandchildren "now living." The Court observed that if
this codicil directed an accumulation of the rents and
profits of land, it would be void under the statutes because it was to commence at once but might be for the
benefit of persons not yet in being. It held, however,
that the mineral royalties were not rents and profits but
the proceeds of sales of iron ore.
In Eldred v. Shaw/~ 1 land and sheep were devised to
a trustee for a grandson with directions to apply only
so much of the income as was necessary to the support,
education, and maintenance of the beneficiary during
minority, "and, in the case of the death of my said
grandson without heirs by his body begotten, the lands
49 0 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888). Cf. Poole v. Union Trust Co.,
191 Mich. 162, 157 N.W. 430 (1916), where the Court, without overruling Palms v. Palms on the accumulation question, allowed the life
income beneficiary under a trust the entire royalties paid during her
lifetime under mineral leases given by the settlor.
491 112 Mich. 237, 70 N.W. 545 (1897), Part One, note 98 supra.
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with all its increases and accretions I give, devise and
bequeath" to adult children of the testator. It was held
that the grandson took an estate tail, subject to trust
during minority, which, by operation of the fee tail
statute, 492 became a fee simple subject to a contingent
limitation (shifting executory interest) on death without
issue. The Court decided that the provision for accumulation of surplus income was valid under the accumulation statutes and that the accumulated fund should be
held on trust for the life of the grandson, he to receive
the income and the principal to go with the land. In
reaching the latter conclusion, the Court seems to have
overlooked the fact that the statutes permitted accumulations of the rents and profits of the land only for the
benefit of minors. An accumulation during the minority
of a child for the benefit of an adult is not permitted by
the statutes. The New York decisions make it clear that
accumulations are invalid unless for the exclusive benefit of the persons during whose minority they are made,
that the minor is entitled to the whole accumulation on
coming of age, and that a limitation giving it to another on a contingency is void.m
In Hull v. Osborn/94 the residue of an estate was devised to testator's two granddaughters, $10,000 to be paid
to each on reaching twenty-five, $10,000 on reaching
thirty, $10,000 on reaching thirty-five, $10,000 on reaching forty, and the balance of half the residue on reachPart One, note 84 supra.
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.110 (1952); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT,
§445 (1944). The Restatement and a 1945 amendment to the New
York statute [Laws 1945, c. 558, Real Prop. Law, §6la] provide that
a gift to others of the accumulated fund on death of the minor before
reaching twenty-one is valid.
494 151 Mich. 8, 113 N.W. 784 (1908). Cf. Hunter v. Hunter, 160
Mich. 218, 125 N.W. 71 (1910).
492

493

ACCUl\:IULATIONS

441

ing forty-five. The will provided that if either died bereaching forty-five, wit:Pout issue, the unpaid port~n of her share should pa~s to the other and that if
bot~~o died, all unpaid should pass to persons to be
ascertaii:ied-~at-that time. It was held that the entire
interests of the granddaughters vested on the death of the
testator, subject to being divested by death without issue
before reaching forty-five, and that the provisions for
postponement of payment did not violate "the rule as
to perpetuities or accumulations." The Court thought
that these provisions postponed: only payment of principal and that the granddaughters were entitled to the
entire income as it accrued.
In Post v. Grand Rapids Trust Co.,495 half the residue
ot an estate, consisting who}Iy of personalty, was bequeathed to trustees to pay from the income not to
exceed $300 per monthto testatrix's daughter Fannie for
life and then to her issue until her youngest child living
at the testatrix's death reached twenty-five, then to transfer the principal and accumulated surplus income to the
issue of Fannie. When one of her two children was a
minor and the other was of age, Fannie and her children petitioned for payment of more than $300 a month
(the total income being some $450 per month) to pay
for the education of the children. A decree ordering
such payment was reversed insofar as it related to the
child who was of age. The Court ruled that, as the
accumulation statutes related only to the rents and
~?re

495 255 Mich. 436, 238 N.W. 206 (1931). In Hay v. Hay, 317 Mich.
370, 26 N.W. (2d) 908 (1947), personalty was bequeathed to a trustee
to pay certain life annuities and accumulate the surplus income until
twenty-one years after the death of the last survivor of the grandchildren of the testator who were living when he died, then to pay the
accumulated fund to his heirs, to be determined at that time. There
were seven grandchildren living when the testator died. The provisions
were treated as valid.
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profits of land they had no application and, hence, that
the direction to accumulate for a period measured by
lives in being was valid. It held, nevertheless, that a
court may direct advancements from an accumulation
for the education and support of minor beneficiaries. 496
The testator in Loomis v. Laramie 491 devised the
residue of his estate, consisting of land and personalty,
to trustees to accumulate the income for twenty years
and then to transfer the principal and accumulated income to five named persons "and the heirs of their body
forever." The Court, without mentioning the accumulation statutes, held that the trust was void because it
suspended the absolute power of alienation for a period
not based on lives in violation of the statutes then in
force and that the five persons were entitled to the residue immediately and absolutely. The same result should
have been reached if the accumulation statutes had been
considered and applied.
In re Dingler's Estate 498 involved a devise of an estate
to trustees to pay the income to testatrix's twin granddaughters in quarterly instalments until they reached
thirty and then to transfer the principal to them "or
to the survivor unless one of said granddaughters shall
die leaving issue surviving." It was held that the provision for payment of the income in quarterly instalments was not a direction to accumulate because it did
not involve adding income to principal.
496 Citing Knorr v. Millard, 52 Mich. 542, 18 N.W. 349 (1884),
which reached the same result on the ground that, as Rev. Stat. 1846,
c. 62, §39 [Part Two, note 482 supra] expressly authorizes such advancements from accumulations of the rents and profits of land, a
court of equity should have power to direct them from accumulations
of the income from personalty. Accord: Knorr v. Millard, 57 Mich. 265,
23 N.W. 807 (1885).
497 286 Mich. 707, 282 N.W. 876 (1938).
498 319 Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947).
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In re Mac Donell's Estate
concerned a devise of
land and a small amount of personalty to trustees to pay
the testator's son Donald $200 a month until he reached
thirty-five and then to transfer the corpus of the trust
to him. Before reaching thirty-five, Donald sued to
compel the trustees to pay him the entire income. The
trustees contended that the accumulation statutes were
inapplicable because the will did not expressly direct
accumulation and because it conferred upon the trustees
discretionary power to pay Donald more than $200 a
month in the event of emergency. J\ decree for the
trustees was reversed, the Court holding that the accumulation statutes applied to a mixed disposition of land
and personalty and that an implied direction to accumulate was governed by them. J\s there was no other beneficiary, it would seem that Donald would have been entitled to compel termination of this trust under the rule
in Bennett v. Chapin. 500 He did not seek to do so.
Sections 37 and 38 of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 were amended by Act 227, Public J\cts
of 1949, to read as follows:
499

"Sec. 37. J\n accumulation of rents and profits of
real estate, or of the profits or income of personal estate,
or both, for the benefit of 1 or more persons, may be
directed by any will or deed sufficient to pass real or
personal estate, as follows:
"First. If such accumulation be directed to commence
499 325 Mich. 449, 39 N.W. (2d) 32 (1949). But see In re Peck's
Estate, 323 Mich. 11 at 20-21, 34 N.W. (2d) 533 (1948). An accumulation of the income from a mixed mass of property consisting of land
worth $40,000 and personalty worth $40,000,000, to last until certain
children reached twenty-five, was involved in Dodge v. Detroit Trust
Co., 300 Mich. 575, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942). Its validity was not
determined.
5oo 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889), Part One, note 611, Part Two,
note 466, supra. See: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §441, Comment c.
(1944).
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on the creation of the estate out of which the rents and
profits or income are to arise, it must be made for the
benefit of l or more minors then in being, and terminate at the expiration of their minority.
"Second. If such accumulation be directed to commence at any time subsequent to the creation of the
estate out of which the rents and profits or income of
real estate or the income of personal estate~ or both~
are to arise, it shall commence within the time in this
chapter permitted for the vesting of future estates, and
during the minority of the persons in being at the creation thereof~ for whose benefit it is directed, and shall
terminate at the expiration of such minority.
"Sec. 38. If in either of the cases mentioned in the
last preceding section, the direction, in any will or deed
heretofore or hereafter attested~ executed or delivered~
for such accumulation shall be for a longer time than
during the minority of the persons intended to be benefited thereby, or for a longer time than 33 years from
the death of the maker of any will~ it shall be void as
to the time beyond said minority or said 33 years~· and
all directions for the accumulation of the rents and
profits of real estate, or of the profits or income of personal estate~ except such as are herein allowed, shall be
void." 501
These amendments extended the restrictions imposed
by the sections, which had theretofore applied only to
accumulations of income from land and mixed property,
to accumulations of income of personalty. Moreover,
they increased the stringency of the restrictions by requiring that accumulations be for the benefit of minors
in being at the creation of the estate~ which means at
the effective date of the deed or will directing the ac5o1 Act 227, P.A. 1949, §1, Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.37, 26.38; Comp.
Laws (1948) §§554.37, 554.38. Language added by amendment shown
by italics.
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cumulation.
If Andrew Baker devised land to James
Thorpe upon trust to pay the income to John Stiles for
life, then to accumulate the rents and profits during the
minority of John's eldest son, and to transfer the land
and accumulation to such son at his majority, the direction to accumulate would have been valid under the
statutes in their original form whether or not John's
eldest son was in being when the testator died. 503 The
amendments to Section 37 would make it invalid unless
the eldest son was in being when the testator died. This
being so, the thirty-three year provision in the amendment to Section 38 could have no application. Section
37, as amended, restricted accumulations directed by
will to the minority of a person in being when the testator died. Such a minority could not last for more than
twenty-one years and nine months after the testator's
death. 60'
Sections 37, 38, 39, and 40 of Chapter 62, Revised
602

wz Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §41, Comp. Laws (1857) §2625; Comp.
Laws (1871) §4108; Comp. Laws (1897) §8823; How. Stat., §5557;
Comp. Laws (1915) §11559; Comp. Laws (1929) §12961; Mich. Stat.
Ann., §26.41; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.41, provides: "The delivery of
the grant, where an expectant estate is created by grant; and where
it is created by devise, the death of the testator shall be deemed the
time of the creation of the estate." Mr. Thomas G. Long of the Detroit Bar thinks that what must have been meant was in being "at
the commencement of the accumulation" rather than "at the creation
of the estate" in the technical statutory sense of that term. "Perpetuities and Accumulations: Recent Legislative Acts Explained," 17 DETROIT LAWYER 193 (1949). Mr. Long's suggestion tends to explain
the otherwise meaningless 33-year provision in Section 38.
5os Manice v. Manice, 43 N.Y. 303 (1871), Part Three, note 367
infra. See Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642, 134 N.W. 1018 (1912),
Part Three, note 366 infra.
504 Professor Whiteside thought that this provision was intended to
validate a direction in a will to accumulate for a period in gross of
thirty-three years, unconnected with minorities. "Statutory Rules:
Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PRoPERTY,
§25.112. If so, it certainly was not well drafted to accomplish this
purpose. See note 502 supra.
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Statutes of 1846, as amended, 505 were repealed, as to wills
of persons dying after the effective date of the repealing
acts and deeds delivered thereafter, by Acts 6 and 7, Public Acts of 1952, which became effective on September
18, 1952. As a result of these repeals, there are now no
restrictions on accumulations in Michigan except the
Common-Law Rule Against Accumulations. 506 It should
be noted, however, that the repealing acts apply only to
accumulations directed by wills or deeds becoming effective after September 18, 1952. The 1949 amendments,
which extended the prior statutory restrictions on accumulations to personal property and increased their
stringency, are still in force as to accumulations directed
by wills or deeds which became effective before that date.
Moreover, the 1949 amendments expressly purported to
govern accumulations directed by deeds or wills which
became effective at any time before the amendments
were enacted. If this provision for retroactive application is constitutionally valid, the 1949 amendments make
void many directions for accumulation which were valid
when the deed or will containing them became effective,
such as that involved in Post v. Grand Rapids Trust
Co.5o1
Part Two, notes 482, 501, supra.
Part Two, note 480 supra. The existence of this rule was recog·
nized in St. Amour v. Rivard, 2 Mich. 294 at 299-300 (1852), Part
Two, notes 39, 484, supra; Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W.
814 (1879), Part Two, note 485 supra.
.
·
soT Part Two, note 495 supra. Mr. Thomas G. Long of the Detroit
Bar thinks that, if the 1949 amendments were really intended to be
retroactive, they were unconstitutional to that extent because they
would disturb vested interests. "Perpetuities and Accumulations: Recent Legislative Acts Explained," 17 DETROIT LAWYER 193 (1949). It
is to be hoped that Mr. Long is correct, but the question is far from
being free of doubt. If Andrew Baker died in 1948 bequeathing
$100,000 to James Thorpe upon trust to pay $100 a month to Lucy
Baker for life and to accumulate the surplus income until her death,
then to pay over the accumulated fund to John Stiles, his executors,
505

506

ACCUMULATIONS
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Trusts created by employers as part of a stock bonus
plan, pension plan, disability or death benefit plan, or
profit-sharing plan, for the benefit of employees 508 and
trusts or funds established by cemetery corporations for
perpetual care of graves 509 are expressly excepted by
statute from legal restrictions on the duration of accumulations. It will be recalled that charitable trusts are excepted by statute from the Rule Against Perpetuities. 510
As the statute does not expressly except them from the
Common-Law Rule Against Accumulations, it would
seem that that rule should be applied to charities here
as it is applied in other jurisdictions. That is, a provision for accumulation in a limitation in favor of charity
which may operate for longer than the period of the Rule
Against Perpetuities is valid, but a court of competent
jurisdiction may shorten the period of accumulation. 511
administrators or assigns, the amendments would not divest any interest; they would merely entitle John Stiles to demand the surplus
income during the life of Lucy Baker.
5os Act 193, P.A. 1947, §2 amended, Act. 61, P.A. 1951, Mich. Stat.
Ann., §26.82 (2); Comp. Laws (1948) §555.302.
509 Act 308, P.A. 1917, Comp. Laws (1929) §10435; Mich. Stat. Ann.,
§21.855; Comp. Laws (1948) §456.35.
510 Part Two, note 421 supra.
flu Part Two, note 481 supra.

CHAPTER

17

Consequences of Violation of the Rule
A. EXCISION OF THE LIMITATION WHICH VIOLATES THE RULE

W

HEN an interest in property is limited subject
to an illegal provision for defeasance by way
of condition subsequent or executory limitation, the provision for defeasance is void but the interest
itself is usually valid and indefeasible.012 If Andrew
Baker conveys land to John Stiles and his heirs, "but
if the grantee or his heirs shall attempt to alienate, the
grantor or his heirs may re-enter and terminate the estate
hereby conveyed," the condition subsequent is void as
an illegal direct restraint on alienation of an estate in
fee simple, and John takes an indefeasible fee. 513 When,
on the other hand, an interest in property is limited
subject to a condition precedent which is illegal because
it may be fulfilled at a time beyond the period of the
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, the interest it~
self as well as the condition is void. 514 In some cases it
would be possible for the courts to treat the condition as
void but the interest as valid. Thus if Andrew Baker
conveys land to John Stiles, who has no children, for
life, remainder to the children of John who reach
512 PROPERTY
REsTATEMENT, §228, Comment d., §229 (1936);
Browder, "Illegal Conditions and Limitations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, §27.22 (1952).
513 Part One, note 108 supra; Mand1ebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich.
78 (1874), Part One, note 138 supra; Braun v. K1ug, 335 Mich. 691,
57 N.W. (2d) 299 (1953), Part One, note 162 supra; PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §406, Jll. 1 (1944).
514 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §201 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §520 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§370,
371 (1944).
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twenty-five, it would be possible to delete the words
"who reach twenty-five" and give the children an interest which would vest on the death of John. Although
conditions precedent which are illegal for some other
reason than the Rule Against Perpetuities are sometimes
handled in this manner, 515 conditions which violate the
Rule are not. If a condition precedent is void under the
Rule, the interest subject to it is also void.
English law recognized an exception to the rule of
complete nullity of interests limited in violation of the
Rule Against Perpetuities in two related situations.
When land was devised to an unborn person for life with
remainder in tail to his children or to an unborn person
for life with successive remainders for life to each generation of his descendants forever, the first unborn person took an estate tail under what was known as the cy
pres doctrine. 516 St. Amour v. Rivard 517 involved a will
devising land to a son for life, remainder to his children
for life, with successive remainders for life to each generation of his descendants. There were similar devises
to others, with cross-remainders on extinction of issue of
any initial devisee. The Court discussed the cy pres
doctrine at some length and refused to apply it. Of
course the cy pres doctrine cannot be applied in its
515 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §424, Comment d.
(1944); Browder,
"Illegal Conditions and Limitations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PRoPERTY,
§27.22 (1952).
5HI Nicholl v. Nicholl, 2 Black. W. 1159, 96 Eng. Rep. 683 (1777);
Humberston v. Humberston, 1 P. Wms. 332, 24 Eng. Rep. 412 (1716);
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§643, 652 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §552 (1936). This is not the same as the
doctrine of the same name which is applied when the specific purpose
of a charitable trust fails or does not require the whole trust property.
517 2 Mich. 294 (1852). The testator died in 1841, so the commonlaw Rule Against Perpetuities applied to the devises of land.
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original form to wills of testators who died after March
2, 1821, when estates tail were abolished. 518
Generally speaking, when a limitation is void under
the Rule Against Perpetuities, it is stricken out of the
instrument and, unless they are inseparably connected
with it, the other limitations of the instrument take effect as if it had not contained the void limitation. 519
If the void limitation is the only one made by the instrument or is a limitation of an ultimate remainder, the
interest invalidly limited never passes out of the transferor by virtue of the limitation. In such a case, if the
void limitation is contained in a deed, the interest ineffectively limited simply remains in the grantor. 520 If
it is contained in the residuary clause of a will, the interest passes to the heirs or next of kin of the testator as
intestate property.521 If it is contained in a prior clause
Part One, note 82 supra.
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §247 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §529 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §402
(1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.47 (1952).
5 20 Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730,
3 N.W. 207 (1879) (deed of land violating suspension statutes); Hopkins v. Crossley, 138 Mich. 561, 101 N.W. 822 (1904); (inter vivos
trust of personalty); Casgrain v. Hammond, 134 Mich. 419, 96 N.W.
510 (1903) (deed of land violating suspension statutes); McPherson v.
Byrne, 155 Mich. 338, ll8 N.W. 985 (1909) (inter vivos trust of personalty); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §403 (1944). Cf. Bateson v. Bateson, 294 Mich. 426, 293 N.W. 705 (1940).
521 Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885) (ultimate
remainder in land violating suspension statutes); Farrand v. Petit, 84
Mich. 671, 48 N.W. 156 (1891) (ultimate remainder in land violating
suspension statutes); Trufant v. Nunneley, 106 Mich. 554, 64 N.W.
469 (1895) (ultimate remainder in land violating suspension statutes);
Wheelock v. American Tract Society, 109 Mich. 141, 66 N.W. 955
(1896) (residue consisting of land and personalty); Petit v. Flint & Pere
Marquette R.R. Co., ll4 Mich. 362, 72 N.W. 238 (1897) (ultimate
remainder in land violating suspension statutes); State v. Holmes, 115
Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898) (ultimate remainder in land and personalty violating suspension statutes); Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482,
85 N.W. 1100 (1901) (residue consisting of land and personalty; disposition violating the suspension statutes); Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155
518
519
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of a will, the interest falls into the residue and passes
under the residuary clause. 522 If Andrew Baker conveys
land to John Stiles "if and when the Penobscot Building
falls," the deed conveys nothing, and Andrew retains a
fee simple absolute. If Andrew Baker devises the residue
of his estate to John Stiles, who has no children, for life,
remainder to those children of John who reach twentyfive, John takes a life estate and the heirs of Andrew
inherit the reversion. If Andrew Baker devises land to
John Stiles, who has no children, for life, remainder to
those children of John who reach twenty-five, and devises the residue of his estate to James Thorpe and his
heirs, John takes a life estate and James the remainder
in fee.
Mich. 126, ll8 N.W. 938 (1908) (ultimate remainder in land and
personalty); Moore v. O'Leary, 180 Mich. 261, 146 N.W. 661 (1914)
(residue consisting of land and personalty); Otis v. Arntz, 198 Mich.
196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917) (disposition of residue, consisting of land
and personalty, violating the suspension statutes); Rozell v. Rozell, 217
Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922) (ultimate remainder in land violating the suspension statutes); Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220
Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922) (disposition of entire estate violating
suspension statutes); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196
N.W. 976 (1924) (ultimate remainder violating common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities); Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588, 242
N.W. 760 (1932) (disposition of entire estate violating suspension
statute); Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270,
255 N.W. 587 (1934) (disposition of residue, consisting of land and
personalty, violating both the suspension statutes and the common-law
Rule); In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938)
(disposition of residue, consisting of land and personalty, violating
the suspension statutes); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §403, Comments h., i.
(1944). See: James E. Scripps Corporation v. Parkinson, 186 Mich.
663, 153 N.W. 29 (1915) (ultimate remainder violating suspension
statutes).
522 Van Driele v. Kotvis, 135 Mich. 181, 97 N.W. 700 (1903) (annuity violating suspension statutes); Stoepel v. Satterthwaite, 162 Mich.
457, 127 N.W. 673 (1910) (bequest of personalty on void trust);
Lounsbury v. Trustees of Square Lake Burial Association, 170 Mich.
645, 129 N.W. 36 (1912) (bequest of personalty on perpetual honorary trust); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §403, Comment c. (1944). See:
Snyder v. Potter, 328 Mich. 236, 43 N.W. (2d) 922 (1950) (ultimate
remainder, not in residuary clause, violating the suspension statutes).
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Where an interest which violates the Rule Against
Perpetuities is limited to follow a prior interest, its
invalidity does not enlarge the prior interest. If Andrew
Baker conveys land to John Stiles and his heirs so long
as the Penobscot Building stands and then to James
Thorpe and his heirs, the shifting executory limitation
to James is void, but its invalidity does not make John's
estate endure after the Penobscot Building falls. Andrew Baker retains a possibility of reverter which will
become possessory in that event. 523 On the other hand,
if the void interest is limited to cut off a prior interest,
the prior interest is indefeasible. If Andrew Baker conveys land to John Stiles and his heirs, "but if the Penobscot Building should fall, then to James Thorpe and
his heirs," the interest of James is void, and John takes
an indefeasible estate in fee simple absolute.524
If an appointment under a power of appointment
which is limited as to objects violates the Rule, the property passes to the persons to whom it is limited in default of appointment. 525 If an appointment under a
power of appointment which is not limited as to objects
violates the Rule, the effect is the same under some cir523 Leonard v. Burr, 18 N.Y. 96 (1858); First Universalist Society
v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892); 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE
INTERESTS, §530 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §403, Comment e.
and Ill. 2 (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against
Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§24.47, 24.62 (1952).
524 Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W.
703 (1930), Part Two, note 535 infra; Proprietors of the Church in
Brattle Square v. Grant, 3 Gray (69 Mass.) 142 (1855); Gray, RuLE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §247 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE
INTERESTS, §530 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §229 (1936), §402,
Comment d., §403 Comment e. (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common
Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.47
(1952).
5 2 5 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §365 (1940), §403 (b) (1944); Leach &
Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.47 (1952).
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cumstances as if the donee of the power had made an
effective appointment to himself or his estate. 526
The problems which involve the most difficulty in the
field covered by this chapter are those involving the
validity of limitations which, if considered by themselves,
do not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, but which
are contained in instruments limiting other interests
that do violate the Rule. The otherwise valid limitations
do not fail unless they are inseparably connected with
the void limitations. The following sections of the chapter are devoted largely to consideration of various situations where such connection may exist. The statutes
prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation of land for more than two lives, which were in
force in Michigan from 1847 to 1949,521 were a statutory
substitute for the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, and the problems relating to the consequences of
violation of the statutes were, for most purposes, the
same as those which relate to the consequences of violation of the common-law Rule. Hence it will be convenient to consider, in the sections which follow, Michigan cases determining the consequences of violation of
the statutes as well as those determining the consequences
of violation of the common-law Rule. Such precedents
must be used with caution, however, because the theory
and operation of the statutes differed from those of the
common-law Rule. The common-law Rule Against Per526 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §365 (1940), §403 (c) (1944); Leach &
Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.47 (1952). The property passes to the donee's
estate rather than to the taker in default of appointment if it is found
that the donee intended to exclude the donor from further control
of it. Such a finding is usually made when the appointment is to a
trustee on a trust which fails and when the appointment is made
in a residuary clause which disposes of owned and appointive assets
by the same words.
527 Part Two, note 47 supra; Part Three, note I infra.
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petuities invalidates only future interests which may
vest at a time beyond the period of the Rule; it does not
limit the duration of trusts as such, only the vesting of
future interests under or following them. The statutes,
on the other hand, invalidated provisions, whether for
present or future interests, which might suspend the
absolute power of alienation for longer than two lives in
being; hence they invalidated present trusts for receipt
of the rents and profits of land which might last longer
than two lives although the interests under and following the trusts were vested and, apart from the trusts,
did not violate either the statutes or the common-law
Rule. 528
B. EFFECT ON PRIOR LIMITATIONS

When a limitation of a future interest violates the
Rule Against Perpetuities, limitations of interests prior
thereto, whether present or future, which do not themselves violate the Rule, take effect in accordance with
their terms, unless the void limitation is so essential to
the dispositive scheme of the transferor that it is inferable that he would not wish the prior limitations to stand
alone.529 If Andrew Baker devises land to John Stiles,
who has no children, for life, remainder to those children
of John who reach twenty-five, the limitation of the life
estate to John will ordinarily be effective even though
the remainder violates the Rule.
Part One, note 593 supra; Chapter 20, Section C, infra.
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §247 (1915); 2 Simes,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §530 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §402
(1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.48 (1952); Annotation, 28
A.L.R. 375 (1924), 75 A.L.R. 124 (1931). That is, the prior limitations
are presumptively valid. Illinois and Missouri appear to hold that
they are presumptively invalid.
s2s
529
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In Wilson v. Odell/ 30 land was devised to trustees to
pay annuities to the testator's wife and children for their
lives and to the children's children until the youngest
grandchild came of age, and to distribute the principal
to the children's children after the death of all the children and on the maJority of the youngest grandchild.
It was held that the limitations subsequent to the interests of the testator's children violated the statutes prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation
for more than two lives in being and so were void, but
that the provisions for the annuities to the children were
effective. In Trufant v. Nunnelly, 581 land was devised to
three children for their lives, remainder to their "body
heirs." It was held that the limitation of the remainder
violated the suspension statutes, but that the life estates
could take effect. In State v. Holmes, 532 land was devised
to the testator's wife for life with alternative contingent
remainders conditioned on events which might not occur
for five years after her death to the State of Michigan
and a grandson. It was held that the limitations in remainder violated the suspension statutes but that the life
estate was valid. In Rozell v. Rozell/ 33 one farm was
devised to testatrix's son Cass for life, remainder to his
children for their lives, remainder to the heirs of such
children in fee. Another farm was devised to testatrix's
daughter Sarah for life, remainder to Cass for life, remainder to his children for life, remainder to the heirs
of such children in fee. It was held that the remainders
530 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885). The widow renounced her
interest under the will. In Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W.
419 (1888), Part Two, note 561 infra, prior life interests were held
valid although a subsequent trust violated the suspension statutes.
531 106 Mich. 554, 64 N.W. 469 (1895).
532 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898). See: Gilchrist v. Corliss,
155 Mich. 126, 118 N.W. 938 (1908).
533 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922).
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to the children of Cass were void because they violated
a statute then in force prohibiting the limitation of life
estates to unborn persons 534 and that the remainders to
their heirs violated the suspension statutes, but that the
life estates of Cass and Sarah could take effect.
Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co.ll35 is an excellent
illustration of the effect on prior limitations of a subsequent limitation which is void under the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities. There, half the residue of an
estate was devised to a trustee, with direction to convert
land to personalty, to pay the income to testatrix's daughter Belle for life, and on her death to divide the corpus
into as many shares as Belle should have children then
surviving or with issue her surviving. The trustee was
to pay one share to each child of Belle who had reached
twenty-five and to the issue of each child who had predeceased Belle. The other shares were to be held on
trust for each child until it reached twenty-five and then
paid to it, but if any child died under twenty-five, its
share was to go to its issue, or if none, the other children or their issue, and if all the issue of Belle were then
dead, to a sister of Belle. The provisions for defeasance
of the interests of children of Belle who survived their
mother but died under twenty-five violated the Rule
Against Perpetuities. It was held that the life interest of
53 4 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §17, Comp. Laws (1857) §2601; Comp.
Laws (1871) §4084; Comp. Laws (1897) §8799; How. Stat. §5533;
Comp. Laws (1915) §11535; Comp. Laws (1929) §12937; Mich. Stat.
Ann., §26.17; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.17. Repealed by Act 38, P.A.
1949, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2), Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52; Chapter 19 infra. The section read: "Successive estates for life shall not
be limited unless to persons in being at the creation thereof; and
when a remainder shall be limited on more than two successive estates
for life, all the life estates subsequent to those of the two persons first
entitled thereto, shall be void, . . . " The disposition of the second
farm violated both clauses of this section.
oao 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930).
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Belle was valid and that her surviving issue would take
shares which would be indefeasible from the time of
her death.
If a limitation of a future interest violates the Rule
Against Perpetuities and the void interest is so essential
to the dispositive scheme of the transferor that it is inferable that he would not wish prior limitations to stand
alone, such prior limitations are also invalid. St. Amour
v. Rivard 5311 involved a will which devised life estates in
land to nine persons, with remainders for life to the
children of the first tenants, remainders for life to the
children's children, and so on forever, with cross remainders in the event of extinction of the descendants
of any original taker. The will prohibited alienation forever of interests devised by it. Although the initial life
estates and the remainders for life to the children of the
first life tenants did not themselves violate the Rule, the
Court decided that the testator's scheme was to create
an indestructible perpetuity, and that since most of it
must fail he probably would not wish any part to stand.
Hence it held the whole will void, so that the land passed
to the heirs of the testator as intestate property.
Dean v. Mumford 537 involved a will which, as construed by the Court, devised land to trustees to pay
income to the testator's wife for life, then to divide into
five shares, transfer two to the testator's two daughters
or their children, and hold the other three on separate
trusts for testator's three sons and their wives, and on
the death of each son and his wife, to transfer the principal of that son's trust to his children. The Court held
that the trust provision for each son suspended the abso5<>6 2 Mich. 294 (1852), Part Two, note 39 supra. The testator died
in 1841, before the enactment of the suspension statutes.
537 102 Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 (1894). Cf. Farrand v. Petit, 84 Mich.
671, 48 N.W. 156 (1891).
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lute power of alienation for the lives of (1) testator's
wife, (2) the son's life, (3) the son's wife's life, and so
the trusts were void under the statutes. The widow having renounced her interest under the will, the property
was ordered distributed at once to the five children free
of trust. The Court declined to decide whether the children took as devisees or as heirs at law of the testator.
In Niles v. Mason/ 38 land was devised to trustees to pay
an annuity to testator's sister Sarah for life and to pay the
balance of the income to testator's children Charles and
Lottie for their lives. On the death of either Charles or
Lottie, half the principal was to be transferred to the
children of the deceased child, or if none, held in trust
for the other child and transferred on its death to its
children. If both Charles and Lottie died without issue,
the principal was to be transferred to testator's brother.
It was held that these provisions suspended the absolute
power of alienation for three lives, those of Sarah,
Charles, and Lottie, and that they were all void except
the annuity of Sarah, which the Court deemed sufficiently
disconnected to be enforcible apart from the other provisions.
Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst 539 involved a will
which, after a $1000 bequest to a business associate, devised an estate consisting of land and personalty on trust
to pay life annuities to two nephews and a niece, and to
pay the balance of the income to testator's son, a brother,
and two sisters until the son reached twenty-five or died.
When the son reached twenty-five or died, half the
estate was charged with the annuities and payment of
the balance of the income to the brother and sisters for
sss 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. 1100 (1901).
220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922). Accord, on similar facts:
Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258, Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932).
ss9
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life. Subject thereto, the son was to take the entire estate
on reaching twenty-five; if he died under twenty-five, it
was to be held on trust for his issue and transferred to
them on reaching twenty-one. If the son died without
issue or his issue died under twenty-one, the estate was
to pass to four charities, subject to the provisions for the
annuities and the brother and sisters. It was held that
the bequest to the business associate was valid but that
the other dispositions were so interconnected that the
violation of the suspension statute by some of them
caused all to fail.
In Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co.J5 4.<! the
residue of an estate, consisting of land and personalty,
was devised to trustees upon two trusts. Each trust was
to pay the income to a daughter of the testator for life,
then to her children. Each child was to receive half a
share in principal at twenty-five and the other half at
thirty. If any child died under thirty, its issue was to
receive the income from its share until twenty-one and
then the principal. If a child died under tP,irty without
issue, its interest passed to the other children of the
daughter or their issue on the same trusts, and if the
daughter and all her issue died before the termination
of the trusts, the principal of her trust was to be added
to the principal of the similar trust for the other daughter and her issue. If both daughters and their issue died
before termination, the property was to pass to testatrix's
brother. The Court held that the trusts violated both
the suspension statutes and the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities and that no part of them could be
given effect without making a wholly new scheme for
the testator, which the court declined to do.
s4o

267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934).
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The Michigan cases just discussed indicate that, under
both the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities and the
suspension statutes, the invalidity of a future interest
does not ordinarily affect the validity of prior interests.
The last four cases considered appear to hold, on the
other hand, that when a trust for receipt of the rents and
profits of land was set up to last for longer than two lives
in being, the entire trust was void; it would not be split
and held valid for two lives but void as to the balance.541
Professor Whiteside has remarked that under the
Michigan decisions it is difficult, if not impossible, to
point out any definite test for determining when invalid
provisions will be eliminated from a testamentary disposition and the valid provisions sustained.542 Most of
the confusion has arisen, however, because the suspension statutes prohibit not only certain contingent future
interests but also present trusts which might last longer
than two lives in being. The repeal of the suspension
statutes leaves only the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, which is violated only by a future interest
which may vest more remotely than the period of the
Rule. Moreover, the period of the common-law Rule
includes any number of lives in being plus twenty-one
years in gross. Under the common-law Rule, there
should seldom be occasion for striking down innocent
prior interests merely because some subsequent interest
is too remote.
541 Dean v. Mumford, Part Two, note 537 supra; Niles v. Mason,
Part Two, note 538 supra; Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, Part
Two, note 539 supra; Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co.,
Part Two, note 540 supra; Part Three, notes 221, 222, infra. Cf.
Wilson v. Odell, Part Two, note 530 supra.
542 "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN
LAw OF PROPERTY, §25.45 (1952). New York appears to have developed
more definite rules. Id §25.28; PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A,
1'[1'[39-45 (1944).
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C. EFFECT ON ALTERNATIVE AND CONCURRENT LIMITATIONS

When a limitation of a future interest violates the
Rule Against Perpetuities, limitations of alternative and
concurrent interests, which do not themselves violate the
Rule, generally take effect in accordance with their terms
unless the void limitation is inseparably connected with
them, as it is when it is so essential to the dispositive
scheme of the transferor that it is inferable he would
not wish the otherwise valid limitations to stand alone. 543
Completely disconnected limitations are almost always
valid. Thus if a testator directs payment of his debts and
of small legacies to servants and friends and devises the
residue of his estate to a trustee to accumulate the income for a thousand years and pay the accumulated
fund to his descendants then in being, the invalidity
of the residuary clause does not prevent the provisions
for payment of debts and legacies taking effect. Moreover, concurrent limitations may be separable although
related to some extent to the void provision. Bateson• v.
Bateson 544 was a suit by a settlor to set aside a deed of
543 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§529, 531 (1936); PROPERTY
REsTATEMENT, §402, (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule
Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PRoPERTY, §§24.49, 24.50
(1952). It should be recalled, however, that if the interest of any
member of the class may vest at a time beyond the period of the Rule,
a class gift is wholly void, although the interests of some members are
presently vested or will certainly vest within the period. Part Two,
note 280 supra.
544 294 Mich. 426, 293 N.W. 705 (1940). Three justices dissented on
the ground the absolute power of alienation of the two tenths was
not suspended beyond the life of James. Cf. Lewis v. Nelson, 4 Mich.
630 (1857). In Wheelock v. American Tract Society, 109 Mich. 141,
66 N.W. 955 (1896), the residue of an estate was devised to the
executors to pay to four named charitable societies, with discretion to
pay some to worthy poor girls to aid in their education. It was held
that the provision for worthy poor girls was void for indefiniteness and
that the provisions for the charitable societies were inseparable
and so failed also. This was unsound; if the discretionary power to
benefit poor girls was invalid, the four societies should have been held
to take indefeasible interests. TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §398 (2). There
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trust. The plaintiff conveyed his land to his son George
upon trust to pay the income to the settlor for life and
at his death (1) to convey four tenths to George, if then
alive, or to his named wife and son, (2) to hold four
tenths upon trust to pay the income to the settlor's son
Samuel for life and on his death to convey to his named
wife and daughters, (3) to hold two tenths upon trust
to pay the income to the settlor's grandson James for
fifteen years and then to convey to James, but if James
should die within the fifteen years, to convey to the
wife and children of James, if any, otherwise one tenth
to George and one tenth to the trust for Samuel. It
was held that the disposition was void under the suspension statutes as to the two tenths, but that the other
eight tenths were separable and valid.
If alternative limitations are made on verbally separate
contingencies, the fact that one is invalid does not ordinarily prevent the other from taking effect.645 If Andrew
Baker devises property to James Thorpe, who has no
children, for life, remainder to his children, but if all
his children die under twenty-five without surviving isare numerous cases holding wholly unrelated legacies valid although
the principal dispositive provisions of the will were void. E.g. Farrand v. Petit, 84 Mich. 671, 48 N.W. 156 (1891) (devises of land to
sons and daughter good although trust of residue wholly void under
suspension statutes); State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548
(1898) ($2000 legacy to grandson valid although contingent remainders
in residue violated the suspension statutes); Otis v. Arntz, 198 Mich.
196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917) (bequest to church valid although trust of
residue violated suspension statutes); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226
Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924) (bequest of tea set good although
devise of land bad). There are numerous cases of this type in which
the validity of the separate gifts was not questioned. See: PRoPERTY
REsTATEMENT, §376, Comment c., §402, Comment e. (1944).
545 Longhead ex dem. Hopkins v. Phelps, 2 Black W. 703, 96 Eng.
Rep. 414 (1770); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PFRPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §331
(1915); 2 Simes, LAW oF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§521, 531 (1936); PROPERTY
REsTATEMENT, §376, Comment e. (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PRoPERTY,

§§24.49, 24.54 (1952).
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sue or if James dies without surviving issue, to John
Stiles and his heirs, the contingency of James's children
dying under twenty-five is too remote so John cannot
take if James has surviving children, but the contingency
of James's dying without surviving issue is not too remote so John will take if James dies without surviving
issue. A verbally single contingency will not be split,
however. 046 If Andrew Baker devises property to James
Thorpe, who has no children, for life, remainder to his
children who reach twenty-five, but if there are no such
children, to John Stiles and his heirs, John cannot take
even though James dies without having had a child.
In Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker/47 testatrix devised
land to her husband for life, remainder to a trustee to
convert into money and hold for the benefit of her son
Stuart for life. The will provided:
"If my said son shall have lawful child or children
of his body who shall survive him, his share of my estate
shall go to such child or children, girls at age of twentyfive years and boys at thirty years and not before.
"If my son Stuart shall die without lawful issue, his
share of my estate shall go five thousand dollars ($5,000)
to my son Looe Baker in fee, and the remainder for his
life and at his death to his lawful children,---."

Stuart died after the testatrix, without having had
issue. It was held that the first quoted paragraph suspended the vesting of the interests of the children of
Stuart for longer than lives in being and twenty-one
546 Proctor v. Bishop of Bath and Wells, 2 H. Bl. 538, 126 Eng.
Rep. 594 (1794); Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §332
(1915); 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §521 (1936); PROPERTY
REsTATEMENT, §376, Comment f. (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY,
§24.54 (1952). In a few narrow situations the English courts developed
exceptions to the rule that a single contingency cannot be split. Simes,
id., §§522-524.
547 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924).
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years and so violated the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. The Court also held that the remainder
limited to Looe and his children in the event of Stuart's
death without issue failed because of the invalidity of
the interest of the children of Stuart. The latter holding
was clearly wrong. The contingencies were separately
stated and that of Stuart's death without issue did not
violate the Rule. As Stuart did die without issue, the
remainder to Looe and his children should have been
given effect.
In Gettim v. Grand Rapids Trust Co./ 48 half of the
residue of an estate was devised to a· trustee to pay the
income to testatrix's daughter Belle for life, and if Belle
had issue then surviving, to divide into as many shares
as Belle should have children then surviving or with
issue her surviving. The trustee was to pay one share
to each child of Belle who had reached twenty-five and
to the issue of each child who had predeceased Belle.
The other shares were to be held on trust for each child
until it reached twenty-five and then paid to it. The
will provided:
"- - - and in the event of the death of such child before
the same shall reach the age of 25 years, my trustee shall
pay, deliver and convey his or her special fund to my
said daughter's children surviving, except this, that if
any child has died with issue then surviving, said issue
shall take the share the deceased child would receive if
living and if at the death of any child my daughter has
no issue then surviving, it shall pay, deliver and convey
the special fund to my daughter, Shirley S. Thurston, if
surviving, and to her issue, if she is deceased.
"If [upon the death of Belle] she has no issue then
surviving I direct my trustee to pay, deliver and convey
548

249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930).
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this trust fund to my said daughter, Shirley S. Thurston,
if then surviving, and to her issue, if she is deceased."
It was held that the provisions of the first quoted paragraph for gifts over on the contingency of Belle's children dying under twenty-five were void under the Rule
Against Perpetuities. The Court held, however, that the
remainder to Shirley or her issue on the contingency of
Belle's death without surviving issue. could take effect
in that event. As the contingencies were separately stated,
this result was correct. When the problem arises again
it is to be hoped that the Court will follow the sound
rule of the Gettins case rather than the unsound one of
the Baker case.
It will be recalled that under English law a remainder
on an estate tail, which, of course, could not take effect
unless the descendants of the first tenant in tail became
extinct, was valid. 549 As chattels real and personal could
not be entailed, however, a limitation over on extinction
of issue of a legatee of such interests violated the Rule
Against Perpetuities.5 w When freehold land and other
property were devised by the same limitation, the dispositions of the freehold land and those of the other
property were treated as separable.5 n If Andrew Baker,
owning Blackacre in fee simple and an estate for a
thousand years in Whiteacre, devised all his interests in
land to James Thorpe and the heirs of his body and upon
extinction of such heirs to John Stiles and his heirs, the
limitation to John was valid as to Blackacre although
void as to Whiteacre. A very similar problem arose in
549 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §ll1 (1915); Part Two,
note 155 supra.
sso Burges v. Burges, 1 Ch. Cas. 229, 22 Eng. Rep. 775 (1674); Gray,
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIEs, 3rd ed., §212 (1915); Part Two, note 175
supra.
551 Forth v. Chapman, 1 P. Wms. 663, 24 Eng. Rep. 559 (1720).
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Michigan because the stringent provisions of the statutes
prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation, which were in force from 1847 to 1949, applied
only to land, whereas limitations of personalty were restricted only by the more liberal provisions of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. If Andrew Baker
devised his entire estate, consisting of land and personalty, to James Thorpe upon trust to pay the income to
Lucy Baker for life, then to John Stiles for life, then
to the issue of John Stiles for twenty years and to transfer
the principal to the descendants of John in being at the
end of the twenty years, the dispositions did not offend
the common-law Rule but did violate the suspension
statutes. Should the fact that the limitation was void as
to land make it void as to personalty also? The early
Michigan decisions indicated that it should not, 552 but
later cases laid down an arbitrary rule that such limitations were not separable; if they failed as to land, they
failed as to personalty also. ~' The most extreme case of
this type was In re Richards' Estate/54 where the fact
that land worth $800 was included in a limitation with
5 8

M2 Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 562, 2 N.W. 814 (1879);
Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885); Palms v. Palms,
68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888). But see concurring opinion of
Champlin, J., in the latter case, 68 Mich. 355 at 380.
55 3 State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898); Grand
Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922);
Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W.
587 (1934); DeBuck v. Bousson, 295 Mich. 164, 294 N.W. 135 (1940);
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, ~52 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY, §25.37 (1952); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule
Against Perpetuities," id., §24.50; Part Two, note 53 supra.
554 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938). The desirability of this
harsh and arbitrary rule was questioned by Butzel, J. in Dodge v.
Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575 at 598, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942),
where the land involved was worth some $40,000 and the personalty
about $38,000,000.
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personalty worth $56,000 caused the entire limitation to
fail.
The donee of a power of appointment sometimes exercises the power and disposes of his own property by the
same limitation. If the limitation is invalid under the
Rule Against Perpetuities insofar as it is an appointment,
it would seem that it is nevertheless valid insofar as it disposes of the donee's own property. 555 Suppose Andrew
Baker devises Blackacre to John Stiles, who has no. children, for life, remainder to such issue of John as John
may by will appoint. John Stiles, owning Whiteacre; devises "all land over which I have power of disposition to
my children for life, remainder to my grandchildren." As
the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities is computed,
in determining the validity of an appointment under
such a limited testamentary power, from the death of
Andrew, 556 the limitation to the grandchildren of John
violates the Rule so far as Blackacre is concerned.
It would seem that it is valid as to Whiteacre.
If a limitation of a future interest violates the Rule
Against Perpetuities and the void interest is so essential
to the dispositive scheme of the transferor that it is inferable that he would not wish otherwise valid alternative
or concurrent limitations to stand alone, such alternative
or· concurrent limitations also fail. This proposition is
well, illustrated by In re Richards' Estate. 557 There a
testator bequeathed $1,000 to Willard G. Stone and devised one third of his estate to his daughter and two
thirds to trustees to pay the income to his two sons for
twenty years and then to transfer the principal to issue
555 Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities,"
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.50 (1952). See: Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155 Mich. 126, 118 N.W. 938 (1908), Part Two, note 420 supra.
556 Part Two, note 322 supra.
557 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1988).
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of the sons to be ascertained at that time. As the suspension statutes permitted no period in gross, the disposition of the two thirds was void. It was held that the
legacy of Willard G. Stone could stand, but that the
devise to the daughter of one third of the estate failed.
As the Court observed, the testator probably intended
to treat his children with approximate equality. If the
disposition of the two thirds alone failed, it would pass
as intestate property, so the daughter would receive one
third plus two-ninths, or five-ninths of the estate, and
each son would receive only two ninths. By eliminating
the devise of one third to the daughter, the Court caused
the entire estate, less the $1,000 legacy, to pass as on
intestacy to the three children equally.
D. EFFECT ON SUBSEQUENT LIMITATIONS

If a future interest is so limited that it may vest at
a time beyond the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, a subsequent interest limited to follow it or cut
it off is usually such that it, too, may vest too remotely.
In such a case both fail by reason of the direct operation
of the Rule. In a few situations, however, it is possible
to have a future interest which violates the Rule followed
by an interest which is vested or will certainly vest within the period of the Rule. If Andrew Baker devises
property to James Thorpe, who has no children, for life,
remainder to the children of James who reach twentyfive for their lives, remainder to John Stiles and his
heirs, the life estate of the children of James violates the
Rule Against Perpetuities, but the remainder in fee of
John Stiles is indefeasibly vested. If Andrew Baker bequeaths property to John Stiles, who has no children,
for life, remainder to such issue of John as John may
by will appoint, and John appoints by will "to my
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daughters for their lives, remainder to their children for
their lives, remainder to my son Henry and his heirs,"
the appointment to the children of the daughters violates the Rule, but the appointment to Henry vests upon
the death of John, who was a life in being when Andrew
died. Should such subsequent interests, themselves
vested or certain to vest within the period of the Rule,
fail merely because prior interests violate the Rule? The
English cases suggest that they do/ 58 and Professor Gray
accepted this view.559 The Restatement of Property and
Professors Simes and Leach do not agree. They think
that subsequent interests should be treated in the same
way as prior, alternative and concurrent interests, that
is, as valid unless the void intermediate limitation is so
essential to the dispositive scheme of the transferor that
it is inferable that he would not wish the subsequent
limitations to stand if the intermediate interest fails. 560
There are no American decisions on this problem.
Michigan has, however, a number of decisions as to the
closely related problem of the validity of interests which
did not themselves violate the statutes prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation for more
than two lives but were limited to follow trusts which
did violate the statutes.
51>8 Monypenny v. Dering, 2 De G.M.&G. 145, 42 Eng. Rep. 826
(1852); Burley v. Evelyn, 16 Sim. 290, 60 Eng. Rep. 885 (1848); In re
Mortimer, [1905] 2 Ch. 502 (C.A.); Re Backhouse, [1921] 2 Ch. 51.
. 5 59 RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §251 (1915). He had expressed a contrary view in previous editions. Moreover he thought
that the rule of nullity extended only to subsequent interests in fee,
that, despite the English cases to the contrary, a life estate limited to a
living person should be valid although preceded by a void interest.
Id., §§252-257.
56o PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, §402, Comment d. (1944); 2 Simes, LAw
OF FUTURE INTERESTs, §532 (1936); Leach & Tudor, "The Common
Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.51
(1952). Morris, "Ulterior Limitations and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 10 CAMB. L.J. 392 (1950), adopts this view.
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In Palms v. Palms/ 61 land and personalty were devised to trustees to pay the income to the testator's two
children for their lives and then to transfer the principal
to their children. The will provided that if any child
was a minor at its parent's death, its share should be held
on trust during minority. It was held that this provision for trusts to last beyond lives in being probably
violated the suspension statutes but that both the prior
and subsequent interests were valid, that is, the grandchildren would take on the deaths of their parents, free
of the void trusts.
In Dean v. M umford/62 land was to be held on trust
during the lives of the testator's widow, three sons, and
the sons' wive:,, remainder to the children of the sons.
The Court held that the trust for each son, his wife, and
children, was separate from the others but that the whole
disposition failed and the property involved passed as
on intestacy. As the interest of the children of each son
would vest in interest on the death of their father, a
life in being at the death of the testator, it would seem
that their interests were valid, apart from the trusts. It
would have been possible to delete the trusts and hold
the limitations to the children valid.
In Niles v. Mason,S 63 an estate was devised to trustees
to pay a life annuity to the testator's sister Sarah and to
divide the remaining income between the testator's two
children, Charles and Lottie, for their lives. On the
death of either child, half the principal was to be transferred to his children, if any, and if none, held on trust
for the other child and transferred to his children at his
death. If both died without issue, the principal was to
68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888).
102 Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 (1894).
56a 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. llOO (1901).
561

562
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be transferred to testator's brother. It was held that the
disposition created a trust for three lives and so violated
the suspension statutes and that the estate passed to the
heirs subject to the annuity to Sarah. It might have been
possible to hold that the trusts for Charles and Lottie
were separate, that each could last for the life of Sarah
and the life beneficiary, with remainder to the children
of the life beneficiary, and that nothing failed except
the cross remainder to the other trust on the death of
Charles or Lottie without issue. The decision rendered
indicates unwillingness to find separate trusts when there
are cross-remainders. 564
In Casgrain v. Hammond/'65 Ellen Hammond conveyed land to her son Charles, who executed an instrument of trust declaring that he would pay the net income to Ellen for life, and if she died before the expiration of fourteen years, he would pay it to five of her
children, including himself. The instrument provided
that the trust should last for fourteen years and until the
death of Ellen if she lived longer. Upon its expiration
Charles was to convey the land to the five children or
the survivor or survivors of them. The trust was void
because it suspended the absolute power of alienation for
a period not based on lives. It was held that the land
passed to the heirs of Ellen, who had died before the
suit was commenced. The Court said that it did not
pass to the five children who were cestuis of and remaindermen after the void trust because there was no
·intention to convey to them. This seems unsound. The
trust instrument gave the five children an unconditional
estate which vested in them immediately, subject only
564 See: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 111!39, 40 (1944) Cf.
Part Two, note 541 supra.
565 134 Mich. 419, 96 N.W. 510 (1903).
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to the void trust and to defeasance upon failure to survive. It would seem that the provision for the trust lasting beyond the life of Ellen could have been deleted and
the balance of the disposition allowed to stand, so that
the five children would take a remainder, indefeasible
after the death of Ellen. 66~
In Van Driele v. Kotvis/ 67 a testator bequeathed $500
to a church, to be paid out of the rents, issues, and profits
of his estate at the rate of $25 a year for twenty years
and devised the residue to his wife for life, remainder to
his daughter for life, remainder to the heirs of his wife
and himself. It was held that the provision for the
church was void but that this did not invalidate the disposition of the residue which was, of course, partly concurrent with and partly subsequent to the void inte;rest.
]ames E. Scripps Corporation v. Parkinson•$8 involved the will of a testator who died in 1851, devising
land to his wife upon trust until 1864, then one-third
to the wife for life, and the balance, being a present
estate as to two-thirds and a remainder after the widow's
life estate as to the other third, in equal shares, one to
each of testator's sons in fee and one to his daughter
Jane for life, remainder to her heirs. It was held that
because the trust, not being limited in duration by lives,
was invalid, the whole will was void and the land passed
566 See: PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[64 (1944). But see
Part Two, note 541 supra.
567 135 Mich. 181, 97 N.W. 700 (1903).
568 186 Mich. 663, 153 N.W. 29 (1915). There was earlier litigation
over this will. Parkinson v. Parkinson, 139 Mich. 530, 102 N.W. 1002
(1905). It was held in the later case that the heirs of Jane did acquire
an interest by purchase, not under the will but by virtue of her consent
to a probate decree of partition in accordance with the terms of the
void will. Thus the Court reached by indirect means the same result
it should have reached by simply deleting the void trust and enforcing
the subsequent provisions.. A similar result was reached by the same
indirect means in Snyder v. Potter, 328 Mich. 236, 43 N.W. (2d)
922 (1950).
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to the testator's heirs at his death, so that the heirs of
Jane took nothing by purchase. This holding seems
unsound. If the void trust, which suspended the absolute
power of alienation for thirteen years in gross in violation of the statutes, were deleted, the other provisions
of the will would be valid, since the limitation to the
heirs of Jane would vest at her death, and these provisions should have been enforcible.
In Otis v. Arntz/69 a will directed that the income
from the residue of an estate, consisting of a farm and
personalty, be paid to the two children of the testator,
Grace and Clark, "and in case of their decease to their
heirs" for twenty-five years. The next paragraph devised
the residue, subject to the preceding provision as to income, to the children's children in equal shares, "The
share of any deceased grandchild shall go to his children
if living, otherwise to revert to the surviving grandchildren." The following paragraph directed that the farm
be kept intact, unsold and unmortgaged, until the expiration of twenty-five years, when it should be partitioned among the grandchildren or sold and the proceeds
divided as directed in the preceding paragraph. A codicil provided that if Grace died within twenty-five
years, her interest in the income should go to the children of Clark. It was held that these dispositions of
the residue were wholly void under the suspension statutes and that the residue passed to the heirs at law of
the testator. If, as the Court thought, a trust to last
twenty-five years was intended, this result was probably
sound, either on the ground that the will suspended the
vesting of the grandchildren's interests for twenty-five
years or on the ground that the testator would not want
569198 Mich. 196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917).
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their interests to stand alone and be accelerated as to
possession, because this would deprive his children of
all benefit under the will. It would have been possible,
however, to construe the will as devising a legal estate
for twenty-five years to the children with a remainder
to the grandchildren which would vest completely on the
death of their parents. Such a twenty-five year term
would be valid because the provision of the Michigan
Constitution making void leases of agricultural land for
agricultural purposes for terms of more than twelve
years only applies to leases which reserve rent or services.570
Scheibner v. Scheibner 511 involved a will which, after
provision for several legacies, devised the residue to
trustees to pay the income to the testator's wife for life
and after her death to pay $75 a month to each of his
two sons, Charles and William, until the expiration of
twenty years after the testator's death, then to convert the
estate into cash and pay it to the sons. Charles, during
570 Const. 1908, Art. XVI, §10, Part One, notes 306, 350, supra.
However, even on this construction, the interest of the grandchildren
would be void if its vesting was suspended for twenty-five years, because
the statutes then provided, "A contingent remainder shall not be
created on a term for years, unless the nature of the contingency upon
which it is limited be such that the remainder must vest in interest,
during the continuance of not more than two lives in being at the
creation of such remainder, or upon the termination thereof." Rev.
Stat. 1846, c. 62, §20, Comp. Laws (1857) §2604; Comp. Laws (1871)
§4087; Comp. Laws (1897) §8802; How. Stat., §5536; Comp. Laws
(1915) §11538; Comp. Laws (1929) §12940; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.20;
Comp. Laws (1948) §554.20; repealed by Act 38, P.A. 1949, §2, Mich.
Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52.
m 199 Mich. 630, 165 N.W. 660 (1917). See Part Two, note 541
supra. Subsequently the widow conveyed her interest, which had been
enlarged as to a third from a life estate to a fee as a result of Charles's
suit, to William. After her death, Charles sued unsuccessfully to set
aside the conveyances on the ground of undue influence. Scheibner v.
Scheibner, 220 Mich. 115, 189 N.W. 913 (1922). If he had never
brought the first suit, Charles would have taken half the estate instead
of only a third.
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the widow's life, sought a decree that the provisions for
a trust were invalid and that the residue should pass at
once, free of trust, to the widow and sons as heirs at
law. A motion to dismiss the bill on the ground there
was an adequate remedy at law was overruled, and the
order overruling it was affirmed in an opinion which
intimated that the disposition of the residue was wholly
void and that the residue passed to the widow and sons
as heirs at law. This result seems unsound. The trust
could have been sustained for the life of the widow, with
immediate remainder to the sons, or the trust could
have been deleted entirely and the widow given a legal
life estate, with remainder to the sons.
Loomis v. Laramie 672 illustrates the type of result
which could have been reached in Scheibner v. Scheibner and several other cases discussed above. There the
residue of an estate was devised to trustees to accumulate
the income for twenty years and transfer the accumulated
fund to five named persons, "and the heirs of their body
forever." The trust for accumulation violated both the
suspension statutes and the accumulation statutes then
in force. It was held, however, that the interests of the
five named persons were vested and took effect at once.
As these persons were not the heirs of the testator, they
would have taken nothing if the void trust had been
held to invalidate the limitations subsequent to it, as
was the case in Scheibner v. Scheibner.
s12 286 Mich. 707, 282 N.W. 876 (1938). In DuBuck v. Bousson,
295 Mich. 164, 294 N.W. 135 (1940), a will disposed of an estate to
the testator's wife and children in fourteen paragraphs. The fifteenth
provided that these devises and bequests should not be effective for a
year after the testator's death. It was held that the fifteenth paragraph
was void under the suspension statutes but that this did not affect the
validity of the other provisions because its deletion would not materially alter the testator's plan. Cf. Snyder v. Potter, 328 Mich. 236,
43 N.W. (2d) 922 (1950).
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It is thus apparent that our Supreme Court was willing, in some cases, to enforce limitations subsequent to
trusts which were void under the suspension statutes if
the deletion of the void trust did not unduly distort the
transferor's dispositive scheme. It would seem that it
should also be willing to enforce limitations subsequent
to interests which violate the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities, under similar conditions. The purpose of
the Rule is to prevent property being tied up for undesirably long periods, not to punish innocent transferees
of interests which do not so fetter it.

PART THREE
THE TWO LIVES STATUTES

CHAPTER

18

The Statutory Scheme
A. THE STATUTES

HAPTER 62 of the Michigan Revised Statutes of
1846, which became effective March 1, 1847, provided:

C

"Sec. 14. Every future estate shall be void in its
creation, which shall suspend the absolute power of
alienation for a longer period than is prescribed in this
chapter: Such power of alienation is suspended, when
there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute fee
in possession can be conveyed.
"Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation shall
not be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the continuance
of two lives in being at the creation of the estate, except
in the single case mentioned in the next section.
"Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be
created on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the
event that the persons to whom the first remainder is
limited shall die under the age of twenty-one years, or
upon any other contingency by which the estate of such
persons may be determined before they attain their full
age.
"Sec. 17. Successive estates for life shall not be
limited, unless to persons in being at the creation
thereof; and when a remainder shall be limited on more
than two successive estates for life, all the life estates
subsequent to those of the two persons first entitled
thereto, shall be void, and upon the death of those per477
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sons, the remainder shall take effect, in the same manner
as if no other life estate had been created.
"Sec. 18. No remainder shall be created upon an
estate for the life of any other person or persons than
the grantee or devisee of such estate, unless such remainder be in fee; nor shall any remainder be created
upon such an estate in a term for years, unless it be for
the whole residue of the term.
"Sec. 19. When a remainder shall be created upon
any such life estate, and more than two persons shall be
named as the persons during whose lives the estate shall
continue, the remainder shall take effect upon the death
of the two persons first named, in the same manner as
if no other lives had been introduced.
"Sec. 20. A contingent remainder shall not be
created on a term for years, unless the nature of the contingency upon which it is limited be such that the remainder must vest in interest, during the continuance
of not more than two lives in being at the creation of
such remainder, or upon the termination thereof.
"Sec. 21. No estate for life shall be limited as a remainder on a term of years, except to a person in being
at the creation of such estate.
"Sec. 23. All the provisions in this chapter contained relative to future estates, shall be construed to
apply to limitations of chattels real, as well as of freehold
estates, so that the absolute ownership of a term of years,
shall not be suspended for a longer period than the absolute power of alienation can be suspended, in respect
to a fee.
"Sec. 41. The delivery of the grant, where an expectant estate is created by grant; and where it is created
by devise, the death of the testator, shall be deemed the
time of the creation of the estate." 1
1 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§14 to 21, 23, 41; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2598
to 2605, 2607, 2625; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4081 to 4088, 4090, 4108;
Comp. Laws (1897) §§8796 to 8803, 8805, 8823; How. Stat., §§5530
to 5537, 5539, 5557; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11532 to 11539, 11541,
11559; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12934 to 12941, 12943, 12961; Mich. Stat.
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These statutory provisions were frequently criticized. 2
Sections 14 through 20 and 23 were repealed by Act 38,
Public Acts of 1949, which provided that the commonlaw Rule Against Perpetuities should thereafter be applicable to interests in Michigan land and that,
"Sec. 3. This act applies only to wills with respect
to which the testator dies after the effective date of this
act and to deeds and other instruments executed after
the effective date of this act." 3
The repealing act became effective September 23,
1949. The form of the repeal being such that it does
not extend to limitations in instruments which became
effective before that date, Michigan lawyers will be
obliged to contend with the restrictive provisions of
Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 for many
years to come.
The quoted provisions of Chapter 62 of the Revised
Statutes of 1846 were taken from the New York Revised
Ann., §§26.14 to 26.21, 26.23, 26.41; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.14 to
554.21, 554.23, 554.41. As to the drafting of the Michigan statutes, see
Part One, at note 582 supra. The judicial interpretation of these
statutes is discussed in some detail in PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App.,
Ch. B, 1!1!50-58, 85 (1944), and Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §§25.36-25.47,
25.98 (1952), and in more summary fashion in 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE
INTERESTS, §576 (1936) and Brake, "Satisfying Michigan's Perpetuity
Rules," 5 UNiv. oF DETROIT L.J. 160 at 174-179 (1942).
2 E.g. Chief Justice Campbell in Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at
570, 572, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); Goddard, "Perpetuity Statutes: Some
Reform Statutes in Need of Reformation," 22 MICH. L. REv. 95 (1923);
Report of Committee on Revision of the Michigan Perpetuity Statutes,
1930, 10 MicH. ST. BAR J. 20 (1930); Report of the Committee on
Legislation and Law Reform, 17 MicH. ST. BAR J. 393 at 403-405
(1938); Tripp, "The Michigan 'Two Lives' Rule," 28 MicH. ST. BAR
J. 17 (Mar. 1949).
3 Mich. Stat. Ann.,
§§26.49 (1) to 26.49 (3); Comp. Laws (1948)
§§554.51 to 554.53. See: Long, "Perpetuities and Accumulations: Recent Legislative Acts Explained," 17 DETROIT LAWYER 193 (1949);
Sherrard, "Perpetuities in Michigan Today," 29 MICH. ST. BAR J. 5
(Mar. 1950); Waterbury, "Some Recent Statutory Changes in the
Law of Perpetuities," 48 MICH. L.R. 158 at 1159-1164 (1950).
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Statutes of 1829.4 The New York revisers explained their
purpose as follows:
"Notwithstanding the abolition of estates tail, our law
allows certain executory dispositions of land and the
profits of land, by which the former may be rendered
inalienable, and the latter may be made to accumulate
for a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years thereafter. This limit is derived from the English law, and was
originally adopted by the English judges from analogy to
settlements by entail. A settlement on a parent for life,
with remainder to his eldest son in tail, and any number
of remainders over for life and in tail, could be barred
by the son's suffering a recovery as soon as he came of
age. Not to give a greater perpetuity to a disposition by
executory devise, than the possible (and from the
exigencies of society, even in that country, the general)
limits of an entail, the courts held that· no executory
devise could be good, unless it must necessarily take
effect within a life or lives in being, or twenty one years
thereafter.
"When our legislature abolished entails, they left the
4Part Two, Ch. I, Tit. II, Art. First, §§14-21, 23, 41. As to the drafting
of the New York statutes, see Part One at note 575 supra. The judicial
interpretation of these statutes is discussed in detail in Chaplin, SusPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, AND POSTPONEMENT OF VESTING,
UNDER THE LAws oF NEw YoRK (3rd. ed., 1928); Powell and Whiteside, THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW YoRK CONCERNING PERPETUITIES AND RELATED MATTERS [New York Legislative Document (1936)
No. 65 (H)]; PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A (1944); Whiteside,
"Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN ,LAw
oF PROPERTY, §§25.1-25.35, 25.92-25.96 (1952). In addition to Michigan,
eleven other states (Arizona, California, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and
Wisconsin) and the District of Columbia adopted parts of the New
York statutory scheme. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Appendix on the
Statutory Rules Against Perpetuities, Introductory Note (1944). Because of wide variation in the extent to which the scheme was adopted,
no attempt has been made in this book to cite decisions from these
jurisdictions interpreting the statutes. They are discussed in PROPERTY
RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. B (1944) and Whiteside, "Statutory Rules,
Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY,
§§25.1-25.5, 25.36-25.98 (1952).
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common law in regard to executory limitations, unaltered; so that all we have gained by abolishing entails,
is, that we have avoided the necessity of levying a fine
or suffering a recovery to bar the estate tail. Indeed
land may be rendered inalienable for a longer period
by springing use, or executory devise, than by an entail.
In the settlement of an estate tail, like that above mentioned, the life estate depends upon a single life; but in
these executory dispositions, as the lives are not necessarily required to take any interest in the estate, or to be
in any way connected with it, any number may be introduced, at the pleasure of the party, and for the mere
purpose of protracting the period of alienation. In England this has often been done. In one case, twenty-eight
persons (all of whom except seven, were strangers, taking no interest in the land,) were inserted for the purpose
of securing the longest possible term. It is obvious that
the chance of finding, out of so great a number a very
long life, is much greater than in the case of the entail.
Again: The term of twenty-one years in the case of the
settlement by entail, only occurs during the actual infancy of the party entitled in remainder. In the case of
the executory devise, &c. it is added to the life or lives in
being, as an absolute term, and there may be cases, where,
after the expiration of the twenty-one years, the real
infancy of the party may be added to the former term
thus rendering the land inalienable, except in special
cases, for twenty-one years longer.
"In the case of the will of Peter Thelusson, the testator availed himself of the executory devise, to secure
the accumulation of his personal estate, and the rents
and profits of his realty, to such an extent, that the British parliament passed an act, (40 Geo. III. c. 98,) 'to
restrain all trusts and directions in deeds or wills, whereby the profits or produce of real or personal estates shall
be accumulated, and the beneficial enjoyment thereof
postponed beyond the time therein limited.'
"This act has not been re-enacted in this state; but in
the preceding sections, the Revisers have proposed some
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new regulations on this subject, which will considerably
abridge the present power of rendering real estate inalienable; and in a subsequent section, they have restrained the accumulation of profits within still narrower limits than are now allowed in England. 5 The
difference between the preceding sections and the existing law, consists in the following particulars:
"1. Alienation cannot be protracted by means of
mere nominees unconnected with the estate, beyond the
period of two lives.
"2. No more than two successive estates for life can
be created.
"3. The period of twenty-one years, after a life or
lives in being, is no longer allowed as an absolute term;
but the rule is restored to its original object, by being
confined to the case of actual infancy~ which is directly
provided for by rendering the disposition d,efeasible, and
allowing another to be substituted during that period.
"It is presumed that no argument need be advanced
in favor of restricting, at least to the extent here proposed, the power of creating perpetuities. It is perhaps
a more doubtful question, whether the genius of our
government, and the state of our society, do not require
that the right of suspending alienation should be still
further reduced.
"It is proper to observe that these sections agree in
some respects with the propositions contained in the recent work of Mr. Humphreys on the law of real property
in England.
"It may be useful to illustrate by examples, the effect
of § 16, as its meaning may not be immediately obvious.
Suppose an estate devised to A for life, and upon his
death, to his issue then living; but in case such issue
shall die under the age of twenty-one years, or in case
such issue shall die under the age of twenty-one years
and without lawful issue, then to B in fee. Here, in both
cases, the remainder to B would be valid as embraced by
5 The statutes restricting accumulations, here referred to, are discussed in Chapter 16, supra.
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the terms of the section; but if the devise were to A for
life) and after his death to B for the term of twenty-one
years; and upon the expiration of such term) to the eldest male descendant of A then living) an<d if there be no
such male descendant then living) to C in fee. Here the
period of twenty-one years being an absolute term,
wholly unconnected with the infancy of any person entitled, both the term and all the remainders dependent
on it would be void; and on the determination of the life
estate, the fee would descend to the heirs of the testator.
To prevent a possible difficulty in the minds of those to
whom the subject is not familiar, we may also add, that
an estate is never inalienable, unless there is a contingent
remainder, and the contingency has not yet occurred.
Where the remainder is vested as where the lands are
given to A for life, remainder to B (a person then in
being) in fee, there is no suspense of the power of alienation; for the remainderman and the owner of the prior
estate, by uniting, may always convey the whole estate.
This is the meaning of the rule of law prohibiting perpetuities, and is the effect of the definition in 1f 14." 6
The Michigan statutes differed from those of New
York in two important respects. First, the New York
statutes contained complementary provisions forbidding
suspension of the "absolute ownership" of personal
property, 7 so the statutory scheme there covered limitations of all types of property, real, personal, and mixed.
The Michigan statutes contained no such complementary
6 Extracts from the Original Reports of the Revisers, IS N.Y. Rev.
Stat. (2d ed.) 571-573 (1836).
1 "§I.
The absolute ownership of personal property shall not be
suspended by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period
than during the continuance and until the termination of not more
than two lives in being at the date of the instrument containing such
limitation or condition; or if such instrument be a will, for not more
than two lives in being at the death of the testator.
"§2. In all other respects, limitations of future or contingent interests in personal property, shall be subject to the rules prescribed in
the first Chapter of this Act, in relation to future estates in lands."
N.Y. Rev. Stat., 1829, Part Two, Ch. IV, Tit. IV, §§1, 2.
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provisions, so the statutory scheme here covered only
limitations of land, including freehold estates and estates
for years. 8 Moreover, the Michigan Supreme Court held
that if a will contained a mandatory direction to convert
land into other property, the direction worked an equitable conversion and the statutory scheme did not apply. 9
As has been seen, however, the Court extended the statutory scheme to mixed dispositions of land and personalty
by refusing to treat them as separable.10 Second, Section
24 in the New York version of the statutes provided that
"a fee may be limited on a fee, upon a contingency,
which, if it should occur, must happen within the period
prescribed in this Article." 11 This provision was not
adopted in Michigan. As the New York courts made it
the basis for deciding that the statutory scheme prohibited remoteness of vesting as well as suspension of
the absolute power of alienation, 12 its omission here is
significant. The effect of this omission will be discussed in Chapter 20.
To the extent that the Michigan statutes were identical with those of New York, judicial interpretations of
the statutes made in New York before 1846, when they
were adopted in Michigan, were treated by our Supreme
Court as virtually binding on it. 13 Later New York jus Part Two, note 52 supra. As to the possibility that the scope of
those sections of the statutory scheme which were not repealed by
Act 38, P.A. 1949, was extended to include limitations of chattels personal by Act 227, P.A. 1949, see Part Two, note 184 supra.
9 Part Two, note 59 supra.
10 Part Two, notes 53, 553, 554, supra.
n N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, Part Two, Ch. I, Tit. II, Art. First, §24.
12 Matter of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.E. 497 (1909); Walker v.
Marcellus and Otisco Lake Ry. Co., 226 N.Y. 347, 123 N.E. 736 (1919).
1a State v. Holmes, II5 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898), the theory
being that, in adopting the New York statutes, the Michigan Legislature was presumed to have adopted the prior interpretation of them
in New York. Controlling force was not accorded the decisions of
inferior New York courts. Foster v. Stevens, 146 Mich. 131 at 141,
109 N.W. 265 (1906).
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dicial decisions were accorded weight but not treated as
binding. 14
B. SUSPENSION OF THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF ALIENATION

The notes of the New York revisers quoted in the preceding section indicate that they thought the only effect
of the statutes prohibiting suspension of the absolute
power of alienation (Sections 14, 15 and 16) was to
shorten the period of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities by changing "any number of lives in being" to
"two lives in being" and by eliminating the period of
twenty-one years in gross. They did not think that they
had changed the theory or nature of the Rule. That this
was their understanding of the statutes which they had
drafted is made evident by their statement, "an estate
is never inalienable, unless there is a contingent remainder, and the contingency has not yet occurred."
That statement was roughly true under English law because contingent future interests were inalienable at
common law 15 and the English courts would not enforce
prohibitions on alienation of any other interest in
property, legal or equitable. 16 But the revisers evidently
failed to realize fully that other provisions of their own
revision changed the law on both these points by making
contingent future interests alienable 17 and the inter14 Casgrain v. Hammond, 134 Mich. 419, 96 N.W. 510 (1903); Foster
v. Stevens, 146 Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906); Moore v. O'Leary,
180 Mich. 261, 146 N.W. 661 (1914); In re Coots' Estate, 253 Mich.
208, 234 N.W. 141 (1931).
15 Part One, note 359 supra.
:ts Part One, note 556 supra. There was an exception in the case of
the separate equitable estate of a married woman. Part One, note 557
supra.
17 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, Part Two, Ch. I, Tit. II, Art. First, §35;
Part One, note 371 supra.
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ests of beneficiaries of trusts for receipt of the rents and
profits of land inalienable.18
If contingent future interests are alienable, such an
interest limited to an ascertained living person does not
suspend the absolute power of alienation, as such suspension is defined by Section 14/9 because there are persons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can
be conveyed. If Andrew Baker devises land to James
Thorpe and his heirs so long as the Penobscot Building
shall stand, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs, the
remainder of John is contingent, but James and John
are persons in being "by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed." Hence, although the interest
of John violates the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, because it may vest too remotely, it does not suspend
the absolute power of alienation. 20
On the other hand, as the New York courts soon held,
a present trust for receipt of the rents and profits of land
does suspend the absolute power of alienation because
1s N. Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, Part Two, Ch. I, Tit. II, Art. Second, §63;
Part One, notes 580, 621, supra. It is virtually certain that the revisers
did not realize that this would make present trusts suspend the absolute power of alienation. Powell and Whiteside, THE STATUTES OF THE
STATE OF NEW YORK CoNCERNING PERPETUITIES AND RELATED MATTERS,
56 [New York Legislative Document (1936) No. 65 (H)]; PROPERTY
RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1!17 (1944); Rundell, "The Suspension of
the Absolute Power of Alienation," 19 MicH. L. REv. 235 at 249-251
(1921). Dean Rundell's article is an interesting and valuable commentary on all the topics treated in this section.
19 Part Three, note 1 supra.
20 Walker v. Marcellus and Otisco Lake Ry. Co., 226 N.Y. 347, 123
N.E. 736 (1919). But see Leonard v. Burr, 18 N.Y. 96 at 107 (1858).
Although the interest of John in the example given does not suspend
the absolute power of alienation, as such suspension is defined in
Section 14, it would violate the portion of Section 24 which was not
adopted in Michigan (Part Three, note 11 supra), because that portion of Section 24, like the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities,
forbade remoteness of vesting. Matter of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288, 87
N.E. 497 (1909). Dean Rundell thinks that §§14 and 15 should have
been construed to restrict remoteness of vesting. "The Suspension of
the Absolute Power of Alienation," 19 MicH. L. REV. 235 at 259 (1921).
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the interest of the cestui que trust is inalienable, although all interests in the land are vested. 21 If Andrew
Baker devises land to Roger White upon trust to receive
the rents and profits and apply them to the use of James
Thorpe and his heirs for ten years and then to convey
the land to John Stiles, "there are no persons in being,
by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed,"
so the present trust suspends the absolute power of
alienation for a period not limited to two lives in being,
in violation of Section 15,22 although there are no unvested interests and hence no violation of the commonlaw Rule Against Perpetuities.
The decisions of the New York courts interpreting and
applying the suspension statutes, rendered before 1846,
when the statutes were adopted in Michigan, made it
clear that, contrary to the view of the New York revisers,
Sections 14, 15, and 16 did not merely shorten the period
of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities; they imposed restrictions on the creation of interests in property
which, while they had the same general purpose as the
common-law Rule, were of a quite different nature from
that Rule and operated upon a different theory. 23 Whereas the common-law Rule prohibited all future interests
21 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (1835); Hawley v. James, 16
Wend. 61 (1836), Chapter 20, Section C, infra; Dean Rundell thinks
that this rule is unsound. "The Suspension of the Absolute Power of
Alienation," 19 MicH. L. REv. 235 at 251 (1921).
22 Matter of Hitchcock, 222 N.Y. 57, 118 N.E. 220 (1917). Section
15 is quoted above at Part Three, note 1.
23 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd. ed., §14
(1928); Walsh, FuTURE EsTATES IN NEw YoRK, §23 (1931). Because
the New York statutes were construed to prohibit remoteness of vesting as well as suspension of the absolute power of alienation (Part
Three, note 12 supra), their theory and operation did not differ so
radically from those of the common-law Rule as did the narrower
Michigan statutes. The only prohibition on remoteness of vesting
in the Michigan statutes is that in Section 20 (Part Three, note 1
supra) as to a contingent remainder on a term of years.
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which might vest too remotely and had no application
whatever to present and other vested interests, Sections
14 and 15 24 applied equally to vested and contingent
interests, whether present or future, prohibiting all and
only those which so affected the title to land that no persons in being could convey an absolute fee in possession.
Because the statutes were phrased in terms of suspension of the absolute power of alienation, they have
tended to be confused, by both courts and lawyers, with
the common-law rules against direct restraints on alienation which are the subject of Part One of this study.
Those rules are distinct from and were not superseded
or modified by the suspension statutes; the statutes did
not permit any direct restraint on alienation which was
void at common law. 25 At common law a prohibition
or condition which would prevent or penalize the alienation of an estate in fee simple is void although the restraint will last for only a single day. 2~ This rule was
not abrogated by the suspension statutes. 27 A prohibition
on alienation, if effective, would suspend the absolute
power of alienation within the meaning of Section 14, 28
but, except in the case of spendthrift trusts, 29 all prohibiPart Three, note 1 supra.
2 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS, §576 (1936); Brake, "Satisfying Michigan's Perpetuity Rules," 5 UNIV. oF DETROIT L.J. 160 at 166
(1942).
2s Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 at 107, 18 Am. Rep. 61
(1874), Part One, notes 138, 140, supra. The will involved in this case
became effective before the suspension statutes.
21 In re Estate of Schilling, 102 Mich. 612, sub nom. Moore v.
Schindehette, 61 N.W. 62 (1894), Part One, note 154 supra; Porter
v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532, 42 A.L.R. 1267 (1925), Part
One, note 158 supra; Smith v. Smith, 290 Mich. 143, 287 N.W. 411,
124 A.L.R. 215 (1939), Part One, note 167 supra; Braun v. K1ug,
335 Mich. 692, 57 N.W. (2d) 299 (1953), Part One, note 162 supra.
2s Part Three, note 1 supra.
29 Part One, notes 569, 570, supra; Rose v. Southern Michigan National Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 238 N.W. 284 (1931), Part One, note
647 supra; Roberts v. Michigan Trust Co., 273 Mich. 91, 262 N.W.
24
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tions on alienation of otherwise alienable interests in
property are void under the common-law rules. 80 A condition subsequent restraining alienation would not suspend the absolute power of alienation within the meaning of Section 14. If Andrew Baker conveys land to
John Stiles and his heirs "but if the grantee or his heirs
shall attempt to alienate the estate hereby conveyed, the
grantor or his heirs may enter and terminate the estate,"
Andrew and John are persons in being "by whom an
absolute fee in possession can be conveyed," even if the
condition were valid. But such a condition is void at
common law and was not validated by the suspension
statuteS. 81
The common-law rules against direct restraints on
alienation, the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities,
and the suspension statutes share a common purpose of
keeping property alienable, but their scope is different.
The common-law rules against direct restraints on alienation relate to provisions which would prevent an ascertained, living owner from alienating his own interest in
property. The common-law Rule Against Perpetuities
relates to future interests which indirectly restrain alienation of the full title to property because they are limited
to persons unborn, who cannot convey, or on contingencies which are so uncertain as to make the interests
commercially unmarketable. The suspension stautes related primarily to future interests which were inalienable because limited to unborn or unascertained persons
and to interests under trusts which were made inalienable by statute. The suspension statutes, like the com744 (1935), Part One, note 651 supra; Hay v. Le Bus, 317 Mich. 698,
27 N.W. (2d) 309 (1947).
3o Part One, notes 107, 244, 245, 297, 298, Part Three, notes 26,
27, supra.
31 Part Three, notes 26, 27, supra.
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mon-law Rule Against Perpetuities, were aimed primarily at indirect restraints on alienation, limitations which
do not in terms prohibit or penalize alienation but which
have the indirect effect of making it difficult or impossible. They were designed to complement, not to supersede, the common-law rules against direct restraints on
alienation.
C. SCOPE AND ARRANGEMENT OF PART THREE

The restrictions on the creation of life estates and remainders thereon imposed by Sections 17, 18, 19, and
21 32 were peculiar to the statutory scheme and will be
discussed in Chapter 19. Because, as has been seen, the
class of interests which suspended the absolute power of
alienation in violation of Sections 14 and 15 33 did not
coincide in all respects with the class of interests which
suspend vesting in violation of the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities, 34 Chapter 20 will be devoted to
discussion of the types of limitations which could suspend
the absolute power of alienation. As the period of suspension of the absolute power of alienation permitted by
Sections 15 and 16 differs from the period of suspension
of vesting permitted by the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities, the computation of the statutory period will
be discussed in Chapter 21.
Although the statutory scheme differed from the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities as to the types o!
interests within its scope and as to the permissible period
of suspension, it was a substitute for the common-law
Rule, and many of the problems which arise under the
common-law Rule arose and were solved in the same way
Part Three, note I supra.

s2
33Jd.
34

Part Three, notes 20, 21, 23, supra.
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under the statutes. The effect of destructibility of an
interest, discussed in Chapter I 0/ 5 was similar under the
statutory scheme to what it is under the common-law
Rule. 36 Under the common-law Rule it has to be absolutely certain that an interest cannot vest at a time beyond the period of Rule, 37 and under the statutes it had
to be absolutely certain that a suspension of the absolute
power of alienation would not last longer than the statutory period. 38 When vesting was significant under the
statutory scheme, the rules of vesting were the same as
under the common-law Rule. Hence all of Chapter II
has relevance to Part Three. The rules as to what constitutes a class gift, the composition of classes, and their
closing were the same under the statutory scheme as at
common law, so Chapter I2 is relevant to Part Three
in these respects. The statutory definitions of absolute
powers of revocation and disposition, discussed in Chapter I3, 39 applied under the statutory scheme. The application of the statutory scheme to charities has already
Part Two at notes 69-81, supra.
Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§5584 (1928); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1]"14 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952). But the doctrine of destructibility
under the statutes differs from that under the common-law Rule in
several important respects. Chapter 20, Subsection B (3), infra.
37 Part Two, notes 122-124, 130, 131, supra.
38 Chaplin, SusPENSION oF THE PowER oF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§51,
131, 132 (1928); Walsh, FUTURE EsTATES IN NEW YoRK, §§26, 30 (1931);
PRoPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1]"1]"30-32, (1944); Chapter 21,
Section B, infra. Thus the conclusive presumption that every person
is capable of having issue as long as he lives applied under the statutes
as at common law. Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489
(1922), Part Two, note 145 supra; PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch.
A, 1]"31, Ch. B, 1]"56 (1944). Similarly, the general rule that events
occurring before the time when certainty is required can be considered in determining certainty but events occurring after that time
cannot (Part Two, notes 125-129, supra) applied under the statutes;
Chaplin, id., §§89-92; PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1T1T29, 30,
Ch. B, 1]"56 (1944), Chapter 21, Section B, infra.
39 Part Two, notes 304-307, supra.
35

36
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been discussed in Chapter 15.40 The statutes regulating
accumulations, which the New York revisers treated as
an integral part of the statutory scheme, have been covered in Chapter 16. The consequences of violation of
Sections 14 and 15 41 have been discussed in Chapter
17. These and other problems arising under the
Statutory scheme which have been adequately covered in
Part Two will not be treated in Part Three other than
by cross-references to the relevant discussions.
40

n

Part Two, notes 404, 406, 407, 412, 423, 437, 438, supra.
Part Three, note I supra.

CHAPTER

19

The Restrictions on Life Estates
ECTIONS 17, 18, 19, and 21 of Chapter 62 of the
Revised Statutes of 1846 42 imposed several restrictions, unknown to the common law/ 3 upon the creation of estates for life 44 in land and the limitation of remainders thereon. Section 16 of Chapter 63 provides,

S

"Every express trust, valid as such in its creation, except as herein otherwise provided, shall vest the whole
estate in the trustees, in law and in equity, subject only
to the execution of the trust; and the person for whose
benefit the trust was created, shall take no estate or interest in the lands, but may enforce the performance of
the trust in equity." 45
In consequence, the interest of a life beneficiary under
a trust is not an "estate for life" within the meaning of
Sections 17, 18, 19, and 21 of Chapter 62, and those sections imposed no restrictions on the creation of beneficial
interests under trusts; they related only to legal life
estates. 46 It should be borne in mind, however, that the
42 Part Three, note 1 supra.
43 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[22 (1944).
See: Chene
v. Bank of Michigan, Walk. Ch. 511 (Mich. 1844).
44 As to the meaning of the term "estate for life" and the various
types of life estates, see Part One, supra, at note 234.
45 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §16, Comp. Laws (1857) §2646; Comp.
Laws (1871) §4129; Comp. Laws (1897) §8844; How. Stat., §5578;
Comp. Laws (1915) §11580; Comp. Laws (1929) §12982; Mich. Stat.
Ann., §26.66; Comp. Laws (1948) §555.16. As the Revised Statutes of
1846 constituted a single act, all of their provisions must be construed
together. Brayton v. Merithew, 56 Mich. 166, 22 N.W. 259 (1885).
4 6 Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900); Sprague
v. Moore, 130 Mich. 92, 89 N.W. 712 (1902); Ward v. Ward, 163
Mich. 570, 128 N.W. 761 (1910); Re Wager's Estate, 295 Mich. 463,
295 N.W. 227 (1940); McGraw v. McGraw, 176 Fed. 312 (6th Cir.
1910) (affirming decree of U.S. Circuit Court, E. Dist., Mich., Harlan,
Circuit Justice); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[26, Ch. B.
1[56 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.96 (1952).
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interest of a trustee is a legal estate. If the trustee's interest was an estate for life or a remainder following legal
estates for life, it was subject to the restrictions of Sections 17, 18, 19, and 21, and its invalidity could affect
other interests. 47
Section 17 prohibited the limitation of successive
estates for life, "unless to persons in being at the creation
thereof," and Section 21, which is still in force, 48 provides
that "No estate for life shall be limited as a remainder on
a term of years, except to a person in being at the creation
of such estate." Downing v. Birney 49 involved a deed
which, as construed by the Court, limited land to Loramie Spicer for life, remainder to her children for life,
remainder to Lorainie in fee. At the date of the conveyance Lorainie had two children, Mary and Diana, and
two more were born later. Diana predeceased her
mother. It was held that, as the interests limited to the
children followed that of their mother, there were "successive life estates" involved within the meaning of Section 17 and that, under that section, the children born
after the date of the conveyance could not take. The
47 PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[26 (1944); Whiteside, id.
Thus, if land was conveyed to James Thol'{le for the life of Lucy
Baker, upon trust for Lucy, with legal remamder to John Stiles for
life, remainder to his children in fee, the remainder to John Stiles
was void under Section 18, which provided, "No remainder shall be
created upon an estate for the life of any other person or persons than
the grantee or devisee of such estate, unless such remainder be in
fee; ... " As Professor Whiteside and the Restatement have observed,
the New York courts have sometimes failed to note this effect of the
section.
48 Section 21 was not included in the general repeal of the statutory
scheme effected by Act 38, P.A. 1949, §2, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2),
Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52. As to the possibility that the scope of
Section 21 was extended to include limitations of chattels personal by
Act 227, P.A. 1949, see Part Two, note 184 supra.
49 117 Mich. 675, 76 N.W. 125 (1898). The language of the conveyance was partially construed on an earlier appeal, Downing v. Birney,
112 Mich. 474, 70 N.W. 1006 (1897), Part One, note 90 supra.
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Court ruled that Mary and Diana took separate life
estates, each in an undivided half of the land, and that
Lorainie's life estate merged with her remainder in fee,
as to half, on the death of Diana. It is to be noted that
this decision seems to have treated the statute as altering
the normal rules governing the closing of classes, under
which the class "children of Lorainie" would not close
until some member of it was entitled to possession, which
was at the death of Lorainie. 50 This construction of the
statute made it possible to treat the limitation to the
children as valid.
In Rozell v. Rozell,"1 a testatrix devised a 160-acre tract
of land to her son Cass for life, remainder to the children
of Cass for life, remainder to the heirs of such children in
fee. At the time when the litigation arose, Cass had five
children, four of whom were born before the death of
the testatrix and one of whom was born four months
thereafter. The Court said that a child en ventre sa mere
is "in being" within the meaning of Section 17 but that
the limitation of life estates to the children of Cass was
void because the class would not close until the death of
Cass and so children of Cass not in being at the death of
the testatrix might take. This decision would seem to
overrule Downing v. Birney on the question of whether
Section 17 alters the normal rules as to the closing of
classes.
As Section 21 is still in force, it must be considered in
legal drafting. If Andrew Baker conveys land to John
Stiles for life, remainder to the children of John for life,
the remainder would violate Section 17, as construed in
Rozell v. Rozell. But Section 17 has been repealed, so
such a remaiD;der may now be limited. If, however, the
5o Part Two, notes 275, 276, supra.
s1217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922).
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conveyance is to John Stiles for ten years if he shall so
long live, remainder to the children of John for life, the
remainder is void under Section 21 because the interest
of the children is a "remainder on a term of years;" the
class "children of John" will not close until the expiration of ten years or the earlier death of John and so may
include children not in being at the testator's death. It
should be noted that in neither example given in this
paragraph would the remainder for life suspend either
vesting or the absolute power of alienation for longer
than a life in being.
The statutes under consideration did not prevent the
limitation of estates for life to persons not in being except in the two situations mentioned in Sections 17 and
21, successive estates for life and remainders on estates
for years. If Andrew Baker conveyed land to James
Thorpe and his heirs, "but if James dies without issue
alive at the time of his death, remainder to the children
of John Stiles for life," the remainder was valid under
the statutes. 52 The interest of James was an estate in fee
simple subject to defeasance, so the remainder to the
children of John was neither a "successive estate for life"
within the meaning of Section 17 nor a "remainder on a
term of years" within the meaning of Section 21.
In addition to prohibiting the limitation of successive
estates for life to persons not in being, Section 17 provided, "when a remainder shall be limited on more than
two successive estates for life, all the life estates subsequent to those of the two persons first entitled thereto,
shall be void, and upon the death of those persons, the
remainder shall take effect, in the same manner as if no
other life estate had been created." 53 The most difficult
App., Ch. A, 1!23, Ill. 10 (1944).
Part Three, note I supra.

52 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
53
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problem of construction of this section which arose was
that of what constituted "successive estates for life." As
has been seen, the interests of beneficiaries under trusts,
whether concurrent or successive, were not "estates for
life" within the meaning of the section. 5 4 If a trust could
not last longer than two lives in being, it did not violate
Section 15, and Section 17 did not limit the number of
successive beneficiaries. If John Stiles devised land to
James Thorpe and his heirs upon trust "to pay the entire
net income to my wife for her life, then to pay the net
income to my children in equal shares and upon the
death of each child, to pay his share in the income to his
children in equal shares, but upon the death of my two
youngest grandchildren living at the time of my death
the trust shall terminate and the trustee shall convey the
land to my issue then in being," all of the provisions of
the devise were valid under both the suspension sections
( 14 and 15) and Section 17, even if John had ten children
and each of them had children.
It is clear that if Andrew Baker devised land to Lucy
Baker for life, remainder to James Thorpe for life, remainder to John Stiles for life, remainder to the children
of John in fee, successive estates for life were involved
and that of John was void under Section 17. Thus in
Hovey v. Nellis/ 5 a testator devised land to his widow
for life, remainder to his son for life, remainder to the
son's wife for life, remainder to the son's children in fee.
The remainder to the son's wife was a third successive
estate for life and so void under the statute. Similarly, in
Rozell v. Rozell/ 6 a testatrix devised a 143-acre tract of
Part Three, note 46 supra.
98 Mich. 374, 57 N.W. 255 (1894).
se 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922). The remainder to the children of Cass also violated the provision against successive life estates
to unborn persons. Part Three, note 51 supra. See also Downing v.
Birney, Part Three, note 49 supra.
54
5s
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land to her daughter Sarah for life, remainder to her son
Cass for life, remainder to the children of Cass for life,
remainder to the heirs of such children in fee. The remainder to the children of Cass for life followed two
prior life estates and so was void under the statute.
It is equally clear that concurrent life estates in separate shares of the same land, without cross-remainders
to the survivors, are not "successive life estates." In
Woolfitt v. Preston/ 7 a testatrix devised land to her
daughter Claudia for life, remainder to Martha and
Florence for life, remainder to Helen and Ruth in fee. It
was held that this was a valid disposition of an undivided
half to Claudia for life, remainder to Martha for life,
remainder to Helen and Ruth in fee, and of the other
undivided half to Claudia for life, remainder to Florence for life, remainder to Helen and Ruth in fee.
The situation which has caused real difficulty is that
of concurrent life estates in the same land with crossremainders to the survivors and survivor of a group. This
situation arises if Andrew Baker devises land to Lucy
Baker, Roger White, and John Stiles, in equal shares,
remainder on the death of any of these three to the
survivors and survivor for life, remainder on the death
of the survivor of the three to James Thorpe and his
heirs. In this situation the New York decisions are
to the effect that successive life estates are involved.
If Lucy Baker dies first and Roger White next, the
remainder in Lucy's third to Roger and John is good,
but the remainder to John on the death of Roger fails
as to the half of Lucy's third which passed to Roger
s1 203 Mich. 502, 169 N.W. 838 (1918). Accord: Felt v. Methodist
Educational Advance, 247 Mich. 168, 225 N.W. 545 (1929), Part Three,
note 62 infra. Cf. Le Baron v. Shepherd, 21 Mich. 263 (1870).
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on her death. 58 Michigan took a different approach. In
Case v. Green/ 9 land was conveyed to Hiram Case and
Rebecca, his wife, for their lives, remainder after their
deaths to Adelbert Case for life. The life estate of Adelbert was treated as valid, apparently on the theory that
the interest of Hiram and Rebecca was a single estate for
the life of the survivor. Similarly, in Truitt v. City of
Battle CreekJ 60 land was leased to Oliver Beauregard and
his wife for life. On the same day the lessor conveyed
the reversion to Truitt. Later Truitt conveyed the reversion to his mother, who reconveyed to Truitt for life,
remainder to his heirs in fee. It was held that Truitt's
life estate was not invalid as a third successive estate for
life because the interest of Beauregard and wife was a
single estate by the entirety for the life of the survivor.
In Kemp v. Sutton/ 1 a testator devised land to his wife
and four sons "for and during their said natural lives,"
the wife to have a third of the income during her life,
the sons to share the balance equally, and the survivors
and survivor to take the whole, remainder on the death
of the survivor to the City of Sault Ste. Marie. It was
held that the whole disposition was valid; that the wife
arid sons took a single joint life estate for the life of the
survivor rather than separate life estates with crossremainders to the survivors and survivor. In Felt v.
ss Purdy v. Hayt, 92 N.Y. 446 (1883); In re Soley's Estate, 150
Misc. 839, 271 N.Y. Supp. 595 (1934); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App.,
Ch. A, ~24, (1944).
59 78 Mich. 540, 44 N.W. 578 (1889). See also Russell v. Musson,
240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927).
6o 205 Mich. 180, 171 N.W. 338 (1919), reversed on other grounds,
208 Mich. 618, 175 N.W. 578 (1920).
61 233 Mich. 249, 206 N.W. 366 (1925). Accord: Jones v. Snyder,
218 Mich. 446, 188 N.W. 505 (1922). Cf. Root v. Snyder, 161 Mich.
200, 126 N.W. 206 (1910).
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Methodist Educational Advance/2 a testator devised a
farm to his wife for life, then,
"I give, devise and bequeath to my children, Joseph
Elwell, George W. Elwell, and Rhody Conant, the use,
improvement and income of my--- farm ---from and
after the decease of my wife - - -, to have and to hold the
same to the said Joseph Elwell, George W. Elwell and
Rhody Conant for and during the term of their natural
lives, - - - the same to be equally divided among them if
requested by all or either of them; and from and immediately after the decease of the said Joseph Elwell,
George W. Elwell and Rhody Conant, or either of them,
the share set off to such deceased heir, I give, devise and
bequeath to the heirs of said deceased heir, for him, her
or them and their heirs and assigns forever."
The ultimate remainders were held valid in an opinion stating, "Our later cases hold that the devise of a life
estate to a class collectively creates an estate for one life
only, that of the 'longest liver' of the class, - - -." This
language was unnecessary to the decision. In this case as
in Woolfitt v. Preston/ 3 there were no cross-remainders
to the survivors and survivor. As to each third there was
a life estate in the widow, a second successive life estate
in a child, and a remainder in fee to the heirs of the
child. The result was correct but the reasoning unsound.
Section 18 prohibited a remainder for life on an
estate pur autre vie.64 If Andrew Baker devised land
to Lucy Baker for the life of Roger White, remainder
to John Stiles for life, John's remainder was void although it was only the second successive estate for life. 65
247 Mich. 168, 225 N.W. 545 (1929).
Part Three, note 57 supra.
Part Three, note 1 supra. As to estates pur autre vie see Part
One, supra, at notes 234, 235, 238-241, 243.
65 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1T25
(1944); Whiteside,
"Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations,'' 6 AMERICAN LAw
OF PROPERTY, §25.95 (1952).
s2

63
64

THE RESTRICTIONS ON LIFE ESTATES

501

Section 19 provided that if a remainder was limited on
an estate pur autre vie measured by more than two lives,
the remainder should become possessory upon the expiration of the second life named. 66 If Andrew Baker devised land to Lucy Baker and her heirs for the lives of
James Thorpe, Roger White, and Thomas Kempe, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs, John's remainder
would become possessory upon the deaths of James and
Roger. It should be noted, however, that Section 19 did
not abbreviate an estate pur autre vie measured by more
than two lives unless there was a remainder limited on
it. If Andrew Baker conveyed land to Lucy Baker and
her heirs for the lives of James Thorpe, Roger White,
Thomas Kempe, and Edward Willis, the limitation was
fully effective, and Andrew's reversion did not become
possessory until James, Roger, Thomas, and Edward
had died. 67
Estates pur autre vie unconnected with trusts have
been uncommon here, but the duration of a trustee's
estate is sometimes measured by the lives of the trust
66 Part Three, notes 1, 65, supra. As Professor Whiteside observed,
it is inferable that the measuring lives had to be those of persons in
being.
67 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1!25 (1944). Cf. In re
McBride's Estate, 253 Mich. 305, 235 N.W. 166 (1931). All of the restrictions on the creation of life estates were relatively narrow in scope and
could be avoided quite easily by a skillful draftsman. For example, in
Young v. Young, 255 Mich. 173, 237 N.W. 535 (1931), Part One, note
608 supra, land was devised to a trustee to pay the income to the
testator's two children for ten years if they should so long live, remainder to the children or the survivor of them for life, remainder
on the death of the survivor to their issue. This was treated as wholly
valid. Suspension of the absolute power of alienation would certainly
cease on the death of the surviving child, so Sections 14 and 15 (Part
Three, note 1 supra) were not violated. The trustee's estate was a
term of years, so there were neither more than two successive estates
for life within the meaning of Section 17, nor a remainder for life
on an estate pur autre vie within the meaning of Section 18. All
interests would vest on the death of the survivor of the two children,
so Section 20 was not violated. The children were persons in being
so their estates did not offend Section 21.
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beneficiaries. Sections 18 and 19 could cause trouble in
such situations. If Andrew Baker devised land to James
Thorpe for the life of Lucy Baker, upon trust for Lucy,
with legal remainder to John Stiles for life, remainder
to his children in fee, it would seem that the remainder
to John was void under Section 18.68 Similarly, if Andrew Baker devised land to James Thorpe for the lives
of Lucy Baker, Roger White, and John Stiles, upon trust
to pay the income to Lucy, Roger, and John, and the
survivor and survivors of them, legal remainder on the
death of the survivor to the children of John Stiles in
fee, it would seem that although the interests of Lucy,
Roger, and John were not "successive estates for life"
within the meaning of Section 17,69 the remainder would
have to take effect, if at all, under Section 19, on the
deaths of Lucy and Roger although John was still alive.
On the other hand, if the estate of the trustee was a fee
simple, Sections 18 and 19 would not affect these dispositions at all. If Andrew Baker devised land to James
Thorpe and his heirs upon trust to pay the income to
Lucy Baker, Roger White, and John Stiles, and the survivors and survivor of them until the death of the survivor, and then to convey the land to the children of
John Stiles in fee, Section 19 would have no application
if the estate of James was a fee simple. 70 Under the decision in Kemp v. Sutton 71 and the dictum in Felt v.
Methodist Educational Advance/2 the trust would not
suspend the absolute power of alienation for more than
a single life, so the disposition would be wholly effective.
Sections 17 and 19 73 expressly provided that a ress Part Three, note 47 supra.
Part Three, note 46 supra.
70 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[26 (1944).
n Part Three, note 61 supra.
12 Part Three, note 62 supra. But see Chapter 21, Section C (3),
infra.
73 Part Three, note 1 supra.
69
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mainder in fee subsequent to a life estate which was
void or abbreviated under these sections should not fail
but should be accelerated as to the time at which it
became possessory. If the remaindermen in fee were
ascertainable at the time when they became entitled to
possession under these sections, the remainder did take
effect at that time. 74 If Andrew. Baker devised land to
Lucy Baker for life, remainder to Roger White for life,
remainder to James Thorpe for life, remainder to John
Stiles and his heirs, the remainder of John was effective
and became possessory on the deaths of Lucy and Roger.
If, however, the remaindermen were not ascertainable
at the time when the statutes entitled them to possession, the remainder failed. 75 If Andrew Baker devised
land to Lucy Baker for life, remainder to Roger White
for life, remainder to John Stiles for life, remainder in
fee to the issue of John Stiles in being at the death of
John, John's life estate was void and the remainder to
his issue failed if he survived Lucy and Roger.
Even if one approves of the statutes prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation, the additional restrictions on the creation of life estates imposed
by the statutory scheme appear unnecessary and a trap
for the unwary conveyancer. Now that the suspension
statutes and the other restrictions on life estates have
been repealed, the retention of Section 21 would seem
to have no possible justification. It, too, should be repealed.
74 Hovey v. Nellis, 98 Mich. 374, 57 N.W. 255 (1894), Part Three,
note 55 supra; Downing v. Birney, 117 Mich. 675, 76 N.W. 125 (1898),
Part Three, note 49 supra; PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[24
(1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations,"
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.94 (1952)
1s Purdy v. Hayt, 92 N.Y. 446, (1883); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App.,
Ch. A, 1[24 (1944); Whiteside, id. See: Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich.
324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922).
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What Suspends the
Absolute Power of Alienation?
ECTION 14 of Chapter 62, Revised Statutes of
1846, provided, "the absolute power of alienation
. . . is suspended when there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed." 76 Such suspension can be caused by (1) an indestructible future interest, (2) an indestructible power,
and (3) an indestructible trust. These three forms of
suspension will be considered in the following sections
of this chapter.

S

A. INDESTRUCTIBLE FUTURE INTERESTS

A limitation of an indestructible future interest to a
person or corporation not in being suspends the absolute power of alienation. 77 Such a person or corporation
cannot convey his or its interest, so "there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute fee in possession
can be conveyed." If Andrew Baker devises land to
76 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §14, Comp. Laws (1857) §2598; Comp.
Laws (1871) §4081; Comp. Laws (1897) §8796; How. Stat., §5530;
Comp. Laws (1915) §11532; Comp. Laws (1929) §12934; Mich. Stat.
Ann., §26.14; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.14. Repealed, Act 38, P.A.
1949, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 {2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52.
7 7 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §576 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, ff10 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rulea:
Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PRoPERTY,
§§25.8, 25.39 (1952). Cf. Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575,
2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942) (Corporation not in being). Future interests
of persons not in being are subject to sale under court order on a
showing that the rights of interested parties would otherwise be jeopardized [Part One, note 283 supra; Garrison v. Hecker, 128 Mich. 539,
89 N.W. 642 (1901)] but this does not prevent their suspending the
absolute power of alienation.
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John Stiles, who has no children, for life, remainder to
the first son of John, the absolute power of alienation
is suspended until John has a son. Similarly, a limitation of an indestructible future interest to a class, the
membership of which may possibly include a person or
corporation not presently in being, suspends the absolute power of alienation. 78 If Andrew Baker devises
land to John Stiles for life, remainder to the children
of John, the absolute power of alienation is suspended
until the death of John because children who were not
in being when the conveyance took effect may become
members of the class. In Trufant v. Nunneley/ 9 a testator devised three tracts of land, each to a named child
for the life of that child. A later clause of the will devised the three tracts to "the body heirs of my said son
and daughters, share and share alike." It was held that
the latter limitation suspended the absolute power of
alienation for three lives. The "body heirs" of the three
children might include persons who came into being
after the deaths of the first two.
A limitation of an indestructible future interest to a
7 8 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §210
(1928); Powell & Whiteside, THE STATUTES oF THE STATE OF NEw
YoRK CONCERNING PERPETUmEs AND RELATED MATTERS, 61 (New
York Legislative Document (1936) No. 65 (H)]; PROPERTY REsTATE·
MENT, App., Ch. A, 1'[10 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §§25.8,
25.39 (1952).
79 106 Mich. 554, 64 N.W. 469 (1895). See also: Paton v. Langley,
50 Mich. 428, 15 N.W. 537 (1883); Farrand v. Petit, 84 Mich. 671, 48
N.W. 156 (1891); Defreese v. Lake, 109 Mich. 415, 67 N.W. 505
(1896); Cole v. Lee, 143 Mich. 267, 106 N.W. 855 (1906); Otis v.
Arntz, 198 Mich. 196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917); Cary v. Toles, 210 Mich.
30, 177 N.W. 279 (1920); Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W.
489 (1922); Russell v. Musson, 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927);
Felt v. Methodist Educational Advance, 247 Mich. 168, 225 N.W. 545
(1929); Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W.
703 (1930); Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W.
760 (1932); In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938).
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person or persons so described that neither the takers
nor the group from among whom the takers are to be
selected are presently ascertainable suspends the absolute power of alienation. 80 No person or group of persons (except the whole populace) can convey the future
interest, so "there are no persons in being, by whom an
absolute fee in possession can be conveyed." If Andrew
Baker devises land to John Stiles for life, remainder to
the person who is Governor of Michigan when John
dies, the absolute power of alienation is suspended until
the death of John.
Vested future interests are, by their nature, owned by
persons who are in being and ascertained. There has
never been any doubt that a vested future interest, not
subject to a trust, does not suspend the absolute power
of alienation.81
The notes of the New York revisers give the impression that they thought that a contingent future interest
suspends the absolute power of alienation, although
limited to a presently ascertainable living person.82 This
would mean that the suspension statutes, like the comLeonard v. Burr, 18 N.Y. 96 at 107 (1858); PROPERTY REsTATEApp., Ch. A, 1T10 & Ill. 3 (1944). Cf. Moss v. Axford, 246 Mich.
288, 224 N.W. 425 (1929), Part Three, note 96 infra.
&1 Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); Chambers v.
Shaw, 52 Mich. 18, 17 N.W. 223 (1883) (vested interest in child en
ventre sa mere); Case v. Green, 78 Mich. 540, 44 N.W. 578 (1889);
Hovey v. Nellis, 98 Mich. 374, 57 N.W. 255 (1894); Hull v. Osborn,
151 Mich. 8, ll3 N.W. 784 (1908); Mcinerny v. Haase, 163 Mich.
364, 128 N.W. 215 (1910); Kemp v. Sutton, 233 Mich. 249, 206 N.W.
366 (1925); Rodey v. Stotz, 280 Mich. 90, 273 N.W. 404 (1937); In re
Dingler's Estate, 319 Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947). The statement in the text should be read with the qualification that a limitation
to a class which may open to admit persons not presently in being or
not presently ascertainable suspends the absolute power of alienation
although the interests of those members of the class who are in
being and ascertained are vested. Part Three, notes 78, 79, supra.
It is not the vested interests which cause the suspension, however, so
the statement in the text is literally accurate.
82 Part Three, note 6 supra.
80
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POWER OF ALIENATION

507

mon-law Rule Against Perpetuities, prohibited remoteness of vesting as such. Because contingent future interests were inalienable at common law,83 their existence
did suspend the absolute power of alienation. But contingent future interests are alienable under the New
York and Michigan statutes,S4 so the existence of such
an interest does not prevent conveyance of an "absolute
fee in possession" if all possible takers are ascertained
living persons. If Andrew Baker conveys land to James
Thorpe and his heirs so long as the Penobscot Building
stands, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs, the interest of John is contingent, but James and John are "persons in being, by whom an absolute fee in possession can
be conveyed." Similarly, if Andrew Baker devises land
to John Stiles, who has four sons, for life, remainder to
that son of John now living who makes the best grades
in college, the remainder is contingent until all of John's
living sons finish college, but John and his four sons are
"persons in being, by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed."
The New York Revised Statutes of 1829 contained
two provisions which expressly prohibited remoteness
of vesting. Sections 20 and 24 provided,
"§20. A contingent remainder shall not be created
on a term of years, unless the nature of the contingency
on which it is limited, be such that the remainder must
vest in interest, during the continuance of not more than
two lives in being at the creation of such remainder, or
upon the termination thereof.
"§24. - - - a fee may be limited on a fee, upon a
Part One, note 359 supra.
N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, Part II, Ch. I, Tit. II, Art. First, §85; Part
One, note 371 supra.
sa

84
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contingency, which, if it should occur, must happen
within the period prescribed in this Article." 85
Accordingly, it has been held in New York that a
future interest in fee limited on a fee is void unless certain to vest within the statutory period, even though
it is limited to an ascertained living person who could
convey it.86 This is not because such a future interest
suspends the absolute power of alienation, but because
Section 24 of the New York statute so provided. The
quoted portion of Section 24 was not adopted in Michigan; the only provision against remoteness of vesting,
as such, in the Michigan statutory scheme being that of
Section 20.
In several of the earlier cases, the Michigan Supreme
Court fell into the same error as the New York revisers
by deeming suspension of the absolute power of alienation synonymous with suspension of vesting. Thus in
Toms v. Williams/ 7 Chief Justice Campbell said,
85 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, Part II, Ch. I, Tit. II, Art. First, §§20, 24;
Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §20, Comp. Laws (1857) §2604; Comp. Laws
(1871) §4087; Comp. Laws (1897) §8802; How. Stat., §5536; Comp.
Laws (1915) §11538; Comp. Laws (1929) §12940; Mich. Stat. Ann.,
§26.20; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.20. Repealed, Act. 38, P.A. 1949,
Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52. The
quoted portion of Section 24 was not adopted in Michigan. It is
arguable that the provision of Section 23 (Part Three, note I supra)
that "the absolute ownership of a term of years, shall not be suspended
for a longer period than the absolute power of alienation can be
suspended, in respect to a fee," prohibited remote vesting of future
interests in chattels real. See: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. B,
ff53 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.40 (1952).
86 Matter of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.W. 497 (1909) (shifting
interest); Walker v. Marcellus and Otisco Lake Ry. Co., 226 N.Y.
347, 123 N.E. 736 (1919) (springing interest); 2 Simes, LAW OF FuTURE
INTERESTS, §567 (1936).
87 41 Mich. 552, at 562, 2 N.W. 814 (1879). Quoted with approval
in Hull v. Osborn, 151 Mich. 8 at 13, 113 N.W. 784 (1908). There is
similar confusion of suspension of the absolute power of alienation
with suspension of vesting in the opinion in Mcinerny v. Haase,
163 Mich. 364 at 368, 128 N.W. 215 (1910). See also opinion of
Champlin, J., in Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355 at 385-386, 36 N.W.
419 (1888).
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"The statutes restricting perpetuities are confined to
avoiding future estates that are made more remote in
their vesting than two lives in being, and such arrangements as serve to postpone them. In all cases where the
application of the rules against perpetuities is invoked,
the character of the interest as vested or otherwise is the
turning consideration. Revisor's note to Part 2, Ch. 1,
New York Revised Statutes."
In one case, State v. Holmes188 the erroneous notion
that a limitation of a contingent future interest to an
ascertained person suspends the absolute power of alienation controlled the decision. There the residue of an
estate was devised to the testator's wife for life, remainder, if the State of Michigan should accept and by
due enactment within five years after the death of the
wife erect a public educational or charitable institution
on the devised land, to the State, otherwise to the testator's grandson. The Court held both limitations in remainder void, saying that a condition precedent suspends the absolute power of alienation and that all of
the parties together could not convey an absolute fee in
possession until the performance of the condition or
the expiration of five years after the widow's death, a
period in gross not permitted by Section 15. 89 This decision was unsound. The limitations in remainder did
suspend vesting for a period which might extend five
years beyond a life in being, but the alternative contingent remainders of the State and the grandson were
88 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898). The decision might be defended under the ancient rule that when property was conveyed to a
public or charitable corporation with a restriction, express or implied,
to use for a public or charitable purpose, the corporation was incapable of alienating the property. Part One, note 219 supra. The
difficulty with this theory is that it would have made all limitations of
present vested interests to public and charitable corporations illegally
suspend the absolute power of alienation, which they did not. Part
Two, notes 396-400, supra.
89 Part Three, note 1 supra.
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alienable, so they could unite to convey an absolute fee
in possession from the moment of the widow's death.
Indeed, the absolute power of alienation was not even
suspended during the widow's lifetime, since she could
join the State and the grandson in a conveyance of the
fee.
The later Michigan decisions make it clear that a contingent future interest does not suspend the absolute
power of alienation if there are persons in being who
can unite to convey an absolute fee in possession; that
suspension of the absolute power of alienation is not
synonymous with suspension of vesting.00 This was first
clearly recognized in Torpy v. Betts/1 where land was
devised to the testator's widow for life, remainder to her
son Frank in fee, on condition that he or his representatives pay $500 to her daughter Grace or her legal representatives. As the Court observed, even if the provision for payment of $500 was a condition precedent to
the vesting of the remainder which might be performed
at a time beyond two lives in being, Frank and Grace
or their issue could convey an absolute fee in possession
after the death of their mother. The opinion stated, "if
an estate must go to persons irl! esse, the power of alienation would never be suspended, as, by joining, the owners of the various estates could always convey the fee." 92
In Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids,93 a testatrix devised
9o 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §576 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, 1f53 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules:
Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY,
§25.40 (1952). See: Brake, "Satisfying Michigan's Perpetuity Rules,''
5 UNIV. OF DETROIT L.J. 160 at 176 (1942).
91 123 Mich. 239, 81 N.W. 1094 (1900).
There were alternative
contingent limitations of the remainder in the event of Frank's predeceasing his mother without surviving issue (I) to Grace, (2) if Grace
predeceased her mother without surviving issue, as .the mother should
appoint.
92 123 Mich. 239 at 243.
93 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900).
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her homestead to her executor to convey to the city, if
it would agree to maintain a free public library thereon
forever, such conveyance to be subject to a provision that
if the premises were used for other purposes or not used
for library purposes for three years, the land should ''revert" to named legatees. If the city should not agree to
those terms, the executor was directed to sell the land
and pay the proceeds to the named legatees. These provisions were held valid, the Court saying, "If there are
in existence persons who, by joining in a conveyance or
by successive releases, are able to pass the whole estate,
the requirements of the statute are met." 94 This decision
would seem to overrule that in State v. H olmes/ 5 where
the limitations were virtually identical.
In Russell v. Mussont, 96 land was devised to Guy and
Clara, his wife, jointly, for their lives, remainder to the
children of Guy surviving him. After the deaths of Guy
and Clara, if Guy died without children, the land was
devised to Josiah and Hannah in equal shares in fee,
charged with support of their mother. If Josiah or Hannah should die without issue, his share was to pass to
the survivor, and if both should die without issue, the
94123 Mich. 281 at 283. In Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, at
534, 211 N.W. 62 (1926) it was held that a perpetual option to purchase did not suspend the absolute power of alienation, "because at
all times there were persons in being by whom an absolute fee in
possession could have been conveyed."
9s Part Three, note 88 supra.
96 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927).
In Moss v. Axford, 246
Mich. 288, 224 N.W. 425 (1929), testatrix devised the residue of her
estate to her executor "with the instructions to pay the same to the
person who has given me the best care in my declining years and who
in his opinion is the most worthy of my said property." This probably suspended vesting until the executor designated the residuary
legatee and no measuring lives were specified, but it was held valid, the
Court saying, "The will provided no restriction on alienation. The
beneficiary, whoever it might be, was in being, and she and the trustee
could have conveyed an absolute fee at any time." This was correct
if it be assumed that the class of persons from which the executor
could select was ascertainable.
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land was to pass to their mother, Sarah, in fee. This disposition of the ultimate remainder suspended vesting for
three lives, those of Guy, Josiah, and Hannah, but it was
held valid because it did not suspend the absolute power
of alienation beyond the life of Guy. On his death Clara
and his children could convey a fee or, if there were no
children, Clara, Josiah, Hannah, and Sarah could together convey an absolute fee in possession.
Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker 97 involved the validity
of a will which devised land to the testatrix's husband
until his death or remarriage, remainder to a trustee to
convert the land into money and hold the money on trust
for various persons. In holding that the direction to convert prevented suspension of the absolute power of alienation for more than one life, the Qourt said,
"It must be kept in mind that, while the rule against
perpetuities applies to future interests in both real and
personal property, it has nothing to do with the statutory
prohibition against suspension of power of alienation.
The rule requires vesting of estates within a period,
while the statute prohibits inalienability beyond a
period; the rule is a restraint only upon future interests
and has no concern with present interests; the statute
reaches vested estates in real property but shorn of alienability." 98

In Rodey v. Stotz/9 . a will provided that the testator's
nephew Adolph should have the use, income benefit,
and control of property devised to Adolph's children
until the youngest of the children attained the age of
twenty-one, and that the testator's nephew Fred should
have like enjoyment of property devised to Fred's chil226 Mich.
226 Mich.
National Bank
99 280 Mich.
97

98

72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924).
72 at 76-77. Quoted with approval in Gardner v. City
& Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270 at 287, 255 N.W. 587 (1934).
90, 273 N.W. 404 (1937).
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dren until the youngest of these attained the age of
twenty-one. Subject to these provisions, all the property
was devised to four named children of Adolph and four
named children of Fred, share and share alike. The
Court, in holding that the remainders vested in the eight
children of the nephews on the death of the testator and
that the dispositions were fully valid, said,
"There is no suspension of the power of alienation
when there are ascertainable persons in being, who together can convey an absolute fee or interest in possession
and this whether their interests are vested or contingent---.
"---The question, however, is raised whether 3 Comp.
Laws 1929, §§12934, 12935, 100 lay down a rule as to
remoteness of vesting in addition to a rule regarding the
suspension of the power of alienation. This question is
raised and answered in 2 Simes, Future Interests, p.48l,
in which it is stated:
" 'Is the power of alienation illegally suspended if
there is a contingent future interest which may not vest
within lives in being, even though there is a group of
ascertained persons who may alienate in fee simple absolute? In other words, do these statutes lay down, not
merely a rule as to the legal power of alienation, but also
a rule as to remoteness of vesting? While the matter is
not free from doubt, it would seem that the statutes are
not regarded as announcing any rule as to remoteness of
vesting.' " 101
As has been seen, because courts of equity will compel
specific performance of irrevocable options concerning
land, an option to purchase land or to renew a lease is,
in reality, an equitable future interest which is contingent upon notice and payment of the price or rent. 102 As
the optionor and optionee can unite to convey an abStat. 1846. c. 62, §§14, 15, Part Three, note 1 supra.
280 Mich. 90 at 95, 99-100.
102 Part Two, notes 362, 364, supra.

1oo Rev.
101
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solute fee in possession, an option does not suspend the
absolute power of alienation within the meaning of Section 14.108 Section 20, however, prohibited a contingent
remainder on a term of years unless the nature of the
contingency was such that the remainder must vest in
interest within two lives in being.1 Moreover, Section
24 of the New York statute prohibited a contingent limitation on a fee upon a contingency which might not
occur within the statutory period.105 It is arguable that
an option to renew a lease is a contingent remainder
on a term of years within the meaning of Section 20 and
that an option to purchase the fee is a contingent limitation of a fee on a fee. Nevertheless, in both New York
and Michigan, options to purchase and to renew leases,
not limited in duration to two lives in being, were held
valid. 106
Reversions are vested future interests. 107 Possibilities
of reverter and rights of entry on breach of condition
subsequent are, in some sense, contingent future interests.108 These interests do not suspend the absolute power
of alienation because they are always held by living persons who can unite with the owner of the fee subject to
(}4

1 oa Part Three, notes I, 76, supra. Chaplin, SusPENSION OF THE PowER
OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §179 (1928).
1o4 Part Three, note 85 supra.
1o5 Idem.
1os Option to purchase fee: Matter of City of New York, 246 N.Y. l,
549, 157 N.E. 911, 159 N.E. 646 (1927), cert. den., 276 U.S. 603 (1928),
Part Two, note 370 supra; Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211
N.W. 62 (1926), Part Two, note 369 supra; Michigan cases cited in
Part Two, notes 370, 372, supra; PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A,
1[12 (1944). Option to renew lease: Burns v. City of New York, 213
N.Y. 516, 108 N.E. 77 (1915); Stender v. Kerreos, 156 Mich. 499, 121
N.W. 258 (1909), Part Two, note 375 supra; Gould v. Harley, 215
Mich. 234, 183 N.W. 705 (1921), Part Two, note 377 supra; Michigan
cases cited in Part Two, note 373 supra; Chaplin, SusPENSION OF THE
PowER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §396 (1928).
101 Part Two, note 332 supra.
1os Part Two, notes 336, 342, supra.
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them to convey an absolute fee in possession.
Mortgages and land contracts do not suspend the absolute
power of alienation so long as the parties thereto can join
to convey an absolute fee in possession. 110
It would seem that the absolute power of alienation
is not suspended, within the meaning of Section 14, by a
limitation of a present or future interest, otherwise alienable, to a person who, by reason of some personal incapacity, such as infancy or insanity, does not have normal power to convey land.m At common law, when
property was conveyed to a public or charitable corporation with a restriction, express or implied, to use for the
corporate purposes or some of them, the corporation was
incapable of alienating the property.112 A literal application of Sections 14 and 15 113 might make void all such
conveyances in mortmain. Yet direct conveyances and
devises of land to public and charitable corporations for
corporate purposes have always been valid in both New
York and Michigan/ 14 probably because the power to
receive and hold land for their corporate purposes conferred upon such corporations by statute was looked
109

1oD Part Two, notes 339, 346, 347, supra; Chaplin, SusPENSION OF
THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§182, 212, 213, 392-394 (1928);
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.9.
110 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§214,
215 (1928).
111 Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642, 134 N.W. 987
(1912)
(minor); Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed.,
§§47, 49, 50 (1928); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and
Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §§25.7, 25.39 (1952).
112 Part One, note 219 supra.
113 Part Three, notes 1, 76, supra.
114 Bird v. Merklee, 144 N.Y. 544, 39 N.E. 645 (1895); Michigan
cases cited in Part Two, notes 396-400, supra; Chaplin, SusPENSION OF
THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §510 (1928); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, ~55 (1944). A direct conveyance or devise to a
charitable corporation must be distinguished from a charitable trust,
which received very different treatment under the statutes. Part Two,
note 406 supra; PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, ~55 (1944).
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upon as exempting interests limited to them from the
operation of the suspension statutes. Michigan legislation of 1907 and later made it clear that such dispositions were not invalidated by the suspension statutes. 115
Section 14 provided, "Every future estate shall be void
in its creation, which shall suspend the absolute power
of alienation for a longer period than is prescribed in
this chapter; - - -." 116 This made it clear that a future
interest which violated the suspension statutes, like a
future interest which violated the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities, was wholly void, not merely invalid
as to the excess.117 The effect of such invalidity on the
title to the property in which the void interest was
limited and upon other limitations in the same conveyance or will was the same as the effect of an interest being
invalid under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.118 This being so, the consequences of violation of
the suspension statutes and those of violation of the common-law Rule have been treated together in Chapter
17.
B. POWERS

(1) Powers Which Cause Suspension
The Michigan law of powers over land was codified
by Chapter 64 of the Revised Statutes of 1846, 119 which
us Part Two, notes 400, 421, 423, 427, 428, supra.

Part Three, notes I, 76, supra.
2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §566 (1936).
118 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1!1!40, 70 (1944).
119 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2658 to 2719; Comp.
Laws (1871) §§4141 to 4202; Comp Laws (1897) §§8856 to 8917; How.
Stat., §§5590 to 5651; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11592 to 11653; Comp.
Laws (1929) §§12995 to 13056; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.91 to 26.152;
Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.1 to 556.62. The following sections are
pertinent to the present discussion.
"§2. A power is an authority to do some act in relation to lands,
or the creation of estates therein, or of charges thereon, which the
116
117
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owner granting or reserving such power, might himself lawfully
perform.
§4. Powers, as authorized in this chapter, are general or special,
and beneficial or in trust.
§5. A power is general, when it authorizes the alienation in fee,
by means of a conveyance, will or charge of the land embraced
in the power, to any alienee whatever.
§6. A power is special,
1. When the person or class of persons, to whom the disposition
of the lands under the power is to be made, are designated:
2. When the power authorizes the alienation, by means of a
conveyance, will or charge, of a particular estate or interest less
than a fee.
§7. A general or special power is beneficial when no person
other than the grantee has, by the terms of its creation, any interest in its execution.
§22. A general power is in trust when any person or class of
persons, other than the grantee of such power, is designated as
entitled to the proceeds, or any portion of the proceeds or other
benefits to arise from the alienation of the lands, according to
the power.
§23. A special power is in trust,
1. When the disposition which it authorizes, is limited to be
made to any particular person or class of persons, other than the
grantee of such power:
2. When any person or class of persons, other than the grantee,
is entitled to any benefit from the disposition or charge authorized
by the power.
§24. Every trust power, unless its execution or non-execution
is made expressly to depend on the will of the grantee, is imperative, and imposes a duty on the grantee, the performance of which
may be compelled in equity for the benefit of the parties interested.
§25. A trust power does not cease to be imperative when the
grantee has the right to select any, and exclude others of the
persons designated as the objects of the trust.
§26. When a disposition under a power is directed to be made
to, or among, or between several persons, without any specification
of the share or sum to be allotted to each, all the persons designated shall be entitled to an equal proportion.
§27. But when the terms of the power import that the estate or
fund is to be distributed between the persons so designated, in
such manner or proportions as the trustee of the power may think
proper, the trustee may allot the whole to any one or more of
such persons, in exclusion of the others.
§28. If the trustee of a power, with the right of selection, shall
die leaving the power unexecuted, its execution shall be decreed
in the court of chancery for the benefit equally of all the persons
designated as objects of the trust.
§29. When a power in trust is created by will, and the testator
has omitted to designate by whom the power is to be executed,
its execution shall devolve on the court of chancery.
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was adopted from the New York Revised Statutes of
1829 120 and is still in force. This codification differs
from the common-law rules 121 as to terminology m and,
to a lesser extent, as to substance. Whereas at common
law the term "power in trust" is equivalent to "imperative power," the statutes extend the term "power in
trust" to include all powers which are not beneficial solely to the donee and all powers under which the donee
cannot appoint to himself or his estate. The most im§33. The grantor in any conveyance may reserve to himself
any power, beneficial or in trust, which he might lawfully grant
to another; and every power so reserved, shall be subject to the
provisions of this chapter, in the same manner as if granted to
another.
§36. Every power, beneficial or in trust, is irrevocable, unless an
authority to revoke it is reserved or granted in the instrument
creating the power.
§47. When the conditions annexed to a power are merely
nominal, and evince no intention of actual benefit to the party
to whom, or in whose favor they are to be performed, they may
be wholly disregarded in the execution of the power.
§48. With the exceptions contained in the preceding sections,
the intentions of the grantor of a power, as to the mode, time
and conditions of its execution shall be observed, subject to the
power of a court of chancery to supply a defective execution, in
the cases hereinafter provided."
120 Part II, c. I, Tit. II, Art. Third.
121 That is, non-statutory law.
Most of the law of powers is of
equitable origin. I Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §245 (1936).
122 1 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS, §292 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §320, Comment e., special Note (1948 Supp.); 3 Walsh,
LAw OF REAL PRoPERTY, §321 (1947), quoting the notes of the New
York revisers, which make it clear that the changes in terminology were
deliberate. Whereas at common law the term "general power'' includes any power unlimited as to objects (possible appointees), the
statutes (Sec. 5) restrict that term to powers to alienate the entire fee.
Whereas at common law the term "special power" is restricted to
powers limited as to objects, the statutes (§6) extend that term to all
powers to alienate less than a fee. Whereas at common law the term
"power in trust" is equivalent to "imperative power," the statutes
(§§22, 23) include some powers which are not imperative in their
definition of powers in trust. The statutes refer to the holder of a
power as the "grantee" (§62), whereas at common law the holder of a
power of appointment is usually referred to as the "donee." For the
common-law terminology, see 1 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS,
§§246, 247 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§319, 320 (1940).
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portant difference in substance is that every power which
the statutes denominate a "power in trust" 123 is imperative unless its execution is made expressly to depend on
the will of the donee. 124 An imperative power is one
which the donee has a duty, enforcible in equity, to execute. At common law the rule is less rigid; although a
power limited as to objects is presumptively imperative
if there is no gift in default of appointment, express language is not required to rebut the presumption.125
There is very little Michigan case authority as to the
application of the suspension of the absolute power of
alienation statutes to powers. The New York cases cannot be relied upon because of two important differences
between the New York and Michigan statutes. First, the
New York suspension statutes apply to both land and
personalty, whereas the Michigan suspension statutes
were restricted to land. 126 Second, the New York suspension statutes were interpreted to restrict suspension of
vesting as well as suspension of the absolute power of
alienation, whereas the Michigan statutes were interpreted as restricting only the latter.127 Because the New
York statutes, like the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, restrict suspension of vesting, they prohibit
powers which operate in such manner as to suspend vesting for longer than the statutory permissible period.
Hence all powers which would violate the common-law
§§22, 23, note 119 supra.
§24, note 119 supra. In Waterman v. New York Life Insurance
& Trust Co., 237 N.Y. 293, 142 N.E. 668 (1923), it was held that a
power to appoint "to such one of my nephews of my own blood as
she may by her will direct" was not imperative.
125 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §367 (1940); Simes, "Powers in Trust
and the Termination of Powers by the Donee," 37 YALE L.J. 63 (1927);
Callahan and Leach, "Powers of Appointment," 5 AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY, §23.63 (1952).
126 Part Three, notes 7, 8, supra.
121 Part Three, notes 12, 86, 90-94, 96-99, supra.
12s
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Rule also violate the New York statutes. 128 But all such
powers did not violate the Michigan statutes. In Michigan the sole guide is Section 14 of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846, which provided that the absolute
power of alienation is suspended, "when there are no
persons in being, by whom an absolute fee in possession
can be conveyed." 129 If a power operated to suspend the
absolute power of alienation, as so defined, for longer
than the statutory permissible period, it was void. It
would seem that a power itself, as distinguished from interests appointed under the power and interests limited
in default of its exercise, suspends the absolute power of
alienation in the following situations:
Class (a) Donee not in being or not ascertainable. If
the power is limited to a person or corporation not in
being, to a class the membership of which may possibly
include a person or corporation not presently in being,
or to a donee or donees so described that neither the
donees nor the group from among whom the donees are
to be selected are presently ascertainable, and the power
cannot be revoked, released, or overridden by ascertainable persons in being, the power suspends the absolute
power of alienation. 130 If Andrew Baker devised land to
12s The application of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities to
powers of appointment is covered in Chapter 13, Sec. B, supra. The
application of the New York suspension statutes to powers is discussed in detail in Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION,
3rd ed., §§306-363 (1928), and more briefly in PROPERTY REsTATEMENT,
App., Ch. A (1944); 3 Walsh, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §349 (1947),
and Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations,"
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.13 (1952).
129 Part Three, note 1 supra.
1ao Battelle v. Parks, 2 Mich. 531 (1853), involved a will which empowered the "executors or administrators" to sell land for the benefit of named legatees, but named no executors. It was held that the
power was valid and exercisable by administrators cum testamento
annexo, but the opinion suggests that such a power given to administrators for their own benefit would violate the suspension statutes
because it would not be certain that the administrators would be ascer-
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James Thorpe and his heirs, subject to a power in the
first son of John Stiles (who had no son) to appoint the
fee by deed or will to any person or persons, the power
would suspend the absolute power of alienation until
John had a son or died. Similarly, if Andrew Baker devised land to James Thorpe and his heirs, subject to a
power in the children of John Stiles (who had five children) who survive him to appoint the fee by deed or will
to any person or persons, the power would suspend the
absolute power of alienation until the class of donees
was closed by the death of John. Likewise, if Andrew
Baker devised land to James Thorpe and his heirs, subject to a power in the person who should be Governor
of Michigan in the year 1984 to appoint the fee by deed
or will to any person or persons, the power would suspend the absolute power of alienation until 1984. The
examples given involve powers beneficial solely to the
donee. Class (a) also includes what the statutes term
powers in trust, but the beneficiaries of a power in trust
would be able to override it unless it also falls into Class
(b) or (c) below.
Class (b) Beneficiaries not in being or not ascertainable. If the power is in trust, as that term is defined by
the statutes, is not presently exercisable for the sole benefit of ascertainable persons in being, and the beneficiaries
are a person or corporation not in being, a class the membership of which may possibly include a person or corporation not presently in being, or persons so described
that neither they nor the group from among whom they
tainable within two lives. Both the decision and the dictum are
consistent with the rule stated in the text. The actual power involved
in the case could be overridden by the named legatees, who were ascertainable persons in being, so it did not fall into Class (a). If, however,
the administrators had been the beneficiaries of the power as well as
its donees, the power would have fallen into Classes (a) and (b).
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are to be selected are presently ascertainable, and the
power cannot be revoked, released or overriden by ascertainable persons in being, the power suspends the
absolute power of alienation. 131 If Andrew Baker devised land to James Thorpe and his heirs, subject to an
imperative power in John Stiles (who had no son) to
appoint the fee to his first son, the power would suspend
the absolute power of alienation until John had a son.
Similarly, if Andrew Baker devised land to James Thorpe
and his heirs, subject to an imperative power in John
Stiles (who has five children) to appoint the fee by will
to those of his children who survive him, the power
would suspend the absolute power of alienation until the
class of objects was closed by the death of John. Likewise, if Andrew Baker devised land to James Thorpe
and his heirs, subject to an imperative power in John
Stiles to appoint the fee to some member of the Michigan
Legislature of 1983, the power would suspend the absolute power of alienation until 1983.
The three examples just given, as falling in Class (b),
are of imperative powers of appointment limited as to
object. Class (b) also includes imperative powers to sell,
lease, charge, or encumber land when any person or class
of persons other than the donee "is designated as entitled
to the proceeds, or any portion of the proceeds or other
1a1 Trufant v. Nunneley, 106 Mich. 554, 64 N.W. 469 (1895) (imperative power to purchase land and convey a remainder therein to
a class of persons which could not be ascertained for three lives and
might include persons who came into being after two lives). In Moss
v. Axford, 246 Mich. 288, 224, N.W. 425 (1929), the residue of an
estate was devised to the executor, "with the instructions to pay the
same to the person who has given me the best care in my declining
years and who in his opinion is the most worthy of my said property."
It was held that the power did not suspend the absolute power of
alienation. It did suspend vesting but the group from among whom
the beneficiary was to be selected consisted of ascertainable persons
in being who could join with the executor to convey an absolute fee
in possession. See also the preceding note.
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benefits to arise from the alienation of the lands" or
"from the disposition or charge authorized by the
power." 132 If Andrew Baker devised land to James
Thorpe and his heirs, subject to an imperative power in
John Stiles (who had no son) to mortgage for $5,000 to
pay for the education of his first son, the power would
suspend the absolute power of alienation. Similarly, if
Andrew Baker devised land to James Thorpe and his
heirs, subject to an imperative power in John Stiles (who
had no son) to sell the fee when his first son reached the
age of eighteen and use the proceeds of such sale to pay
for the education of such son, the power would suspend
the absolute power of alienation. Because the Michigan
suspension statutes were limited to land, Class (b) has
an exception: an imperative power to sell the entire fee
for money or exchange it for personalty, presently exercisable, would not suspend the absolute power of alienation even though the beneficiaries of the proceeds were
not in being or not ascertainable. Such a power would
work an immediate equitable conversion of the land into
personalty, so the suspension statutes would not apply.133
If Andrew Baker devised land to James Thorpe and his
heirs, subject to an imperative power in John Stiles (who
had no son) to sell the fee at once and hold the proceeds
in trust for James and his heirs until John's first son
reached the age of eighteen, then to use the proceeds to
pay for the education of such son, the power would not
suspend the absolute power of alienation for a moment,
even though John, with the consent of James, chose to
delay effectuating the sale.
132 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §§22, 23, Part Three, note 119 supra.
That is, if it is an imperative "power in trust" as this term is defined
by the statutes.
133 Part Three, notes 9 supra, 197 infra.
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Class (c) Power to create a trust. If the power is in
trust, as that term is defined by the statutes, and calls
for the creation or prolongation of a trust which would
itself suspend the absolute power of alienation, and the
power cannot be revoked, released, or overridden by
ascertainable persons in being, the power suspends the
absolute power of alienation. 134 As will be made clear
in Section C below, a trust for receipt of the rents and
profits of land suspends the absolute power of alienation
because, by statute, the interests of the trustee and the
cestui que trust are inalienable. Hence an imperative
power to create such a trust also suspends the absolute
power of alienation. If Andrew Baker devised land to
James Thorpe and his heirs, subject to an imperative
power in John Stiles to create a trust of the land for
application of the rents and profits to the support of
Lucy Stiles, present wife of John, for the life of Lucy,
the power would suspend the absolute power of alienation for the life of Lucy.
It would seem that powers not included in one or
more of these three classes did not suspend the absolute
power of alienation under Michigan law. A power was
not within any of these classes if it could be revoked,
released, or overridden by ascertainable persons in being because, in those cases, there were "persons in being,
by whom an absolute fee in possession" could be conveyed, despite the power, within the meaning of Section 14 of Chapter 62. 135 The statutes expressly provided that "Every power, beneficial or in trust, is irrevocable, unless an authority to revoke it is reserved or
134 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed.,
§342 (1928). See: Garvey v. McDevitt, 72 N.Y. 556 (1878).
135 Part Three, note 1 supra.
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granted in the instrument creating the power."
The
beneficiaries of a power may override it, that is, convey
free of it, if they are all in being and ascertained and
their interests are not inalienable because subject to a
trust for receipt of the rents and profits of land. 131 If
Andrew Baker devised Blackacre to James Thorpe and
his heirs, subject to an imperative power in John Stiles
to appoint the fee to any one of his brothers, Thomas,
Richard, and Henry, when and if James Thorpe or his
heirs should inherit Whiteacre, James, John, Thomas,
Richard, and Henry are persons in being who could
presently convey an absolute fee in possession. Express
provisions of the instrument creating the power could
enable less than all the beneficiaries to override it. Thus,
in the second example given in Class (b) above, if An136

1as Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §36, Part Three, note 119 supra. Accord,
at common law: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §337 (I) (1940); Callahan
and Leach, "Powers of Appointment," 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY,
§23.31 (1952).
1a1 Battelle v. Parks, 2 Mich. 531 (1853), Part Three, note 130 supra;
Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900);
Part Three, note 93 supra; Moss v. Axford, 246 Mich. 288, 224 N.W.
425 (1929), Part Three, note 131 supra; Hetzel v. Barber, 69 N.Y. I
(1877); Trask v. Sturges, 170 N.Y. 482, 63 N.E. 534 (1902); PROPERTY
RESTATEMENT, §338 (1940); Callahan and Leach, "Powers of Appointment," 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §23.32 (1952); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF
PROPERTY, §25.13n (1952). See: Bennett v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 526 at
538, 43 N.W. 893 (1889). Cf. State v. Holmes, II5 Mich. 456, 73 N.W.
548 (1898), Part Three, note 88 supra. In Matter of Butterfield, 133
N.Y. 473, sub nom. In re Christie, 31 N.E. 515 (1892), where a testator
devised land to his children in fee, subject to an imperative power in
the executrix, not to be exercised until all of his children, five of
whom were minors, should reach their majority, to sell the land for
payment of debts and legacies. It was held that, because of the New
York equivalent of Rev. stat. 1846, c. 64, §48, Part Three, note II9
supra, the power could not be overridden by the beneficiaries (i.e.,
the creditors and legatees, who were ascertained persons in being)
because it was on the express condition that it should not be exercised
until a future time. Consequently, the power suspended the absolute
power of alienation for longer than the permissible period. It would
seem that Sec. 48 does not really relate to the problem of overriding
and that the decision is unsound.
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drew Baker devised land to James Thorpe and his heirs,
subject to an imperative power in John Stiles (who has
five children) to appoint the fee by will to those of his
children who survive him, the power would not suspend
the absolute power of alienation if the will further provided, "but such power may be overridden during the
life of John by his children in being at the time of such
over-riding."
Class (a) comprises powers limited to a donee who is
not in being or not ascertainable. Such a power cannot
be released by the donee. Classes (b) and (c) comprise
powers in trust, which term under the statutes includes
all powers which are not beneficial solely to the donee
and all powers under which the donee cannot appoint to
himself or his estate. As has been seen, under the
statutes, a power in trust is imperative unless its execution is made expressly to depend on the will of the donee.
At common law an imperative power cannot be released
by the donee/'38 and there is no doubt that this was also
the rule under Chapter 64 of the Revised Statutes of
1846. There is a conflict of authority at common law
as to whether and under what circumstances a power
limited as to objects which is not imperative may be
released by the donee/39 and there is grave doubt on
138 1 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §281 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §335 (1940) and 1948 Supp.; Simes, "Powers in Trust and
the Termination of Powers by the Donee," 37 YALE L.J. 211 at 216
(1927).
1s9 1 Simes, LAW OF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §§283, 284 (1936); PROPERTY
REsTATEMENT, §335 (1940), as changed by 1948 Supp.; 3 Walsh, LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY, §334 (1947); Callahan and Leach, "Powers of Appointment," 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§23.27, 23.28 (1952);
Annotation, 76 A.L.R. 1430 (1932); Simes, "Powers in Trust and the
Release of Powers by the Donee," 37 YALE L.J. 211 (1927); Ball, "Release of Powers of Appointment for Federal Estate Tax Purposes," 4
ARK. L. REv. 66 (1949-50). Prior to 1881 the English rule seems to
have been that such powers were releasable if the donee had a possessory estate in the land in addition to the power but not otherwise.
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the question of whether the donee of a power which is
in trust, within the statutory meaning of that term, but
not imperative, could release the power under the New
York and Michigan statutes.140 Act 296 of the Public
Acts of 1945 141 provides that the donee of a power,
including a power in trust, may release the power. It
follows that powers in trust created between May 25,
1945, the effective date of Act 296, and September 23,
1949, the effective date of the repeal of the suspension
statutes, were releasable if the donee was in being and
ascertainable. This means that no power created after
May 24, 1945, fell into Classes (b) or (c). Act 296 purStat. 44 & 45 Viet., c. 41, §52, (1881), re-enacted, 15 Geo. V, c. 20, §155
(1925) permits release in either case. Professor Simes thinks that all
non-imperative powers are releasable. The Restatement originally took
the position that powers limited as to objects were releasable only if
the donor manifested an intention to that effect or if the power is
presently exercisable (i.e. not testamentary or subject to a condition
precedent) and the takers in default are persons to whom an effective
appointment could be made. It now takes the view that such powers
can be released unless the donor has manifested a contrary intent.
It takes no position as to the effect of such a manifestation where the
power is not imperative.
Ho Chase National Bank v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 155 Misc.
61, 279 N.Y. Supp. 327 (1935), aff'd., 246 App. Div. 201, 284 N.Y.
Supp. 472 (1935), aff'd., 271 N.Y. 602, 659, 3 N.E. (2d) 205, 475 (1936).
The Appellate Division held that such a power could not be released.
The Court of Appeals refused to pass on the question because the
donee of the power subsequently died without attempting to exercise
it. In Merrill v. Lynch, 13 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 514 at 532-533 (Sup. Ct.
Spec. Term, 1939) it was suggested that the view of the Appellate
Division was unsound. The fact that Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §17, Part
Three, note 119 supra, expressly authorizes a tenant for life with power
to make leases for years to release the power to any person entitled to
an expectant estate in the land, indxcates by virtue of the maxim
expressio unius exclusio alterius, that other powers in trust are not
releasable. Sec.. 15 classes such a power in a tenant for life as beneficial, but it is difficult to see why it does not fall under the definition of a power in trust made by Sec. 23, Part Three, note 119 supra.
141 Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.154 (1) to 26.154 (6); Comp. Laws (1948)
§§556.101 to 556.106. Similar statutes were enacted in a number of
other states at about the same time. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, 1948
Supp., §335, Comment e; Simes, HANDBOOK OF FUTURE INTERESTS,
§74 (1951).
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ports to validate releases of powers executed before its
effective date, 142 but it would seem that retroactive ap·
plication of the act would be unconstitutional insofar as
it disturbed vested rights of property.
(2) Interests Created By Execution of Powers
An interest in land created by the donee of a power
by execution of the power suspends the absolute power
of alienation, within the meaning of Section 14 of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846,143 in the following
situations:
(a) If the interest so created is an indestructible future interest of a type which, under the rules discussed
in Section A, above, suspends the absolute power of
alienation.
(b) If the interest so created is a power of a type
which, under the rules discussed in Subsection B (1),
above, suspends the absolute power of alienation.
(c) If the interest so created is a trust of a type which,
under the rules discussed in Section C, below, suspends
the absolute power of alienation.
In other words, the types of interests created by execution of a power which suspend the absolute power of
alienation are exactly the same as the types of interests
created by direct conveyance or devise which suspend
the absolute power of alienation. The only difference
is in the time from which the permissible period of
suspension is computed. Whereas, in the case of an interest directly conveyed or devised, the suspension ordinarily commences when the deed or will creating it
142 §4, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.154 (4); Comp. Laws (1948) §556.104.
us Part Three, note 1 supra.
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takes effect, 144 in the case of an interest created by execution of a power the statutes provide,
"Sec. 55. The period during which the absolute
right of alienation may be suspended by any instrument
in execution of a power, shall be computed from the time
of the creation of the power, and not from the date of
such instrument.
"Sec. 56. No estate or interest can be given or
limited to any person, by an instrument in execution
of a power, which such person would not have been
capable of taking, under the instrument by which the
power was granted." 145
These statutory provisions were taken from the New
York Revised Statutes of 1829.146 The New York Court
of Appeals has indicated that these two sections are modified by other sections of the statutes which, as in force
in Michigan, provide:
"Sec. 9. When an absolute power of disposition, not
accompanied by any trust, shall be given to the owner
of a particular estate, for life or years, such estate shall
be changed into a fee, absolute in respect to the rights
144 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§15, 41, Part Three, note 1 supra, provided, "Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer J.>eriod
than during the continuance of two lives in being at the creatzon of
the estate, . . . Sec. 41. The delivery of the grant, where an expectant estate is created by grant; and where it is created by devise, the
death of the testator, shall be deemed the time of the creation of
the estate." [Emphasis supplied.] It should be borne in mind, however, that an interest does not suspend the absolute power of alienation
while it is destructible by virtue of the fact that there are ascertainable persons in being "by whom an absolute fee in possession can be
conveyed." Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §14, Part Three, note 1 supra. See
Subsection (3), infra. Cf. Chapter 10, Section A, supra.
145 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §§55, 56; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2712, 2713;
Comp. Laws (1871) §§4195, 4196; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8910, 8911;
How. Stat., §§5644, 5645; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11646, 11647; Comp.
Laws (1929) §§13049, 13050; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.145, 26.146; Comp.
Laws (1948) §§556.55, 556.56. These sections are still in force. As
to their effectiveness, since the repeal of the suspension statutes, see
Chapter 13, Section C, supra.
H6 Part II, c. 1, Art. Third, §§128, 129. See Part Two, note 303
supra.
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of creditors and purchasers, but subject to any future
estates limited thereon, in case the power should not be
executed, or the lands should not be sold for the satisfaction of debts.
"Sec. 10. When a like power of disposition shall be
given to any person to whom no particular estate is
limited, such person shall also take a fee, subject to
any future estates that may be limited thereon, but
absolute in respect to creditors and purchasers.
"Sec. 11. In all cases where such power of disposition is given, and no remainder is limited on the estate
of the grantee of the power, such grantee shall be entitled to an absolute fee.
"Sec. 12. When a general and beneficial power to
devise the inheritance, shall be given to a tenant for
life or for years, such tenant shall be deemed to possess
an absolute power of disposition, within the meaning,
and subject to the provisions of the three last preceding
sections.
"Sec. 13. Every power of disposition shall be deemed
absolute, by means of which the grantee is enabled, in
his lifetime, to dispose of the entire fee for his own
benefit." 147
1.47 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §§9 to 13; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2666 to
2670; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4149 to 4153; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8864
to 8868; How. Stat., §§5598 to 5602; Comp. Laws (1915) §§1160011604; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13003 to 13007; Mich. Stat. Ann.,
§§26.99-26.103; Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.9-556.13. N.Y. Rev. Stat.
1829, Part II, Art. Third, §§81-85 were identical, except as to section
numbers. N.Y. Real Property Law, §§149 to 153, as presently in
force, are virtually identical. These sections operated to eliminate
the strange fiction of powers appendant, under which one person might
have both the whole fee and a power to appoint the fee which would
enable him to defeat dower and creditors. See: Simes, "The Devolution
of Title to Appointed Property," 22 ILL. L. REv. 480 at 493-497 (1928).
The following section provides: "Sec. 14. When the grantor in any
conveyance shall reserve to himself, for his own benefit an absolute
power of revocation, such grantor shall still be deemed the absolute
owner of the estate conveyed, so far as the rights of creditors and
purchasers are concerned."
As will be pointed out in the following subsection, the commencement of the period of the suspension statutes may be deferred, as to
interests created by the exercise of a power as well as other interests,
by the existence of such an absolute power of revocation or by other
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In the view of the New York Court, if the donee of a
power has an absolute power of disposition of the entire
fee within the meaning of Sections 9-13, Sections 55 and
56 have no application, and the validity of interests
created by him in execution of the power is determined
as if he were in fact an absolute owner disposing of his
own property. If the donee does not have an absolute
power of disposition of the entire fee within the meaning of Sections 9-13, Sections 55 and 56 do apply, and
the validity of interests created by him in execution of
the power is judged from the time of the creation of
the power. 148 Thus if the donee's power of disposition
is limited to a future estate, it does not come within
Sections 9-13, so Sections 55 and 56 apply. If Andrew
Baker devises land to James Thorpe upon trust to pay
the rents and profits to John Stiles for life, remainder
as John Stiles may by deed or will appoint, John cannot
dispose of the entire fee because, under New York and
Michigan law, his equitable life interest as beneficiary
of the trust is inalienable.149 Hence, even though his
power to dispose of the remainder is unlimited and
presently exercisable by deed, the validity of any appointment which he makes will be judged, under the
New York view, from the death of Andrew. 150
provisions which make the interest destructible because there are ascertained persons in being "by whom an absolute fee in possession can
be conveyed." Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §14, Part Three, notes 1, 144,
supra .
.148 Farmers' Loau &: Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 85 N.E. 59
(1908); Bettner, "The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Powers
of Appointment,'' 27 VA. L. REv. 149 at 167-171 (1940). Professor
Walsh thought, however, that even an absolute power of disposition
was governed by §§55 and 56; that the dictum to the contrary in the
Kip case was unsound. 3 LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, §349 (1947).
149 Part One, notes 580, 583, 621, 625, supra. See: Hunt v. Hunt,
124 Mich. 502, 83 N.W. 371 (1900); In re Peck Estates, 320 Mich.
692, 32 N.W. (2d) 14 (1948); Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N.Y. 522 (1881).
15° Farmers' Loan &: Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 85 N.E. 59
(1908).
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As has been seen, when a power of appointment is
restricted as to objects or exercisable only by will, the
period of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities is
computed, as to interests created by exercise of the
power, from the time of the creation of the power, rather
than from that of its exercise; but facts which occur between the creation and exercise of the power may be
considered in determining whether such interests are
certain not to vest beyond the permissible period.161
Under the New York and Michigan statutes, when a
power of appointment is not an absolute power of disposition, the period of permissible suspension of the
absolute power of alienation is computed, as to interests
created by exercise of the power, under Section 55, from
the time of the creation of the power, rather than from
that of its exercise, but it has not been settled in either
state whether facts which occur between the creation and
exercise of the power may be considered in determining
whether such interests are certain not to suspend the
absolute power of alienation beyond the permissible
period.152
(3) Powers Which Prevent Suspension: Destructibility
As has been seen, under the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities, if a future interest will be destructible at
all times until it vests, it is not subject to the Rule, and
if a future interest is so limited as to be destructible for
a time and then indestructible for a time before it vests,
Part Two, notes 318, 322, 324, supra.
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1'[30 (1944) (taking the
position that such facts may be considered); Whiteside, "Perpetuities
and Accumulations: Statutory Rules," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY,
§25.13 (1952) (expressing the view that they may not be considered).
Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§360-362
(1928), appears to favor the latter view.
151
152

POWER OF ALIENATION

533

the Rule applies, but the period of the Rule does not
commence until the interest becomes indestructible. 153
A future interest is destructible for purposes of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities only while some
ascertained living person has unlimited and unconditional power to destroy it for his own exclusive benefit. 15"
Where estates tail have been abolished, such destructibility under the common-law Rule ordinarily exists
only because of a presently exercisable power of appointment or of revocation, by the exercise of which the donee
could immediately vest the future interest in himself.
Under the statutes restricting suspension of the absolute power of alienation there is an analogous doctrine
of destructibility. A future interest, power, or trust does
not suspend the absolute power of alienation while there
are ascertained persons in being who have unlimited and
unconditional power to convey an absolute fee in possession.155 As in the case of the common-law Rule, such
destructibility ordinarily exists because of a power of
appointment or of revocation, but the doctrine of destructibility under the statutes differs from the doctrine
under the common-law Rule in seven important respects:
(a) Whereas, under the common-law Rule, the power
of destruction must reside in the holder or holders of a
Part Two, notes 69, 70, supra.
Part Two, note 74 supra. As pointed out in the text at Part
Two, notes 75-81, supra, a future interest is not destructible for purposes of the common-law Rule merely because its owner is ascertained,
in being, and capable of uniting with the owners of other interests to
convey an absolute fee; a power of appointment limited as to objects,
exercisable only by will, or subject to a condition precedent, is not
sufficient to make an interest subject to the power destructible; and
a power of sale is not sufficient if the proceeds of the sale would be
subject to the future interest.
155 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §56
(1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 111114, 20 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952).
153
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single estate, interest, or power, 156 under the statutes it
is sufficient if the holders of various estates, interests,
and powers can combine to convey an absolute fee in
possession. 157 If Andrew Baker conveys land to John
Stiles (who has no son) and his heirs until some son of
John reaches the age of thirty years and then to such son
and his heirs, subject to a power in John and his heirs
to appoint an absolute fee to any person or persons with
the consent of the grantor, his heirs or assigns, the limitation to the son of John is not destructible under the
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities and is void under
that Rule. The interest of the son of John would, however, be destructible and valid under the Michigan suspension statutes, because there would at all times be
persons capable of conveying an absolute fee in possession.
(b) Whereas, under the common-law Rule, the power
of destruction must enable its holder to destroy the future interest for his own exclusive benefit,158 under the
statutes it is sufficient that the power be exercisable for
the benefit of others/ 59 so long as its exercise does not
subject the holder to any condition or penalty.160 If
156 Part Two, note 74 supra. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §373, Comment d. (1944), takes the position that destructibility does not exist
if the power must be jointly exercised by two or more persons or is
exercisable by the donee only with the concurrence of one or more
other persons.
157 Williams v. Montgomery, 148 N.Y. 519, 43 N.E. 57 (1896); Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §81 (1928);
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952).
us Part Two, note 74 supra. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §373, Comment d. (1944).
1sa See Matter of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288 at 305, 306, 87 N.E. 497
(1909); Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed.,
§65 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[20 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952).
160 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §71
(1928). In Underwood v. Curtis, 127 N.Y. 523, 28 N.E. 585 (1891), a
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Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe and his
heirs upon trust to apply the rents and profits to the
support of John Stiles, his sons, and grandsons, during
their lives, and upon the death of the last grandson of
John to convey the land to the great-grandsons of John,
subject to an absolute and unconditional power in the
trustee and his successors to terminate the trust at any
time by reconveying the land to the settlor, his heirs
or assigns, the remote future interests are not destructible under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities
and are void under that Rule. They would, however,
be destructible and valid under the Michigan suspension
statutes, because there would at all times be persons
capable of conveying an absolute fee in possession.m
(c) Whereas, under the common-law Rule, a power to
destroy a future interest exercisable only by will is not
sufficient,m under Section 12 of Chapter 64 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 163 a tenant for life or years with
a general and beneficial power to devise the inheritance
has an absolute power of disposition, which is sufficient. 164
(d) Whereas, under the common-law Rule, the mere
fact that the holder of the future interest in question is
in being, ascertained, and able to convey his interest,
does not make it destructible, even though he can unite
will created a trust which suspended the absolute power of alienation
for longer than the permissible term, subject to an unrestricted power
in the cestuis que trustent to sell the land and distribute the proceeds
to others. It was held that the penalty of loss of the property imposed
upon the donees in the event of exercise of the power prevented the
power from making the trust destructible.
161 Schreyer v. Schreyer, 101 App. Div. 456, 91 N.Y. Supp. 1065 (1905),
aff'd., 182 N.Y. 555, 75 N.E. 1134 (1905); Chaplin, SusPENSION OF THE
POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §75 (1928); Whiteside, "Statutory
Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROP
ERTY, §25.15 (1952).
162 Part Two, note 75 supra.
163 Part Three, note 147 supra.
164 See Part Two, note 321 supra.
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with others to convey an absolute fee in possession, 165
under the Michigan statutes no interest suspended the
absolute power of alienation if its owner was in being,
ascertained, and able to unite with the holders of other
estates, interests, and powers to convey an absolute fee
in possession.166 If Andrew Baker devises land to James
Thorpe and his heirs so long as the Penobscot Building
stands and then to John Stiles and his heirs, the interest
of John Stiles, although alienable, is not destructible
under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities and is
void. As James and John have unconditional power to
convey an absolute fee in possession at any time, the
interest of John would not offend the Michigan suspension statutes.
(e) Whereas, under the common-law Rule, it is sufficient if the offending future interest itself is destructible,167 under the statutes destructibility does not exist
unless ascertained persons in being have power to convey
the entire fee. 168 If Andrew Baker devises land to James
Thorpe and his heirs for the life of John Stiles, (who
has no son) , upon trust to apply the rents and profits
to the use of John, remainder to the first son of John
who reaches the age of thirty, subject to a power in John
to appoint the remainder by deed or will to any person
or persons, the limitation to the son of John is destructible during the life of John under the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities and so is valid because it
must vest within lives in being at the death of John.
Under the statutes, however, because the life interest
of John is inalienable, there are no persons in being
Part Two, note 78 supra.
Part Three, notes 90-94, 96-99, supra. PROPERlY RESTATEMENT,
App., Ch. B, 1[53 (1944); But see Part Three note 160 supra.
167 Part Two, note 67 supra.
168 See: Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N.Y. 522 (1881).
165
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during the life of John who can convey an absolute fee
in possession. 169
(f) Whereas, under the common-law Rule, if a future
interest is so limited as to be destructible for a time and
then indestructible for a time before it vests, the period
of the Rule does not commence until the interest becomes indestructible and lives in being at that time may
be used as measuring lives although they were not in being when the instrument creating the interest became
effective,170 this is not the case under the statutes. An
interest does not suspend the absolute power of alienation while ascertained persons in being have unlimited
power to convey an absolute fee in possession, but if an
interest is so limited as to be destructible in this sense
for a time and then indestructible for a time, during
which it will suspend the absolute power of alienation,
the two lives which measure the permissible period of
suspension must be those of persons who were in being
when the instrument creating the interest became effective.171 If John Stiles (who has no son) conveys land to
James Thorpe and his heirs upon trust to apply the
rents and profits to the use of John for life, then to
apply them to the use of the first son of John for life
and, at his death, to convey the land to the eldest son
of such first son, subject to an unconditional power in
John to revoke by deed or will, the interests of the son
and grandson are destructible under both the commonlaw Rule Against Perpetuities and the statutes during
the life of John. The first son of John must necessarily
be in being at John's death, and the grandson must necesSee Part Three, note 149 supra.
Part Two, note 70 supra.
171 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§63,
95 (1928). Contra: PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1T14, Ill. 8
169

110

(1944).

'
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sarily come into being during the son's life, so their
interests do not violate the common-law Rule. But both
interests would violate the suspension statutes because
they would suspend the absolute power of alienation during the life of John's first son, a life not in being at the
time of the conveyance. On the other hand, if John
Stiles, having a son Henry and a grandson Peter, conveys land to James Thorpe and his heirs upon trust to
apply the rents and profits to the use of John for life,
then to the use of Henry for life, then to the use of
Peter for life and, on the death of Peter, to convey the
land to the first son of Peter, subject to an unconditional
power in John to revoke by deed or will, the fact that
the interests were destructible during the life of John
would mean that the absolute power of alienation was
suspended for only two, instead of three, lives, those of
Henry and Peter, which were in being at the time of the
conveyance. Hence none of the limitations would violate the statuteS.172
(g) Whereas, under the common-law Rule, a power
to sell land or exchange it for other property is not sufficient if the proceeds of the sale or property received in
exchange are subject to the future interest, 173 under the
Michigan statutes, a power to convert land into other
property could, in some situations, prevent a future interest, power, or trust from suspending the absolute
power of alienation. 174 This is because the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities applies to all forms of property, whereas the Michigan statutes applied only to land.
112 Equitable Trust Co. v. Pratt, 117 Misc. 708, 193 N.Y. Supp. 152
(1922), affd., 206 App. Div. 689, 199 N.Y. Supp. 921 (1923).
11a Part Two, notes 79, 81, supra.
174 Part One, note 639, Part Three, note 9 supra; PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, 1[51 (1944); This point is covered in detail
in the paragraphs which follow.
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Because the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities
applies only to unvested future interests and has no application to present and other vested interests, whether
or not they are subject to a trust, the examples of destructibility given in the preceding paragraphs (a)
through (g) have been designed to illustrate, by contrasting the common law and statutory rules, the existence and effect of destructibility in the case of future
interests which, in the absence of destructibility, would
violate both the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities
and the suspension statutes. Because, under the New
York and Michigan statutes, the interests of the trustee
and cestuis que trustent of a trust for receipt of the rents
and profits of land are inalienable,175 such a trust suspends the absolute power of alienation even though all
interests involved are present or vested.m1 Most of the
decisions as to the existence and effect of destructibility
under the statutes relate to suspension of the absolute
power of alienation by trusts, and hence the details of
the doctrine of destructibility under the statutes must
be developed by consideration of those decisions. It
should be borne in mind, however, that the principles
developed by the cases apply equally to suspension of
the absolute power of alienation occasioned by future
interests limited to unborn or unascertained persons and
by powers.
Under the New York decisions and what Michigan
cases there are, for destructibility to exist, not only must
ascertained persons in being have power to convey an
absolute fee in possession, but the power itself must be
absolute in the sense that its exercise is not subject to
any condition precedent and does not entail any penalty
175
17<6

Part One, notes 580, 583, 602, 621, supra.
Part On~, note 593 supra; Section C, infra.
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or loss to the persons who exercise it. 177 Thus a trustee's
power to terminate the trust by selling the land and distributing the proceeds to ascertained persons in being is
not sufficient if sale is not permitted until a certain price
can be obtained 178 or until the cestuis que trustent demonstrate capacity to handle the proceeds wisely. 179
Neither is it sufficient if its exercise is conditional upon
the consent of the cestuis que trustent and the proceeds
177 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed.,
§64 (1928); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952).
11s Stewart v. Woolley, 121 App. Div. 531, 106 N.Y. Supp. 99
(1907); Chaplin, id., §69; Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities
and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952).
See: Spitzer v. Spitzer, 38 App. Div. 436, 56 N.Y. Supp. 470 (1899);
Bennett v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889). In Farrand v.
Petit, 84 Mich. 671, 48 N.W. 156 (1891), a power to plat and sell
enough to pay taxes and expenses of platting when "the public good
and the best interests of the estate" required platting and to sell the
rest and distribute after twenty years was held insufficient.
17 9 Matter of Perkins, 245 N.Y. 478, 157 N.E. 750 (1927); Chaplin,
SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §70 (1928); PROP·
ERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1!20 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory
Rules: Perpetuites and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952). In Taylor v. Richards, 153 Mich. 667, ll7 N.W.
208 (1908), land was devised to executors upon trust to apply the
income to the support of testator's grandson, William, with discretionary power of sale for reinvestment, "title thereto to remain in
my executors until he arrives at twenty-five years of age, when, if he
shall show himself worthy and of steady habits, my said executors
shall, if they deem it safe and for his best interest, transfer and convey
said farm [to William], or in case they shall have previously sold
said farm then they shall transfer to said William the proceeds . . .
if they shall so deem it safe and for his best interest." No doubt these
powers were not sufficient to prevent suspension of the absolute power
of alienation, but, as such suspension could not last beyond a life in
being, there was no violation of the statutes. In Michigan Trust Co.
v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924), testatrix devised land
to her husband until death or remarriage, with power to invade principal for his support and comfort and to convey to that end, remainder to a trustee with mandatory direction to convert to money,
and hold on trust for, inter alia, unborn persons. The opinion suggests that the power of the husband, which was subject to a condition
precedent which might not occur, and that of the trustee, which was
not exercisable until the husband's death, did not prevent suspension
of the absolute power of alienation during the life of the husband.

POWER OF ALIENATION

541

are payable to others, so that the giving of such consent
would entail loss to the cestuis.J.So A requirement of
consent of the cestuis que trustent or some other person
before exercise of the power does not prevent destructibility, however, if the persons whose consent is required
are ascertained and in being and the exercise of the
power will not entail any penalty or loss to them. 181
Moreover, if the power is immediately exercisable, a
mere permission to the trustee to delay its exercise for a
time or until conditions are favorable does not prevent
destructibility. 182 Thus in Floyd v. Smith/ 83 an imperative power to be exercised "at the earliest time practicable after my death, without undue sacrifice of the true
value thereof," was held sufficient to make destructible a
trust which, in its absence, would have suspended the
absolute power of alienation for four lives.
As has been seen, under the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities, the existence of a power to sell land or
chattels free of future interests or to exchange for other
property is not sufficient to make future interests therein
destructible if the proceeds of the sale or property received in exchange are subject to the future interests. 18•
That is to say, the common-law Rule inhibits not only
the tying up of specific land or chattels for unduly long
18o Underwood v. Curtis, 127 N.Y. 523, 28 N.E. 585 (1891); Chaplin,
id., §71.
181 Chaplin, id., §81. See: Williams v. Montgomery, 148 N.Y. 519
at 526, 43 N.E. 57 (1896).
182 Robert v. Corning, 89 N.Y. 225 at 239 (1882); Chaplin, id., §66;
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6
AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §25.7 (1952). Accord: Fitzgerald v. City
of Big Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900), (donee empowered
to act at once but authorized to delay for three years.); In re De
Bancourt's Estate, 279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891 (1937) (direction to
trustee to convert into money at or before the expiration of fifteen
years).
183 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942).
1s4 Part Two, notes 79, 81, supra.
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periods, but also the tying up of aggregations of economic power even when the specific property involved
can itself be alienated free of contingencies. It would
have been possible to construe the New York statutes
as restricting only suspension of the absolute power of
alienation of specific land or chattels. The New York
courts, however, accepted the common-law view by holding that, although a trustee's unconditional power to
terminate the trust by sale of the corpus and distribution
of the proceeds to ascertained persons in being is sufficient to make the trust destructible/85 an unconditional
power to sell or exchange for reinvestment, that is, one
after the exercise of which the trust would continue to
bind the proceeds, is not sufficient to make the trust destructible.186 Because the Michigan suspension statutes,
unlike those of New York, applied only to land, 187 the
situation here was different. If a trustee had unconditional power, whether imperative or discretionary, to sell
the land or exchange it for other property, it was arguable that the absolute power of alienation was not suspended, even though the proceeds would be subject to
the trust. The trustee was a person in being who could
convey an absolute fee in possession, and the fact that
the absolute power of alienation of the proceeds would
18 5 Robert v. Corning, 89 N.Y. 225 (1882); Matter of Wilcox, 194
N.Y. 288 at 305, 87 N.E. 497 (1909); Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER
OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§36, 65 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App.,
Ch. A, 1120 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952).
1ss Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61 at 163 (N.Y. 1836); Chaplin,
SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §36 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1119, Ch. B, 1156 (1944); Whiteside,
"Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw
OF PROPERTY, §§25.12, 25.15 (1952). No doubt the same rule would
apply in Michigan to a power to exchange land for other Michigan
land.
187 Part Two, note 52, Part Three, note 8 supra.
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be suspended was immaterial, so long as they did not
consist of land. 188
Thatcher v. Wardens and Vestrymen of St. Andrew's
Church of Ann Arbor 189 has sometimes been assumed to
stand for the proposition that a trustee's discretionary
power of sale for reinvestment prevented a trust of land
from suspending the absolute power of alienation. 190 By
deed of June 20, 1862, Minerva Mundy conveyed land
to trustees, "to have, hold, use and enjoy the same, and
lease, or dispose of the same, or cause the same to be
used, and to receive the rents, profits and income thereof,
and to use or dispose of the same on trust," first, for the
use of the grantrix during her life; second, to pay the
grantrix's debts and funeral expenses; and third, to support the grantrix's husband for life and pay the expenses
of his last illness and funeral, whereupon the trust should
cease. The next paragraph of the deed conveyed the
legal remainder in the land to the Wardens and Vestrymen of St. Andrew's Church of Ann Arbor. Minerva
Mundy died in 1871 and her heirs employed Erastus
Thatcher, a lawyer, to conduct a suit to quiet title on
their behalf. In 1873 the heirs conveyed to Fanny
Thatcher, wife of Erastus, and in 1875 they quit claimed
to the Wardens and Vestrymen, who brought an action
1SSAs the statutes making the interest of the trustee and cestui que
trust inalienable apply in Michigan only to trusts of land (Part One,
notes 638, 640, supra), a trust of personalty would not suspend the
absolute power of alienation, even if such suspension were prohibited,
unless it was a spendthrift trust.
189 37 Mich. 264 (1877). The facts are not fully stated in the report,
which accounts for the fact that the decision has been misunderstood.
They are to be found in Records & Briefs, June Term, 1877, No. 36.
It is not clear, however, when the grantrix's husband died.
t9o Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885); PROPERTY
RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, 1!56, note 222 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF
PROPERTY, §25.41, note 5 (1952). See: Methodist Episcopal Church of
Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730 at 740, 3 N.W. 207 (1879).
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of ejectment against Erastus and Fanny Thatcher. The
Circuit Court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on the
ground the deed to Fanny Thatcher was void as champertous. The defendants appealed, contending, inter
alia, that the trust deed of June 20, 1862, was void because the provisions for payment of expenses of last illness and funeral caused a suspension of the absolute
power of alienation for longer than two lives. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Marston, in which
Chief Justice Cooley and Justices Campbell and Graves
concurred, affirmed the judgment for the plaintiffs on
the ground the trust deed of June 20, 1862 was valid,
saymg,
"We think it is a self-evident proposition that the
'absolute power of alienation' is not suspended, where
the instrument gives the trustees power to dispose of
the property at their option. Where power is given to
convey the trust estate, the absolute power of alienation
can in no possible way be said to be suspended. If such
a power is exercised as it may at any time, the trust is
at once and forever, upon the execution and delivery of
the conveyance, at an end, and cannot be revived, and
that such a power is good when contained in an instrument which without it would be invalid, there can be
no doubt. A conveyance under such a power would be
good and would pass a good title to the grantee. In
order to render the instrument invalid under our statutes
the power of alienation must be suspended, and the time
it is so suspended must be for over two lives in being at
the creation of the estate, or at least so that it may be
so suspended, - - - but there is no absolute suspension
whatever where the trustees have power to sell. It is
true they may not dispose of the estate, but it is not a
question of what they may or may not in fact do, but
one of power. Have they power to sell, or is the power
of sale suspended absolutely for the prohibited period?
If the former, the instrument is valid; if the latter, in-
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valid. Belmont v. O'Brien, 12 N.Y. 394; Mason v.
Mason, 2 Sand£. Ch., 432; Hawley v. ]ames, 16 Wend.,
153, per Bronson, J.; Hunter v. Hunter, 17 Barb., 90;
Nelson v. Callow, 15 Sim. Ch., 353; Cresson et al v.
Ferree, 70 Pa. St., 446. The power being one which may
be exercised at any time before the determination of the
limitations which precede the ultimate one, renders the
trust valid. Beyond this we do not express any opinion
as to the correctness of the rule laid down in New York
as to the proper construction of the statute." 191
For several reasons, the Thatcher case is not authority
for the proposition that a trustee's discretionary power
of sale for reinvestment prevented a trust for receipt of
the rents and profits of land from suspending the absolute power of alienation. First, the Court treated the
power not as one of sale for reinvestment but as one of
sale and termination of the trust. Second, even if the
power did not extend to termination of the trust, the
trust was not to continue beyond the lives of Minerva
Mundy and her husband except as a trust "to sell lands
for the benefit of creditors." 192 As will be made clear
in the next section, such a trust does not suspend the
absolute power of alienation because the interests of the
cestuis que trustent are alienable. The provision for payment of expenses of last illness and funeral, therefore,
could suspend the absolute power of alienation beyond
the lives of Mrs. Mundy and her husband only if it be
assumed that it constituted a limitation of an indestructible future interest to creditors who might not be ascertainable or members of an ascertainable group for several days after the deaths of Mr. and Mrs. Mundy. 193
Third, even if the provision for payment of expenses of
37 Mich. 264 at 270·271.
Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §11 (1), Part One, notes 583, 586, supra.
193 Chapter 20, Sec. A, Subsec. B. (2), supra.
191
192
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last illness and funeral did suspend the absolute power
of alienation because it was a limitation of a future interest to persons who might not be ascertainable within
two lives, the validity of that interest was not involved
in the litigation before the Court. All that was involved
was the validity of the legal remainder limited by the
deed of June 20, 1862, to the Wardens and Vestrymen.
This was vested in a corporation in being, subject only
to partial divestment by exercise of the power in favor
of the creditors. If the interest of the creditors was void,
the remainder would be valid and indefeasible.194
The proposition that a trustee's discretionary power
of sale for reinvestment prevents a trust from suspending
the absolute power of alienation was questioned in Palms
v. Palms 195 and definitely rejected in Niles v. Mason. 196
This rejection is probably justifiable on the ground that
a trustee's discretionary power of sale for reinvestment is
never really absolute and unconditional; under the law
of trusts the trustee would be guilty of a breach of trust
if he exercised it before such time as the proposed change
of investments would be of benefit to the cestuis que
trustent. Such a power is, therefore, really subject to a
condition precedent. This is not true of an imperative
power of sale for reinvestment which the trustee is bound
194 Part Two, notes 543, 548, supra; Whiteside, "Statutory Rules:
Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY,
§25.10 (1952).
195 68 Mich. 355 at 386, 36 N.W. 419 (1888) (Concurring opinion
of Champlin and Sherwood, JJ).
m 126 Mich. 482, 86 N.W. llOO (1901). Accord: Grand Rapids
Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922); Gardner
v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934);
In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938); PROPERTY
REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, 1!56 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules:
Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW oF PROPERTY,
§25.41 (1952). See: Allen v. Merrill, 223 Mich. 467 at 471, 194 N.W.
131 (1923). Cf. Skinner v. Taft, 140 Mich. 282, 103 N.W. 702 (1905);
Moore v. O'Leary, 180 Mich. 261, 146 N.W. 661 (1914).
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to exercise, regardless of the resulting advantage or disadvantage to the cestuis que trustent. Consequently, the
Michigan Supreme Court repeatedly and consistently
held that an imperative power of sale for reinvestment in
property other than Michigan land worked an equitable
conversion, so that the trust was to be considered a trust
of chattels personal, not subject to the suspension statutes, from the time when the trustee had an unconditional duty to sell.197 It has been rather liberal in construing powers to be unconditional and imperative for
this purpose. Thus in Floyd v. Smith/98 land was de197 Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649, 5 L.R.A. 858 (1889)
(devise of legal life estate, remainder to trustee with direction to
convert at once into personalty and hold the latter on perpetual
charitable trust); Ford v. Ford, 80 Mich. 42, 44 N.W. 1057 (1890)
(mandatory direction in will to convert Michigan land into Missouri
land on death of testator and to hold the Missouri land in trust for
more than two lives); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72,
196 N.W. 976 (1924) (devise of legal life estate, remainder to trustee
to sell, convert into money, and hold the latter on trust for more than
two lives); Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228
N.W. 703 (1930) (devise to trustee with mandatory direction to sell
at once and hold proceeds on trust for more than two lives); In re
De Bancourt's Estate, 279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891 (1937) (devise to
trustee to pay income to testator's heirs for fifteen years, to convert
into money at or before the expiration of fifteen years, and to divide
the proceeds among the heirs at the end of fifteen years, determined
according to the statute then in force); Van Tyne v. Pratt, 291 Mich.
626, 289 N.W. 275 (1939) (devise to trustee upon trust for three lives
with mandatory direction to sell land at the end of a named life);
Floyd v. Smith, 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942), Part Three,
note 198 infra. See: Joseph v. Shaw, 48 Mich. 355, 12 N.W. 486
(1882) (direction to administrator to convert land into money before
distribution to life tenant); Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich.
575, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942) (devise to trustees with mandatory direction to form a corporation, convey the land to it in exchange for
its stock, and hold the stock in trust). PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App.,
Ch. B, 1!51 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.37 (1952). Although
an imperative power to convert to personalty prevented a trust from
suspending the absolute power of alienation, contingent limitations of
interests under or following the trust might violate the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities. Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, Gettins v.
Grand Rapids Trust Co., supra.
198 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942). See also Penny v. Croul,
76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649 (1889).
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vised to trustees upon a trust which was to last for four
lives. The following language of the will was treated as
creating an imperative power which prevented suspension of the absolute power of alienation:
"Any real estate constituting a part of my estate at
the time of my death shall be sold and converted into
personalty at the earliest time practicable after my death
without undue sacrifice of the true value thereof, to the
end that the trust by this will created shall be solely a
trust of personalty and subject to the rules applicable
thereto only."
Although a trustee's power to sell for reinvestment has
never been sufficient to make the trust destructible in
New York 199 and was not sufficient in Michigan unless
imperative, a power in the trustee to terminate the trust
by distributing the corpus, or by selling the corpus and
distributing the proceeds, has always been sufficient in
both states to prevent the trust from suspending the absolute power of alienation, whether the power is imperative or discretionary. 200 It should be borne in mind,
Part Three, note 186 supra.
Part Three, note 185 supra,· Gilkey v. Gilkey, 162 Mich. 664, 127
N.W. 715 (1910) (inter vivos trust to last for three lives or twenty
years, whichever was shorter, with power in the trustee to distribute the
corpus whenever he deemed it advisable); Allen v. Merrill, 223 Mich.
467, 194 N.W. 131 (1923) (devise to trustee with discretionary power
of sale and direction to distribute the corpus within five years after
testator's death); Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Nichols, 311 Mich.
107, 18 N.W. (2d) 383 (1945) (trust mortgage with imperative power
in the trustee, in the event of foreclosure, to sell the land and dis·
tribute the proceeds to holders of participation certificates). PROPERTY
RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, ~20 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules:
Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW oF PROPERTY,
§25.42 (1952). See Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. llOO (1901);
Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250
(1922); In re Richard's Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938),
where it was held that a discretionary power of sale for reinvestment
was not sufficient to make the trust destructible but suggested that a
discretionary power to terminate the trust would be sufficient. See
also Ward v. Ward, 163 Mich. 570, 128 N.W. 761 (1910).
199
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however, that while a power of termination in the trustee
prevents the trust, as such, from suspending the absolute
power of alienation, the provisions for distribution of
the corpus or its proceeds may constitute limitations of
future interests in land or personalty which raise independent problems of validity. In New York, these would
always be governed by the suspension statutes. In Michigan it would seem that, if the distribution was to be of
land, the suspension statutes governed, but if chattels or
money were to be distributed, the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities applied. 201
C. INDESTRUCTIBLE TRUSTS

Chapter 63 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 provides:
"Sec. 11. Express trusts may be created for any or
either of the following purposes:
1.

To sell lands for the benefit of creditors:

2. To sell, mortgage or lease lands, for the benefit
of legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any charge
thereon:
3. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and
apply them to the use of any person, during the life of
such person, or for any shorter term, subject to the rules
prescribed in the last preceding chapter:
4. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to
accumulate the same for the benefit of any married
woman, or for either of the purposes and within the
limits prescribed in the preceding chapter:
5. For the beneficial interest of any person or persons, when such trust is fully expressed and clearly defined upon the face of the instrument creating it, subject
to the limitations as to time prescribed in this title.
201

Cf. note

197 supra.
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"Sec. 19. No person beneficially interested in a trust
for the receipt of the rents and profits of land, can assign
or in any manner dispose of such interest; but the rights
and interest of every person for whose benefit a trust for
the payment of a sum in gross is created, are assignable.
"Sec. 21. When the trust shall be expressed in the
instrument creating the estate, every sale, conveyance, or
other act of the trustees, in contravention of the trust,
shall be absolutely void." 20·2
This legislation was adopted from the New York Revised Statutes of 1829/03 but Subsection 5 of Section 11
and the provision as to married women in Subsection 4
are peculiar to Michigan. 204
( 1) Trusts for Receipt of the Rents and Profits of Land
The New York courts gave an extensive effect to the
first clause of the New York equivalent of Section 19,
holding not only that a cestui que trust of a trust for
receipt of the rents and profits of land could not alienate
his interest, 205 but that, even though all the cestuis were
202 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§11, 19, 21; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2641,
2649, 2651; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4124, 4132, 4134; Comp. Laws (1897)
§§8839, 8847, 8849; How. Stat. §§5573, 5581, 5583; Comp. Laws (1915)
§§11575, 11583, 11585; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12977, 12985, 12987;
Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.61, 26.69, 26.71; Comp. Laws (1948) §§555.11,
555.19, 555.21. For the background of this legislation, see Part One at
notes 575-587, supra.
203 Part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. second, §§55, 63, 65, Part One, notes
580, 581, supra. See: Part Three, note 234 infra.
2o4 Rev. Stat. 1846, p. V.
2 0 5 Douglas v. Cruger, 80 N.Y. 15 (1880). An express provision of
the trust instrument, authorizing alienation by the cestui, has been
deemed inoperative because of the statute. Crooke v. County of
Kings, 97 N.Y. 421 (1884); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, 192
N.Y. 266 at 280, 85 N.E. 59 (1908); Chaplin, SusPENSION OF THE PowER
OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §254 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App.,
Ch. A, 1!17 (1944); 3 Walsh, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §344 (1947);
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.11 (1952).
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in being and ascertained, they could not compel the
termination of the trust 206 or cooperate with the trustee
to terminate it. 207 Moreover, they held that the statutory
inalienability of the cestuis' interests applied to trusts
to receive and pay over the rents and profits as well as
to trusts to receive and apply them. 208 This being so,
the existence of such a trust meant that there were no
persons in being by whom an "absolute fee in possession" 209 could be conveyed. In consequence, unless such
a trust was destructible under the rules discussed in the
preceding subsection, it suspended the absolute power
of alienation even though all interests in the land were
indefeasibly vested in ascertained persons in being. 210
Although the language of Subsection 5 of Section 11
indicates that, when the Michigan Legislature adopted
the New York statutes governing trusts and suspension
of the absolute power of alienation, it was aware of and
intended to adopt the New York judicial interpretation
of them, it has been seen that the Michigan Supreme
Court appears to have held in Bennett v. Chapin 211 that,
200 Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N.Y. 326, 32 N.E. 1088 (1893); Part
One, note 614 supra; Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and
Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.11 (1952).
201 Dale v. Guaranty Trust Co., 168 App. Div. 601, 153 N.Y. Supp.
1041 (1915); Part Three, note 206 supra.
2os Leggett v. Perkins, 2 N.Y. 297 (1849); Cochrane v. Schell, 140
N.Y. 516 (1894); Part One, note 597 supra; PROPERTY REsTATEMENT,
App., Ch. A, 1[18 (1944).
209 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §14, Part Three, note I supra.
210 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (1835); Hawley v. James, 16
Wend. 61 (1836); Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION,
3rd ed., §§252, 255 (1928); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[17
(1944); 3 Walsh, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §§344, 350 (1947); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.12 (1952).
211 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889), Part One, note 611, Part
Two, note 466 supra. But see Blossom v. Anketell, (D.C. Mich. 1921)
275 F. 947. In Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900),
land was conveyed to a trustee to apply the rents and profits to the
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if the cestuis que trustent of a trust for receipt of the
rents and profits of land were all in being and ascertained, they could compel termination of the trust and
convey an absolute fee in possession. If so, it would
seem to follow logically that, in Michigan, such a trust
was destructible under the rules discussed in the preceding subsection 212 and so did not suspend the absolute
power of alienation. Nevertheless, the Michigan Court
held repeatedly that a trust for receipt of the rents and
profits of land did suspend the absolute power of alienation even if all interests in the land were owned by
ascertained living persons who, were it not for the statutory inalienability of the interests of trustee and cestuis que trustent, could join to convey an absolute fee
in possession. In Casgrain v. Hammond, 218 land was conveyed to a trustee (I) to pay the income to the settlor
for life; (2) if the settlor died within fourteen years, to
pay the income to five children of the settlor or the survivors of them until the expiration of that period; (3)
use of William Fitzhugh during his life and after his death to apply
them to the use of his wife and children during the life of the wife,
remainder at her death to the children. After the death of William
his widow released her interest to the other beneficiaries. They sued
to compel termination of the trust and distribution of the corpus to
them and were granted the relief sought. This decision is, of course,
in flat conflict with Section 19 insofar as it holds that the interest
of a beneficiary of a trust for receipt and application of the rents and
profits of land is alienable.
212 Part Three, notes 181, 185, supra.
21s 134 Mich. 419, 96 N.W. 510 (1903). Accord: Scheibner v. Scheibner, 199 Mich. 630, 165 N.W. 660 (1917) (devise to trustees to pay
income to widow for life, then to pay $75 a month to each of two sons
until twenty years after testator's death, then to convert into cash
and divide between the sons); Loomis v. Laramie, 286 Mich. 707, 282
N.W. 876 (1938) (devise to trustees to accumulate for twenty years
and then distribute to six named persons, their heirs or assigns);
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6
AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §25.41 (1952). In James E. Scripps
Corporation v. Parkinson, 186 Mich. 663, 153 N.W. 29 (1915) it was
held that a trust suspended the absolute power of alienation although
the sole trustee was also the sole income beneficiary.
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after the death of the settlor and the expiration of fourteen years from the date of the trust instrument, to convey the principal to the five children or the survivors of
them. Although the entire fee was owned by the settlor,
the trustee, who was one of the five children, and the
other four children, all of whom were ascertained living
persons, it was held that the trust was wholly void because it might suspend the absolute power of alienation
for a period not measured by two lives in being.
Most trusts for receipt of the rents and profits of land
involve suspension of the absolute power of alienation
caused not only by the statutory inalienability of the
interests of the trustees and cestuis que trustent) but by
the fact that unborn or unascertained persons are entitled to the rents and profits 214 or to shares in the principal 215 at some future time. In such cases, the interests
of the unborn or unascertained persons are, of course,
future interests which, if indestructible, would suspend
the absolute power of alienation under the rules discussed in Section A of this chapter even if there were no
trust. z16 The opinions commonly fail to make a clear
214 Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885); Palms v.
Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); Ford v. Ford, 80 Mich. 42,
44 N.W. 1057 (1890); Dean v. Mumford, 102 Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7
(1894); Cole v. Lee, 143 Mich. 267, 106 N.W. 855 (1906); Otis v.
Arntz, 198 Mich. 196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917); Grand Rapids Trust Co.
v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922); Allen v. Merrill,
223 Mich. 467, 194 N.W. 131 (1923); Burke v. Central Trust Co.,
258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932); Gardner v. City National Bank
& Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934); In re Richards'
Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938); Dodge v. Detroit Trust
Co., 300 Mich. 575, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942).
215 Farrand v. Petit, 84 Mich. 671, 48 N.W. 156 (1891); Niles v.
Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. 1100 (1901); Foster v. Stevens, 146
Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906); James E. Scripps Corporation v.
Parkinson, 186 Mich. 663, 153 N.W. 29 (1915); Van Tyne v. Pratt,
291 Mich. 626, 289 N.W. 275 (1939); Bateson v. Bateson, 294 Mich.
426, 293 N.W. 705 (1940); Miller v. Curtiss, 328 Mich. 239, 43 N.W.
(2d) 834 (1950); cases cited in preceding note.
21e Part Three, notes 77-80, supra.

554

PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS

distinction between the two types of suspension, by
trusts themselves and by future interests under or following trusts, but it is important to make that distinction
because the possible duration of suspension of the one
type may not, in a given case, be the same as the possible
duration of suspension of the other type. If Andrew
Baker devises land to James Thorpe for the life of John
Stiles upon trust to apply the rents and profits to the use
of John, legal remainder to the children of John who
reach thirty, the remainder is a future interest which may
suspend the absolute power of alienation beyond the
permissible period, but suspension caused by the trust
itself cannot last longer than a single life in being, that
of John.
A future interest which violates the common-law Rule
Against Perpetuities is wholly void, not merely void as
to those parts which may suspend vesting for too long.m
Section 14 of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846
applied the same rule to future interests which violate
the suspension statutes by providing that "Every future
estate shall be void in its creation, which shall suspend
the absolute power of alienation for a longer period than
is prescribed in this chapter." 218 The invalidity of present trusts which suspend the absolute power of alienation
rested, however, on Section 15, which provided merely
that "The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever, for a
longer period than during the continuance of two lives
in being ... " 219 It would, therefore, have been possible
211 Thus a class gift is wholly void under the common-law Rule
if the interest of any member of the class may vest too remotely, even
though the interests of some members are presently vested. Part Two,
note 280 supra.
21s Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §14, Part Three, notes I, 76, supra.
219 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §15, Part Three, note 1 supra.
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to !10ld that a trust set up to last for too long was void
only as to the excess; for example, that a trust to last for
three lives was valid for the first two lives named. 220 The
New York courts held, however, that a trust which,
under its terms, might last longer than the statutory
period was wholly void, not merely invalid as to the
excess, 221 and Michigan followed this view. 222
(2) Trusts for Payment of a Sum in Gross; Annuities
As the statutory inalienability created by Section 19
of Chapter 63 affects only the interests of beneficiaries
under trusts, it is clear that a provision for payments to
an ascertained living person which does not create a trust
does not suspend the absolute power of alienation. Thus
a provision for payment of a legacy, whether in a lump
sum or in instalmentS, 223 or a provision for payments
which imposes a mere equitable charge or lien on land, 224
22o Cf. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §17, Part Three, notes 1, 53, supra,
which provided, "when a remainder shall be limited on more than two
successive estates for life, all the life estates subsequent to those of
the two persons first entitled thereto, shall be void, . . ." Under this
section, if more than two successive legal life estates were limited, the
first two were valid. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §38, Part Two, note 482
supra, provided, similarly, that a provision for an accumulation for
longer than the permitted period was void only as to the excess.
221 Coster v. Lorillard,
14 Wend. 265 (N.Y. 1835); Whiteside,
"Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw
OF PROPERTY, §25.12 (1952). However, if trust provisions could be
construed to be separable, that is, to call for several separate trusts,
some might be valid although some were void. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT,
App., Ch. A, 1!1!33, 47-52 (1944). The problem of separability will be
discussed in Chapter 21, infra.
222 Part Three, notes 213-215, Part Two, note 541 supra.
22a See: Radley v. Kuhn, 97 N.Y. 26 (1884).
224 Torpy v. Betts, 123 Mich. 239, 81 N.W. 1094 (1900); Mcinerny
v. Haase, 163 Mich. 364, 128 N.W. 215 (1910); Peoples' Trust Co. v.
Flynn, 188 N.Y. 385, 80 N.E. 1098 (1907); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,
App., Ch. A, 1!53 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and
Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952). When
the amount payable to the beneficiary is fixed as to total or as to
periodical payment and thus does not depend upon the amount of
rents and profits actually earned, the provision is a charge.
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does not effect suspension. If a provision does create a
trust, it becomes necessary to determine whether it is for
"the receipt of the rents and profits" or the "payment of
a sum in gross." If Andrew Baker devises land to James
Thorpe on trust to receive the rents and profits and
apply them to the use of John Stiles, his wife, and children, during their lives, it is clear that Section 19 makes
the interests of the beneficiaries inalienable. If Andrew
Baker devises land to James Thorpe on trust to sell,
mortgage, or lease in order to raise the sum of $10,000,
to pay this sum to John Stiles, and then to transfer the
balance of the proceeds of sale or the land subject to
the mortgage or lease to Lucy Baker, it is equally dear
that the interests of the beneficiaries are alienable. 225
The provisions which have caused difficulty are those
which call for periodic payments in fixed amounts,
usually referred to as "annuities." If such a provision
creates only an equitable charge, with priority over the
zzs In Fredericks v. Near, 260 Mich. 627, 245 N.W. 537 (1932), a
husband and wife conveyed land to a trustee to sell it and pay a debt
of the husband to a corporation. Being unable to make a sale, the
trustee, with the consent of the corporation, reconveyed to the settlors.
Because this was a trust "to sell lands for the benefit of creditors"
created under Subsection I of Sec. 11 (Part Three, note 202 supra),
not a trust "for the receipt of the rents and profits of lands," and
because it was "for the payment of a sum in gross," the interest of
the beneficiary was alienable under §19. Hence it was correctly held
that the reconveyance effectively terminated the trust. In re De
Rancourt's Estate, 279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891 (1937), involved a
devise to a trustee to pay $10,000 to the Salvation Army in Jackson
upon the performance of a condition precedent. Because this was a
trust "to sell . . . lands, for the benefit of legatees" created under
Subsection 2 of Sec. 11 (Part Three, note 202 supra), not a trust
"for the receipt of the rents and profits of lands," and because it was
"for the payment of a sum in gross," the interest of the beneficiary
was alienable under §19. In Fox v. Greene, 289 Mich. 179; 286 N.W.
203 (1939), land was conveyed to trustees to subdivide, sell, and distribute the proceeds to the settlors. Because this was a trust to sell
and distribute the proceeds, not one to hold and receive the rents
and profits, the interests of the beneficiaries were properly treated
as alienable.
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trust, the New York decisions are to the effect that it
does not suspend the absolute power of alienation. 22~ If,
on the other hand, a trust is created and the payments
are to be made exclusively from the rents and profits,
such an annuity does suspend the absolute power of
alienation. 221 If the provisions in question create a trust
and make an annuity payable from principal or from
both principal and income, it is held in New York that
the annuity does not effect suspension and does not prolong the duration of the trust. 228 After the trust terminates, such an annuity becomes a mere equitable
charge. 229 If Andrew Baker devises land to James Thorpe
upon trust to pay $5000 per year to Lucy Baker for life,
using either income or principal therefor, and, subject
thereto, to pay the net income to John Stiles for life,
then to William Stiles for life, residue to the heirs of
the testator, the trust is treated as terminating with the
deaths of John and William. If Lucy Baker is alive at
that time, her annuity continues only as an equitable
Part Three, note 224 supra.
Cochrane v. Schell, 140 N.Y. 516, 35 N.E. 871 (1894); Chaplin,
SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §250 (1928).
228 Clark v. Clark, 147 N.Y. 639, 42 N.E. 275 (1895); Chaplin, id.,
§249; Whiteside, id., §25.15. Subsection 2 of Section 55 of the New
York statute (Part One, note 580, Part Three, note 203, supra) was
amended by Laws 1909, ch. 52, to read, "To sell, mortgage or lease
real property for the benefit of annuitants or other legatees, or for
the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon." Section 63 was amended
to read, "The right of a beneficiary of an express trust to receive
rents and profits of real property and apply them to the use of any
person, can not be transferred by assignment or otherwise, but the
right and interest of the beneficiary of any other trust in real property, ... may be transferred." Real Property, Law, §§96, 103. These
amendments served to confirm the existing judicial construction of the
original sections.
229 Buchanan v. Little, 154 N.Y. 147, 47 N.E. 970 (1897}; Powell and
Whiteside, THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEw YoRK CoNCERNING
PERPETUITIES AND RELATED MATTERS, 102 [N.Y. Legislative Document
(1936) No. 65 (H).] Cf. Burke v. Central Trust Co., Part Three, note
247 infra, where it was suggested that an express provision to this
effect would be valid.
22s

221
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charge, which does not suspend the absolute power of
alienation. The Michigan decisions involving these
problems are neither clear nor harmonious and so require detailed discussion.
In Toms v. Williams/ 80 the testatrix owned land subject to a forty-year lease which provided that the lessor
would pay for the lessee's improvements at the expiration
of the term or renew the lease for an additional forty
years. At the time of the testatrix's death, the original
term had eighteen years to run. She devised this and
other property to trustees (1) to set aside $5,000 per
annum to form a sinking fund to pay for the lessee's improvements; (2) to accumulate the balance of the income and pay it over to two nephews and a niece when
the youngest attained majority; (3) to transfer the principal to the nephews and niece as soon as the lessee's
improvements were paid for. It was held that this was
a trust to "lease lands, for the benefit of legatees, or for
the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon" within the
meaning of Subsection 2 of Section 11 and that it was
not subject to the suspension statutes. The opinion suggests that trusts falling under Subsection 1, to sell lands
for the benefit of creditors, were also exempt from the
suspension statutes.
Russell v. Musson· 231 involved a devise to a son and
his wife for their lives, remainder to the children of the
son who survived him but, if there were no such children, remainder to Josiah and Hannah Musson, charged
with the support of their mother, and if either die with2ao 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879). The lessee's interest under
the trust was alienable. The provision for accumulation of the balance
of the income was held not to exceed the permissible duration. Part
Two, notes 485-487, supra. See Part Three, note 225 supra.
2s1 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927). Accord: Matter of Bloodgood, 184 App. Div. 798, 172 N.Y.S. 509 (1918).
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out issue, to the survivor; if both die without issue, to
their mother. Under this devise, after the death of the
son, all interests in the land would necessarily be held
by ascertained living persons, the son's wife, Josiah, Hannah, and their mother. Hence the entire fee would be
freely alienable after a single life in being unless the provision for support of the mother made her the beneficiary of a trust for receipt of the rents and profits of
lands so that her interest thereunder was inalienable. It
was held that her interest was alienable and that the dis·
position could not suspend the absolute power of alienation beyond the son's life. This decision was sound
because the provision for support created an equitable
charge, not a trust. 232 The interest of the beneficiary of
an equitable charge is not made inalienable by statute;
hence such a charge in favor of an ascertained living person does not suspend the absolute power of alienation.
In Wilson v. Odell,233 a testator devised his entire
estate to trustees with power to sell land, "except as
otherwise provided, at such times and in such parcels
as they shall deem advisable, and out of said property
pay" (1) funeral expenses and the cost of a monument;
(2) an annuity of $1500 to his widow; (3) annuities to
each of his three children of $600 while under fourteen
and $1000 beyond that age; (4) two pecuniary legacies.
Subsequent clauses directed retention of certain parcels
of land for the purpose of aiding in carrying out the
third purpose, devised the residue to his grandchildren
after the death of all his children and on the majority
232 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, §10 (1935). An equitable charge differs
from a trust in that it is a mere lien on land, the legal owner of which
holds for his own benefit without fiduciary duties to the beneficiary
of the charge, whereas a trustee holds for the benefit of the cestuis que
trustent and owes fiduciary duties to them. The holder of an equitable
charge is, in effect, a mortgagee.
23a 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885).
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of the youngest grandchild, and directed that the annuity of any deceased child be continued to its children
until the division. It was held that these dispositions
were valid as to the land subject to the trustees' power
of sale. 234 Insofar as they related to land not subject to
sale, it was held that the implied direction to accumulate
surplus rents and profits was valid only during the minority of the children, 235 that the limitations to the grandchildren were void, and that the trust would terminate when
the children came of age, at which time the land would
pass to the heirs, subject to the children's annuities. The
opinion does not discuss the problem of whether the annuities of the children suspended the absolute power of
alienation, but the fact that they were treated as valid
indicates that the Court thought they did not.
Dean v. Mumford 236 involved a will which devised
the use of testator's homestead to his widow for life, directed the executors to pay the taxes and repairs thereon
from the estate, bequeathed a life annuity of $1500 to
the widow, and devised the residue to his five children.
The will provided that the executors should hold the
shares of three sons on trust for these sons, their wives
and children, during the lives of the sons and their wives,
remainder to their children. It was held that the latter
provision was for three separate trusts, each for the life
of a son and his wife, but that the provisions for payment
of taxes and repairs and the annuity to the widow
created a trust which suspended the absolute power of
alienation for her life. As to each of the three shares,
therefore, the absolute power of alienation was susPart Three, note 190 supra.
Part Two, note 489 supra.
102 Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 (1894). The widow elected to take
against the will, so the validity of the provisions for her was not in
question.
234
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pended for three lives, those of the widow, a son, and his
wife. The trusts for the sons, their wives and children,
and the remainders thereafter to the sons' children were
held void. 237
In Niles v. Mason/ 38 an estate was devised to a trustee
(1) to pay debts, funeral expenses, and a small legacy;
(2) to pay $12.50 per month to sister Sarah for life, but,
"upon the event of her marriage the said legacy to cease,
and to become part of the income hereinafter provided
for;" (3) subject to the foregoing, to pay half the income to son Charles for life and half to daughter Lottie
for life; if either die without issue, the whole income to
the survivor for life, remainder to the issue of Charles
and Lottie or, if there should be none, to a brother. It
was held that the provision for an annuity to the sister
suspended the absolute power of alienation during her
life and that the other provisions suspended it during the
lives of Charles and Lottie, making three lives; that the
trust for Charles and Lottie and the remainders were
void, but that the annuity, being separable, was valid.
Before the case was decided the trustee had executed
a mortgage to the sister to secure payment of the annuity, and the Court approved his act in doing so, thus
indicating that it considered the annuity a charge on
principal, not merely on the rents and profits. As has
been seen, such an annuity does not suspend the absolute power of alienation under the New York decisions. 239
Van Driele v. Kotvis 240 involved a will which proPart Two, note 562 supra.
126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. 1100 (1901).
239 Part Three, note 228 supra.
240 135 Mith. 181, 97 N.W. 700 (1903). Contra: Otis v. Arntz, 198
Mich. 196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917) (bequest to church of $25 a year for
ten years, "the said sum to be taken from the income of my estate.")
But the will in this case became effective in 1916, after the enactment
of Act 122 of 1907, Part Two, note 421 supra.
237
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vided, "I - - - bequeath to the Fourth Dutch Reformed
Church - - - the sum of five hundred dollars, to be paid
by my executor out of the rents, issues, and profits of my
estate in the manner following, to wit: Twenty-five dollars per year, for a period of twenty years." The provision was held invalid on the ground that it suspended
the absolute power of alienation for twenty years.
In Skinner v. Taft/41 a testator devised his estate to
trustees to pay "out of the interest, income and profits"
$5,000 per year to his widow and $1,666.66 to each of
his three children. The will provided, "the trust herein
and hereby created ... shall terminate five years from
the date of the probating of my will," at which time
the trustees were directed to distribute the principal to
the wife and children in equal shares. The income was
insufficient to pay the annuities, and the widow sought
a decision that they were a charge on principal. It was
held that they were not in an opinion which assumed
that, as so construed, the trust was valid. If, as appears
to have been the case, the estate included land, the implied holding that the trust did not suspend the absolute
power of alienation seems irreconcilable with the previous Michigan decisions discussed above.
Cole v. Lee 242 involved a will which directed the executors (1) to pay Phebe Simons $200 a year for life;
(2) to provide Carrie Humphrey with a home costing
not more than $2,000, pay her $50 a month for life, and
"to make such further expenditures as may be necessary
to secure her maintenance in ease and comfort;" (3) to
pay the living expenses of Frank Cole, his wife and children, during the lives of Frank and wife. Subject to
these provisions and some outright legacies, the residue
2n
242

140 Mich. 282, 103 N.W. 702 (1905).
143 Mich. 267, 106 N.W. 855 (1906).
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was devised to the children of Frank, whenever born.
It was held that the will created a valid trust for the lives
of Frank and his wife. The opinion does not mention
the Simons annuity but states, "The charge of an annuity
in favor of Mrs. Humphrey does not prevent the vesting
of the estate, as the amount is fixed."
The will involved in Hull v. Osborn 243 directed the
"executors and trustees" to pay (I) testator's widow $250
per month during her lifetime, an additional $150 per
month on demand, and a sum sufficient to pay taxes, insurance, and repairs on her home; (2) Fred Rowley $150
per year during the life of Carrie Rowley for the use of
Carrie. The residue was devised to Blanche and Frances
Hull in equal shares, each to be paid $10,000 at 21,
$10,000 at 25, $10,000 at 30, $10,000 at 35, $10,000 at
40, and the balance of her half at 45. The will further
provided that, if Blanche or Frances died under 45,
without issue, payments due her should be made to the
survivor at the same times, and that if both died without
issue, the payments due them should be made to anumber of relatives to be ascertained at that time. The executors and trustees were directed to keep the assets
safely invested until distribution. When both were
under 30, Blanche and Frances sued to compel termination of the trust and distribution of the entire principal to them. An order sustaining a demurrer to the bill
was affirmed in an opinion which states that the provisions for Blanche and Francis did not create a trust
and, because their interests were vested, did not violate
the suspension statutes, and that the provision for distribution of the residue in the event both Blanche and
Frances died without issue did not suspend the absolute
power of alienation beyond two lives. Although the
24s

151 Mich. 8, 113 N.W. 784 (1908).

564

PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS

opinion does not mention the annuities to the widow
and Fred Rowley, the decision necessarily assumes that
they did not suspend the absolute power of alienation.
This assumption also seems inconsistent with earlier decisions.
In Scheibner v. Scheibner/ 44 the residue of an estate
was devised to trustees (1) to pay the income to the
testator's widow for life; (2) to pay to the testator's two
sons $75 "a month each, from and after the death of my
said wife, until the expiration of a period of twenty years
from the date of my death, during which time I direct
that none of my property shall be sold or mortgaged;"
(3) to convert the estate into cash at the end of the
twenty years and pay it to the sons. It was held that a
bill of complaint praying that this trust be declared
void as suspending the absolute power of alienation beyond two lives stated a cause of action.
Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst 245 involved a will
which (1) directed payment of $75 per month each to
two nephews and a niece during their lives; (2) directed
division of the remainder of the net income among a
son, a brother, and two sisters in equal shares; (3) devised to the son, when and if he reached 25, half the
estate outright and the other half charged with payment
of the $7 5 a month to each nephew and niece and the
remainder of the net income therefrom to the brother
and sisters and the survivor of them during life; (4) if
the son died under 25 leaving issue, devised half the
estate to trustees to apply principal and income to the
support of the issue until 21 or earlier death; principal
to the issue at 21; (5) if the son died under 25 without
issue or with issue which failed to reach 21, devised the
244199 Mich. 630, 165 N.W. 660 (1917).
245 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922).
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entire estate to four named charitable institutions, subject to the payments specified in (3). It was held that all
of these provisions were void, the opinion saying,
"Counsel for sustaining the will contended no trust
is created by the will except for the unborn issue of testator's son, and designating as 'annuities' the monthly
payments provided for the nephews and niece in paragraphs 3-5, urge that they are thereby made outright bequests of definite sums of money to be paid the beneficiaries by the executors. But the next paragraph (6)
directs 'the remainder of the net income,' not the income
of the remainder, to 'be equally divided between' testator's son, brother and two sisters, and although by
paragraph 7 an ownership accrues to the son if he lives
until 25 years old which relieves one-half of the estate
of the monthly payments to nephews and niece, the
brothers and sisters yet receive 'the balance of the net
income' of the remaining half after payment of the $7 5
per month each provided for the nephews and niece,
thus plainly providing that their monthly payments are
to be taken from net income and are not annuities. An
annuity is 'A yearly payment of a certain sum of money,
granted to another in fee, for life or years, charging the
person of the grantor only' (Burrill's Law Diet.), distinguished from an 'income' by the latter being interest
or profits to be earned. - - -.
~·---the life beneficiaries being interested in the rents
and profits of the real estate to which it relates, we are
unable to see how against the prohibition of this statute 246
those beneficiaries can relieve it of that burden by disposing of their interests. The interests of the life beneficiaries are not sums in gross but portions of an income,
or rents and profits of ultimate indeterminate amount,
even as to those given a stated monthly stipend owing
to uncertainty of their respective lives." 247
246 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §19, Part Three, note 202 supra.
m 220 Mich. 321 at 327-329.
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In Burke v. Central Trust Co./ 48 a testatrix devised
her estate to a trustee (1) to pay Mary Burke $300 per
month for life out of income or, if necessary, out of
principal; (2) to pay stipulated monthly sums out of
income to each of five named persons for life; (3) when
the youngest child of grandnephew Frank Burke, whenever born, reached 25, to transfer the principal and any
accumulated income to the children of Frank then living,
subject to a lien to ensure payment of the monthly payments specified in (1) and (2). A codicil provided for
payment of $300 per month to the guardian of Frank's
children from the death of their parents until the termination of the trust. It was held that the entire trust was
void but suggested that, if the will had provided that the
trust should terminate when the youngest child of Frank
then in being reached 25, the provisions would have
been valid. This, in effect, is dictum that, after the
termination of the trust, the annuities would be mere
equitable charges which would not suspend the absolute
power of alienation.
In• re Wagar's Estate 249 involved a will which devised
the estate to a trustee (1) to pay the entire income to
the widow for life; (2) after the death of the widow, to
pay stipulated monthly sums from the "rents and earnings" to each of three named children and three named
grandchildren until the death of the survivor of the
children, the heirs of any of the six persons who died
before the termination of the trust to receive the
amounts otherwise payable to the person so dying. The
only question raised in the litigation was whether the
258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932).
295 Mich. 463, 295 N.W. 227 (1940). Cf. Dodge v. Detroit Trust
Co., 300 Mich. 575, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942), where a number of
annuities under a trust were involved but their validity was not
determined.
248
249
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widow of one of the children was an "heir" for this
purpose. In an opinion which does not discuss the
validity of the trust it was held that she was.
It would seem from the cases just reviewed that, in
Michigan as in New York, a provision for an annuity
which created a mere equitable charge and not a trust
did not suspend the absolute power of alienation. 250
Several of the decisions, however, found that a trust was
created in situations where an equitable charge construction would have been possible. 251 When the language used was construed to create a trust, the Michigan
decisions are not consistent. It will be recalled that,
under the New York decisions, an annuity payable
under a trust suspends the absolute power of alienation
if it is to be paid exclusively from the rents and profits 25'2
but does not if it is to be paid from principal or from
both principal and income. 2"3 Three of the Michigan
cases involving an annuity payable under a trust exclusively from rents and profits held that it did effect suspension/54 and two appear to have held that it did
not. 255 Two Michigan decisions held that an annuity pay2so Russell v. Musson, Part Three, note 231 supra. Wilson v. Odell,
Part Three, note 233 supra, Cole v. Lee, Part Three, note 242 supra,
and Hull v. Osborn, Part Three, note 243 supra, are probably decisions
to this effect. The dictum in Burke v. Central Trust Co., Part Three,
note 248 supra, also appears to support this proposition.
2s1 Dean v. Mumford, Part Three, note 236 supra; Van Driele v.
Kotvis, Part Three, note 240 supra; Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst,
Part Three, note 245 supra.
252 Part Three, note 227 supra.
21>a Part Three, note 228 supra.
25 4 Van Driele v. Kotvis, Part Three, note 240 supra; Scheibner v.
Scheibner, Part Three, note 244 supra; Grand Rapids Trust Co. v.
Herbst, Part Three, note 245 supra. Cf. Burke v. Central Trust Co.,
Part Three, note 248 supra.
255 Skinner v. Taft, Part Three, note 241 supra; In re Wagar's
Estate, Part Three, note 249 supra. The Wagar decision may have
assumed or held that the provisions were valid either because the
probate order of distribution to the trustee was res judicata on this
point [Snyder v. Potter, 328 Mich. 236, 43 N.W. (2d) 922 (1950)] or
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able under a trust from both principal and income suspended the absolute power of alienation, 25tl and two
others which involved this problem did not clearly decide it. 257 In this state of the authorities, it would be
hazardous to venture an opinion as to when an annuity
under a trust suspended the absolute power of alienation
in Michigan. As Section 19 of Chapter 63 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 258 has not been repealed, the problem of the alienability of such annuities may still arise,
even though the instrument creating them became effective after the repeal of the suspension statutes.
If the settlor of an inter vivos trust is also a beneficiary, it is held in New York that his beneficial interest
is alienable and so does not suspend the absolute power
of alienation. 259 Hence a trust to last for the lives of
the settlor and two other persons is valid. The plaintiff
in Bateson v. Bateson 260 conveyed land to a trustee (1)
to pay the entire income to the settlor during his lifetime; (2) after the settlor's death to hold 2/10 of the
because the suspension effected could not extend beyond the permissible statutory period. In Sprague v. Moore, 130 Mich. 92, 89 N.W.
712 (1902), a mother conveyed land to a daughter on trust to use the
income to support the settlor and pay not to exceed $1000 per year
to each of the settlor's seven children and one grandchild, these eight
to receive the principal on the death of the settlor. The opinion
appears to treat the interests of the children and grandchild as to
income as alienable. If so, they did not suspend the absolute power
of alienation.
256 Dean v. Mumford, Part Three, note 236 supra; Niles v. Mason,
Part Three, note 238 supra. Cf. Burke v. Central Trust Co., Part
Three, note 248 supra.
257 Wilson v. Odell, Part Three, note 233 supra; Burke v. Central
Trust Co., Part Three, note 248 supra.
258 Part Three, note 202 supra.
259 Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N.Y. 316, 50 N.E. 967 (1898); Whiteside,
"Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw
OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952).
26o 294 Mich. 426, 293 N.W. 705 (1940). Cf. Lewis v. Nelson, 4 Mich.
630 (1857); Casgrain v. Hammond, 134 Mich. 419, 96 N.W. 510
(1903), Part Three, note 213 supra. See Part One, supra, at notes
626-632.
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corpus in trust and pay the income therefrom to James
for 15 years; (3) at the expiration of the 15 years to
convey this 2/10 of the corpus to James in fee; (4) if
James should die within the 15 years, to convey the fee
to his wife and children; but if there were none, to convey l/10 to George and hold the other l/10 on trust and
pay the income therefrom to Samuel for life and, on
his death, to convey the corpus to Samuel's wife and
children. The Court disagreed as to the validity of
the provision relative to George, but all the justices
agreed that the provisions as to the l/10 to be held in
trust for the lives of the settlor, James, and Samuel suspended the absolute power of alienation for three lives
and so were void. This decision is, therefore, contrary
to the New York view.
The application of the suspension statutes to charitable and honorary trusts has been discussed in Chapter
16.261 The situations in which a trust does not suspend
the absolute power of alienation because it is destructible
by the exercise of a power have been discussed in the
preceding section of this chapter.
261

Part Two, supra, at notes 406-428, 432, 437-447.

CHAPTER

21

The Statutory Period
HAPTER 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 provided:

C

"Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation
shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition
whatever, for a longer period than during the continuance of two lives in being at the creation of the estate,
except in the single case mentioned in the next section.
"Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be
created on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect in
the event that the persons to whom the first remainder
is limited shall die under the age of twenty-one years,
or upon any contingency by which the estate of such
persons may be determined before they attain their full
age.
"Sec. 30. When a future estate shall be limited to
heirs, or issue, or children, posthumous children shall
be entitled to take, in the same manner as if born before
the death of the parents.
"Sec. 31. A future estate depending on the contingency of the death of any person without heirs or issue,
or children, shall be defeated by the birth of a posthumous child of such person, capable of taking by descent.
"Sec. 41. The delivery of the grant, where an expectant estate is created by grant; and where it is created
by devise, the death of the testator, shall be deemed the
time of the creation of the estate." 262
262 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§15, 16, 30, 31, 41; Comp. Laws (1857)
§§2599, 2600, 2614, 2615, 2625; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4082, 4083,
4097, 4098, 4108; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8797, 8798, 8812, 8813,
8823; How. Stat., §§5531, 5532, 5546, 5547, 5557; Comp. Laws (1915)
§§11533, 11534, 11548, 11549, 11559; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12935,
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The period of permissible suspension of the absolute
power of alienation under Sections 15 and 16 differs
from the period of permissible suspension of vesting
under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities in
three respects: (1) Whereas under the common-law Rule
there may be suspension for any number of lives in
being, 268 under the statutes the number of lives in being
is limited to two. (2) Whereas under the common-law
Rule suspension is always permissible during the minority of a person who is not in being at the commencement of the period but will certainly come into being,
if at all, within lives in being, 264 suspension is permissible under the statutes during such a minority only if
the minor is certain to come into being, if at all, within
two lives and only when the minor is entitled to a fee
defeasible by a condition occurring during minority.
(3) Whereas under the common-law Rule suspension
is permissible during a gross period of twenty-one years
or less, unconnected with an actual minority, whether or
not such period follows lives in being, 265 the statutes do
not permit suspension for any period in gross whatever.
A. COMMENCEMENT OF THE PERIOD

Under both the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities and the statutes, the period is computed, as to an
interest which is indestructible from its creation, from
the time when the instrument creating the interest becomes effective. In the case of a deed, this is the time of
12936, 12950, 12951, 12961; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.15, 26.16, 26.30,
26.31, 26.41; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.15, 554.16, 554.30, 554.31,
554.41. Sections 15 and 16 were repealed by Act 38, P.A. 1949, Mich.
Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52. As to the
limited effect of this repeal see Part Three at note 3 supra.
263 Part Two, note 95 supra.
2&4 Part Two, notes 31, 101, supra.
265 Part Two, notes 35, 112-115, supra.
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delivery; in the case of a will, the death of the testator. 266
Under both the common-law Rule and the statutes, an
interest created by the exercise of a power of appointment is normally deemed, for this purpose, to be created
by the instrument creating the power rather than by
the instrument exercising it. 267 However, under the
common-law Rule, an interest created by the exercise of
a power of appointment which is unlimited as to objects,
and exercisable by deed, is deemed to be created by the
instrument exercising the power/68 and this is true
under the statutes as to an interest created by exercise
of an absolute power of disposition of the entire fee.ll 69
Under both the common-law Rule and the statutes, the
commencement of the period may be postponed by the
existence of destructibility. What constitutes destructibility, however, is not the same under the statutes as
at common law. 270
B. THE REQUIREMENT OF CERTAINTY

Under both the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities and the statutes, an interest which is indestructible
from its creation and not created by exercise of a power
is invalid unless, at the time when the creating instrument becomes effective, it is absolutely certain that the
interest will not effect suspension for longer than the
permissible period; a high degree of probability is not
enough. If, viewed from that time, any combination of
future events which would extend suspension beyond
266 Part Two, note 63 supra; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§15, 41, Part
Three, note 262 supra; Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENA·
TION, 3rd ed., §88 (1928).
267 Part Two, notes 318, 322, Part Three, note 145, supra.
268 Part Two, note 301 supra.
269 Part Two, note 305, Part Three, note 148, supra.
210 Part Two, notes 70-81, Chapter 20, Section B (3), supra.
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the permissible period is possible, the interest is void,
although the actual occurrence of that combination of
events is highly unlikely and even though, by the time
the validity of the interest is litigated, it has become
manifest that they did not or cannot occur. 211 In determining this certainty it is always deemed possible,
under the statutes as at common law, that a living person
may marry a person as yet unborn, 272 that a living person, regardless of age or physical condition, is capable of
having children,278 and that such administrative steps as
211 Part Two, note 130, supra; Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25
N.W. 506 (1885); State v. Holmes, ll5 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898);
Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. llOO (1901); Casgrain v.
Hammond, 134 Mich. 419, 96 N.W. 510 (1903); Scheibner v. Scheibner,
199 Mich. 630, 165 N.W. 660 (1917); Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324,
186 N.W. 489 (1922); Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich.
321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922); Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588,
242 N.W. 760 (1932); Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co.,
267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934); Bateson v. Bateson, 294 Mich.
426, 293 N.W. 705 (1940); Chaplin, SusPENSION oF THE PowER oF
ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §92 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch.
A, 1"[1"[31, 32 (1944); See: Foster v. Stevens, 146 Mich. 131, 109 N.W.
265 (1906); Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228
N.W. 703 (1930); Miller v. Curtiss, 328 Mich. 239, 43 N.W. (2d)
834 (1950).
212 Part Two, note 131 supra; Schettler v. Smith, 41 N.Y. 328 (1869);
Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §ll5
(1928); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1"[32 (1944). That is to
say, if a limitation is construed to be to, or measured by the life of,
anyone whom a named person may marry in the future, it is possible
that the spouse may be a person as yet unborn. But in Dean v.
Mumford, 102 Mich. 510 at 515, 61 N.W. 7 (1894), where a will, as
construed by the court, created a trust to last for the lives of the
testator's widow, his unmarried son, and the son's wife, it was said,
"But it is suggested that, in this view, as Herbert L. was unmarried
at the time the will took effect, the will should be construed to
relate to any wife whom he might in the future marry, and, so construed, the estate would not vest in the children or heirs until after
the expiration of two lives in being. We think the will not open to
this construction, but that it was intended to mean any wife of Herbert
L. living at the time of the decease of the testator." A limitation in
favor of the wife of a married person is normally construed to refer
to his existing wife. Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009
(1900); Cole v. Lee, 143 Mich. 267, 106 N.W. 855 (1906).
21s Part Two, notes 138-141, supra; Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324,
186 N.W. 489 (1922); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1"[31, Ch. B,
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probating a will may not be taken within a predictable
time. 274 If the time when the absolute certainty must
exist is the effective date of the instrument creating the
interest, it follows that events which occur before that
time may be considered in determining certainty but
events which occur thereafter may not. As a will becomes effective upon the death of the testator, events
which occur after the execution of the will and before
such death may be considered; 275 events which occur
after the testator's death may not. 27~
1f56 (1944). See: Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642 at 647, 134
N.W. 1018 (1912) (woman aged 68; suggestion that it would make
no difference if she were 100). Accord under the common-law Rule:
Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703
(1930), Part Two, note 145 supra.
274 Part Two, note 134 supra. Thus in Battelle v. Parks, 2 Mich.
531 (1853), it was suggested that a devise of a beneficial power to the
testator's administrator would be void because of the possible delay
in appointing an administrator, and in Thatcher v. Wardens &
Vestrymen of St. Andrew's Church of Ann Arbor, 37 Mich. 264 (1877),
Part Three, note 189 supra, it was assumed that a direction to a
trustee to pay the expenses of last illness and funeral of a cestui que
trust could suspend the absolute power of alienation for a period not
limited by two lives. In both New York and Michigan there is a
strong tendency to construe provisions postponing distribution until
the completion of some administrative step as not suspending the
absolute power of alienation in the meantime. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1)66 (1944); Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids, 123
Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900) (discretionary power in executor to
withhold distribution of residue until payment of debts and other
legacies; Court remarked that such delay would be necessary in the
absence of the provision); Moss v. Axford, 246 Mich. 288, 224 N.W.
425 (1929) (devise to person to be selected by executor valid; suggestion that the ordinary delays in the settlement of an estate are not
within the reason of the statute); McGraw v. McGraw, 176 Fed. 312
(6th Cir. 1910) (devise to trustee to convey to named persons after
two lives and payment of testator's debts). Cf. De Buck v. Bousson,
295 Mich. 164, 294 N.W. 135 (1940).
2 75 Mullreed v. Clark, 110 Mich. 229, 68 N.W. 138 (1896) (will
suspended the absolute power of alienation for lives of testator's wife
and two children; death of wife before testator prevented invalidity);
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1)29, Ch. B, 1)56 (1944). Accord,
under the common-law Rule: Part Two, note 125 supra.
276 Dean v. Mumford, 102 Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 (1894) (will suspended the absolute power of alienation for lives of testator's wife,
son, and the son's wife; widow's election to take against the will did
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Under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities,
there are two situations in which the absolute certainty
that an interest will not suspend vesting for longer than
the permissible period need not exist at the time when
the creating instrument becomes effective. When an
interest will be destructible for a time and then indestructible for a time, it is sufficient if the certainty
that it will vest in due time exists when the indestructibility commences; that is, events which occur between
the effective date of the creating instrument and the
end of the period of destructibility may be considered in
determining certainty. 277 When the interest is created
by exercise of a power of appointment, it is sufficient if
certainty exists when the power is exercised, even though
the period of the Rule is computed from the effective
date of the instrument creating the power; that is,
events which occur between the creation of the power
and its exercise may be considered in determining certainty.278 Under the statutes, however, it may be that, in
all cases, it must be absolutely certain at the time when
the creating instrument becomes effective that any suspension of the absolute power of alienation effected
thereby will terminate within the statutory period; that
is, events which occur after the effective date of the creating instrument can never be considered in determining
certainty. 279 It may be that this is so even though, because
prevent invalidity); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1f30,
B, 1f56 (1944). Cf. Allen v. Merrill, 223 Mich. 467, 194 N.W.
(1923). Accord, under the common-law Rule: Part Two, notes
128, supra.
277 Part Two, notes 70, 125, supra; PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §373,
Comment C. (1944).
21s Part Two, note 324 supra.
279 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed.,
§§63, 89, 95, 360-362 (1928); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities
and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.13 (1952).
On this theory, where a power is involved, the instrument exercising
not
Ch.
131
127,
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the interest in question will be destructible for a time,
the commencement of the period of suspension is postponed to the end of the period of destructibility. If John
Stiles conveyed land to James Thorpe upon trust to apply
the rents and profits to the use of John for life, then to
the use of John's wife for life, then to the use of John's
daughters Mary and Lucy for their lives and, on the
death of the survivor, to convey to the descendants of
John then in being, reserving to the grantor an absolute
power of revocation, the trust would be destructible until
the death of John and so could not suspend the absolute
power of alienation until then. 280 Nevertheless, it may
be that the fact that John's wife predeceased him could
not be considered in determining the validity of the
trust. At the time when the deed was delivered it was
possible that the trust would suspend the absolute power
of alienation for three lives, those of John's wife and his
two daughters.
C. TWO LIVES IN BEING

(I) What is a Life in Being?
The statutes did not invalidate an interest which suspended the absolute power of alienation if it was certain
when the instrument creating the interest took effect
that the suspension could not last longer than the lives
of two persons who were in being at that time and designated by or ascertainable from the instrument as the
measuring lives. 281 On the other hand, except in the narthe power is read as if it were a part of the instrument creating the
power. Contra: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, ~~14, Ill. 8;
20; 30 (1944).
28o Part Three, notes 155, 200, supra.
2s1 Paton v. Langley, 50 Mich. 428, 15 N.W. 537 (1883); Palms v.
Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); Defreese v. Lake, 109 Mich.
415, 67 N.W. 505 (1896); Mullreed v. Clark, llO Mich. 229, 68 N.W.
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row situation to which the restricted minority provision
of Section 16 282 applied, the statutes did not permit
suspension of the absolute power of alienation for any
part of a life which was not certainly in being when the
instrument creating the interest took effect. 283
In Palms v. Palms) 284 land was devised to trustees to
pay half the income to the testator's son for life and half
to the testator's daughter for life. On the death of either,
half the principal was to be paid to the children of the
deceased child. A subsequent clause directed that the
share of any grandchild who was a minor at its parent's
death should be held in trust for it during minority. It
was suggested that the latter provision was invalid as to
138 (1896); Torpy v. Betts, 123 Mich. 239, 81 N.W. 1094 (1900);
Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900); Sprague v.
Moore, 130 Mich. 92, 89 N.W. 712 (1902); Van Driele v. Kotvis, 135
Mich. 181, 97 N.W. 700 (1903); Cole v. Lee, 143 Mich. 267, 106 N.W.
855 (1906); Foster v. Stevens, 146 Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906);
Hull v. Osborn, 151 Mich. 8, 113 N.W. 784 (1908); Taylor v. Richards,
153 Mich. 667, 117 N.W. 208 (1908); Mcinerny v. Haase, 163 Mich.
364, 128 N.W. 215 (1910); Ward v. Ward, 163 Mich. 570, 128 N.W.
761 (1910); Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642, 134 N.W. 1018
(1912); Woolfitt v. Preston, 203 Mich. 502, 169 N.W. 838 (1918); Cary
v. Toles, 210 Mich. 30, 177 N.W. 279 (1920); Young v. Young, 255
Mich. 173, 237 N.W. 535 (1931); Van Tyne v. Pratt, 291 Mich. 626,
289 N.W. 275 (1939); In re Dingler's Estate, 319 Mich. 189, 29 N.W.
(2d) 108 (1947); Miller v. Curtiss, 328 Mich. 239, 43 N.W. (2d) 834
(1950). However, such an interest might be invalid because of some
other rule of law. Thus a direct restraint on alienation of an estate
in fee simple is void under the common law even though limited in
duration to two lives. Part Three, notes 25-31, supra. And although
a trust of land did not suspend the absolute power of alienation beyond
two lives when there was a mandatory direction to convert to personalty at or before the expiration of two lives, interests under or
following such a trust might violate the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities. Part Three, note 197 supra.
282 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §16, Part Three, note 262 supra.
283 Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885); Palms v.
Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); Ford v. Ford, 80 Mich. 42,
44 N.W. 1057 (1890); Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489
(1922); Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760
(1932); Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270,
255 N.W. 587 (1934).
284 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888).
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any grandchild who was not in being at the death of the
testator. In Burke v. Central Trust Co./85 land was devised to a trustee to pay the rents and profits to various
persons. The will provided that the trust should terminate when the youngest of Frank's three living children "or of any child or children hereafter born to my
said grandnephew Frank . . . shall attain the full age of
twenty-five years," and devised the remainder to the then
living children of Frank. As the youngest child of Frank
might be a person not in being at the death of the testatrix, its life was not a proper measuring life and hence
these provisions were void. In Gardner v. City National
Bank & Trust Co./86 land was devised to trustees (1) to
pay the income to testator's daughter Alene for life; (2)
to pay the income to Alene's named children and any
further born children until each child reach twenty-five;
(3) to transfer half of its share in the principal to each
child of Alene on reaching twenty-five; (4) to pay the
income from the remaining half to each such child until
it reached thirty and then to transfer the principal to it;
(5) if any child of Alene should die before receiving its
full share of the principal, to pay the income from its
share to its issue during minority, then to transfer such
share in the principal to the issue; (6) if any child of
Alene should die without issue before receiving its full
share of the principal, to add that share to those of the
other children; (7) if Alene and all her issue should die
prior to the termination of these trusts, to add the principal to that of a like trust set up for testatrix's daughter
Natalie and her children. As these provisions might suspend the absolute power of alienation for periods measured by parts of the lives of unborn children of the
285
286

258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932).
267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934).
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daughters and the minority of unborn grandchildren,
they were held void.
It would seem that the two measuring lives must be
those of human beings; that the lives of corporations,
animals, or plants would not serve. 287 Although the Michigan statutes were not explicit on the point, 288 it appears
that a child en ventre sa mere at the time the instrument
creating an interest became effective was a life in being
which could serve as one of the two measuring lives. 289
Part of a life in being could be used as a measuring life, 29o'
but, when so used, it was treated as a whole life in computing the number of lives during which suspension
might last. Thus a suspension of the absolute power of
alienation for three minorities was invalid, although the
minors were aged 18, 19 and 20 when the creating instrument took effect. 291 Although the New York revisers
2a 7 See: Matter of Howells, 145 Misc. 557, 260 N.Y. Supp. 598
(1932). Accord, under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities:
Part Two, notes 92, 93, supra.
2 88 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§30, 31, Part Three, note 262 supra.
The New York statutes were amended in 1929 to make it clear that
a child en ventre is a life in being. REAL PROPERTY LAW, §42; Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.16 (1952).
289 Chambers v. Shaw, 52 Mich. 18, 17 N.W. 223 (1883); Rozell v.
Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT,
App., Ch. A, ~37, Ch. B, ~56 (1944).
290 Paton v. Langley, 50 Mich. 428, 15 N.W. 537 (1883) (widowhood); Hull v. Osborn, 151 Mich. 8, 113 N.W. 784 (1908) (until 45);
Taylor v. Richards, 153 Mich. 667, 117 N.W. 208 (1908) (until 25
and worthy); Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd
ed., §§106, 107 (1928); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and
Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §25.16 (1952). Measurement by part of a life in being must be distinguished from
measurement by part of a life not in being (Part Three, notes 283286, supra) and from measurement by a period not certain to terminate at or before the expiration of two lives. Thus a period defined
as "until my son John reaches 21 or would have reached that age if
alive" is a period in gross, not a measurement by part of a life.
291 Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61
(1836); Benedict v. Webb, 98
N.Y. 460 (1885); Matter of Butterfield, 133 N.Y. 473, sub nom.
In re Christie, 31 N.E. 515 (1892), Part Three, note 137 supra; Chaplin,
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criticized the use, under the common-law Rule Against
Perpetuities, of the lives of persons who take no interest
under the conveyance as measuring lives, 292 the statutes
did not prohibit doing this. Accordingly, it is not essential that the two measuring lives in being be those of persons who take an interest under the instrument in question.293 The suspension statutes did not limit the number of interests which could be created by an instrument.294 Hence a trust for receipt of the rents and profits
of land could have any number of beneficiaries so long
as it was certain to terminate at or before the expiration
of two lives in being. 295 Similarly, a future interest could
be limited to any number of persons and could be preceded by any number of interests in any number of persons, so long as it was certain not to suspend the absolute
power of alienation for more than two lives in being. 296
SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §107 (1928); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.16 (1952). In Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482,
85 N.W. llOO (1901), "until her death or marriage" was treated as a
full life in counting the permissible two. Other Michigan cases on
this point will be discussed below in connection with the problem of
measurement by the life of the survivor of a group.
292 Extracts from the Original Reports of the Revisers, 3 N.Y. Rev.
Stat. (2d ed.) 571 (1836), quoted in the text at Part Three, note 6

supra.
293 Crooke

v. County of Kings, 97 N.Y. 421 (1884); Chaplin, SusPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §105 (1928).
294 But see Chapter 19, supra, as to the statutory restrictions on
successive legal life estates.
295 Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900); Sprague
v. Moore, 130 Mich. 92, 89 N.W. 712 (1902); Foster v. Stevens, 146
Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906); Ward v. Ward, 163 Mich. 570, 128
N.W. 761 (1910); Van Tyne v. Pratt, 291 Mich. 626, 289 N.W. 275
(1939); Re Wagar's Estate, 295 Mich. 463, 295 N.W. 227 (1940);
McGraw v. McGraw, 176 Fed. 312 (6th Cir. 1910); Chaplin, SusPENSION
OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §105 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, ~59, Ch. B, ~56 (1944). A properly measured trust
might have unborn beneficiaries. Gilman v. Reddington, 24 N.Y. 9
(1861 ).
296 Torpy v. Betts, 123 Mich. 239, 81 N.W. 1094 (1900); Mcinerny
v. Haase, 163 Mich. 364, 128 N.W. 215 (1910); Kemp v. Sutton, 233
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(2) As,certainment of the Measuring Lives
Under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, the
measuring lives must be ascertainable from the instrument creating the interest or, in the case of an interest
created by the exercise of a power, from the instruments
creating and exercising the power. 297 That is to say,
under the common-law Rule, it must be possible, from
the creating instrument and the extrinsic facts which may
be considered in determining certainty, 298 to ascertain at
the time certainty is required 299 the identity of the persons whose lives are the measuring lives in being. This
is an aspect of the requirement of certainty 300 with which
the New York revisers must have been familiar and which
they probably intended to adopt. Nevertheless, both the
New York and Michigan courts relaxed this aspect of the
requirement of certainty to some extent. Although it
was necessary that the creating instrument or instruments
provide some mode of ascertaining the two measuring
lives in being which would ensure their identification at
or before their own expiration, 301 it was not essential that
the identity of the two persons whose lives were to measure be determinable at the time the creating instrument
became effective. It was sufficient if one life was immediately identifiable and the other certainly would be
at the expiration of the first. 302 Thus the duration of a
Mich. 249, 206 N.W. 366 (1925). But some of the preceding interests
might be invalid under the statutes restricting the creation of life
estates discussed in Chapter 19, supra.
297 Part Two, notes 89·91, supra.
29s Part Two, notes 125, 127, 128, Part Three, notes 275, 276, supra.
299 Part Two, notes 70, 125, 130, 324, Part Three, notes 271, 277,
278, supra.
3oo Chapter 11, Section A, and Chapter 21, Section B, supra.
301 Everitt v. Everitt, 29 N.Y. 39 at 72 (1864); Chaplin, SusPENSION
OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§95, 97-99 (1928).
302 Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900) (lives
of named person and any wife who survived him); Van Cott v. Pren-
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testamentary trust could be measured by the life of the
testator's widow and that of his youngest child living at
the widow's death. Moreover, it was sufficient if each
measuring life was certain to be identifiable at or before
its own expiration. Thus the duration of a testamentary
trust could be measured by the lives of those two of the
testator's six children who first died. 303
(3) Life of the Survivor of a Group
If it be accepted that it is sufficient if a measuring life
is certain to be identifiable at or before its own expiration, it would seem to follow logically that a suspension
of the absolute power of alienation could properly be
measured by the life of the survivor of a group of three
or more living persons. This would be a single life, certain to be identifiable before its own expiration. Relaxation of the requirement of ascertainability to this extent would, however, make the restriction to two lives
virtually inoperative by equating it to the "any number
of lives in being" of the common-law Rule. It would
make possible the measurement of suspension by the life
of the survivor of a group of twenty-eight persons, as was
done in an English case 304 which had been severely crititice, 104 N.Y. 45, 10 N.E. 257 (1887) (life of settlor and minority of
that one of three named persons as should, at the death of the
settlor, be the youngest of them living); Chaplin, SusPENSION OF THE
POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§100, 102 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATE·
MENT, App., Ch. A, 1[58 (1944). See: Dean v.. Mumford, 102 Mich.
510 at 515, 61 N.W. 7 (1894).
aoa Ward v. Ward, 163 Mich. 570, 128 N.W. 761 (1910) (trust to
last for twelve years after the death of the testator "or until the death
after my decease and prior to the expiration of said period of twelve
years, of two of my children who shall survive me."); Meldon v.
Devlin, 31 App. Div. 146, 53 N.Y. Supp. 172 (1898), affd., 167 N.Y. 573,
60 N.E. 1116 (1901); Chaplin, SuSPENSION OF THE PowER OF ALIENA·
TION, 3rd ed., §108 (1928).
&04 Bengough v. Edridge, 1 Sim. 173, 57 Eng. Rep. 544 (1827), aff'd.,
sub nom. Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833).
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cized by the New York revisers.
Hence, illogically but
understandably, the New York courts refused to take this
step. They have held consistently that measurement by
the life of the survivor of a group of more than two persons is not permissible; that it suspends the absolute
power of alienation by as many lives as there are persons
in the group. 3011 The Michigan Supreme Court experienced so much difficulty with this problem that a detailed
review of the cases involving it is necessary to an understanding of the situation here. 807
Toms v. Williams 308 involved a devise of land to trustees to accumulate part of the rents and profits for the
benefit of three named children of the testatrix's deceased
brother. When the testatrix died these were aged, respectively, 15, 19, and 21. The will provided,
305

"I direct my - - - trustees - --, at the expiration of the
minority of the youngest of the said children of my deceased brother, - - - to pay over to said children or the
ao5 Extracts from the Original Reports of the Revisers, 3 N.Y.
Rev. Stat. (2d ed.) 571 (1836), quoted in the text at Part Three, note
6 supra. The ideas of the revisers are criticized in 3 Walsh, LAw oF
REAL PROPERTY, §347 (1947), where it is pointed out that the lives
of two healthy children are likely to last longer than any number of
lives of mature persons, and that the life expectancy of two persons is
little different from that of ten or more of the same age.
aos Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (1835) (survivor of twelve
persons); Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61 (1836) (until youngest of
thirteen minors to reach 21 did so); Benedict v. Levi, 177 App. Div.
385, 163 N.Y. Supp. 846 (1917), aff'd., 223 N.Y. 707, 120 N.E. 858
(1918) (survivor of eight persons); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App.,
Ch. A, 1!39 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §25.16 (1952). The
application of this rule is sometimes prevented by the tendency to
construe "surviving" as meaning "surviving the testator." Part Two,
notes 251, 253-258, supra.
307 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, ff54 (1944); 3 Walsh, LAW
oF REAL PROPERTY, §358 (1947); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§25.16,
25.43 (1952). Professor Whiteside discusses the Michigan cases in some
detail. He and the Restatement suggest that there is grave doubt
as to their effect.
3os 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879), Part Two, notes 485, 487, supra.
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survivors of them, share and share alike, all the net accumulations of my estate, - - - ."
A statute then in force provided that an accumulation of
rents and profits of real estate "must be made for the
benefit of one or more minors then in being, and terminate at the expiration of their minority." 309 As only
two of the children were minors when the testatrix died,
the quoted provision could not, on any possible construction of the statutes, have suspended the absolute power
of alienation for longer than two lives in being, so th~
only question presented was the effect of the accumulation statutes. The trial court held that the accumulation
for each child should terminate when it reached 21 and,
as this ruling was not appealed, it was not disturbed, but
the Supreme Court, after holding that "survivors" meant
those who survived the testatrix, said,
"But we do not feel at all satisfied that the statute requires such a construction. Its language certainly is quite
consistent with an accumulation for any number of infants until all come of age, and such an accumulation is
really no more than for the minority of a single life in
being." 310
This passage related only to the accumulation statute and
had nothing to do with the two lives provisions of the
suspension statutes, but the last clause reflects a mode of
thought which is out of harmony with the New York decisions under the suspension statutes. .
Dean v. Mumford 311 involved a will which gave the
testator's widow the life use of his homestead and directed
his executors to pay taxes and repairs and to pay her a
Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §37, Part Two, note 482 supra.
41 Mich. 552 at 569. Per Campbell, C.J. Accord, as to the meaning of the accumulation statute, Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25
N.W. 506 (1885).
311 102 Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 (1894).
309

31°
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life annuity. A succeeding clause directed division of the
residue among five children. A later clause directed that
the shares of three sons be held in trust for the sons, their
wives and children, "during the lives of my said sons,
and their wives, and upon the decease of said sons and
their wives, the portion so held in trust by my said executors shall become the property of and go to the child or
children of said sons, severally." It was held that the first
provision created a trust for the life of the widow which
suspended the absolute power of alienation during her
life, and that the last clause mentioned created three
separate trusts, each of which was to be judged, as to
validity, separately, and each of which suspended the
absolute power of alienation for the lives of a son and his
wife. The court held the three trusts void because, in
combination with the trust for the widow, each suspended the absolute power of alienation for three lives,
those of the widow, a son and his wife. This decision appears to accept the New York interpretation of the suspension statutes on the point under consideration.
In Trufant v. Nunneley/ 12 a testator devised the use
of two described farms to his son John for life, the use
of two smaller farms to his daughter Julia for life, and
the use of farms of equal value to those of Julia to his
daughter Alice for life. Subject to these life estates, all
of the farms were devised "to the body heirs of my said
son and daughters, share and share alike." The will
further provided that if any child should die without issue before testator's widow, the land devised to that child
for life should pass to the widow for life, with remainder
to the body heirs of the children, if any, otherwise to the
heirs of the wife. A decree holding these dispositions
valid was reversed with an opinion which stated,
a12

106 Mich. 554, 64 N.W. 469 (1895).
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"In any view of the case, we are satisfied that the will
cannot be sustained as to these three parcels of land. The
conditions of this will are such that there is no one who
can convey so as to cut off future rights of as yet unascertained persons; for, until the death of testator's three
children, it cannot be ascertained who are the body heirs
of these three persons. Complainant's body heirs cannot
be ascertained until his death, and so with the body heirs
of the ,daughters. So the estate in these lands is tied up
during the life of the son and two daughters, making
three lives, and then the remainder over is to the body
heirs of all the children of the testator. Until all these
contingencies happen, there is no person or persons in
whom the estate can vest in fee simple absolute, and
hence no person in being who could convey. Chapl. Suspen. §127; Kilpatrick v. Barron~ 54 Hun, 322; Graham
v. Fountain, 2 N.Y. Supp. 598. It follows that the will
must be held void as affecting the pieces of land described, and, as to the remainder in them, they must be
distributed under the statute." 313
In Niles v. Mason, 314 a testator devised his entire estate
to trustees (1) to pay Sarah Niles $12.50 a month until
her death or marriage; (2) subject thereto, to pay half
the income to Charles Niles for life and the other half
to Lottie Niles for life; (3) upon the death of Charles or
Lottie to pay half the principal to the children of the deceased; (4) if Charles or Lottie die without surviving issue, to pay the entire income to the other for life and the
313 106 Mich. 554 at 560-561. Kilpatrick v. Barron, 54 Hun. 322
(1889), affd., 125 N.Y. 751, 26 N.E. 925 (1891) .and Graham v. Fountain, 2 N.Y. Supp. 598 (1888), cited by the Court, did not involve suspension of the absolute power of alienation beyond two lives. These
cases held merely that a future interest limited to a class which might
include unborn persons could not be cut off by persons in being.
314 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. llOO (1901). As pointed out above (Part
Three, note 228 supra), this will would have been fully valid in New
York because the annuity of Sarah was a charge on principal, alien·
able, and did not suspend the absolute power of alienation for her
life. Hence, under the New York analysis, there was suspension only
for the lives of Charles and Lottie.
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entire principal to his children at death; (5) if both
Charles and Lottie die without surviving issue, remainder to Charles Niles in fee. It was held that these dispositions suspended the absolute power of alienation for
three lives, those of Sarah, Charles, and Lottie, and that,
except as to the annuity of Sarah, they were void.
In Foster v. Stevens, 315 land was devised to trustees to
pay the rents, profits and income to the testator's widow
and two sons "during their natural lives and the natural
life of either of them." A later clause directed that, upon
the death of the sons, the land should descend to their
heirs. The Court assumed that, if the trust was to last
for the life of the survivor of the widow and sons, it
would suspend the absolute power of alienation for three
lives but construed the will as providing that the trust
should cease upon the death of the survivor of the sons,
even if the widow was still alive. As so construed the
trust was, of course, valid.
In Root v. Snyder, 316 Root conveyed land to Frantz as
trustee to convey to Root, Susan Snyder, Jared Snyder,
and Flora Snyder, "as joint tenants and to their heirs and
assigns, and to the survivors or survivor of them, and the
heirs and assigns of the survivors or survivor of them,"
which Frantz did by a deed which contained the same
language in the granting clause but the habendum of
which was, "to them as joint tenants and not as tenants
in common, and to their heirs and assigns forever." Sub315 146 Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906). The Court cited People's
Trust Co. v. Flynn, 106 App. Div. 78, 94 N.Y. Supp. 436 (1905), which
reached a contrary result on the construction problem, but sought to
distinguish it on the ground that the Foster will made other provision
for the widow. Mrs. Foster died before the litigation was commenced
by one of the sons against the other and the trustee.
316 161 Mich. 200, 126 N.W. 206
(1910). Compare Trufant v.
Nunneley, 106 Mich. 554, 64 N.W. 469 (1895), Part Three, note
312 supra.
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sequently Root sued to set aside these deeds on the
ground, inter alia, that they limited interests to the heirs
of the survivor of four persons and so suspended the absolute power of alienation for four lives. The Court rejected this contention, holding that the deeds created an
ordinary joint tenancy in fee; that the heirs of the survivor took by descent and not by purchase. This being
so, the entire title was held by four living persons and
there was no suspension of the absolute power of alienation.317
Truitt v. City of Battle Creek 318 involved a series of
conveyances of land. On April 13, 1903, Robertson, who
owned in fee, executed a life lease to Beauregard and
wife. On the same day Robertson conveyed the fee, subject to the Beauregard lease, to Melbourne Truitt, and
Truitt and the Beauregards joined in a mortgage of the
fee to Welch. On July 24, 1903, Melbourne Truitt conveyed the fee, subject to the Beauregard lease, to Louise
Truitt. On the following day Louise Truitt conveyed to
Melbourne Truitt for life, remainder to his heirs. The
Welch mortgage was foreclosed and the land purchased
at foreclosure sale by Onen, who conveyed the fee to
Melbourne Truitt in 1910. Louise Truitt then quits11 After this decision, Susan and Jared Snyder died, Root conveyed
an undivided half of the land to Jones, Root died, and Jones sued
Flora Snyder for partition. The Court then held that the deeds
created a joint tenancy for life, with a contingent remainder to the
survivor in fee which could not be cut off by Root's conveyance.
Hence Flora Snyder acquired the entire fee on the death of Root.
Jones v. Snyder, 218 Mich. 446, 188 N.W. 505 (1922). Although this
construction was inconsistent with that made in Root v. Snyder, it
did not involve suspension of the absolute power of alienation because, under it, the entire fee was held by four living persons who
could, acting together, convey an absolute fee in possession. On the
construction problem see Part One, note 167 supra, and Danahey,
"The Confusing Right of Survivorship," 32 MICH. ST. BAR JL. 14-17
(Feb. 1953).
31.8 205 Mich. 180, 171 N.W. 338 (1919), overruled on rehearing,
208 Mich. 618, 175 N.W. 578 (1920), Part Three, note 60 supra.
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claimed in fee to Melbourne Truitt, and Melbourne
brought suit to quiet title against his own unknown
heirs. The plaintiff conceding that, if he was a life tenant
before the mortgage foreclosure, his purchase of the title
acquired by the foreclosure would not cut off the remaindermen, contended that the deed of July 25, 1903,
was void because it violated the suspension statutes and
the statute prohibiting more than two successive life
estates. 319 On the original hearing the Supreme Court
reversed a decree for the plaintiff, saying,

a

"The crucial question therefore in the instant case
is, Did the life lease to Oliver Beauregard and Thersil,
his wife, create an estate for two lives in being, two life
estates, or but one? Was its duration measured by two
lives or by only one, that of the survivor? That the estate
created was an estate by entirety has been frequently held
by this court - - -. Each is a tenant by the entirety, and
the survivor takes the whole estate. The duration of the
estate is measured by the life of the survivor. It is neither
shortened nor lengthened by the death of one of the
parties. It is terminated only by the death of the survivor. Obviously, therefore, the estate created is an estate
for one life, viz., that of the survivor. See Woolfit v. Preston} 203 Mich. 502." 32{)
On rehearing, the original decision was vacated and
the decree of the trial court quieting title in the plaintiff
3~9
s2o

Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §17, Part Three, notes I, 53, supra.
205 Mich. 180 at 183-184. In Woolfitt v. Preston, 203 Mich. 502,
169 N.W. 838 (1918), Part Three, note 57 supra, land was devised to
Claudia for life, remainder to Martha and Florence for life, remainder to Helen and Ruth in fee. It was held that this was a valid
disposition of an undivided half to Claudia for life, remainder to
Martha for life, remainder to Helen and Ruth in fee, and of the other
undivided half to Claudia for life, remainder to Florence for life,
remainder to Helen and Ruth in fee; that is, that the life estates of
Martha and Florence were in separate shares. The Court was careful
to hold explicitly that the survivor of Martha and Florence would
take no interest in the share of the other.
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in fee affirmed on the ground that the deed of July 25,
1903, had never been accepted, the court saying,
"The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary
to determine the effect of the life estate given to Oliver
Beauregard and wife Thersil. The determination of that
question being unnecessary, what was said in the original opinion on that subject may be considered withdrawn, and the case will be disposed of on another
theory." 821
Despite the express withdrawal of the quoted language
of the original opinion, its presence in the Reports introduces disturbing elements of confusion into the law.
As the Court evidently failed to see, the interests involved could not possibly have suspended the absolute
power of alienation for longer than the life of Melbourne
Truitt. As none of them was subject to a trust, at Melbourne's death his heirs would certainly be ascertainable
and able to combine with the Beauregards and the mortgagee to convey an absolute fee in possession. Hence the
only problem presented was whether a conveyance to two
persons for the life of the survivor creates a single life
estate or two successive life estates within the meaning of
the statute prohibiting more than two. It was already
settled in Michigan that such a conveyance creates a
single life estate. 822 The statement that such an estate
is one for a single life has nothing to do with the question
whether there was a single estate or two and so was wholly
unnecesary to the decision, even on the theory of the
original opinion. Even more disturbing than this confusion of two separate questions is the suggestion implicit
in the original opinion that when the absolute power of
s21208 Mich. 618 at 619. Both opinions were by Fellows, J.
a22 Case v. Green, 78 Mich. 540, 44 N.W. 578 (1889), Part Three,
note 59 supra.
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alienation of a tract of land is suspended by each of several distinct and separate conveyances, the periods of
suspension effected by each are to be added together and
invalidity found if the aggregate of these periods exceeds
the permissible statutory period. The New York decisions clearly negative this suggestion. They hold that the
statutory period limits only suspension created by a single
transaction. For example, if an owner in fee creates a
trust which suspends the absolute power of alienation for
two lives, retaining the reversion, he may at a later time,
as a separate transaction, create another trust of the reversion for two other lives then in being. 323
Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst 324 involved a will
which (1) directed payment of $75 a month each to two
nephews and a niece during their lives; (2) directed division of the remainder of the net income among a son,
a brother, and two sisters in equal shares; (3) devised to
the son, when and if he reached 25, half the estate outright and the other half charged with payment of the $75
a month to each nephew and niece and the remainder of
the net income therefrom to the brothers and sisters and
the survivor of them during life; (4) if the son died
under 25 leaving issue, devised half the estate to trustees
to apply principal and income to the support of the issue
until 21 or earlier death; principal to the issue at 21; (5)
if the son died under 25 without issue or with issue which
a2a New York Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Cary, 191 N.Y. 33,
83 N.E. 598 (1908); Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION,
3rd ed., §139 (1928). Of course, the exercise of a power of appointment created by the original transaction is not a separate transaction.
Genet v. Hunt, 113 N.Y. 158, 21 N.E. 91 (1889).
324 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250
(1922), Part Three, note 245
supra. Cf. Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W.
760 (1932), Part Three, notes 248, 285, supra; Gardner v. City National
Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934), Part Three,
note 286 supra, in both of which the facts were similar and the result
the same.
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failed to reach 21, devised the entire estate to four named
charitable institutions, subject to the payments specified
in (3). Provision (4) was probably invalid, insofar as it
purported to create a trust for receipt of the rents and
profits of lands to last during the minority of unborn
persons. 825 It had, however, been held in Palms v.
Palms 826 that the invalidity of such a provision did not
invalidate other dispositions made by the same will. The
Court decided that provisions (1), (2), and (3) created
a trust for receipt of the rents and profits of lands to last
until the death of the survivor of the son, brother, sisters,
nephews, and niece, and held that such a trust was void
because it was to last for seven lives. Although this case
was complicated by the interests of the unborn issue of
the son, the decision, like those in Dean v. Mumford, 321
Trufant v. Nunneley/ 28 Niles v. Mason/~ 9 Foster v. Stevens,S80 and Root v. Snyder, 331 appears to be based on the
New York theory that a suspension of the absolute power
of alienation for the life of the survivor of a group of
persons is a suspension for as many lives as there are persons in the group. 332
In Allen v. Merrill/ 33 a testator devised the residue of
his estate to trustees (1) to pay out of income $1,000 per
year to his wife for life and the balance to his wife and
five children in equal shares; (2) if any child die, his
children to receive the income otherwise payable to him,
325

Part Three, note 283 supra . . But see Part Three, notes 369, 370,

infra.
68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888), Part Two, note 561 supra.
Part Three, note 311 supra.
328 Part Three, note 312 supra.
329 Part Three, note 314 supra.
330 Part Three, note 315 supra.
381 Part Three, note 316 supra.
332 Part Three, note 306 supra.
333 223 Mich. 467, 194 N.W. 131 (1923).
a2s
327
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or, if none, the other children of the testator; (3) on the
death of the wife, principal to be distributed to the five
children, share of any child pre-deceasing the wife to go
to its issue, if any, otherwise to the surviving children of
the testator; (4) if the wife predecease the testator or
elect to take against the will, trustees to distribute within
five years after the testator's death as provided in (3).
The wife elected to take against the will. Ten years after
the testator's death, a creditor of one of his children attached the trust land, and the trustees sued to remove
the attachment as a cloud on title. A decree for the plaintiffs was affirmed in an opinion which rejected the contention of the creditor that the trust was void because it
suspended the absolute power of alienation beyond two
lives in being. In this connection the Court said,
"Under the will the trustees hold the legal estate, for
they have power to convey and thereby cut off the equitable estates or interests of the designated beneficiaries.
Such holding by the trustees, coupled with the duty, in
case of sale, to bring the avails to the administration of
the trust, suspends in law the power of alienation. And
this brings us to the pivotal question of whether this suspension goes beyond two lives in being.
"If the widow elected to take under the statute, then
the will directed the estate to be settled in five years after
testator's death, by distribution, first, to his children then
living (one life in being); second, in case of death of any
of his children, with issue, then to such issue by right of
representation (two lives in being), and if no issue, then
to his surviving children. The distributees, so designated, were all in being at the death of testator. The
trust was a valid one." 334
The meaning of this passage is obscure. As the trustee
was empowered to terminate the trust by distribution at
334

223 Mich. 467 at 471-472. Per Wiest, C.J.
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any time after the death of the widow or her earlier election to take against the will, neither the trust nor interests under it could suspend the absolute power of alienation for longer than the life of the widow .335 If this were
not so, the trust would be void because it might last for
a gross term of five years, unconnected with measuring
lives, and the class of distributees might include persons
who came into being at any time within five years after
the death of the testator. 33;; The quoted passage has sometimes been thought to state that suspension of the absolute power of alienation may be measured by the life
of the survivor of a group of more than two persons on
the theory that that would be one life. 337 If this be its
meaning, the language is not pertinent to the facts, because the trust involved in the case was not measured by
lives at all but by a term in gross.
Kemp v. Sutton 338 involved a devise of land to the
testator's widow and three sons and the survivors and survivor of them, remainder on the death of the survivor to
the City of Sault Ste. Marie. The Court correctly held
that the will created no trust and that, because all mPart Three, notes 185, 200, supra.
The quoted passage appears to construe "surviving" as meaning
"surviving the testator." See Part Two, notes 251, 253-258, supra.
Actually, it probably meant "surviving to a time when the trustees
are authorized to distribute," which would be (1) the death of the
testator if his wife predeceased him, (2) the death of his widow, or (3)
the widow's election to take against the will. On either of these constructions, the distributees of both income and principal would all
be in being and ascertained within a life in being at the testator's
death. If, however, "surviving" ineant "surviving until actual distribution," the class of distributees might include persons who came into
being at any time within five years after the testator died. A limitation
to such a class would, in the absence of destructibility, be void even
if the trust itself did not suspend the absolute power of alienation
beyond the widow's life. Part Three, note 78 supra.
3 37 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, 1154, note 216
(1944),
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.43, note 7 (1952).
ass 233 Mich. 249, 206 N.W. 366 (1925), Part Three, note 61 supra.
335
33 6
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terests in the land were limited to ascertained persons in
being, there was no suspension of the absolute power of
alienation whatever. The only problem involved was
whether there was a violation of the statute prohibiting
more than two successive legal life estates. 889 Consistently
with previous decisions, 840 the Court held that a joint
estate for the life of the survivor of several persons is a
single estate, not several successive life estates. In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court used language
which has sometimes been misunderstood to state that
the life of the survivor of a group of persons is a single
life for purposes of the suspension statutes. It said,
"The life tenants are joint holders. They count as a
class and in the eye of the law as one life in being. - - As was said in Smith's Appeal) 88 Pa. St. 492:
'It matters not how many lives there may be so that
the candles are all burning at the same time, for the
life of the longest liver is but a single life.'
"See 2 Alexander on Wills, §1158. Such rule was announced upward of two and a half centuries ago. See
1 Siderfin, 451.'' 841
In Felt v. Methodist Educational Advance/ 42 a testator devised a farm to his widow for life, remainder to his
three children,
s89 Rev. State. 1846, c. 62, §17, Part Three, notes 1, 53, supra. This
was true also in Truitt v. City of Battle Creek, Part Three, note 318
supra.
840 Case v. Green, 78 Mich. 540, 44 N.W. 578 (1889); Part Three,
note 59 supra; Truitt v. City of Battle Creek, 205 Mich. 180, 171
N.W. 338 (1919), reversed on other grounds, 208 Mich. 618, 175 N.W.
578 (1920), Part Three, notes 60, 318, supra; Jones v. Snyder, 218
Mich. 446, 188 N.W. 505 (1922), Part Three, notes 61, 317, supra.
841 233 Mich. 249 at 257, 260. Per Wiest, J. As the question at issue
was not whether there were one or more lives but whether there were
successive life estates, it is unfortunate that the court chose to discuss
the problem of whether a period measured by the life of the survivor
of a group is one or several lives and to cite authorities relating to the
permissible period of suspension of vesting under the common-law
Rule Against Perpetuities.
u2 247 Mich. 168, 225 N.W. 545 (1929), Part Three, note 62 supra.
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"to have and to hold the same to the said Joseph Elwell, George W. Elwell and Rhody Conant for and during the term of their natural lives, - - - the same to be
equally divided among them if requested by all or either
of them; and from and immediately after the decease of
the said Joseph Elwell, George W. Elwell and Rhody
Conant, or either of them, the share set off to such deceased heir, I give, devise and bequeath to the heirs of
said deceased heir, for him, her or them and their heirs
and assigns forever."
The ultimate remainders were held valid in an opinion stating, "Our later cases hold that the devise of a life
estate to a class collectively creates an estate for one life
only, that of the 'longest liver' of the class, and is to be
so taken in determining the period of suspension of power of alienation." 343 Although the decision was perfectly
sound, this statement was inaccurate and unnecessary.
There were two questions presented, (1) whether the devise created more than two successive legal life estates,
and (2) whether the remainder interests of the heirs of
the life tenants suspended the absolute power of alienation for more than two lives. There was no "devise of a
life estate to a class collectively;" what was involved was
a devise of separate life estates in distinct shares, without
cross-remainders. As to each third of the farm, there was
a life estate in the widow, a second successive life estate
in a child, and a remainder in fee tO. the heirs of that
child. Thus as to any share there were only two successive life estates and suspension of the absolute power of
34 3 247 Mich. 168 at 171, citing Woolfitt v. Preston, 203 Mich. 502,
169 N.W. 838 (1918), Part Three, notes 57, 320, supra, Truitt v. City
of Battle Creek, 205 Mich. 180, 171 N.W. 338 (1919), Part Three,
notes 60, 318, supra, and Kemp v. Sutton, Part Three, note 338 supra.
Woolfitt v. Preston disposed of virtually the same problem on the
theory suggested in the text as correct.
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alienation for one life, that of the child who was life
tenant in remainder.
Bateson v. Bateson 344 was a suit by the settlor to set
aside a deed on the ground that the trust created thereby
suspended the absolute power of alienation for more than
two lives. The deed conveyed land to a trustee (1) to
pay the net income to the settlor for life; (2) on the
death of the settlor to transfer an undivided 4jl0 of
the principal to the settlor's son George or, if George was
then dead, to George's wife Jennie and son George, Jr.
or the survivor of them; (3) after the death of the grantor
to hold an undivided 4jl0 of the principal in trust, pay
the net income therefrom to the settlor's son Samuel for
life and, on the death of Samuel, to transfer this 4jl0 of
the principal to Samuel's wife Hattie and daughters Harriet and Dorothy, or the survivors or survivor of them;
(4) after the death of the settlor to hold an undivided
2/10 of the principal in trust, pay the net income to the
settlor's grandson James for fifteen years, computed from
the death of the settlor, and, at the expiration of that
period, to transfer this 2jl0 of the principal to James,
but if James should die within the fifteen years, to transfer this 2jl 0 of the principal to the wife and children of
James or the survivors of them. The deed provided that
if James should die within the fifteen years without surviving wife or children, the trustees should transfer half
of this 2jl 0 of the principal to George and retain the
other half in the trust for Samuel. The majority opinion,
written by Mr. Justice Wiest, the author of the opinions
in Allen v. Merrill 345 and Kemp v. Sutton/ 46 stated,
"The trust deed grant of the 2jl0 interest suspended
294 Mich. 426, 293 N.W. 705 (1940), Part Three, note 260 supra.
Part Three, notes 333, 334, supra.
s46 Part Three, notes 338, 341, supra.
&44

845
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the power of alienation during the lifetime of the grantor
and for 15 years thereafter. The grantor is still living.
Upon execution of the deed there were no persons in
being by whom an absolute fee in possession could be
conveyed. Contingent, subsequent vesting of the title
upon expiration of the stated period of suspension, dependent upon future and unpredictable events, leaves
the title beyond disposition by persons in being by whom
an absolute fee in possession could be conveyed and renders the grant of the 2/10 interest void under the statute. 3 Comp. Laws 1929, §§12934, 12935 (Stat. Ann.
§§26.14, 26.15).-- -.
"This brings to consideration the question of whether
the void grant invalidates all the grants. Courts in construing trust deed grants make no fine distinction between such and testamentary trust devises for the ultimate determinative factors in either instance run along
like lines and are accorded like consideration.
"To carry out the directions of the grantor the attorney who prepared the deed of trust had to treat each
grant separately for they were unlike in purpose and
scope. Each was separate and consequently severable and
the valid grants are in no way dependent upon operation
of the one found invalid. The intention of the grantor
at the time of the execution of the deed of trust governs,
and it is clear that he then considered each grant by
itself and imposed conditions relative to contingent
devolution not to a class but to persons specifically designated. True, the three grants were in one instrument,
but that is of no particular importance upon the question of severability. Under the evidence bearing upon
the grantor's intention at the time of the execution of
the deed and expressed in the terms of that instrument
we must hold the grants separate and independent and
the void one falls alone.
"The general principle is stated in Chaplin on Suspension of the Power of Alienation (3rd ed.), §528, as
follows:
"'Where an instrument contains dispositions some of
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which are void for undue suspension, or postponement
of vesting, it does not necessarily follow that all parts of
the scheme are thereby destroyed. For a distinction is to
be observed between schemes which were obviously intended to constitute a single entity and must stand or fall
on their merits as one whole, and those which may be
separated into wholly independent dispositions. If a
provision of the former character involves an unlawful
suspension or postponement, the whole scheme falls to
the ground, while if the taint of illegality attaches only
to a wholly independent part of an entire scheme, this
illegal part may be cut off, and the rest allowed to
stand.' "
"And also sections 529 and 530 reading:
" 'The fact that valid and void limitations are both
embraced within the terms of a single trust, does not
constitute any insuperable obstacle in the way of sustaining the former while cutting off the latter.
"'And where an estate is vested in a trustee upon
several independent and separable trusts, some of which
are legal, while others are in contravention of the statute concerning suspension, the estate of the trustee may,
in accordance with the principles above stated, be upheld to the extent necessary to enable him to execute
the valid trusts.' "
"We hold the trust deed valid, except as to the 2/10
interest mentioned. The devise of the mentioned 2/10
interest was 'void in its creation' and title thereto remained vested in plaintiff.'' 347
Three justices dissented in part in an opinion stating,
"First, it should be noted that the mere inclusion of
the 15-year limitation incident to this trust provision
does not render it invalid, because wholly independent
of that limitation the period of suspension is measured
by two lives in being-i.e., the life of plaintiff and that
of his grandson. - - 347 294 Mich. 426 at 431, 432-433. These parts of the opinion, other
than the first paragraph quoted, are set out here because they are a
sound and valuable discussion of the problem of separability.
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"Nor am I in accord with that portion of my Brother's
opinion wherein he holds that 2/lOths interest in the
corpus of the trust provision for the grandson is void
in toto. Instead, the provision as to the one-half of this
2/lOths which upon the death of the grandson will
forthwith vest in fee in defendant George Bateson (or
in the surviving wife and children, if any, of the grandson), is valid because it does not suspend the power of
alienation beyond two lives in being." 348
The minority was correct in stating that the trust for
the grandson James did not suspend the absolute power
of alienation for fifteen years in gross. It was bound to
terminate at or before the death of James. But the minority view that the limitation of the 1/10 which might,
on the death of James, be continued in trust for the life
of Samuel, was void follows the New York theory that
a trust to last for the life of the survivor of three persons
suspends the absolute power of alienation for three lives
and so is void.
In re Wagar's Estate 349 involved a will which devised
land to a trustee to pay the income to the testator's widow
for life and after her death to pay fixed annuities from
the rents and earnings to three named children and four
named grandchildren, or the heirs of any who died, until
the death of the survivor of the three children. The
only question raised in the litigation was whether the
widow of one of the children was an heir for this purpose. The parties did not attack the validity of the provision, and the Court decided the question presented in
favor of the widow without considering the validity of
the trust. It is possible that this is, in effect, a decision
a48 294 Mich. 426 at 433-435. A justice having died, the Court had
only seven members.
S49 295 Mich. 463, 295 N.W. 227 (1940), Part Three, notes 249, 255,
supra.
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that the duration of a trust for receipt of the rents and
profits of land may be measured by the life of the survivor of a group of four persons. It may, however, constitute a ruling that the annuities involved were alienable and so did not suspend the absolute power of alienation.350 What is more likely than either of these
hypotheses is that the validity of the trust was already
res judicata because of failure to appeaJ from the original probate order of distribution. 351 If this is the case,
the decision has no value whatever as a precedent on the
question under consideration.
In Dodge v. Detroit Trust Compan'Y/ 52 the residue of
an estate was devised to trustees to form a corporation,
transfer the property to it in exchange for its stock, and
hold the stock in trust until the death of the survivor of
four named persons. The interested parties entered into
a settlement agreement under a statute authorizing such
settlements. Later one of them sued to set aside this
agreement. Counsel for the defendants argued that,
under the language in Kemp v~ Sutton 353 and Felt v.
Methodist Educational Advance/54 the life of the survivor of four persons is one life which might be used to
measure the duration of a trust under the suspension
statutes. The Court found it unnecessary to pass upon
this contention, suggesting that the validity of the trust
was sufficiently doubtful to warrant a settlement agreement.
It thus appears that, although there are dicta in five
opinions which seem to suggest that measurement of
3so

Part Three, note 255 supra.

351 Snyder v. Potter, 328 Mich. 236, 43 N.W. (2d) 922 (1950).
352 300 Mich. 575, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942). For the statute authorizing such settlement agreements, see Part One, note 648 supra.
353 Part Three, notes 338, 341, supra.
354 Part Three, notes 342, 343, supra.
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suspension of the absolute power of alienation by the
life of the survivor of a group of persons is measurement
by one life, none of the cases in which these opinions
were rendered actually involved the problem. 855 In
every case where the problem was really involved the
Michigan Supreme Court acted on the theory of the New
York courts that suspension for the life of the survivor
of a group of persons is for as many lives as there are
persons in the group. 8 5!6 What the Court will do in cases
which arise in the future remains to be seen, but it would
be hazardous to rely on its departing from the New
York theory in cases involving the suspension statutes,
as distinguished from the statutes restricting accumulations and successive life estates.
(4) Separability
As was seen in Chapter 17, under both the commonlaw Rule Against Perpetuities and the statutes restricting
suspension of the absolute power of alienation, when one
interest created by an instrument is void because it may
effect a suspension for too long a period, other interests
created by the same instrument may be valid if they are
separable from the void provision. 857 Where, as in New
355 Toms v. Williams, Part Three, note 308 supra; Truitt v. City
of Battle Creek, Part Three, note 318 supra; Allen v. Merrill, Part
Three, note 333 supra; Kemp v. Sutton, Part Three, note 338 supra;
Felt v. Methodist Educational Advance, Part Three, note 342 supra.
Cf. Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., Part Three, note 352, supra.
356 Dean v. Mumford, Part Three, note 3ll supra; Trufant v. Nunne1ey, Part Three, note 312 supra; Niles v. Mason, Part Three, note
314 supra; Foster v. Stevens, Part Three, note 315 supra; Root v.
Snyder, Part Three, note 316 supra; Grand Rapids Trust Co. v.
Herbst, Part Three, note 324 supra; Bateson v. Bateson, Part Three,
note 344 supra. Cf. In re Wagar's Estate, Part Three, note 349 supra.
357 Part Two at notes 529-572, supra, and see the discussion of this
point in the opinion in Bateson v. Bateson, Part Three, note 344
supra, quoted in the text at Part Three, note 347 supra.
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York, the period of suspension is restricted to two lives
in being and suspension for the life of the survivor of
a group of more than two persons is not permitted, 358
the doctrine of separability attains a new importance
because in some situations, although all the interests
violate the statutes if they are not separable, all may
be valid if they are. If John Stiles devises land to a
trustee to apply the rents and profits to the use of John's
widow for life and then to the use of his five children
for the life of the survivor, the trust suspends the absolute power of alienation for six lives and is wholly void
under the New York and, at least the earlier, Michigan
decisions. If, however, John Stiles devises land to a
trustee to apply the rents and profits to the use of his
widow for life and on her death to divide the principal
into five shares and hold each on trust for the life of one
of John's children, the trusts for the children are separable and all are valid. 359 As to each share, the absolute
power of alienation is suspended for only two lives, those
of the widow and one child. The New York courts have
developed the doctrine of separability elaborately and,
by means of it, have saved many dispositions which otherwise would have failed. 360 Although there are fewer cases
here, Michigan recognizes the doctrine. 361 If, as sugPart Three, note 306 supra.
Wells v. Wells, 88 N.Y. 323 (1882); Vanderpoel v. Loew, 112
N.Y. 167, 19 N.E. 481 (1889); Oliver v. Wells, 254 N.Y. 451, 173 N.E.
676 (1930); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, ~43 (1944).
300 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed.,
§§140-151 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, ~~33, 39-52
(1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations,"
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§25.24-25.27 (1952).
s61 Dean v. Mumford, 102. Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 (1894), Part Three,
note 311 supra; Mullreed v. Clark, 110 Mich. 229, 68 N.W. 138
(1896) (devise to wife for life, remainder to James in fee but if James
die without issue, to Mary and Jane in fee and if either Mary or
Jane die without heirs, her share to Elizabeth in fee. The wife predeceased the testator, and the shares of Mary and Jane were treated as
358
359
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gested in the preceding paragraph, Michigan still follows
the New York rule that the absolute power of alienation
may not be suspended for the life of the survivor of a
group of more than two persons, the doctrine of separability may yet be used here to validate all of the provisions of an instrument which would, in its absence, be
wholly void.
D. THE RESTRICTED MINORITY PROVISION

Under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities,
vesting may be suspended during the minority of a person who is not in being at the commencement of the
period but is certain to come into being, if ever, within
designated lives in being. 362 The suspension statutes
permitted suspension of the absolute power of alienation
beyond two designated lives in being at the time the
creating instrument took effect in only one narrow situation. Section 16 of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes
of 1846 provided,
"A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a
prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that
the persons to whom the first remainder is limited shall
die under the age of twenty-one years, or upon any contingency by which the estate of such persons may be determined before they attain their full age." 363
separable.); Woolfitt v. Preston, 203 Mich. 502, 169 N.W. 838 (1918),
Part Three, note 320 supra. See: Blossom v. Anketell, 275 Fed. 947
(D.C.E.D. Mich. 1921). Cf. Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W.
llOO (1901), Part Three, note 314 supra; Felt v. Methodist Educational
Advance, 247 Mich. 168, 225 N.W. 545 (1929), Part Three, note 342
supra, where the doctrine should have been applied but the limita·
tions were held valid on another theory; Michigan Trust Co. v.
Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924), Part Two, note 547 supra.
See: Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.44 (1952).
a62 Part Two, notes 31, 101, llO, supra.
363 Part Three, note 262 supra. The comments of the New York
revisers on this section are set out in the text at Part Three, note 6
supra.
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The extended suspension permitted by this section
appears to be that effected by the second remainder in
fee and to be permitted only when the person whose
minority is to serve as its measure is himself certain to
come into being within the statutory period and when
a fee in remainder is first limited to him. 364 It should
be noted that the provision is not limited to situations
where the person whose minority is to measure the extended term is not in being when the creating instrument takes effect. That is, it permits suspension for two
and a fraction lives in being or for two lives in being plus
the minority of a person not in being. 865
In Van Gallow v. Brandt,S66 land was devised to the
testator's sister Mary in fee. The will provided,
"In case my said sister - - - should die before her husband, I hereby give, bequeath and devise forever the
premises described in this paragraph five to the children of my said sister - - - in equal shares, share and
share alike, intending thereby that my brother in law
- - -, husband of my said sister - - -, shall not in any manner whatever participate in my estate; neither as heir of
his wife or any of his children, and to that end I do
hereby ordain, and it is my will and intent, that in case
any one or more of the children of my sister die under
age and without issue, that his or her surviving brothers
and sisters shall inherit such respective share of any deceased child to the absolute and complete exclusion of
its or their father - - -."
As no trust was created, the only possible suspension
of the absolute power of alienation was by the limitation
of future interests to persons not in being. Although at
the death of the testator Mary was 68 and had eight
364 Eldred v. Shaw, 112 Mich. 237, 70 N.W. 545 (1897); Chaplin,
SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§119, 120 (1928).
365Jd., §121.
366 168 Mich. 642, 134 N.W. 1018 (1912).
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children, all of whom were of age, it was possible, in the
eye of the law, that she might have further children who
might die under age and without issue after her death.
The Court held that "in that remote event the limitation would not violate the statute." This decision was
sound because the ultimate limitation fell squarely into
the provision of Section 16. All of the children of Mary
were certain to come into being within a single life in
being, that of their mother, each took a "prior remainder in fee," and each ultimate remainder in fee was
limited on a contingency by which the estate of the prior
remainderman in fee would be determined before he
attained his full age.
The language of Section 16 appears to relate only to
suspension of the absolute power of alienation by future
interests. Whether Section 16 permits the duration of
a trust for receipt of the rents and profits of land to be
prolonged beyond two designated lives in being is a
much more difficult problem. In Manice v. Manice,S67
land was devised to trustees (1) to apply the rents and
profits to the use of the testator's widow for life; (2) at
her death to divide into shares and apply the rents and
profits of one share to the use of testator's daughter Mary
for life; (3) on the death of Mary, to divide her share
into as many shares as she had children and hold each
on trust to accumulate the rents and profits during the
minority of the child and transfer the principal and
accumulated rents and profits to it at 21; (4) if any child
of Mary die during minority, to transfer its share to its
issue, if any, otherwise to the other children of Mary.
367 43 N.Y. 303 at 374-382
(1871). Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE
POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§122-124 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATE·
MENT, App., Ch. A, ~61 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §25.17
(1952).
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The trusts for accumulation could extend beyond two
lives in being and during the minority of children of
Mary who were not in being at the death of the testator.
Both the trusts and the ultimate limitations were held
valid. The Court held that Section 37 368 expressly permits trusts for accumulation during the minority of unborn persons and that the interest of such a person is a
"prior remainder in fee" within the meaning of Section
16. This is· not a decision that any other type of trust
may be measured by the minority of an unborn person.
In Matter of Trevor,S 69 part of the residue of an estate
was devised to trustees (1) to apply the rents and profits
to the use of testator's widow for life; (2) on the death of
the widow to divide the principal into three shares and
hold each on trust to apply the rents and profits to the
use of a designated child until it reached a stipulated
age; (3) if any child died before reaching the stipulated
age, to divide its share into as many sub-shares as it had
issue, which sub-shares should then vest indefeasibly in
such issue; (4) to hold the sub-share of any such issue
in trust during minority and apply the rents and profits
to its use. All persons taking interests under these dispositions would necessarily be in being and ascertained
within two designated lives in being, but provision (4)
contemplated trusts for receipt of the rents and profits
of land which were not for accumulation and which
might suspend the absolute power of alienation beyond
supra.
239 N.Y. 6, 145 N.E. 66 (1924). PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, App.,
Ch. A, ~62 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and
Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §25.17 (1952). Professor Whiteside explains this decision on the ground that the
"trusts" for the issue of the children were not true trusts but mere
provisions for custody similar to guardianship. Sed quaere. Cf.
Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§125,
295-303 (1928).
ss8 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §37, Part Two, note 482
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two lives in being. Moreover, the "prior remainder in
fee" of each of the issue was not defeasible. Nevertheless,
they were held valid. The language of Section 16 does
not extend to this situation and it is doubtful that the
Michigan courts would follow the decision.mt
E. PERIODS IN GROSS

Under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities,
vesting may be suspended during a period in gross of
twenty-one years or less, either following lives in being
or unrelated to lives. 311 Of the suspension statutes the
New York revisers said, "the period of twenty-one years,
after a life or lives in being, is no longer allowed as an
absolute term," 372 and Section 15 and 16 373 certainly
did not permit measurement of a period of suspension of
the absolute power of alienation by anything except two
37o Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888), Part Three,
note 284 supra; Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321,
190 N.W. 250 (1922), Part Three, note 324 supra. Cf. Blossom v.
Anketell, 275 Fed. 947 (D.C.E.D. Mich. 1921); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT,
App., Ch. B, 1!57 (1944). The statement in this paragraph of the
Restatement to the effect that, in Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85
N.W. 1100 (1901), a provision that the share of any grandchild "be
under the care of the trustee as agent of the grandchild" during
minority was "sustained" is inaccurate. In that case the provisions
for the grandchildren were held void. Part Three, notes 238, 314,
supra. Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations,"
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.43 (1952). Professor Whiteside
repeats the statement.
m Cadell v. Palmer, 1 CI. &: F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833), Part
Two, note 35 supra, cited with approval in St. Amour v. Rivard, 2
Mich. 294 at 297 (1852), Part Two, note 39 supra,· Toms v. Williams,
41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879), Part Two, note·ll2 supra; Markham
v. Hufford, 123 Mich. 505, 82 N.W. 222, 48 L.R.A. 580 (1900), Part
Two, note 114 supra; In re De Bancourt's Estate, 279 Mich. 518, 272
N.W. 891, llO A.L.R. 1346 (1937), Part Two, note 115 supra.
s1.2 Extracts from the Original Reports of the Revisers, 3 N.Y.
Rev. Stat. (2d ed.) 571-573 (1836), Part Three, note 6 supra.
373 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§15, 16, Part Three, note 262 supra;
Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §271
(1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1{64, Ch. B, 1{56 (1944);
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§25.18, 25.43 (1952).
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lives in being and an actual minority. Hence a future
estate could not be limited to a class which might increase to include members not theretofore in being during a fixed term of years, 374 and a trust for receipt of the
rents and profits of land could not be created to last for
a term of years, 375 or even for a single year. 376
When, under the terms of the instrument creating an
interest, suspension was to last for the longer of two
alternative periods, one measured by one or two lives
in being and the other by a gross term of years, the interest was void. Thus a trust for receipt of the rents and
profits of land stipulated to continue until the death of
a named beneficiary and, if that beneficiary died within
3 74 Farrand v. Petit, 84 Mich. 671, 48 N.W. 156 (1891) (devise of
land to trustees to hold for 20 years and then convey a quarter to
the children of each of testator's four children as each grandchild
came of age; share of any grandchild who died without issue before
such conveyance to be conveyed to the others); Otis v. Arntz, 198
Mich. 196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917) (devise of residue on trust for 25
years, then to grandchildren and issue of deceased grandchildren to be
ascertained at that time); In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278
N.W. 657 (1938) (devise to trustees for 20 years, then to grandchildren
and issue of deceased grandchildren to be ascertained at that time).
See: State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898), Part Three,
note 88 supra. Cf. Allen v. Merrill, 223 Mich. 467, 194 N.W. 131
(1923), Part Three, notes 200, 333, supra; In re De Rancourt's Estate,
279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891 (1937), Part Three, note 182 supra. Cf.
the complementary provision of Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §20, Part
Three, note 1 supra.
375 Farrand v. Petit, Part Three, note 374 supra; James E. Scripps
Corporation v. Parkinson, 186 Mich. 663, 153 N.W. 29 (1915) (devise
to wife upon trust to apply the rents and profits to her own use until
October 17, 1864; testator died August 14, 1851, so the period was
slightly over 13 years); Otis v. Arntz, Part Three, note 374 supra;
In re Richards' Estate, Part Three, note 374 supra; Loomis v. Laramie,
286 Mich. 707, 282 N.W. 876 (1938) (20 years). Cf. Fitzgerald v.
City of Big Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900), Part Three,
note 182 supra; Skinner v. Taft, 140 Mich. 282, 103 N.W. 702 (1905),
Part Three, note 241 supra; Gilkey v. Gilkey, 162 Mich. 664, 127 N.W.
715 (1910), Part Three, note 200 supra; Allen v. Merrill, 223 Mich.
467, 194 N.W. 131 (1923), Part Three, notes 200, 333, supra,· In re
De Rancourt's Estate, 279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891 (1937), Part Three,
note 182 supra.
376 De Buck v. Bousson, 295 Mich. 164, 294 N.W. 135 (1940).
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fourteen years from the date of the creating instrument,
until the expiration of such fourteen years, was invalid. 377
On the other hand, when, under the terms of the creating instrument, suspension could not last beyond the
shorter of two alternative periods, one measured by
one or two lives in being and the other by a gross term
of years, the interest thereby created did not offend the
suspension statutes. 378 In Ward v. Ward/ 79 a devise to
trustees to receive the rents and profits for twelve years
"or until the death after my decease and prior to the
expiration of said period of 12 years, of two of my children who shall survive me" was treated as valid. In
Young v. Y oung/80 a devise to a trustee to receive the
rents and profits and pay them over to the testator's two
children for ten years if they should so long live was
treated as valid. In Miller v. Curtiss~ the residue of
an estate was devised to a trustee to pay the income and
five per cent of the principal annually to Phyllis Jane
Russell, and, if she should die before distribution of the
principal was completed, the remainder was devised to
her children or, if there were none, to seven named persons. The Court rejected a contention that this trust
881

'
Casgrain v. Hammond, 134 Mich. 419, 96 N.W. 510 (1903), Part
Three, note 213 supra. Accord: Schneiber v. Schneiber, 199 Mich.
630, 165 N.W. 660 (1917), Part Three, note 213 supra (life of widow
or 20 years, whichever was longer).
378 Chaplin, SusPENSION OF THE PowER oF ALIEN·ATION, 3rd ed., §134
(1928); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1!67, Ch. B, 1!56 (1944);
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6
AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §§25.18, 25.43 (1952).
379 163 Mich. 570, 128 N.W. 761 (1910), Part Three, note 303 supra.
Six children survived the testator.
3so 255 Mich. 173, ~37 N.W. 535, 77 A.L.R. 963 (1931).
381 328 Mich. 239, 43 N.W. (2d) 834 (1950). Accord: Blossom v.
Anketell, 275 Fed. 947 (D.C.E.D. Mich. 1921) (until death of Julia
or expiration of two years, whichever shall soonest occur).
377
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suspended the absolute power of alienation for twenty
years in gross, saying,
"In any event, the trust cannot continue beyond the
lifetime of Phyllis Jane Russell. The suspension of the
power of alienation is not for a period beyond the lifetime of Phyllis Jane Russell; it will be shorter than her
lifetime if she lives more than 20 years after the death of
the testator.
"The trust period is not in gross, but is for the lifetime
or less than the lifetime of one person, the first and
direct beneficiary. It is not necessary to examine into
plaintiff's theories as to the class or classes of remaindermen. It is of no moment to consider how many of the
contingent remaindermen may die before the death of
Phyllis Jane Russell." 382 ..
It will be recalled that, in Bateson v. Bateson,S83 a
trust to receive the rents and profits of land and pay
them to the testator's grandson James for fifteen years
or until his earlier death was treated by the majority
of the Court as suspending the absolute power of alienation for a gross period of fifteen years and so void. This
view was, of course, unsound and contrary to the preceding three cases mentioned. A trust which cannot last
longer than one life in being does not suspend the absolute power of alienation for a term in gross merely because it may terminate before the expiration of that life.
Three of the seven justices sitting in Bateson v. Bateson
dissented on this point. 384 The decision in the later case
of Miller v. Curtiss was unanimous. 385 Insofar as Bateson
v. Bateson held, contrary to the New York and all other
Michigan decisions, that the absolute power of alienation
as2 328 Mich. 239 at 242-243. Per Reid, J. The decision was
unanimous.
383 294 Mich. 426, 293 N.W. 705 (1940), Part Three, note 344 supra.
384 Part Three, note 348 supra.
385 Part Three, note 381 supra.
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could not be suspended for the shorter of two alternative
periods, one measured by one or two lives and the other
by a gross term of years, it must be deemed to have been
overruled sub silentio.
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3.373
c. 62, §17, 1.257, 1.267, 1.280, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 2.280, 2.534, 3.1,
3.42, 3.67, 3.220, 3.319, 3.339
c. 62, §18, 1.257, 1.280, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 3.1, 3.42, 3.47, 3.67
c. 62, §19, 1.257, 1.280, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 3.1, 3.42
c. 62, §20, 1.307, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 2.180, 2.570, 3.1, 3.23, 3.67, 3.85,
3.374
c. 62, §21, 1.257, 1.307, 1.371, 2.180, 3.1, 3.42, 3.48, 3.67
c. 62, §22, 2.182
c. 62, §23, 1.307, 1.308, 1.371, 2.46, 2.180, 3.1, 3.85
c. 62, §24, 1.257, 1.307, 1.371, 1.392, 2.178, 2.180, 2.194, 3.20
c. 62, §27, 1.257, 1.307, 1.342, 2.180
c. 62, §28, 1.89, 2.181
c. 62, §29, 1.257, 1.267, 2.189
c. 62, §§30, 31, 2.106, 3.262, 3.288
c. 62, §32, 1.242, 2.38, 2.188
c. 62, §33, 1.179, 2.188
c. 62, §34, 1.156
c. 62, §35, 1.371, 2.203
c. 62, §36, 2.184
c. 62, §37, 1.585, 2.184, 2.482, 3.309
c. 62, §38, 2.184, 2.482, 3.220
c. 62, §39, 2.184, 2.482, 2.496
c. 62, §40, 2.184, 2.482
c. 62, §41, 2.502, 3.1, 3.144, 3.262, 3.266
c. 62, §42, 1.371
c. 62, §43, 1.166
c. 62, §44, 1.166, 2.178, 2.184
c. 62, §45, 2.178
c. 62, §46, 1.143, 2.178, 2.184
Revised Statutes, 1846, c. 63, 1.583
c. 63, §3, 1.588, 1.634
c. 63, §7, 1.271
c. 63, §11, 1.586, 2.483, 3.192, 3.202, 3.225
c. 63, §13, 1.587, 1.595, 1.639
c. 63, §16, 1.587, 3.45
c. 63, §19, 1.587, 1.590, 1.595, 1.620, 1.621, 1.639, 2.54, 2.462, 3.202,
3.211, 3.225, 3.246
c. 63, §20, 1.598
c.
c.
c.
c.
c.
c.
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c. 63, §21, 1.602, 1.609, 2.54, 2.462, 3.202
c. 63, §24, 1.600
Revised Statutes, 1846, c. 64, 3.119
c. 6<1, §§2, 4, 3.119
c. 6'1, §5, 3.119, 3.122
c. 64, §6, 2.71, 3.119, 3.122
c. 64, §7, 3.119
c. 64, §9, 1.183, 2.304, 3.147
c. 64, §10, 2.304, 3.147
c. 64, §11, 2.304, 3.147
c. 64, §12, 2.75, 2.293, 2.297, 2.304, 3.147
c. 64, §13, 1.183, 2.304, 3.147
c. 64, §14, 2.304, 3.147
c. 64, §§15, 17, 3.140
c. 64, §22, 3.119, 3.122, 3.123, 3.132
c. 64, §23, 2.296~ 3.119, 3.122, 3.123, 3.132, 3.140
c. 64, §24, 2.296, 3.119, 3.124
c. 64, §§25 to 27, 3.119
c. 64, §28, 2.296, 3.119
c. 64, §§29, 33, 3.119
c. 64, §36, 3.119, 3.136
c. 64, §47, 3.119
c. 64, §48, 3.119, 3.137
c. 64, §55, 2.302, 3.145, 3.148
c. 64, §56, 2.302, 2.325, 3.145, 3.148
c. 64, §62, 3.122
Revised Statutes, 1846, c. 65, §4, 1.156, 1.242
c. 65, §7, 1.373
Revised Statutes, 1846, c. 66, §13, 1.379
Revised Statutes, 1846, c. 67, § 1, 1.174
Revised Statutes, 1846, c. 68, §1, 1.175
Revised Statutes, 1846, c. 74, §5, 1.209
Revised Statutes, 1846, c. 85, §25, 1.151
Revised Statutes, 1846, c. 90, §§24, 25, 1.628
Revised Statutes, 1846, c. 108, §61, 1.701
Revised Statutes, 1846, c. 109, §1, 1.202
Revised Statutes, 1846, c. 110, §6, 1.242
Revised Statutes, 1846, c. Ill, §3, 1.337
Revised Statutes, 1846, c. 123, §26, 1.325
Act 235, P.A. 1849, §4, 1.220
Act 184, P.A. 1851, 1.628
Act 80, P.A. 1855, §6, 1.220
Act 120, P.A. 1855, 1.628
Act 145, P.A. 1855, §21, 2.406
Act 168, P.A. 1855, 1.152, 1.175
Act 191, P.A. 1877, §4, 1.522
Act 233, P.A. 1887, 1.283, 1.606, 1.607, 2.80
Act 209, P .A. 1897, 2.406
Act 230, P.A. 1897, 1.161
Act 255, P.A. 1899, §§1, 8, 1.497, 1.516
Act 29, P.A. 1901, §7, 1.220
Act 229, P.A. 1905, 1.497
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Act 122, P.A. 1907, 1.593, 2.421, 2.422, 2.432, 2.436
Act 125, P.A. 1911, 2.421, 2.422, 2.447
Act 106, P.A. 1913, §15, 1.522
Act 135, P.A. 1913, 1.518
Act 380, P.A. 1913, 2.400, 2.421, 2.447
Act 280, P.A. 1915, 1.220, 1.593, 2.421, 2.447
Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 6, §4 (6), 1.628
Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 19, §§62 to 70, 1.283, 1.606, 1.607, .2.80
Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 23, §141, 1.335
Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 29, §54, 1.701
Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 30, §25, 1.325, 1.715
Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 33, §19, 1.337
Act 63, P.A. 1917, §5, 1.220
Act 72, P.A. 1917, §§24 to 28, 1.521
Act 243, P.A. 1917,1.715
Act 249, P.A. 1921, 1.648, 3.352
Act 220, P.A. 1923, 1.523
Act 60, P.A. 1925, 1.497
Act 228, P.A. 1925, 1.703
Act 258, P.A. 1925, 1.224, 1.606, 1.660
Act 373, P.A. 1925, 1.220, 1.593, 2.421
Act 373, P.A. 1927, 1.715
Act 172, P.A. 1929, 1.211
Act 211, P.A. 1931, 1.372, 2.265
Act 219, P.A. 1931, 1.374
Act 327, P.A. 1931, §§102, 119, 1.522
Act 327, P.A. 1931, §§152, 161, 174, 183, 1.220
Act 328, P.A. 1931, §175, 1.455
Act 122, P.A. l933, 1.715
Act 50, P.A. 1937, 1.518
Act 282, P.A. 1937, 1.518
Act 288, P.A. 1939, c. 2, §§45 to 48, 1.648, 3.352
Act 288, P.A. 1939, c. 2, §98, 1.209
Act 296, P.A. 1945, 3.141, 3.142
Act 193, P.A. 1947, 2.387, 2.421, 2.508
Act 38, P.A. 1949, 1.232, 1.257, 1.279, 1.307, 1.591, 1.594, 2.46, 2.61,
2.180, 2.534, 2.570. 3.3, 3.8, 3.48, 3.76, 3.85, 3.262
Act 227, P.A. 1949, 1.585, 2.184, 2.482, 2.501, 3.8, 3.48
Act 61, P.A. 1951, 2.387, 2.421, 2.508
Act 6, P.A. 1952, 1.585, 2.482
Act 7, P.A. 1952, 2.482
Michigan Statutes Annotated, 1937
§5.3421; 2.400, 2.421, 2.447
§§19.321 to 19.324; 1.518
§19.345; 1.522
§§19.741 to 19.773; 1.523
§§20. 24 to 20.28; 1.521
§§20.94, 21.103, 21.120; 1.522
§§21.153, 21.162, 21.175, 21.184, 21.446; 1.220
§§21.661 to 21.683; 1.161
§§21.1234, 2l.l265, 21.1767, 21.1806; 1.220
§26.1; 1.132, 2.177, 2.184
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§26.2; 1.32, 2.177
§26.3; 1.85, 1.93, 1.132, 2.68, 2.177, 2.181
§26.4; 1.85, 1.93, 1.132, 2.68, 2.177, 2.182
§26.5; 1.132, 1.257, 1.307, 1.633, 2.177
§26.6; 1.257, 2.177
§26.7; 1.371, 2.177, 2.179
§26.8; 1.371, 2.177, 2.179, 2.184, 2.355
§26.9; 1.370, 1.371, 2.177, 2.179
§26.10; 1.371, 2.177, 2.179
§26.11; 1.371, 2.177, 2.180
§26.12; 1.371, 2.177, 2.330
§26.13; 1.371, 2.177, 2.184, 2.209
§26.14; 1.279, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 2.47, 2.177, 3.1, 3.20, 3.67, 3.76,
3.100, 3.144, 3.147, 3.209, 3.218
§26.15; 1.279, 1.371, 1.591, 1.593, 1.639, 2.46, 2.47, 2.177, 3.1, 3.20,
3.22, 3.67, 3.100, 3.144, 3.219, 3.262, 3.266, 3.373
§26.16; 1.279, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 2.47, 2.177, 2.180, 3.1, 3.262, 3.282,
3.373
§26.17; 1.257, 1.267, 1.280, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 2.177, 2.280, 2.534, 3.1,
3.42, 3.67, 3.220, 3.319, 3.339
§26.18; 1.257, 1.280, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 2.177, 3.1, 3.42, 3.47, 3.67
§26.19; 1.257, 1.280, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 2.177, 3.1, 3.42
§26.20; 1.307, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 2.177, 2.180, 2.570, 3.1, 3.23, 3.67,
3.85, 3.374
§26.21; 1.257, 1.307, 1.371, 2.177, 2.180, 3.1, 3.42, 3.48, 3.67
§26.22; 2.177, 2.182
§26.23; 1.307, 1.308, 1.371, 2.46, 2.177, 2.180, 3.1, 3.85
§26.24; 1.257, 1.307, 1.371, 1.392, 2.177, 2.178, 2.180, 2.194, 3.20
§§26.25, 26.26; 2.177
§26.27; 1.257, 1.307, 1.342, 2.177, 2.180
§26.28; 1.89, 2.177, 2.181
§26.29; 1.257, 1.267, 2.177, 2.189
§§26.30, 26.31; 2.106, 2.177, 3.262, 3.288
§26.32; 1.242, 2.38, 2.177, 2.188
§26.33; 1.179, 2.177, 2.188
§26.34; 1.156, 2.177, 2.188
§26.35; 1.371, 2.177, 2.203
§26.36; 2.177, 2.184
§26.37; 1.585, 2.177. 2.184, 2.482, 2.501, 3.8, 3.48, 3.309
§26.38; 1.585, 2.177, 2.184, 2.482, 2.501, 3.8, 3.48, 3.220
§26.39; 2.177, 2.184, 2.482, 2.496
§26.40; 2.177, 2.184, 2.482
§26.41; 2.177, 2.502, 3.1, 3.144, 3.262, 3.266
§26.42; 1.371, 2.177
§26.43; 1.166, 2.177
§26.44; 1.166, 2.177, 2.178, 2.184
§26.45; 2.177, 2.178
§26.46; 1.143, 1.282, 2.177. 2.178, 2.184
§26.47; 1.372, 2.265
§26.49 (1-3); 1.232, 1.257, 1.279, 1.307, 1.591, 1.594, 2.46, 2.61, 2.180,
2.534, 2.570, 3.3, 3.8, 3.48, 3.76, 3.85, 3.262
§§26.51 to 26.52; 1.583
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§26.53; 1.583, 1.588, 1.634
§§26.54 to 26.56; 1.583
§26.57; 1.271, 1.583
§§26.58 to 26.60; 1.583
§26.61; 1.583, 1.586, 2.483, 3.192, 3.202, 3.225
§26.62; 1.583
§26.63; 1.583, 1.587, 1.595, 1.639
§§26.64, 26.65; 1.583
§26.66; 1.583, 1.587, 3.45
§26.67, 26.68; 1.583
§26.69; 1.583, 1.587, 1.590, 1.595, 1.620, 1.621, 1.639, 2.54, 2.462,
3.202, 3.211, 3.225, 3.246
§26.70; 1.583, 1.598
§26.71; 1.583, 1.602, 1.609, 2.54, 2.462, 3.202
§§26.72, 26.73; 1.583
§26.74; 1.583, 1.600
§§26.75 to 26.77; 1.583
§§26.82 (1-2); 2.387, 2.421, 2.508
§§26.91 to 26.94; 3.119
§26.95; 3.119, 3.122
§26.96; 2.71, 3.119, 3.122
§§26.97, 26.98; 3.119
§26.99; 1.183, 2.304, 3.119, 3.147
§§26.100, 26.101; 2.304, 3.119, 3.147
§26.102; 2.75, 2.293, 2.297, 2.304, 3.119, 3.147
§26.103; 1.183, 2.304, 3.119, 3.147
§26.104; 2.304, 3.119, 3.147
§26.105; 3.119, 3.140
§26.106; 3.119
§26.107; 3.119, 3.140
§§26.108 to 26.111; 3.119
§26.112; 3.119, 3.122, 3.123, 3.132
§26.113; 2.296, 3.119, 3.122, 3.123, 3.132, 3.140
§26.114; 2.296, 3.119, 3.124
§§26.115 to 26.117; 3.119
§26.118; 2.296, 3.119
§§26.119 to 26.125; 3.119
§26.126; 3.119, 3.136
§§26.127 to 26.137; 3.119
§26.138; 3.119, 3.137
§§26.139 to 26.144; 3.119
§26.145; 2.302, 3.119, 3.145, 3.148
§26.146; 2.302, 2.325, 3.119, 3.145, 3.148
§§26.147 to 26.151; 3.119
§26.152; 3.119, 3.122
§§26.154 (1-6); 3.141, 3.142
§26.161; 1.152, 1.175
§26.229; 1.379
§§26.431 to 26.509; 1.2ll
§26.523; 1.156, 1.242
§26.526; 1.373
§26.851; 1.374
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§§26.1131, 26.1132; 1.703
§§26.1191 to 26.1193; 1.220, 1.593, 2.421, 2.447
§§26.1201, 26.1202; 1.220, 1.593, 2.421
§§26.1211 to 26.1214; 1.224, 1.606, 1.660
§27.545 (b); 1.628
§§27.1188 to 27.1196; 1.283, 1.606, 1.607, 2.80
§27.1640; 1.335
§27.1967; 1.701
§27.1999; 1.325, 1.715
§27.2012; 1.202
§27.2130; 1.337
§27.2146; 1.242
§27.3178 (71); 1.175
§§27.3178 (115-118); 1.648, 3.352
§27.3178 (150); 1.174
§27.3178 (168); 1.209
§§28.31, 28.36; 1.497, 1.516
§§28.51 to 28.55; 1.497
§§28.71 to 28.77; 1.518
§§28.78 (1-14); 1.518
§28.374; 1.455
Compiled Laws, 1948
§123.871; 2.400, 2.421, 2.447
§44I.l5; 1.522
§§445.151 to 445.154; 1.518
§§445.171 to 445.184; 1.518
§§445.701, 445.708; 1.497, 1.516
§§445.761 to 445.767; 1.497
§§445.791 to 445.798; 1.518
§§449.24 to 449.28; 1.521
§449.304; 1.522
§§450.102, 450.119; 1.522
§§450.152, 450.161, 450.174, 450.183; 1.220
§§451.101 to 451.133; 1.523
§453.236; 1.220
§§455.1 to 455.24; I.l61
§457.234; 1.220
§457.265; 1.220
§458.87; 1.220
§458.156; 1.220
Chapter 554; 2.177
§554.1; 1.132, 2.184
§554.2; 1.132
§554.3; 1.85, 1.93, 1.32, 2.68, 2.181
§554.4; 1.85, 1.93, 1.132, 2.68, 2.182
§554.5; 1.132, 1.257, 1.307, 1.633
§554.6; 1.257
§554.7; 1.371, 2.179
§554.8; 1.371, 2.179, 2.184, 2.355
§554.9; 1.370, 1.371, 2.179
§554.10; 1.371, 2.179
§554.11; 1.371, 2.180

621

622

PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS
§554.12; 1.371, 2.330
§554.13; 1.371, 2.184, 2.209
§554.14; 1.279, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 2.47, 3.1, 3.20, 3.67, 3.76, 3.100,
3.144, 3.147, 3.209, 3.218
§554.15; 1.279, 1.371, 1.591, 1.593, 1.639, 2.46, 2.47, 3.1, 3.20, 3.22,
3.67, 3.100, 3.144, 3.219, 3.262, 3.266, 3.373
§554.16; 1.279, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 2.47, 2.180, 3.1, 3.262, 3.282, 3.373
§554.17; 1.257, 1.267, 1.280, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 2.280, 2.534, 3.1, 3.42,
3.67, 3.220, 3.319, 3.339
§554.18; 1.257, 1.280, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 3.1, 3.42, 3.47, 3.67
§554.19; 1.257, 1.280, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 3.1, 3.42
§554.20; 1.307, 1.371, 1.591, 2.46, 2.180, 2.570, 3.1, 3.23, 3.67, 3.85,
3.374
§554.21; 1.257, 1.307, 1.371, 2.180, 3.1, 3.42, 3.48, 3.67
§554.22; 2.182
§554.23; 1.307, 1.308, 1.371, 2.46, 2.180, 3.1, 3.85
§554.24; 1.257, 1.307, 1.371, 1.392, 2.178, 2.180, 2.194, 3.20
§554.27; 1.257, 1.307, 1.342, 2.180
§554.28; 1.89, 2.181
§554.29; 1.257, 1.267, 2.189
§§554.30, 554.31; 2.106, 3.262, 3.288
§554.32; 1.242, 2.38, 2.188
§554.33; 1.179, 2.188
§554.34; 1.156, 2.188
§554.35; 1.337, 2.203
§554.36; 2.184
§554.37; 1.585, 2.184, 2.482, 2.501, 3.8, 3.48, 3.309
§554.38; 1.585, 2.184, 2.482, 2.501, 3.8, 3.48, 3.220
§554.39; 2.184, 2.482, 2.496
§554.40; 2.184, 2.482
§554.41; 2.502, 3.1, 3.144, 3.262, 3.266
§554.42; 1.371
§554.43; 1.166
§554.44; 1.166, 2.178, 2.184
§554.45; 2.178
§554.46; 1.143, 1.282, 2.178, 2.184
§§554.51 to 554.53; 1.232, 1.257, 1.279, 1.307, 1.591, 1.594, 2.46, 2.61,
2.180, 2.534, 2.570, 3.3, 3.8, 3.48, 3.76, 3.85, 3.262
§554.101; 1.372, 2.265
§554.111; 1.374
§§554.211, 554.212; 1.703
§§554.351 to 554.353; 1.220, 1.593, 2.421, 2.447
§§554.381, 554.382; 1.220, 1.593, 2.421
§§554.401 to 554.404; 1.224, 1.606, 1.660
Chapter 555; 1.583
§555.3; 1.588, 1.634
§555.7; 1.271
§555.11; 1.586, 2.483, 3.192, 3.202, 3.225
§555.13; 1.587, 1.595, 1.639
§555.16; 1.587, 3.45
§555.19; 1.587, 1.590, 1.595, 1.620, 1.621, 1.639, 2.54, 2.462, 3.202,
3.211, 3.225, 3.246
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§555.20; 1.598
§555.21; 1.602, 1.609, 2.54, 2.462, 3.202
§555.24; 1.600
§§555.301, 555.302; 2.387, 2.421, 2.508
Chapter 556; 3.119
§§556.2, 556.4; 3.119
§556.5; 3.119, 3.122
§556.6; 2.71, 3.119, 3.122
§556.7; 3.119
§556.9; 1.183, 2.304, 3.147
§§556.10, 556.11; 2.304, 3.147
§556.12; 1.75, 1.293, 1.297, 1.304, 3.147
§556.13; 1.183, 2.304, 3.147
§556.14; 2.304, 3.147
§§556.15, 17; 3.140
§556.22; 3.119, 3.122, 3.123, 3.132
§556.23; 2.296, 3.119, 3.122, 3.123, 3.132, 3.140
§556.24; 2.296, 3.119, 3.124
§§556.25 to 556.27; 3.119
§556.28; 2.296, 3.119
§§556.29, 556.33; 3.119
§556.36; 3.119, 3.136
§556.47; 3.119
§556.48; 3.119, 3.137
§556.55; 2.302, 3.145, 3.148
§556.56; 2.302, 2.325, 3.145, 3.148
§556.62; 3.122
§§556.101 to 556.106; 3.141, 3.142
§557.1; 1.152, 1.175
§558.13; 1.379
§§560.1 to 560.79; 1.211
§565.4; 1.156, 1.242
§565.7; 1.373
§606.4 (6); 1.628
§§619.62 to 619.70; 1.283, 1.606, 1.607, 2.80
§623.141; 1.335
§629.54; 1.701
§630.25; 1.325, 1. 715
§631.1; 1.202
§633.19; 1.337
§690.406; 1.242
§702.1; 1.175
§§702.45 to 702.48; 1.648, 3.352
§702.80; 1.174
§702.98; 1.209
§750.177; 1.455

Statutes of Other jurisdictions
Arizona suspension statutes; 3.4
California Civil Code, §§763, 764 (1949); 1.85
California suspension statutes; 3.4
District of Columbia suspension statutes; 3.4
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Idaho suspension statutes; 3.4
Indiana Terr. Act Sep. 17, 1807, Laws Ind. Terr., p. 323; 1.34
Indiana suspension statutes; 3.4
Kentucky suspension statutes; 3.4
Massachusetts General Laws, c. 184 A (1954); 2.127
Minnesota suspension statutes; 3.4
Missouri Revised Statutes, 1949, §453.090; 2.142
Montana Revised Code, 1935, §§6725, 6726; 1.85
Montana suspension statutes; 3.4
New York Laws, 1909, c. 52; 2.303, 3.228
New York Laws, 1945, c. 558; 2.493
New York Real Property Law, §32; 1.85
§42; 3.288
§57; 1.179
§61a; 2.493
§§96, 103; 3.28
§105; 1.609
§§149 to 153; 2.304, 3.147
§§178, 179; 2.303
New York Revised Statutes, 1829, pt. 2, c I, tit. 2, Art. 1; 2.178
§5; 1.633
§14; 3.3
§15; 1.591, 3.3
§§16 to 19; 3.3
§20; 3.3, 3.85
§§21, 23; 3.3
§24; 2.49, 2.178, 3.11, 3.20, 3.85
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Access to Estates for Years,
ll2, 132, 133

INDEX
Access to Estates in Fee
Simple, 7, 112
Access to Estates Tail, 23
Access to Legal Interests, 7
Access to Spendthrift Trusts,
208-209, 230-239, 428, 430431
Access to Trusts, 207, 228229, 237
Bankruptcy, 23, 140, 237
Estates for Years
conditions against access,
131-132
Michigan statute, 132
policy considerations, 135137
Power of Appointment, 378379
Uses Designed to Defraud,
200
Cy Pres Doctrine
Charitable Trusts, 449
Rule Against Perpetuities,
449
Death Benefit Plan. See:
Trusts.
Debentures, 195-196
Default of Appointment. See:
Powers.
Defeasibility
Restraints on Alienation, 8
Vesting. See: Vesting.
Descent. See also: Estates Tail,
Expectant Interests, Restraints on Alienation.
Michigan Statutes, 66
Destructibility
Contingent Remainder, 59,
101, 262-266, 272, 328-329,
409
Estate for Life, 263, 93
Estate for Years, 112, 113
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Estate Tail. See also: Estates
Tail.
interest expectant upon,
22, 25-26, 36, 280-283
Executory Interests, 23, 2526, 36, 69, 268, 281-282
Expectant Interests in Chattels, 268
Expectant Interests Under
Trusts, 268, 409
Reversions, 10 I, 281
Right of Entry, 24
Rule Against Perpetuities.
See: Rule Against Perpetuities.
Spendthrift Trust, 427-431
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation. See:
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation.
Trusts, 268, 409, 426-431, 533549, 572, 576. See also:
Trusts (Restraints on Termination; Termination).
Determinable Estate, 139. See
also: Possibility of Reverter.
Direction to Accumulate. See:
Accumulations.
Direct Restraint on Alienation.
See: Restraints on Alienation.
Disability Plan. See: Trusts.
Disabling Restraints. See: Restraints on Alienation.
Discretionary Trust, 238
Dividends. See: Accumulations.
Division, Restraints On, 81-83
Doctrine of Worthier Title, 19
Donative Transactions. See:
Chattels Personal, Restraints
on Alienation.
Donee. See: Chattels Personal,
Estates Tail, Powers.
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INDEX

Donor (of Power), 370
D o u b I e Possibilities, Rule
Against. See: Rule in Whitby
v. Mitchell
Dower
Alienability, 140-141, 146-147
Barrability, 147
Power of Appointment, 379
Trust Property, 204
Duration. See: Accumulations,
Estates for Years, Trusts,·
Easements
Chattels Personal, 182
Do Not Prevent Vesting, 394
Restraints on Alienation, 8
Right to Exclusive Possession, 394-395
Ecclesiastical Corporations.
See: Charities, Mortmain.
Effect of Invalidity. See: Restraints on Alienation.
Effect of Violation. See: Accumulations, Estates for Life
(Statutory Restrictions on),
Rule Against Perpetuities,
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation.
Election to Take Against Will,
306
Employees' Trusts. See: Trusts.
English Law. See also headings
for specific legal problems
and Table of Statutory and
Constitutional Citations.
Reception in Michigan, 9-16,
141, 270
Engrossing, 175-178
Entails. See: Estates Tail.
Entirety. See: Estates by the
Entirety.
En Ventre Sa Mere. See: Child
En Ventre Sa Mere.

Equitable Charge
Distinguished from Trust,
559
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation, 555556, 559-560, 566, 567
Equitable Conversion. See: Suspension of the A b s o 1 u t e
Power of Alienation.
Equitable Interests. See also:
Trusts.
Contingent Remainders
destructibility, 142, 267268, 409
rule against perpetuities,
271
Equitable Charge
distinguished from trust,
559
suspension of the absolute
power of alienation, 555556, 559-560, 566, 567
Equity of Redemption
access by creditors, 245
alienability, 242, 245-246
devisability, 245
estate tail in, 245
restraints on alienation,
245-247
rule against perpetuities,
407
suspension of the absolute
power of alienation, 515
Estates for Life, 219, 493
Estates for Years
restraints- on alienation,
208-209
Estates in Fee Simple, 216,
218, 219
Estates Tail, 23, 245, 267
Expectant Interests
destructibility, 142, 267268, 409

INDEX
rule against perpetuities,
271, 387
upon estate tail, 267, 268
Land Contract Vendee's, 247258
alienability, 248-249
devisability, 248-249
heritability, 248
restraints on alienation,
59-61, 251-258
rule against perpetuities,
407-408
suspension of the absolute
power of alienation, 515
Old Rule Against Perpetuities, 264
Options,
restraints on alienation,
87-90, 153, 167
rule against perpetuities,
88-90, 167, 398-407
suspension of the absolute
power of alienation, 89,
401, 513-514
Origin and History, 198-205,
240-249
Restraints on Alienation.
See: Restraints on Alienation.
Rule Against Perpetuities.
See: Rule Against Perpetuities.
Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell,
264
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation. See:
Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation.
Trusts. See: Trusts.
Equitable Restrictions, 8
Chattels Personal, 182-183,
189
Do Not Prevent Vesting, 394
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Land, 182-183
Equity of Redemption
Access by Creditors, 245
Alienability, 242, 245
Devisability, 245
Estate Tail in, 245
Nature of Interest, 244-246
Restraints on Alienation,
245-247
Rule Against Perpetuities,
407
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation, 515
Escheat, 262
Escrow, 280
Estates by the Entirety, 8, 65
Estates for Life
Access by Creditors, JI2
Alienability, 6, 91-92
Changed to Fee, 72, 378-379
Chattels Personal, 321
Michigan statutory restrictions, 327, 483-484, 494
·Devisability, 92
Endless Series of, 99-100, 260,
264, 272-273
Entailment, 92
Equitable, 219, 493
Forfeiture, 92, 101, 263
Heritability, 92
Incidents Fixed, 37-39
In Estate for Years
remainder on, Michigan
statutory restrictions,
478, 494
In remainder
may be vested, 314
In Uses, 201
Life Tenant's Power to
Lease, 516, 527
Michigan Statutes, 46, 97-98,
108. 477-478
Motives for Creating, xi
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INDEX

Perpetual Freehold, 99-100,
measuring lives, 478
260, 264, 272-273
remainder on, 478, 494,
Pur Autre Vie
500-502
definition, 91
partial repeal, 479, 494,
devisability, 92
503
measuring lives, Michigan
purpose, 480-483
statu tory restrictions,
remainder expectant upon
478
estate for years, 4 78, 494,
remainder expectant upon,
503
Michigan statutory rechattels personal, 327,
strictions, 478, 494, 500494
502
statute still in force, 479,
special occupant, 92
494, 503
repeal, 479
Remainder Expectant Upon,
scope and arrangement of
94, 138, 314, 318
discussion of, 490-492
Restraints on Alienation.
successive estates for life,
See: Restraints on Aliena103, 108-109, 456, 477tion.
478
Reversion Expectant Upon,
concurrent estates for
94, 138
life, 498-501
Rule Against Perpetuities,
more than two, 456, 477301-302
478, 496-500
Sale of Fee on Petition of
persons not in being,
Life Tenant, llO, 286-287
456, 494-495
Special Limitation, 314, 318
Subject to Estate for Years,
Special Occupant, 92
Statutory Restrictions on,
312
Tenant's Power to Lease,
477-484, 493-503
applicability to chattels
516, 527
personal, 327, 483-484,
Types of, 91
494
Unaffected by Quia Empapplicability to trusts, 493tores Terrarum, 94
494, 497, 501-502
Unlimited Power to Dispose
of Fee, 71, 284-285, 372beneficial life interest,
493, 497
373, 378, 529-530
trustee's estate, 493-494, Estate for Years. See also: In501-502
teressia Termini.
consequences of violation,
Access by Creditors, ll2, 132
502-503, 555
Accumulations
effect on class gift rules,
direction to replace lease,
495
432
enactment, 477-478, 493
royalties under mineral
estates pur autre vie
lease, 439

INDEX
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Alienability, 6, 111-112, 117,
chattels personal
118, 132
Michigan statutory reAnalogies to Bailments, 169
strictions, 327, 494
As Substitute for Mortgage,
contingent, 262-263
241
Michigan statutory reCommencing on Uncertain
strictions, 474, 478,
Future Event, 312
494
Destructibility, 112, 113, 118,
vested, 263, 312-313
Remainder in, 116, 138-141,
125
Devisability, 6, 112
317
expectant upon estate pur
Duration
constitutional limit, 115autre vie, Michigan sta116, 137, 474
tutory restrictions, 478
mediaeval situation, 113
Restraints on Alienation.
Estate for Life in
See: Restraints on Alienaremainder on, Michigan
tion.
s t at u tory restrictions,
Reversion Expectant Upon,
116, 138, 388, 391
478
Estates Tail in, 26, 267, 281,
Right of Entry, 391
Rule Against Perpetuities.
465
Executory Interest Cutting
See also: Rule Against PerOff or Following, 312-313
petuities.
endless series of five-year
Expectant Interest Cutting
Off or Following 312-313
terms, 287
Expectant Interests in, 116options in leases, 399-406
117, 267-268, 317, 318-319,
Shifting Interest in, 114
Statute of Uses, 202
324-325
Statutory Restrictions on
Forfeiture, 112, 118, 125
Freehold Estate Subject to,
suspension of a b s o 1 u t e
ownership, 478, 508
312-313
Suspension of A b s o I u t e
History, 111, 169-170
Ownership, 478, 508
Incidents Fixed, 37-38
Suspension of the Absolute
In Uses, 201
Land Contract Vendee's InPower of Alienation, 276,
terest, 249, 257
484
Life Tenant's Power to
Trusts. See also: Trusts.
Create, 516, 527
applicability of Michigan
Michigan Statutes, 46, 116,
statutes, 231
passive, 216
478
On Special Limitation, 312- Estates in Expectancy. See: Ex·
313
pectant Interests.
Remainder Expectant Upon, Estates in Fee Simple
116-117, 138, 312-313, 317
Access by Creditors, 7, 112
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Alienability, 3, 39, 42, 43, 94
Devisability, 4, 5, 67-68, 143,
200, 201, 221
Equitable Estates in, 216,
218-219
Estate for Life Changed to,
72, 378-379, 529-530
Estates Tail Converted into,
36, 325
Expectant Interest Cutting
Off or Following, 318-319
Heritability, 66
Incidents Fixed, 37-39, 44,
47, 94
In Uses, 201
Michigan Statute Recognizing, 46
Mortgagor's Interest, 246,
251
Remainder Expectant Upon,
39, 261, 318-319, 324
Restraints on Alienation.
See: Restraints on Alienation.
Reversion Expectant Upon,
39, 43, 261, 388
Sale on Petition of Life Tenant, llO, 286-287
Subject to Estate for Years,
312-313
Estates in Fee Simple Conditional. See: Estates Tail.
Estates in Joint Tenancy. See:
Joint Tenancy.
Estates in Land (Types of), 38,
46, 273, 323-325
Estates Pur Autre Vie. See:
Estates for Life.
Estates Tail
Abolished in Michigan, 2829, 36, 325, 450
Access by Creditors, 23

Alienability, 21-26
Barrability
common recovery, 22, 2526, 220, 260, 266-267
fine, 22, 267
perpetuity, 260
restraints on, 25, 26, 83
1331-1472, 21-22, 220
warranty, 23
Chattels Personal, 27, 281,
465
Converted into Fee Simple,
28, 36, 325
Created by De Donis Conditionalibus, 20
Cy Pres Doctrine, 449
Descent, 66
Devisability, 24
Discontinuance, 24, 83, 139
Equitable Interests, 23, 245,
267
Estate for Life, 93
Estates for Years, 26, 267,
281, 465
Expectant Interest Cutting
Off or Following, 22-23, 26,
36, 268, 281-283
Fee Simple Conditional, 18,
33, 38
Forfeiture, 22, 23-24, 200
How Created, 20-21, 31-33
Incidents Fixed, 37-39
In Equity of Redemption,
245
Interests Expectant Upon
destructibility, 22-23, 2526, 36, 281-282
equitable, 268
rule against perpetuities,
281-282
In Uses, 201 .
Maritagium, 17, 18, 21, 38

INDEX
Meaning Before De Donis
Conditionalibus, 28
Michigan Statutes, 27-30, 325
New York Statutes, 29
Not Affected by Quia Emptores Terrarum, 20
Remainder Expectant Upon,
20, 22, 25-26, 33-36, 138,
281-282, 312-315, 318, 325,
465
barrability, 22, 25-26, 36,
281-282
Restraints on Alienation, 2122, 24, 25-26, 83
Reversion Expectant Upon,
20, 22-23, 138
abolished in Michigan, 388
barrability, 22-23, 25-26
Roman Law, 21
Taltarum's Case, 22
Evidences of Debt (Restraints
on Alienation), 195-196
Execution. See: Creditors.
Executory Devise. See: Executory Interests.
Executory Interests
Alienability, 140-141, 143144, 485, 507
Chattels Personal, 163-164,
319
Cutting Off Estate in Fee
Simple, 318
Cutting Off or Following
Estate for Years, 312-313
Cutting Off or Following
Estate Tail
destructibility, 22-23, 2526, 36, 281-282
equitable, 267, 268
rule against perpetuities,
281-282
Defined, 317-319
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Destructibility, 22-23, 25-26,
36, 69, 268, 281-282
cutting off or following
estate tail, 281-282
Devisability, 141, 143
Differences Between Remainders and
abolished in Michigan, 324
Estate for Years to Commence on Uncertain Future Event, 312-313
Expectant Upon Estate in
Fee Simple, 318-319
Future Estates in Michigan,
323, 325
Heritability, 141, 143
Interesse Termini, 317
Interest Subject to May be
Vested, 316-317, 343
Interest Subsequent to, 315,
317, 320
In Uses, 201
May Become Remainder,
320
Michigan and New York Statutes, 69
Michigan Statutes Convert to
Remainder, 324-325
On Failure to Alienate, 69
Permitted by English Law,
312
Restraints on Alienation.
See: Restraints on Alienation.
Rule Against Perpetuities,
317-322, 387
cutting off or following
estate tail, 281-282
generally subject to, 387
some are exempt from,
320-321, 330-332
Shifting, 317-318
Springing, 317-318
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Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation, 504516
Types of, 139, 158, 317-319
Vesting, 317-332
certain to become possessory, 320-321, 330-332
cutting off or following
estate for years, 312-313
deferred possession, 319323, 330-332, 343
English law, 319-323
Michigan law, 326-332
non-possessory interest, 320
not contingent, 319-320
Executory Land Contract. See:
Land Contract.
Expectant Interests. See also:
Executory interests, Interessia Termini, Possibility of
Reverter, Remainders, Reversions, Rights of Entry,
Trusts.
Alienability, 8, 140-141, 143,
275, 393, 485, 507
Chattels Personal, 155-160,
163-164, 267-268, 317, 319
Course of Descent, 141
Cutting Off Estate in Fee
Simple, 318-319
Cutting Off or Following
Estate for Years, 312-313
Cutting Off or Following
Estate Tail, 22-23, 25-26,
36, 268, 281-282
Destructibility
chattels personal, 267-268
contingent remainders, 59,
101, 262-266, 272, 273,
328, 409
executory interests, 22-23,
25-26, 36, 69, 268, 281282

expectant upon estate tail,
22-23, 25-26, 36, 281-282
interests under trusts, 268,
409
Devisability, 141, 143
Estates for Years, 116-117,
267-268, 312, 317, 319, 324325
Executory Interest. See: Executory Interests.
Expectant Upon Estate in
Fee Simple, 318-319
Expectant Upon Estate Tail
destructibility, 22-23, 2526, 36, 281-282
equitable, 267, 268
rule against perpetuities,
281-282
Future Interest (Definition),
311
Heritability, 141-143
Interesse Termini. See: Interessia Termini.
In Uses, 201
Michigan Statutory Classification, 69, 143, 323-325
Motives for Creating, xi
Option, 398
Perpetuity, 261
Possibility of Reverter. See:
Possibility of Reverter.
Remainder. See: Remainders.
Restraints on Alienation.
See: Restraints on Alienation.
Reversion. See: Reversions.
Right of Entry. See: Rights
of Entry.
Rule Against Perpetuities.
See: Rule Against Perpetuities.

INDEX
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation. See:
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation.
Trusts. See: Trusts.
Types of, 69, 138-140, 143,
157-158, 311-312, 317-319,
323-325
Fair Trade Laws, 185-187, 193194
Michigan Statute, 193-194
Non-Signer Provisions, 185187, 193-194
Family Endowments. See: Perpetuity.
Fee Simple. See: Estates in Fee
Simple.
Fee Simple Conditional. See:
Estates Tail.
Fee Tail. See: Estates Tail.
Feoffee to Uses. See: Uses.
Fine. See: Estates Tail.
Fine for Alienation, 3, 135-136
Forcible Entry and Detainer,
133
Foreclosure, 244
Forestalling, 174-178
Forfeiture. See also: Estates for
Life, Estates for Years, Possibility of Reverter, Restraints on Alienation, Right
of Entry.
Attainder of Treason, 200
Bailee's Interest, 171-172
Estates for Life, 93, 101, 263
Estates for Years, 112, 118,
125
Estates Tail, 22, 23-24, 200
Land Contracts, 251-258
Michigan Statutes, 93
Part of Estate, 25
Right of Entry, 140-141, 145
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Future Estates. See: Expectant
Interests, Executory Interests,
Interessia Termini, Remainders, Reversions, Trusts.
Future Interests. See: Expectant Interests, Executory Interests, Interessia Termini,
P o s s i b i l i t y of Reverter,
Powers, Remainders, Reversions, Rig h t s of E n t r y,
Trusts.
Gap in Seisin, 262, 263
Gavelkind, 66
General Power. See: Powers.
Gift. See: Chattels Personal,
Class Gifts, Powers.
Gift in Default of Appointment. See: Powers.
Graves
Trust for Care of, 418-419,
423-425, 447
Gross Period. See: Accumulations, Rule Against Perpetuities, Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation.
Heirs
Meaning of Term, 336-337
Remainder to, 19, 30-31, 43,
44, 334-338
Honorary Trusts, 423-425
Illegal Conditions and Limitations, 152-153, 448-449
I n c i d en t s of Estates. See:
Estates for Life, Estates for
Years, Estates in Fee Simple,
Estates Tail, Interessia Termini.
Incorporeal Interests. See:
Easements, Profits a Prendre.

698

INDEX

Indestructible Future Interests.
See: Destructibility, Rule
Against Perpetuities, Suspension of the Absolute Power
of Alienation.
Indestructible T r u s t s. See:
Trusts.
Indirect Restraint on Alienation. See: Restraints on Alienation.
Ingrossing, 17 5-178
Injunction. See: Restraints on
Alienation.
Insurance. See: Accumulations,
Rule Against Perpetuities.
Insurance Policies
Restraints on Alienation,
195-196
Interessia Termini
Alienability, 140, 143
Defined, 138, 312
Devisability, 141, 143
Executory Interest, 317
Future Estate in Michigan,
323-325
Heritability, 141, 143
Not Strictly on Estate, 138
Permitted by English Law,
311-312
Restraints on Alienation.
See: Restraints on Alienation.
Rule Against Perpetuities,
312, 317-319
Interest (on Debts), 240-243
Invalidity, Effect of. See: Accumulations, Estates for Life
(Statutory Restrictions on),
Illegal Conditions and Limitations, Restraints on Alienation, Rule Against Perpetuities, Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation.

Issue, Possibility of. See: Possibility of Issue.
Joint-Stock Companies. See:
Corporate Stock.
Joint Tenancy
Michigan Statutes, 63, 76,
323
Restraints on Partition, 6365, 75-80
Right of Survivorship, 63,
361, 588
Right to Partition, 75, 76
Just Price, 172-174
Just Wage, 172
Knight Service, 5
Laissez Faire, 177-180
Land Contracts
Contract to Make Will, 74-75
Dower Barred by Joinder in,
147
Forfeiture, 251-258
Restraints on Alienation, 5961, 251-258
Rule Against Perpetuities,
407-408
Specific Performance, 247
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation, 515
Vendee's Interest, 247-258
alienability, 248, 252
devisability, 248
equitable estate, 251
estate for years, 249, 257
heritability, 248
restraints on alienation,
59-61, 251-258
Vendor's Interest
alienability, 248
Landlord and Tenant. See:
Estates for Years.

INDEX
Leases. See: Estates for Years.
Legacy
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation, 555
Lien
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation, 555556
Life Estate. See: Estates for
Life.
Life Insurance. See: Accumulations, Rule Against Perpetuities.
Livery of Seisin, 247
Lives. See: Estates for Life,
H o n o r a r y Trusts, Rule
Against Perpetuities, Suspension of the Absolute Power
of Alienation.
Lives in Being. See: R u 1 e
Against Perpetuities, Suspension of the Absolute Power
of Alienation.
Married Women
Accumulations, 215, 437, 549
Married Women's Act, 57
Restraints on Alienation,
206, 426-427
Maritagium. See: Estates Tail.
Measuring Lives. See: Estates
for Life, Honorary Trusts,
Rule Against Perpetuities,
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation.
Mercantile System, 175
Michigan Law. See also headings for specific legal problems and Table of Statutory
and Constitutional Citations.
Statutes
interpretation, weight of
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New York decisions, 484485
partial adoption of New
York, xiii
revision of 1846, ix., 213214
gradual piecemeal repeal, xiii
single act, 493
Unique, xiii
Miller - Tydings Amendment.
See: Restraint of Trade.
Minority. See: Accumulations,
Rule Against Perpetuities,
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation.
Monastic Corporations. See:
Charities, Mortmain.
Monopolies, 178, 184
Moore v. Littel. See: Rule in
Moore v. Littel.
Mortgages
Chattel Mortgages
assignment by mortgagor,
170-171
Dower Barred by Joinder in,
147
Equity of Redemption, 244247
access by creditors, 245
alienability, 242, 245-246
devisability, 245
estate tail in, 245
nature of interest, 245-246
restraints on alienation,
245-247
rule against perpetuities,
407
suspension of the absolute
power of alienation, 515
Estate for Years as Substitute,
241
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Foreclosure, 244
History of, 240-245
Michigan Law, 250-251
Mortgagee's Interest
alienability, 246
Mortgagor's Interest. See
also: Equity of Redemption.
alienability, 242, 245-246
legal under lien theory,
248, 251
restraints on alienation,
245-247
Rule Against Perpetuities,
407-408
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation, 515
Trust Mortgages, 251
Mortmain (Conveyances in),
198-199, 410
Necessaries (Claims for), 209
Negotiable Instruments
Restraints on Alienation, 196
New York Decisions
Weight in Michigan, 484-485
New York Statutes. See also
headings for specific legal
problems and Table of Statutory and Constitutional Citations.
History of 1829 Revised Statutes, 210
Partial Adoption in Michigan, xiii
Remoteness of Vesting, 275,
276, 480-483, 506-508, 519
Revisers of, 21 0
Revision of 1829
revisers' notes, 480-483
Notes. See: Promissory Notes.

Object (Power of Appointment), 370
Occupancy, Restrictions on, 61
Old Rule Against Perpetuities,
99-100, 264, 272-273
Options
Construction, 404-406
Indirect Restraints on Alienation, 399
Mortgagee, 246
Restraints on Alienation, 8790, 153, 167
Rule Against Perpetuities.
Se~:. Rule Against Perpetmttes.
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation, 89,
401, 513-514
Partition
Michigan Statutes, 76, 79
Restraints on, 63-65, 75-80,
147-148
Partnership (Renewal Lease),
126
Partnership Shares
Restraints on Alienation,
195-196
Patents, 184
Payment of Sum in Gross. See:
Trusts.
Penalty Restraints. See: Restraints on Alienation.
Pension Plan. See: Trusts.
Period. See: Accumulations
Estates ·for Years, Rul~
Against Perpetuities, Suspension of the Absolute Power
of Alienation, Trusts.
Perpetual Freehold, 99-100,
260, 264, 272-273
Perpetual Trusts. See: Trusts
(Duration).

INDEX
Perpetuity. See also: Rule
Against Perpetuities.
Charitable Corporation, 260,
409-410
Evils of, 259-260
Indirect Restraint on Alienation, 259
Meaning of Term
estate of ecclesiastical corporation, 260
indestructible trust, 260
perpetual freehold, 260
remote future interest, 260
unbarrable entail, 260
Motives for Creating, xii,
259
Perpetual Freehold, 99-100,
260, 264, 272,273
Purposes of, xii, 259
Strict Settlement, 19, 265-267
Types of, xi, 260
future interests, 260
restraint on alienation, 260
unbarrable entail, 260
Personal Property. See: Chattels Personal, Estates for
Years.
Philosophic Realism, xii
Plats (Michigan Statute), 81
Political Party (Trust for), 423
Possession
Class Gifts
rule of convenience, 361363
Not Necessary for Vesting of
Remainder, 313-314, 330
Right to, as easement, 394395
Whether Required for Vesting of Executory Interest,
319-320, 330-332, 343
Possibility of Issue, 309-311,
491, 573
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Possibility of Reverter
Alienability, 140-141, 145146, 393
Chattels Personal, 155, 164
Defined, 139, 146
Devisability, 141
Heritability, 141
Indirect Restraint on Alienation, 392-393
Interest Subject to May be
Vested, 316, 332, 343
Prevents Development of
Land,393
Recognized in Michigan, 146
Reversion Expectant Upon
Estate in Fee Simple, 39,
43, 261, 388
Rule Against Perpetuities,
389-390
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation, 514515
Vesting, 317, 332-333, 343,
388-390
Posthumous Child
Michigan Statutes, 297, 570
Remainder to, 262
Postponement of Enjoyment.
See: Trusts.
Power of Alienation. See: Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation.
Power of Termination. See:
Right of Entry.
Powers
Absolute Power, 378-379,
491, 530-531
Definitions, 370, 516-519
Donee
defined, 370, 518
need have no other interest, 375
Donor defined, 370
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Dower, 379
Effect of Non-Exercise, 453
General and Special Powers
statutory changes in definitions, 377-383, 517
General Powers, 372-377
definition, 283, 517
peculiar Michigan definition, 283, 517
Interest Subject to May be
Vested, 316-317, 343, 370
Life Tenant's Power to Appoint Fee, 70-72, 284, 372373, 377, 529-530
Life Tenant's Power to
Lease, 517, 527
Michigan Statutes, 377-379,
516-519, 526-530
applicability to chattels
personal, 379, 383
effect of repeal of suspension statutes, 386
Mortgagee's Interest as, 407
New York Statutes, 378-379,
518
Not Interest in Property, 373
Object Defined, 370
Overriding, 520-522, 524-526
Powers Appendant, 379
Power in Trust, 517, 518
Release, 517, 520-522, 524528
Revocation, 520-522, 524-525
Rule Against Perpetuities.
See: Rule Against Perpetuities.
Special Powers, 370-372, 374375, 385-386, 517, 518
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation. See:
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation.

Testamentary Powers, 370372, 374-375, 383-385
To Appoint Use by Will, 200
To Change Beneficiary. See:
Rule Against Perpetuities.
Pre-Emptive Provisions. See:
Restraints on Alienation.
Presumption of Possibility of
Issue, 309-311, 491, 573
Price Fixing, 173-178, 180-194
Principal and Income. See: Accumulations, Trusts.
Prior Limitations. See: Rule
Against Perpetuities, Suspension of the Absolute Power
of Alienation.
Privity of Estate, 123
Probate Order (Res Judicata),
567, 601
Profits, Unearned, 172-175
Profit-Sharing P 1 a n. S e e :
Trusts.
Profits a Prendre
Accumulations
royalties under mineral
lease, 439
Appurtenant, 125
Divisibility, 118, 149
Do Not Prevent Vesting, 394
Indirect Restraints on Alienation, 8
Prohibited Estates for Life.
See: Estates for Life.
Prohibitory Restraints. See:
Restraints on Alienation.
Promissory Notes
Restraints on Alienation,
195-196
Public Welfare Trusts, 419
Pur Autre Vie. See: Estates for
Life.

INDEX
Quia Emptores Terrarum
Alienation of Part, 81
Applicable to Remainder Expectant Upon Estate Tail,
20
Enactment, 3
Fixed Incidents of Fee
Simple, 47
Inapplicable to Estates for
Life, 94
Inapplicable to Estates Tail,
20
Made Estates in Fee Simple
Alienable, 3, 6-7, 39, 94
Principles Basic in Michigan
Law, 16
Prohibited Fines for Alienation, 136
Prohibited Remainder on
Fee Simple, 39, 94
Prohibited Reversion on Fee
Simple, 39, 44, 261
Qui Tam Actions, 177
Racial Restrictions, 61
Realism, xii
Reception. See: English Law,
Rule Against Perpetuities.
Regrating, 175-178
Release of Power. See: Powers.
Remainders
Chattels Personal, 163-164,
267-268, ·317, 319, 326-327
expectant upon estate for
years, Michigan statutory restrictions, 327,
494
Contingent. See also: Vesting.
alienability, 140, 143, 275,
485, 507
definition, 262, 312-313,
326, 343

703

destructibility, 59, 101,
262-266, 272, 273, 328329, 409
equitable, 267, 271, 409
expectant upon estate for
years, 262
statutory restrictions,
474, 478, 494
expectant upon freehold
estate, 262
implied condition of survival, 144-145, 351-361
invalid in thirteenth century, 19
may not suspend absolute
power of alienation, 506513
person not ascertainable,
315, 333
rule in In re Coots' Estate,
354-356
trust to preserve, 19, 265266
unborn person, 315
validity, 19, 138, 262
Creation of, 261-262, 3ll
Cutting Off Prior Estate, 261262, 324
Defined, 312, 324-325
Devisability, 141, 143
Differences Between Executory Interests and
abolished in Michigan, 324
Equitable
expectant upon estate tail,
267, 268
old rule against perpetuities, 264
rule in Whitby v. Mitchell,
264
Estate for Life in, May be
Vested, 313-314
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Executed Use, 267
Executory Interest May Become, 320
Existed in Thirteenth Century, 19, 157
Expectant Upon Contingent
Prior Estate, May Be
Vested, 315
Expectant Upon Estates for
Life, 94, 138
on special limitation, 314,
318
pur autre vie
statutory restrictions,
4 78, 494, 500-502
Expectant Upon Estates for
Years, 116, 138, 312-313,
317
chattels personal, statutory
restrictions, 327, 494
Michigan statutory restrictions, 327, 474, 478, 494,
503
present estate, 312-313
remainder for life, statutory restrictions, 478
vested, 263, 312-313
Expectant Upon Estate in
Fee Simple, 39, 261, 318,
324
Expectant Upon Estate in
Fee Simple Conditional,
33
Expectant Upon Estate on
Special Limitation, 262,
314, 318, 332-333
Expectant Upon Estate Pur
Autre Vie,
statutory restrictions, 478,
494, 500-502
Expectant Upon Estate Tail,
20, 33-36, 138, 325, 465

destructibility, 22, 25-26,
36, 281-282
equitable, 267, 268
may be vested, 314
Michigan law, 33-36, 325
on special limitation, 315,
318
rule against perpetuities,
281-282
Expectant Upon Executory
Interest, 315, 317, 320
Following Gap in Seisin, 262
Heritability, 141, 143
In Estates for Years, 116, 138,
140, 317
expectant upon estate pur
autre vie, statutory restrictions, 478
In Uses, 201
Michigan Statutory Definition, 325
Permitted by English Law,
311
Posthumous Child, 262, 297,
570
Restraints on Alienation.
See: Restraints on Alienation.
Rule Against Perpetuities.
See: Rule Against Perpetuities.
Subject to Condition Precedent, Not Vested, 313
Subsequent to Executory Interest, ·315, 317, 320
To Heirs, 19, 30, 43, 44, 325,
333-338
Types Permitted, 138, 261263
Unborn Child of Unborn
Child, 264, 272-273
Vested

INDEX
alienability, 140, 143
definition, 326
destructibility, 101
estate for life, 314
expectant upon estate for
years, 262, 312-313
subject to charge, 345
what is, in Michigan, 343
Vesting, 311-317, 326-356.
See also: Vesting.
Rent. See: Accumulations.
Rents and Profits. See: Trusts.
Repair Costs. See: Accumulations.
Resale Price Maintenance. See:
Restraints on Alienation.
Res Judicata (Probate Order), 567
Restraint of Trade, 178-179,
183-195
Restraints on Alienation
Charities, 85-87
Chattels Personal, 155-197
bailment, 169-172
commercial transactions,
169-197
Michigan law summarized, 194-195
resale price maintenance
contracts, 138-150
scope of treatment, 195197
corporate stock, 62, 195196
difference between donative and commercial
transactions, 161
donative and testamentary
transactions, 155, 163169
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Michigan law summarized, 168-169
penalty restraints, 155,
163-169
prohibitory restraints,
165-168
English law, 155-163, 170172, 181-183
equitable interests, 206207. See also: Trusts.
intangibles, 195-196
resale price maintenance
contracts, 180-194
restraints on intestate succession, 166
restraints on testation, 166
rules apply to, xii
shares in business enterprises, 62, 195-196
spendthrift trusts, 208-209,
229-239, 428, 430-431
Conditions Precedent
effect of invalid, 152-153,
448
Consequences of Invalidity,
448-449
Contingent Remainders
Michigan law summarized,
153-54
penalty restraints, 141-143,
149, 151-153
prohibitory restraints, 143,
149, 151-153
Corporate Stock, 62, 195-196
Covenant Against Alienation, 53-54, 55, 62, 65, 107,
ll7-ll8, ll9, 123-124, 129135
specific enforcement, 112,
ll3, 120-122, 134-135
Direct and Indirect Distinguished, 7-8
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INDEX

Disabling Restraints. See:
Prohibitory Restraints,
Distinction Between Prohibitory and P e n a 1 t y Restraints, 7-8, 24
Effect of Invalidity, 448
Equitable Interests, 94, 198258
cestui que trust's interest,
97, 205-209, 229-239, 428,
430-431
English law, 203-207, 245246, 249
equity of redemption, 245247
estates for years, 208-209
land contract vendee's interest, 59-61, 252-258
options, 87-90, 153, 167
policy considerations, 9697
Equity of Redemption, 245247
Estates for Life, 91-110
covenant against alienation, 107
English law, 93-96
equitable interests, 206-209
expectant estates, 150, 154
Michigan law summarized,
109-110
penalty restraints, 94-107
prohibitory restraints, 9394, 99-106, 109-110
tortious alienation, 94, 104
Estates for Years, 111-13 7
covenant against alienation, 117-118, 119, 123124, 129-134
enforcement by injunction, 120-122, 135
English law, 112-115

equitable interests, 206-209
expectant estates, 153-154
Michigan law summarized,
134-135
penalty restraints, 42, 113137
policy considerations, 134137
prohibitory restraints, 112113, 120-123, 125, 134135
Estates in Fee Simple, 37-90,
488
contract to make will, 7375
covenant against alienation, 53-55, 62, 65
English law, 37-46, 65-69,
75, 81, 83-85, 87-88
equitable estates, 206-207,
208
expectant estates, 148-154
in conveyance to charity,
84-87, 239-240
Michigan law summarized,
65
penalty restraints
against all alienation,
40-41, 48-49, 53-54, 62,
65
limited as to alienees,
41-42, 45-46, 59-61, 65
limited in duration, 45,
46,.48, 50-51, 55-57, 65,
488
pre-emptive options, 87-90,
153, 167, 399
prohibitory restraints, 3940, 49-52, 58-59, 65, 260,
488
restraints on division, 8183

INDEX
restraints on inheritance,
65-69, 166
restraints on partition, 6365, 75-80, 147-148
restraints on testation, 6775, 166
tortious alienation, 83
Estates Tail, 25-26, 83
Executory Interests
Michigan law summarized,
154
penalty restraints, 141-143,
149, 151-154
prohibitory restraints, 141143, 149, 151-154
Expectant Interests, 138-154
English law, 141-142
equitable, 209
Michigan law summarized,
153-154
penalty restraints, 143, 148154
prohibitory restraints, 143,
148-154
Gifts to Charity, 84-87, 239240
Illegal is Void, 448
Indirect Restraints
contingent future interests,
8
co-tenancy, 8
defeasibility, 8
easements, 8
equitable use restrictions,
8
future interests, 8
interests in unborn persons, 8
option, 399
perpetuity, 259
possibility of reverter, 392393
profits a prendre, 8
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Insurance Policies, 195-196
lnteressia Termini, 142-143,
153-154
Land Contracts, 59-61, 251258
Legal Theory, 41-45, 51-52,
96-97
Married Women, 206, 426427
Mortgagor's Interest, 245-247
Negotiable Instruments, 195196
Not Favored in Michigan,
48, 148
Options, 87-90, 153, 167, 399
Penalty Restraints. See also:
Estates in Fee Simple,
Estates for Life, etc.
defined, 7, 24
do not suspend the absolute power of alienation,
489
Perpetuity, 260
Pre-Emptive Options, 87-90,
153, 167, 399
Prohibitory Restraints. See
also: Estates in Fee Simple,
. Estates for Life, etc.
defined, 7, 24
suspend the a b s o I u t e
power of alienation, 488
void at common law, 485,
488
Purpose of Rules Against,
xii, xiii, 96-97
Relation of Rules Against to
Rule Against Accumulations, xi
Relation of Rules Against to
Rule Against Perpetuities,
xi, 489
Relation of Rules Against to
Statutes Restricting Sus-
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pension of the Absolute
Scope of Rules Against, xii,
Power of Alienation, xixiii
xii, 489-490
Spendthrift Trusts, 97, 208209, 229-240, 428, 430-431,
Remainders
contingent
488
Suspension of the Absolute
Michigan law summarPower of Alienation Disized, 154
tinguished, 9, 488-490
penalty restraints, 142142-143, 148-149, 150
Suspension Statutes do not
prohibitory
restraints,
Validate, 488-490
142-143, 149, 151-153
Trusts
vested
by trustee, 203-204, 207Michigan law summar208, 213, 216-217
ized, 154
cestuis' interest, 97, 205penalty restraints, 51,
209, 229-240, 428, 430142-153, 148-149, 150
431, 488
prohibitory
restraints,
penalty restraints, 20551, 143, 148-154
208,239
prohibitory
restraints,
Resale P r i c e Maintenance
97, 205-209, 229-239,
Contracts, 180-194
428, 430-431, 488
Restraints on Division, 81-83
charitable, 84-87
Restraints on Inheritance
married women, 206, 426and Intestate Succession,
427
65-69, 166
spendthrift
trusts, 97, 208Restraints on Partition, 63209, 229-240, 428, 43065, 75-80, 148
431, 488
Restraints on Testation, 67Vendee's Interest Under
75, 166
Land Contract, 59-61, 251Restrictions on Occupancy,
258
61
Vested
Remainders
Reversions
Michigan
law summarized,
Michigan law summarized,
154
154
penalty restraints, 142-143,
penalty restraints, 142-143,
148-153
149-151
prohibitory restraints, 142prohibitory restraints, 142143, 148-153
143, 149-151
Rules Against Not Super- Restraint on Division, 81-83
seded or Modified by Sta- Restraint on Enjoyment. See:
Trusts.
tutes Restricting Suspension of the Absolute Power Restraint on Inheritance, 65
of Alienation, 488-490
69, 166

INDEX
Restraint on Intestate Succession, 65-69, 166
Restraint on Partition, 63-65,
75-80
Restraint on Testation, 67-75,
166
Restraint on Termination. See:
Trusts.
Restricted Minority Provision.
See: Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation.
Restrictions
Equitable, 8
. chattels personal, 182-183,
189
does not prevent vesting,
394
land, 182, 183
Estates for Life. See: Estates
for Life.
Occupancy, 61
Resubdivision. See: Restraint
on Division.
Retailer, 173, 175-176
Reversions
Alienability, 140, 143
Chattels Personal, 164
Definition, 388
Destructibility, 101
Devisability, 141, 143
Expectant Upon Estates for
Life, 94, 138
Expectant Upon Estates for
Years, ll4-115, 116, 138,
141, 146, 388, 389, 390
Expectant Upon Estates in
Fee Simple, 39, 43, 94, 261,
388
Expectant Upon Estates
Tail, 20-23, 25-26, 138, 388
Heritability, 141, 143
Incidents of, 138, 143
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In Estates for Years, 138, 140,
143, 146
In Uses, 201
Michigan Statutory Definition, 388
Possibility of Reverter, 139.
See also: Possibility of Reverter.
Present Estate, 261
Restraints on Alienation.
See: Restraints on Alienation.
Rule Against Perpetuities,
388-389
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation, 514515
Tortious Conveyance by Life
Tenant, 101
Types of, 138
Vesting, 261, 388-389
Waste, 200
Rights of Action
Alienability, 140-141, 145-146
Devisability, 141
Discontinued Estate, 139
Heritability, 141
Rights of Entry
Alienability, 140-141, 145-146
Chattels Personal, 155, 164,
182
Destructibility by Discontinuance, 24
Devisability, 141
Estates for Years, 391
Forfeiture for Alienation,
140, 145
Heritability, 141
Interest Subject to May be
Vested, 316-317, 343
Invalidity, Effect of, 448-449
Of Disseisee, 139, 144-145
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On Breach of Condition,
139-141
Prevent Development of
Land, 393
Rule Against Perpetuities,
390-393, 407
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation, 514515
Vesting, 391
Right of Survivorship. See:
Class Gifts, Joint Tenancy.
Royalties, 439
Rule Against Accumulations.
See: Accumulations.
Rule Against Double Possibilities, 99-100, 264, 272-273
Rule Against Perpetuities
Accumulations. See also: Accumulations.
condition precedent to
vesting, 433
Administrative Delays, 307309, 346
All or Nothing Rule, 363369, 461
Applicable to M i c h i g a n
Land Since 1949, 279
Applicability to Mixed Dispositions of Land and
Chattels, 276-277
Certainty of Vesting Required, 280, 304-357, 572573
absolute c e r t a i n t y required, 306-311, 572-573
accumulations, 433
administrative delays, 307309, 346
analogy to suspension statutes, 491, 532, 572-573
appointed interests, 376386, 532, 575

ascertainment of measuring lives, 290-293, 581
class gifts, 358-369
effect of destructibility, 575
English law, 304-310
facts considered in determmmg, 304-306, 370372, 385, 386, 491, 532,
575
gift in default of appointment, 370-372
power of appointment,
372-376
presumption of possibility
of issue, 491, 309-311,
573
unborn widow, 306-307,
357, 573
vesting. See also: Vesting.
accumulations, 433
when certainty must exist,
304-306, 575
Certainty that Power Cannot
be Exercised so as to Violate, 376
Certainty that Power Will be
Exercisable within the Period, 372-373
Certainty that Power will not
be Exercisable Beyond the
Period, 374-376
Charitable Trusts, 218, 409423, 447
Charities
accumulations, 435, 447
duration, 422-423
remoteness of vesting, 409412, 418-421
Class Gifts, 358-369, 461, 554
all or nothing rule, 363369, 461, 554
rule of convenience, 361363

INDEX
rules same under suspension statutes, 491
unit rule, 363-369, 461, 554
vesting, 360-369, 461, 554
Common-Law Rule Against
Accumulations. See: Accumulations.
Consequences of Violation,
448-476
effect on alternative and
concurrent limitations,
461-468
verbally separate contingencies, 462-465
effect on prior limitations,
454-460
may become indefeasible, 452
not enlarged, 452
effect on subsequent limitations, 468-476
excision of violating interest, 280, 448-454
disposition of property
involved, 450-451
prior interest may become indefeasible, 452
prior interests not enlarged, 452
other interests normally
valid, 450, 453
separability, 450, 454-476
alternative and concurrent interests, 461-468
mixed dispositions of
land and chattels, 276277, 465-467
prior interests, 454-460
single clause exercising
power and disposing
of owned property,
467
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splitting single contingency, 463
subsequent interests,
468-476
verbally separate contingencies, 462-463
substantially the same as
consequences of violating statutes restricting
suspension of the absolute power of alienation,
453-454, 516
violating interest void, 449
disposition of property
involved, 450-451
Cy Pres Doctrine, 449-450
Destructibility, 280-287, 371,
372, 379, 531-538, 572, 575
contrasted with suspension
statutes, 531-538, 572
gifts in default of appointment, 371
power of revocation, 379
power to change beneficiary, 283
Does Not Prohibit Remoteness of Possession, 314-315
Endless Series of Five-Year
Terms, 287
English Background, 259-270
Exceptions
administrative powers, 387
charitable limitations, 409421
charitable trusts, 411-421,
447
corporate stock, 408
destructible interests, 282287, 371, 372, 379, 532538
devises and bequests to
municipal corporations,
413
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equity of redemption, 407
executory interests, 320321, 330-332
executory land contracts,
407-408
gifts to charitable corporations, 409-411
interessia termini, 312, 319
interests expectant upon
estates tail, 281-284
mortgages, 407, 408
options in leases, 399-407
possibility of reverter, 389390
public welfare trusts, 419
remainder expectant upon
estate for years, 312-313
right of entry, 390-394, 407
trusts for care of graves,
418-419, 424-425
trusts for employees, 409,
419
Executory Interests, 317-323
Honorary Trusts, 423-425
Inapplicable to Michigan
Land, 1847-1949, 89, 275276, 327
Influence on Construction of
Instruments, 345, 356-357
In Force in Michigan Before
1847, 99-100, 270-273
Interests to Which it Applies, 387-408
appointed interests, 387
beneficial interest under
private trust, 409
charitable trusts, 411-421
contingent remainders,
272-273, 311-317, 387,
393
contracts, 397-398
corporate stock, 408

destructible interests, 282287, 371, 372, 379, 532538
dispositive powers, 387
equitable contingent remainders, 271
equitable future interests,
271, 387
equity of redemption, 407
estates for the life of a living person, 301-302
executory interests, 317323, 330-332, 387
executory land contracts,
407-408
expectant interest under
trust, 271, 279, 387
expectant upon estate tail,
280-282
future interests only, 453454, 460, 539
gift to charitable corporation, 409-411
interessia termini, 312,
317-319
interests expectant upon
estates tail, 280-282
interests in chattels personal, 276, 387
interests of a transferor,
388-396
mixed dispositions of land
and chattels, 276-277,
465-467, 484
mortgages, 407-408
options, 88-90, 167, 397-407
for perpetual renewal of
lease, 400, 405-407
in leases, 399-400, 403407
to repurchase, 396
present interests, 453-454,
539

INDEX
possibility of reverter, 389390
powers of appointment,
370, 372-373, 387, 396
power of revocation, 396
private interest following
trust, 409
public welfare trusts, 419
remainders, 271-273, 311317, 387, 393
expectant upon estate
for years, 312-313
reserved option to repurchase, 396
reserved power of appointment, 396
reversions, 261, 388-389
right of entry, 390-394, 407
summarized, 387
trust of land
direction to convert,
547, 577
power of sale, 278
power of termination,
548-549
unissued corporate stock,
408
vested interests, 274, 539
Michigan Statute Restoring,
279
Mixed Dispositions of Land
and Chattels, 276-277, 465467, 484
Old Rule Against Perpetuities, 99-100, 264, 272-273
Options, 88-90, 167, 397-407
Period
commencement, 280-287
appointed interests, 287,
376-386, 571-572
effect of destructibility,
281-287, 371, 372, 379,
532-538, 572, 575
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escrow, 280
general rule, 280-281
gifts in default of appointment, 370-372
life insurance policy, 283
computation, 287-303
alternative m e as u r e s,
302-303
animal lives, 291, 424
ascertainment of measuring lives, 290-293
general, 287-291, 301
gifts in default of appointment, 371
life of child en ventre sa
mere, 266, 296-298,
301
lives in being, 290-395
lives of descendants of
Queen Victoria, 292
minority of unborn person, 298-299
parts of lives, 294-296
period of gross, 298-301
periods of gestation, 266,
296-298, 301
permissible number of
lives, 292-293
when there are no measuring lives, 298-299
development, 270-271
differences from suspension statutes, 571-572
extinction of issue, 465
general, 269-270
strict settlement, 265-267
Perpetual Freehold, 99-100,
264, 272-273
Postponement of Enjoyment.
See also: Trusts.
accumulations, 433-435,
440-441
Powers, Administrative, 387
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Powers of Appointment, 370386
absolute power of disposition, 491
appointed interests, 287,
376-387, 572, 575
certainty that power cannot be exercised so as to
violate, 376
certainty that power will
be exercisable within period, 372-373
certainty that power will
not be exercisable beyond period, 374-376
gifts in default of exercise,
370-372
powers themselves, 287,
372-376, 387
powers which prevent violation, 283-287, 370-372,
376-383
Power of Revocation, 396
Presumption of Possibility of
Issue, 309-311
Prohibits Remoteness of
Vesting, 311-315
Purpose, 269-272, 409
Reception in Michigan, 270279
Relation to Rule Against Accumulations, xi, 434
Relation to Rules Against
Restraints on Alienation,
xi, 488-490
Relation to Statutes Restricting Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation, xi-xii, 273-278, 453454, 485-492
Remainder, 271-273, 3ll-317,
387, 393

Remoteness of Possession
Not Prohibited, 313-314
Remoteness of Vesting Prohibited, 314
Restraints on Enjoyment.
See also: Trusts.
accumulations, 433-435,
440-441
Rule Against Double Possibilities, 99-100, 264, 272273
Rule in Whitby v. Mi,tchell,
99-100, 264, 272-273
Separability. See: Consequences of Violation.
Shifting Interest in Estate for
Years, ll4
Stated, 269, 280
Statutes Restricting Suspension of the Absolute Power
of Alienation Were Substitute for, 453, 490-491
Strict Settlement, 265-267
Theory and Operation Differs from Statutes Restricting Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation, 453-454, 487-489
Trusts
accumulations. See: Accumulations.
charitable, 218, 409-423,
447
duration. See also: Trusts,
218, 220-221, 418-419,
421-431, 454
accumulations. See: Accumulations.
charitable trusts, 418419, 422-423
honorary trusts, 423-425

INDEX
private trusts, 220-221,
426-431, 454
public welfare trusts,
419
trusts for unincorporated societies, 425-426
for care of animals, 423425
for care of graves, 418-419,
423-425
for employees, 409, 419
for political parties, 423425
for promotion of sports,
423-425
honorary, 423-425
of land, 278
public welfare, 419
remoteness of vesting, 409412, 417-421
restraints on termination,
421-431. See also: Trusts,
honorary trusts, 423-425
private trusts, 224-226,
426-431, 434-435, 551552.
trusts for unincorporated societies, 425-426
Unborn Widow, 306-307
Unit Rule, 363-369, 461
Vesting. See also: Certainty
of Vesting Required, Vesting.
Michigan decisions, 18471949, applicable, 327
Rule in Claflin v. Claflin, 224226, 421-431, 434
Rule in In Re Coots' Estate)
354, 356
Rule in Moore v. LiUel, 333343
Rule in Shelley's Case) 19,
30-31, 43, 44, 325, 333-338
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Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, 99100, 264, 272-273
Rule of Convenience, 361-363,
365-369, 494-495
Sales. See: Chattels Personal.
Security Transactions. See:
Land Contracts, Mortgages.
Seisin. See: Gap in Seisin,
Right of Entry.
Separability. See: Rule Against
Perpetuities, Suspension of
the Absolute Power of Alienation.
Servitudes. S e e: Easements,
E q u i t a b 1 e Restrictions,
Profits a Prendre.
Settlement. See: Strict Settlement, Trusts.
Settlor. See: Trusts.
Severability. See: Separability.
Shares of Stock: See: Corporate
Stock.
Shelley's Case. See: Rule in
Shelley's Case.
Shifting Executory Devise. See:
Executory Interests.
Shifting Use. See: Executory
Interests.
Sinking Fund. See: Accumulations.
Societies (Unincorporated)
Capacity to Hold Legal
Title, 413
Trusts for, 413, 425-426
duration, 425-426
restraints on termination,
425-426
validity, 425-426
Special Limitation, 139. See
also: Possibility of Reverter,
Rule Against Perpetuities,
Vesting.
Estate for Life, 314, 318
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Estate for Years, 312-313
Interest Following May be
Vested, 332-333
Interest Subject to May be
Vested, 316-317, 332-333,
343-344
Special Occupant, 92
Special Power. See: Powers.
Spendthrift Trusts. See: Trusts.
Sports (Trust for Promotion
of), 423-424
Springing Executory Devise.
See: Executory Interests.
Springing Use. See: Executory
Interests.
Stock. See: Corporate Stock.
Stock Bonus Plan. See: Trusts.
Stock Dividends. See: Accumulations.
Strict Settlement, 19, 265-267
Subdivision. See: Plats, Restraints on Alienation (Restraints on Division).
Subinfeudation, 1-3
Subsequent Limitations. See:
Rule Against Perpetuities,
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation.
Substitution, 1
Successive Estates for Life. See:
Estates for Life.
Summary Proceeding for Possession, 126
Support, Trusts for, 208-209
Surviving. See: Construction of
Instruments.
Survivor. See: Estates for Life
(Statutory Restrictions on),
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation (Period).
Survivorship
Class Gifts, 360-361

When Required, 144-145,
350-361
Suspension of Absolute Ownership, 4 78, 483, 508
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation
Administrative Delays, 573574
Certainty, 572-576
absolute certainty required, 572-574
administrative delays, 573574
analogy to rule against
perpetuities, 491, 532,
572-575
ascertainment of measuring lives, 581-582
effect of destructibility,
575-576
facts considered in determining, 491, 532, 571576
presumption of possibility
of issue, 311, 491, 573
unborn widow, 573
when certainty must exist,
575-576
Charitaole Corporation, 509,
515-516
Charitable Trusts, 414-423,
509, 515-516
Chattels Personal, 276-277
Michigan statutes inapplicable~ 483-484
mixed dispositions of land
and chattels, 276-277,
465-467, 484
Class Gifts
class as donee of power,
520-521
class as objects of power,
521-522

INDEX
class which may include
members not in being,
505-506
class whose members cannot be ascertained, 505506
rules same as under rule
against perpetuities, 491
Consequences of Violating
Statutes, 448-476, 516
effect on alternative and
concurrent limitations,
461-468, 516
effect on prior limitations,
454-460, 516
effect on subsequent limitations, 468-476, 516
excision of violating interest, 448-454, 516
power which violates, 520
separability. See: Separability.
substantially the same as
consequences of violating rule against perpetuities, 453-454, 516
trusts, 554-555
Destructibility. See: What
Prevents Suspension.
Differences between New
York and Michigan Statutes, 483-484
Equitable Conversion, 277278, 484, 523-538, 546-548
Estate for Life of Survivor
of Four Persons, 107-108,
594-595
Estates for Years, 276, 484
Exceptions to Statutory Restrictions on
alienable contingent future interest, 506-513
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charities, 418-419, 515-516,
569
devises and bequests to
municipal corporations,
413
infant unable to alienate,
515
insane person unable to
alienate, 515
land contract, 515
mortgage, 515
options, 88-89, 400-407,
513-514
personal incapacity to alienate, 515
possibility of reverter, 514515
reversions, 514-515
rights of entry, 514-515
trusts for employees, 409,
419
trusts for care of graves,
418-419, 424-425, 569
trusts for public welfare
purposes, 419, 569
vested legal future interest, 504-506
Future Interests. See also:
What Suspends.
number of prior interests
not limited, 580
number of takers not limited, 580
number of takers of prior
interests not limited, 580
Infant Unable to Alienate,
515
Insane Person Unable to
Alienate, 515
Interest Which Does Not
Suspend May be Void as
Restraint on Alienation,
577
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INDEX

Interest Which Does Not
Suspend May be Void
under Rule Against Perpetuities, 577
Land Contract, 515
Meaning of the Phrase, 485490
Mixed Property, 276-277,
465-467, 484
Mortgage, 515
Options, 88-89, 400-407, 513514
Period of Permissible Suspension, 570-612
administrative delays, 573574
alternative measures, 609612
commencement, 571-572
effect of destructibility,
532-549, 572-576
interests created by exercise of power, 528532, 572-576
settlor also beneficiary
of trust, 568-569
d i ££ e r e n c e s from rule
against perpetuities, 571
effect of destructibility,
532-549, 572-576
interests created by exercise of power, 528-532,
572-576
minority of unborn person, 571, 604-608
periods in gross, 571, 608612
alternative measures,
609-612
part of life distinguished, 579
restricted minority provision, 571, 604-608

separability, 450, 454-476,
602-604
separate conveyances, 590.591
two lives in being, 576-604
ascertainment of measuring lives, 581-582
child end ventre sa
mere, 579
life of survivor of group,
I 07-108, 582-602
lives of animals, 579
lives of corporations, 579
lives of persons who take
no interest, . 579-580
lives of plants, 579
parts of lives, 579
separability, 602-604
what is a life in being,
576-580
Personal Incapacity to Alienate, 515
Possibility of Reverter, 514515
Powers
absolute power, 378-380,
491, 524, 529-531
interests created by execution of, 528-532, 571-576
powers which cause suspension, 516-528
powers which prevent suspension, 277-278, 504,
524-528, 532-549
Present Interest in Trust,
277, 539
Public Welfare Trusts, 419
Purpose of Statutes Restricting, 479-483
Relation of Statutes Restricting to Rule Against Perpetuities, xi, xii, 273-278,
453-454, 485-490

INDEX
Requirement of Certainty.
See: Certainty.
Restraints on Alienation Distinguished, vii, 9, 109, 488490
Reversion, 514-515
Right of Entry, 514-515
Scope and Arrangement of
Discussion of, 490-492
Separability, 450, 454-476,
602-604
alternative and concurrent
interests, 461-468
concurrent trusts, 461-462,
602-604
may validate all interests,
602-604
may validate separable interests, 450, 453-4 76, 602604
mixed disposition of land
and chattels, 276-277,
465-467, 484
parts of single trust, 460
prior interests, 454-460
single clause exercising
power of disposing of
owned property, 467
subsequent interests, 468476
Separate Conveyances, 590591
Statutes Restricting, xi, xii,
89, 108-109, 217, 273-278,
380, 414, 429, 477-484, 504
adopted in thirteen states,
480
enactment, 477
repeal, 218, 279, 380, 429,
479
revisers' notes, 480-483
Suspension of Vesting Dis-
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tinguished, 485-488, 506513, 520
Trusts. See also: What suspends.
charitable, 414-421, 509,
515-516, 569
for care of graves, 418-419,
424-425, 569
number of beneficiaries
not limited, 497, 580
public welfare trusts, 419,
569
Vesting. See also: Vesting.
rules same as under rule
against perpetuities, 491
unvested future interest
may not suspend, 506513
vested legal interest does
not suspend, 504-506
What Prevents Suspension
destructibility,
532-549,
572-576
differences from rule
against perpetuities,
532-538
future interests, 533-538
trusts, 539-549
direction to convert, 277278, 484, 523, 538, 546548
persons in existence who
can convey a fee, 506507' 510-513
power of court to order
sale of fee, 504
power of sale, 231, 277-278,
542-546
power to convert, 542-549
power to override power,
520, 522, 524-526
power to release power,
520, 522, 524-528
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INDEX

power to revoke power,
520, 522, 524-525
power to terminate trust,
548-549
powers which prevent, 277278, 520-528, 530-549
settlor also beneficiary of
trust, 568-569
What Suspends
administrative delays, 574
annuities, 555-569
Michigan law summarized, 567-568
charities, 414-419, 509, 515516
class gifts, 491, 505, 506,
554
conditions precedent, 506513
contingent remainder, 504.
516
destructible trusts, 539-549
equitable charge, 555-556,
558,560, 566-567
equity of redemption, 515
estate for years, 276, 484
executory interest, 504-516
indestructible future interests, 275 454, 504-516
class which may include
members not in being,
505
corporation not in being, 504
contingent interest may
not, 506-513
person not in being, 504505, 553
person not presently ascertainable, 505-506,
553
under trusts, 553

unvested interest may
not, 506-513
vested legal interest does
not, 504-506
indestructible trusts, 217218, 274-275, 277, 429,
454, 460, 486-487, 549569
annuities, 555-569
care of graves, 419, 423425
charitable, 414-421, 509,
515-516
for payment of a sum in
gross, 555-569
for receipt of the rents
and profits of land,
277, 539, 550-555
future interests under,
506-516, 553
not anticipated by revisers, 486
present interests under,
277, 539
public welfare trusts,
419
settlor as beneficiary,
568-569
to pay annunities, 555569
to satisfy a charge, 555558
to sell lands for the
benefit of creditors,
556, 558
to sell, mortgage or lease
for the benefit of legatees, 555-558
infant's interest does not,
515
interests created by exercise of powers, 528-532

INDEX
land contract, 515
legacy, 555-556
lien, 555-556
lunatic's interest, 515
mortgage, 515
mixed dispositions of land
and chattels, 276-277,
465-467, 484
options, 88-89, 400-407,
513-514
penalty restraints on alienation, 489
personal incapacity to alienate, 515
possibility of reverter, 514515
powers which cause suspension, 516-528
administrative powers,
522-523
beneficiaries not in being or not ascertainable, 521-523
donee not in being or
not ascertainable, 520521
power to convert, 523
power to create a trust,
524-526
power to sell, lease,
charge or encumber,
522-523
powers which violate
rule against perpetuities, 519-520
present interest under
trust, 277, 454, 539
prohibitory restraint on
alienation, 488-489
reversions, 514-515
right of entry, 514-515
unvested future interests,
275, 506-513
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vested interests, 274-275,
504-506

Taltarum's Case. See: Estates
Tail.
Taxes. See: Accumulations.
Tenancy by the Entireties. See:
Estates by the Entirety.
Tenancy in Common
Restraints on Partition, 7580
Right to Partition, 75-76
Tenant for Years. See: Estates
for Years.
Tenants in Chief, 3
T e r m. See: Accumulations,
Estates for Years, Trusts, Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation.
Termination. See: Trusts.
Testamentary Power. See:
Powers.
Testation. See: Restraints on
Alienation, Wills.
Tortious Conveyances, 26, 8384, 94, 101, 104
Trade. See: Restraint of Trade.
Trade Associations, 181
Treason (Effect of Attainder),
3, 22, 23-24, 200
Trustee. See: Trusts.
Trusts
Access by Creditors, 206-209,
228-238, 428, 430-431
Accumulations. See: Accumulations.
Alienability
by trustee, 203-204, 207208, 213, 216-217, 221-227,
231-232, 277, 428, 539
common-law rules, 203204, 207-208, 216-217,
231-232
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Michigan statutes, 213216-217, 221-227, 277,
428, 539, 550-551
New York statutes, 213,
221-222, 428-429, 550551
trusts of chattels personal, 231-232, 327
trusts of land, 230-231,
327
will, 221
cestui's interest, 5-6, 205,
208-209, 212, 216-217,
220, 227, 230-232, 277,
380, 428, 485-486, 539,
543, 550-552, 568
common-law rules, 5-6,
205, 208-209, 216, 232
Michigan statutes, 212,
220, 227, 230-232, 277,
380, 429, 485-486, 539,
543, 550, 568
New York statutes, 212,
230, 428, 539, 550
settlor also beneficiary,
568-569
spendthrift trust, 208209, 229-240, 428, 430431
trust for support, 208209
trust of chattels personal, 230-232, 327
trusts of land, 230-232
Applicability of Statutory
Restrictions on Estates for
Life, 493-494, 497, 501-502
Beneficiary. See: Cestui que
Trust.
Bona Fide Purchaser, 204,
207-208, 221
Cestui in Possession, 216

Cestui Que Trust
alienability of interest.
See: Alienability.
animal, 423
ascertainability, 409-412,
417-421
charitable trust, 412,
417-421
definiteness, 417-421
definition, 203 .
interest of life beneficiary
not life e,state, 493-494,
497
no limit on number of, 497
restraints on alienation.
See: Restraints on Alienation.
unincorporated . societies,
425-426
Charitable. See: Charities.
Chattels Personal
applicability of Michigan
statutes, 230-232, 327
Definiteness of Beneficiaries,
417-421
charitable trusts, 417-421
public welfare trusts, 419
trusts for care of graves,
418-419, 447
trusts for employees, 409,
419, 447
Definiteness of Purpose, 414421
..
charitable trusts, 414-421
public welfare trusts, 419
trusts for care of graves,
418-419, 447
Destructibility, 268, 409 426431, 532-549, 572, 575-576.
See also: Termination.
Device for Creating Expectant Interests in Chattels,
160

INDEX
Disability and Death Benefit
Plans, 409, 419, 447
Discretionary Trust, 238
Dower, 204
Duration, 216-221, 421-431,
434-435, 551-555, 570-612
accumulations. See: Accumulations.
charitable trusts, 218, 422423
honorary trusts, 423-425
married women, 426-427
Michigan law summarized,
428-431
private trusts, 224-227, 426431, 434-435, 551-555,
570-612
public welfare trusts, 419
rule against perpetuities,
218, 418-419, 421-431,
454
suspension of the absolute
power of alienation. See:
Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation.
trusts for care of graves,
418-419, 423-425
trusts for employees, 409,
419
trusts for unincorporated
societies, 415, 425-426
Equitable Charge Distintinguished, 559
Estates for Life
applicability of statutory
restrictions, 493-494, 496,
501-502
Estates for Years (passive),
216
Estates in, 203
Estates Tail, 267
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Exceptions to Statute of
Uses, 5, 202
Expectant Interests (destructibility), 268, 409
For Care of Animals, 423-425
For Care of Graves, 418-419,
423-425, 447
For Employees, 409, 418-419,
447
For Religious Societies, 415
For Support, 208-209
For
Unincorporated
Societies, 415, 425-426
History of, 202-205
Honorary Trust, 423-425
Interest of Life Beneficiary
Not Estate for Life, 493,
497
Interest of Trustee May be
Estate for Life, 493-494,
501-502
Michigan Statutes, 210-216,
228-231, 277, 414, 493-494
applicability to trusts of
chattels personal, 230231, 327
New York Statutes, 210-213,
229-230, 428-429, 551, 557
Pension Plan, 409, 419, 447
Perpetuity
(indestructible
trust), 260
Postponement of Enjoyment,
216, 224-227, 232-233, 347,
427-431, 440-441, 443, 551552, 563
Principal and Income. See:
Accumulations.
Profit-Sharing Plan, 409, 419,
447
Public Welfare Trusts, 419
Purposes for Which Permitted, 212-215, 218-221,
414, 549
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accumulations, 435-437
charity, 414-421
definiteness, 416-421
Michigan statutes, 214-215,
418-419, 549
Restraints on Alienation.
See: Restraints on Alienation.
Restraints on Enjoyment.
See: Postponement of Enjoyment.
Restraints on Termination,
224-227, 421-431, 434-435,
550-552, 563
accumulations. See: Accumulations.
charitable trusts, 218,
422-423
honorary trusts, 423-425
married women, 426-427
private trusts, 224-227, 426431, 434-435, 551-552
rule against perpetuities,
218, 418-419, 421-422,
453-454
rule in Claflin v. Claflin,
224-227, 421-431, 434
spendthrift trusts, 232-235,
428, 430-431
trusts for care of graves,
418-419, 423-425
trusts for employees, 409,
419
trusts for unincorporated
societies, 415, 425-426
Rule Against Perpetuities.
See: Rule Against Perpetuities.
Rule in Claflin v. Claflin,
224-227, 421-431, 434
Separability. See : R u I e
Against Perpetuities (Consequences of Violation),

Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation.
Settlor (also beneficiary),
568-569
Spendthrift Trusts, 96-97,
208-209, 229-239, 428, 429431, 488-489
Michigan law, 229-239,
429-431
policy considerations, 238239
termination, 429-431
Statute of Charitable Uses,
12
Statute of Uses, 5, 12, 139,
201,202
Stock Bonus Plan, 409, 419,
447
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation. See:
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation.
Termination, 216, 224-227,
232-236, 426-431, 434, 550552, 563
accumulations,
434-435,
443
English law, 426, 433
presumption of possibility
of issue, 309-310
restraints on. See: Restraints on Termination.
rule in Claflin v. Claflin,
224-227,421-431,434
spendthrift trusts, 427-428,
430-431
To Preserve Contingent Remainders, 19, 265-266
Trustee
alienation by. See: Alienability.
definition, 203
devisability of interest, 221

INDEX
dower in interest, 204
heritability of interest, 221
interest may be estate for
life, 493-494, 501-502
Trust Mortgages, 251
Trust Mortgages, 251
Two Lives in Being. See: Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation.
Two Lives Statutes. See: Estates
for Life (Statutory Restrictions on) , Suspension of the
Absolute Power of Alienation, Remainders.
Unborn Persons. See also:
Estates for Life, Expectant
Interests, Rule Against Perpetuities, Suspension of the
Absolute Power of Alienation, Vesting.
Alienability of Interests, 7
Unborn Widow, 306-307, 573
Unique Chattels. See: Chattels
Personal.
Unit Rule. See: Class Gifts.
Use and Occupation. See: Chattels Personal (History of
Law of).
Use Restrictions. See: Equitable Restrictions.
Uses
Alienability, 4, 201
Alienation by Feoffee to, 200201, 203
Devisability, 201
Enforcement in Equity, 200201
Estates in, 201, 268
Expectant Interests in, 201,
268
History of, 198-202
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Raised by Bargain and Sale,
247
Remaniders in, 267
Usury. See: Interest.
Vesting, 311-357
Accumulation Condition
Precedent to, 433
Administrative Delays, 307309, 346
Bearing on Restraints on
Alienation, 142-143, 149,
153-154
Certainty of Enjoyment not
Necessary to, 314, 343-344
Certainty of Possession not
Necessary to, 314, 343-344
Certainty of Required by
Rule Against Perpetuities.
See: Rule Against Perpetuities.
Charitable Corporations,
409-411
Charitable Trusts, 411-421
Chattels Personal, 319-320,
326-327
Class Gifts, 358-369, 554
Condition Precedent Prevents, 312-313, 333, 344
Construction of Instruments,
339, 343-357
Constructional Preference
for Early, 339, 345, 348,
354
Contingency as to Person or
Event, 333-343
Defeasibility Does Not Prevent, 316-317, 343, 344-345,
349, 363-369
Easement Does Not Prevent,
394
English Law, 311-323
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executory interests, 317323
remainders, 311-317
Equitable Restriction Does
Not Prevent, 394
Estates for Life, 313-314
Estates for Years
suspension of absolute
ownership, 478, 508
Executory Interests, 317-332,
343
certain to become possessory, 319-321, 330-332
cutting off or following
estate for years, 312-313
deferred possession, 317323, 330-332, 343
English law, 317-323
Michigan law, 326-332
interests,
non-possessory
320
not contingent, 319-320
Gift in Default of Appointment, 370-372
Implied Condition of Survivorship, 144-145, 354-356
Interest Subsequent to Executory Interest, 315, 317,
320
Michigan Law, 323-357
Michigan Rules Differ from
Common Law, 154
Michigan Statutes, 326
punctuation, 336
Options, 398
Possession Not Required for
Remainder, 313-315, 330
Possession Required for Executory Interest, 317-323,
330-333, 343
Possibility of Reverter, 316317, 332-333, 343-344, 389390

Power of Appointment Does
Not Prevent, 316-317, 343344, 370
Presumption of Possibility of
Issue, 309-311
Profit a Prendre Does Not
Prevent, 394
Remainder, 311-317, 326-357
condition precedent prevents, 312-313, 333, 334
certain to occur, 313
condition subsequent does
not prevent, 316-317,
344-345
conditional on preceding
estate terminating in a
particular manner, 313314
defeasibility does not prevent, 316-317, 343-345
class gift exception, 363365
deferred possession does
not prevent, 313-317,
330, 343
English law, 311-317
estate for life, 314
executory limitation does
not prevent, 316-317,
343-344
expectant upon estate for
life on special limitation, 314
expectant upon estate for
years, 262-263, 312-313
Michigan statutory requirement, 474, 478
expectant upon estate tail
on special limitation,
315
heirs of living person, 316,
333-338

INDEX
Michigan law, 326-357
summarized, 343
peculiar class gift rule,
363-365
power of appointment
does not prevent, 316317, 343-344, 370
remainderman not in being or not ascertainable,
315-416, 333
rule in In re Coots' Estate,
354-356
rule in Moore v. Littel,
333-343
special limitation does not
prevent, 316-317, 332333, 343-344
subject to charge, 345
subsequent to executory
interest, 320
Remoteness of
New York statutes, 275276, 484
Rule Against Perpetuities.
See: Rule Against Perpetuities.
Reversion, 261, 388-389
Right of Entry, 316-317, 332333, 343-344, 390-391
Rule Against Perpetuities.
See also: Rule Against Perpetuities.
Michigan decisions, 18471949, applicable, 327
rules same under suspension statutes, 491
Rule in In re Coots' Estate,
354-356
Rule in Moore v. Littel, 333343
Strict Settlement, 265-266
Subject to Executory Interest, 316-317, 343-344

727

S u r v i v o r s h i p (when required), 350-361
S u s p e n s i o n of Absolute
Ownership, 478, 508
Suspension of Not Suspension of lh e Absolute Power
of Alienation, 506-513,
519-520
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation. See
also: Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation.
rules same as under rule
against perpetuities, 491
suspension of vesting not
suspension of the absolute power of alienation,
506-513, 519-520
T r u s t s. S e e a I s o : Rule
Against Perpetuities.
cestui's interest
charitable trust, 411-412
trustee's estate
charitable trust, 411-412
Unborn Widow, 306-307, 573
Violation, Effect of. See: Accumulations, Estates for Life
(Statutory Restrictions on),
Rule Against Perpetuities,
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation.
Warranty (Barring Entail), 23
Waste, 93 1 2
Wasting Assets. See: Accumulations.
Whitby v. Mitchell. See: Rule
in Whitby v. Mitchell
Wholesaler, 173
Will Contest (Compromise),
234
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Wills
Accumulations. See: Accumulations.
Chattels Personal, 6, 159
Class gifts. See: Class Gifts.
Construction. '6~e: Construction of Instfuments.
Contract to Make, 73-76
Effective Date, 280, 571-572
Equity of Redemption, 245
Estates for Life, 92
Estates for Years, 6, 111-112
Estates in Fee Simple, 3-5,
67
Estates Tail, 23-24, 67
Executory Interests, 141, 143
Expectant Interests, 141, 143
Interessia Termini, 141, 143
Land, 3-5, 23-24, 67, 111-112,
141, 143, 201, 221
cestui que use, 200, 201
Michigan statutes, 67, 143
trustee, 221
Land Contracts, 248

Mortgages, 245
Possibility of Reverter, 141
Powers. See: Powers.
Remainders, 141, 143
Restraints on Testation, 6775, 166
Reversions, 141, 143
Right of Action, 141
Rights of Entry, 141
Rule Against Perpetuities.
See: Rule Against Perpetuities.
Statutes, 67, 143
Suspension of the Absolute
Power of Alienation. See:
Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation.
Testamentary Powers, 370372, 374-375, 383-386, 530531
Trustee, 221
Trusts. See: Trusts.
Uses, 200, 201
Worthier Title, Doctrine of, 19

